Gascons in Italy, 1494 - 1515 by Aspin, R. K.
GASCONS IN ITALY, 1494-1515:







I declare that this thesis has been composed




Chapter One - The nobility in royal service 1
Chapter Two - Captains of the Ordonnance and their
companies 42
Chapter Three - Profit and loss in Italy 120
Chapter Four - Casualties of war 167
Chapter Five - Loyalty and discipline in the army
in Italy 208
Chapter Six - The Italian environment 2.7°
Chapter Seven - Louis d'Armagnac, Viceroy of Naples 272
Chapter Eight - Gaston de Foix, Governor of Milan 315




A.N. Archives nationales (Paris).
B.N. Bibliotheque nationale (Paris): manuscripts.
B.P. Archives departementales des Pyrenees-Atlantiques
A.S.I. Archivio Storico Italiano.
B.E.C. Bibliotheque de l'Ecole de chartes.
D.I. Collection de documents inedits relatifs a
l'histoire de France.
Societe de l'histoire de France.
Anselme, Histoire generale et chronolocique...
Jean d'Auton, Chroniques de Louis XII
Marino Sanuto, Diarii
G. Dupont-Ferrier, Gallia regia...
Titres de M. Huillard-Breholles and A. Lecoy de la Marche,









The thesis begins by exploring in the first chapter
the process of increasing dependence of the French nobility
upon royal patronage during the later fifteenth century. The
implications of this growing reliance upon royal favour are
assessed in the second chapter, in terms of the development
of the standing army, and we are introduced to three Gascon
companies to estimate the rival claims of King and captain to
their proprietorship. The chapter continues by examining some
of the characteristics of the gendarmerie, and ends by out¬
lining the importance of service in Italy in the careers of
our sample units and its effects on their composition. These
three specimen companies form the basis of a study in chapters
three and four of the opportunities for gain and promotion
and the perils of death, wounding and capture afforded by
Italian service.
In chapter five the moral quality of the gendarmerie
is investigated and an assessment made of the degree to which
the Crown could rely upon the good conduct of its servants in
Italy. The sixth chapter continues by exploring the rela¬
tions of French soldiers with Italians and other foreigners
across the Alps and examining the impression made upon the
French by contact with the peninsula. The thesis concludes
with descriptions of the careers of two Gascons who attained
i
supreme command in Italy, with particular reference to their
relations with the King and the impact of these upon their
conduct of affairs. An appendix provides brief biographies
of four other Gascon captains with important Italian careers.
CHAPTER ONE
1.
THE NOBILITY IN ROYAL SERVICE
Historians have identified an extraordinary
change in the relations between the French Crown and aris¬
tocracy during the hundred years or so straddling 1500.
A nobility frequently in revolt was tamed, and trained to
assume the role of chief executor of the royal will, both
at home and in foreign affairs. And the prime agent of
this change in French politics has been seen as the power
of the King's purse. A British historian, writing at the
turn of the century, sketched this view concisely:
"Princes and minor nobles alike were gradually brought into
the King's obedience by the King's pay," he maintained;
"while the poor gentlemen entered the King's service as
guards, as men-at-arms, or even as archers, the great
princes drew the King's pensions; or aspired to the luc¬
rative captainship of a body of Ordonnances. If of
sufficient dignity and influence they might hope for the
still more valuable post of governor in some province.
When they had once learnt to rely on the mercenary's
stipend, they could not easily bring themselves to exchange
it for the old, honourable, though lawless independence.
Gradually the provincial nobility became dependent on the
Court, and in large measure resident there. This process
begins in early times, but advances more rapidly under
Charles VII and his successors, and is nearly completed
1 » /
under Francis I .
The attraction of royal money was strengthened
by the financial embarrassment of the landed class. By
the 1450s the economic pinch was becoming more acute:
rents were decreasing in real terms as the landowner, left
with fewer tenants after the catastrophes of the previous
hundred years, had to cope with inflation, fuelled by
rising demand and currency debasement, on a fixed income.
More arbitrary sources of revenue dried up with the decline
in judicial rights, and the prohibition of taxes on free
tenants in 1459 • By the time our period opens, four
decades had passed since the last ravages of the war with
England, during which time the damage to property caused
by the marauding armies was slowly repaired. Yet the
expulsion of the English had hardly ushered in four decades
of peace. Warfare was continual, even if not as generally
calamatous as before, and property suffered: in 1487,
for example, the town of Le Nouvion, which belonged to
Louis d'Armagnac, comte de Guise, was burned by German
1. S. Leathes, in The Cambridge Modern History, vol.i.
(Cambridge, 1902), chap. XII, pp. 597-8.
2. M. Bloch, French rural history: an essay in its
basic characteristics^ tr. J. Sondheimer (London, 1966),
pp. 102-20.
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troops. On the other hand, at the Estates-General at
Tours In 1484 the nobility adduced war and war expense as
4
major reasons for their poverty. Furthermore, the demands
of noble status to maintain a suitable standard of living
q
accentuated the problem. The prodigality encouraged
by such social pressures found its censure at Tours in
1484: the nobles were attacked for "... their excessive
spending on buildings, gold and silver plate, clothes and
belts for men and women, oversized households and over-
sumptuous banquets and feasts...". Alain d'Albret's
expensive rebuilding at N^rac is but one example of this
7
trend.'
Perhaps comparatively few individuals would have
fitted perfectly the scenario outlined above. Between one
gentleman and another there were variations in fortune,
depending on any number of factors, such as the geographical
3. A. Matton, Histoire de la ville et des environs de
Guise, vol." (Laon, 1897) * 287•
4. J. Masselin, Journal des Etats generaux de France
tenus a Tours en 1484, tr. and ed. A. Bernier, DTl.
(Paris, 1835 )* P^ 667•
5. On the question of nobles' spending, see H. Baudrillart,
Histoire du luxe prive et public, vol. iii (Paris, 1880),
PP. 579-98.
6. Masselin, op.cit., p. 197-
7. A. Luchaire, Alain le grand, sire d'Albret: 1'adminis¬




location of his estates, the nature of his revenues, in
money or in kind, or his performance in the marriage
market. However, the fact of increased pressure upon
the nobleman's purse during the later fifteenth century,
as a general rule for that class, from whatever combina¬
tion of causes, is not contested. Even Russell Major,
who insists on the growth of noble fortunes in the
sixteenth century, recognises that government service
was often the best means available to the aristocrat to
remain solvent.^
One of those families for whom the English war had
proved disastrous was that of Durfort-Duras. Gailhard de
Durfort, a partisan of the English in Guienne, was
banished from France in 1453# accompanied by only twelve
servants. Naturally he had been "ruined and totally
disinherited". Although treated more favourably in England
than some of his fellow victims, he had nevertheless
fallen into "dire poverty" by 1454. A commercial venture
failed to restore his fortunes and he was hounded by
8. R. Boutruche, for example, in his article "The devastation
of rural areas during the Hundred Years War", in
The recovery of France in the fifteenth century, ed.
P.S. Lewis, (London, 1971), pp. 23-59, notes that
whilst Beam was largely untouched by war-damage, the
Agenais was badly affected, ibid., p. 29.
9. J. Russell Major, "The Crown and the aristocracy in
Renaissance France," in American Historical Review,
vol LXIX (1964), pp. 631-45; p7 633; Representative
institutions in Renaissance France (Madison, I960),
P. 15.
5.
creditors. In short, he was only too eager to return to
France."^"0 Gailhard was finally reinstated in his French
possessions in 1477* and did not wait along before marrying
his son, Jean, to Jeanne Angevin, the heiress of a wealthy,
former notary of Bordeaux.^ The match was designed to
bolster up an illustrious but war-battered house. By
his will of 1490 we can see that Jean, who had by this
time inherited his late father's estates, was moderately
well off: he had three castles, at Duras, Blanquefort out¬
side Bordeaux, and Allemans; he retained a maltre d'h6tel,
and he was able to assign one thousand livres tournois and
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nine thousand livres bordelais to members of his family.
However, Jean de Durfort-Duras could still find himself
short of funds, so that in June 1495 he sold to one Etienne
Makanan (a Bordeaux merchant of English ancestry) the three
houses of Thil, Tiran and Bussac, which Jeanne herself had
brought for her dowry, for five thousand francs. Jean had
seven years to repay the money if he wanted to redeem his
wife's possessions. In other words, the sale was a form of
loan on the security of some estates, from which Makanan
13
would profit in the meantime, in lieu of interest.
10. R. Boutruche, La crise d'une societe: seigneurs et
paysans du Bordelais, pendant la guerre de Cent ans
(Paris, 1947), pp. 414-5.
11. Ibid., p. 374.
12. B.N., dossiers bleus 244 (dossier Durfort-Duras),
fol. 70 vo..
13. R. Boutruche, Une societe provinciate en lutte contre
le regime feodal (Rodez, 1947) * pp. 96* n.3 and 99*
Information on the Durfort-Duras family is also drawn
from the following works: J. Favre, Precis historique
sur la famille de Durfort-Duras (Marmande, IB5FJI
IL Lauzun, "Le cnateau de Duras", in Revue de l'Agenais,
vol. xlviii(1921), pp. 162-73; and Anselme, vol. v,
pp. 343-5, although all three are not without errors
and contradictions.
6.
Against such a background it is not surprising
to find that the established nobility found it difficult
to increase the size of its domains by purchase. Bloch
notes, for example, that of the forty lordships sold by
Charles, Constable of Bourbon, or sold upon the forfeiture
of his estates after his rebellion against Francis I, only
, , 14
three were acquired by 'ancient noble families. On
the contrary, the inveterate landed class seems to have
been faced with a crisis of diminishing domains. At the
Tours Estates, the nobles sought some indication from the
Government that they would have the opportunity to redeem
estates which had been sold to the Crown in the past - sales
caused by poverty, itself occasioned by war and the poverty
iq
of their tenants. J
In short, the great disability of the landed
nobility at the end of the fifteenth century was, as we
might say today, a cash-flow problem. And of all the
various options open for solving this crisis, that of
entering the King's service was the most attractive, compared
with the selling of estates, or the raising of loans, for
instance. Luchaire has shown how Alain d'Albret, despite
possessing lands equal in extent to ten modern departements,
still had difficulty raising a loan in his later years.
14. Bloch, op.cit., p. 124.
15. Masselin, op.cit., p. 667.
7.
The Albret family was the biggest landowner in France in
1500, after the King, but Alain was reduced to pawning and
the alienation of his domain to finance his massive
expenditure.^ In similar vein, Jean de Foix, vicOmte
de Narbonne, revealed in his will that he had incurred
considerable debts. He foresaw the possibility of his son,
Gaston, not being able to meet these demands promptly,
without selling Narbonne; whose sale he consequently
authorised in such circumstances. He asked the King to
allow his heir to inherit his own pension and governorship
of Dauphine, "... so that he might be better able to defray
his (Jean's) said debts". Large amounts owed to a partic¬
ular family were to be redeemed by means of the revenue of
the grenier in Foix's town of Etampes. To reward his
kinsman and lieutenant of his compagnie d'ordonnance, Roger
de Bearn, Jean authorised further domain alienation, which
Gaston could only recuperate by means of a payment of ten
17
thousand livres tournois. The shortage of ready cash had
16. Luchaire, op.cit., pp. 36 and 50-67. Albret tended
to pay his servants badly, which led on one occasion
to some of his agents in Limousin resorting to robbery,
ibid., pp. 61-2.
17. M. Boucher de Molandon, "Le testament de Jean, comte
de Foix et d'Etampes, roi de Navarre (Orleans 27:10:
1500), "in Bulletin historique et philologique du
comite destravaux historiques et scientifiques
(Paris, lbb5), pp. 31-6; p.35*
8.
prevented Jean de Foix from rewarding his valet de chambre,
Gaston de St. Laurens, as he would have wished, a little
earlier; lacking the three hundred gold ecus he had
promised his servant, Jean had to assign his man revenues
in the viscounty of Narbonne until St. Laurens had been
paid.18
It was perhaps this cash shortage which led some
noblemen to turn to commerce, despite the risk to one's
status involved in such activity. At least, Jean de Foix,
and his brother James, were each granted commercial
privileges by Charles VIII; for in 1492 Jean was accorded
the right to raise four thousand tons of wheat in the
seneschalships of Toulouse, Agenais and Quercy, and to
export it abroad, "... for his profit and advantage,
despite (the King's) prohibition on exports of corn and
wine ...", free of any royal toll or duty.1^ We know that
20
he exported 1714 tons at least, through Bordeaux. At
the same time, James received similar privileges for three
hundred tons. In 1492, two vessels at Bordeaux were
charged with 258 tons of grain, which James was shipping
21
free of the twenty sous' tournois per ton duty.
18. B.N., p.o. 1174, no. 226.
19. Ibid., no. 211.
20. Ibid., no. 219.
21. Ibid., no. 209. Jean was also granted privileges
to trade in wine, B.N., fr. 6602, fol. 171.
The French aristocracy needed cash and it was
the King who provided it. If it is true that "... the
budget of the state was to some extent a budget of noble
22
assistance, " the receipt of a royal pension did none¬
theless imply an obligation of service to the Crown.
Pensions were specifically granted for one's "maintenance
in royal service" for a given year, although entailing no
particular task or duty. Indeed, more or less expensive
charges or missions executed by a royal pensioner were,
it appears, covered by extra payments. In 1493* for
example, Louis d'Armagnac acquitted the Crown for 217
livres, 10 sous tournois granted to him, "... apart from
his pension and other benefits, to help support the expenses
he was making each day in the King's service, and especially
in the trip he had made... conducting the ambassadors of
the Emperor, of the King of the Romans and of the Archduke
(of Austria), when they came to the King, concerning the
peace. Before whom the King had sent him, from Compiegne
to Melun, where he had spent much ... entertaining (them)
Furthermore, Armagnac received an annual 1500
livres' tournois payment in 1493* and from 1495-97* to
defray his costs, he being continually attendant on the
, 24
King s person. In the same way, Jean de Foix received
22. P. Contamine, "The French nobility and the war", in
The Hundred Years War, ed. K. Fowler (London, 1971)*
pp. 135-52; p. 151.
23. B.N., p.o. 95, no. 387.
24. Ibid., nos. 389, 390, 393 and 395-
10.
extra payments from Charles VIII in 1485 and 1492.
His brother James got 500 livres tournois from the
Extraordinaire des Guerres in 1491, over and above his
pension, "... to help him keep himself in (royal service)",
26
in some temporary military capacity, it appears.
In other words, pensions were not salaries, nor
were they really payments of expenses, as a modern
businessman might receive, but were royal gratuities,
varying in amount, according to the status of the recipient.
Such a gradation ensured that, on the whole, however large
one's personal fortune, a great part of one's income came
from the King. In 1492, for instance, the 58,000 livres
which the Duke of Bourbon drew from his domains was almost
equalled by the 50,000 livres represented by his pension
27
and governorship of Languedoc. 1 According to the
Venetian envoy Contarini, writing in 1492, there were at
least 2700 pensioners in France: the top payments reached
60,000 livres tournois, a sum enjoyed by only two
28
individuals, the Dukes of Orleans and Bourbon, and the
range stretched from so massive a figure down to less than
25. B.N., p.o. 1174, nos. 195 and 210.
26. Ibid., no. 212.
27. P. Contamine, Guerre, &tat et societe a la fin du
moyen age (Paris-Hague, 1972), pp. 441-2 and n.220.
28. Contarini's figures are presumably too high, in view
of Contamine's illustration above.
11.
400 livres.However, since there existed at this time
"50
perhaps 30*000 noble houses in the realm, we can see
that the proportion of the nobility which was pensioned
was small. Yet the most important families were covered
and pensions constituted a fair proportion of Crown
expenditure.
The pension was only one, if the most important
method of subsidising or rewarding royal servants and
powerful noblemen. Other, usually smaller payments were
available for the same purposes. As Dupont-Ferrier said,
"51
the Crown regarded local offices as types of pensions.
When Jean d'Albret, seigneur d*Orval, was governor of
Champagne, he was also captain of Ha castle at Bordeaux,
for which he was paid 360 livres in 1494.-^ Obviously
it would have been difficult for Orval personally to perform
two functions at opposite ends of the kingdom at the same
time. For some years, Roger de B^arn held the following
posts simultaneously: captain of 100 lances, seneschal of
29. Zaccaria Contarini's relation of 1492, in Relazioni
degli ambasciatori veneti al senato, ed. E. Alberi,
ser. T, vol. iv (Florence, i860), pp. 3-26; pp. 20-1.
30. This figure is Contamine's estimate, op.cit.. p.479.
Contarini himself was told that there were two hundred
thousand noble houses in France, but he did not believe
this anyway, op.cit., p.22.
31. G. Dupont-Ferrier, Les officiers royaux des bailliages
et senechaussees et les institutions monarchiques
locales en France h. la fin du moyen Sge (Paris, T902),p.468.
32. B.N., p.o. 2172 (dossier Orval), no.3. The governorship
of Champagne was worth 2000 livres tournois in 1502-3*
meanwhile the wages for the captaincy of Ha had, it
seems, dropped to 300 livres by this time, B.N.,
fr. 2930, fols 88 vo. and 123.
12.
Valentinois, governor of Soule, and captain of Trezzo,
in Lombardy. The holding of provincial office did not
then necessarily imply a full-time job, nor were the wages
of office necessarily commensurate with the burden of
responsibility of the office-holder, but were rather
acknowledgements of the individual's status. For
instance, after the death of Jean de Foix, governor of
Dauphin^, in 1500, Louis XII confirmed Anthoine de Meurilhon,
seigneur de Bressieu, in the post of lieutenant to the
governor, but with gubernatorial authority. However,
Gaston de Foix received the governor's salary from the time
of his father's death, even though he did not exercise that
office, even in a purely formal capacity, until the end
of 1503."^ In like manner, in 1492 Charles VIII had
ordered that Gabriel d'Albret, seigneur d'Avesnes, still
be paid his wages as grand seneschal of Guienne, amounting
to 1200 livres tournois per annum, even though he was not
personally carrying out the duties of that office, since he
b4
was occupied on royal business in Navarre.
Similarly, the captaincy of a company of lances
was often an honorary position, a recognition of status
rather than an effective command. A captain was paid
twenty sous tournois, or one livre, per month, for each
lance in his charge, so that a captain of a hundred lance
company received 1200 livres a year, apart from his salary
as a gendarme of 180 livres. The large payment was
33» B.N., Clair. PP- 109 and 117 •
34. B.N., p.o. 25, no. 217.
13.
granted for the "right and status" of an individual as
a captain of the Ordonnance, implying that the sum was a
type of pension or gratuity. Indeed, companies were
often commanded by their captains' lieutenant, such as
the Albret company, which saw considerable service in
Italy, whilst Alain d'Albret himself seems to have never
visited the peninsula during the Italian Wars. On the
other hand, after the death of Jean de Foix, his company
passed to his young son Gaston, and although the captain's
pension was paid to the lieutenant, Roger de Bearn, it
was as late as 1504 when he acknowledged the receipt of
1800 livres for the captaincy during 1501, 1502 and 1503.^
Evidently, for years the Crown was uncertain whether the
Foix company's childish captain or its effective commander
should be granted the 'right and status' of captaincy.
The rates of pay for military command and for
administrative office were constant, but not so the level
of pensions proper. As Contarini noted in 1492, in time
of financial need the King either raised taxes, or he might
cut pensions.For example, Alain d'Albret's pension,
which had stood at 18,000 livres in 1490-1, had been
35. B.N., p.o. 257 (dossier Bearn), no.j52.
56. Contarini, op.cit., p.l9« In 1494, the Florentine
ambassador in France reported that pensions for that
year were to be delayed by six months, but he saw
this as a device to encourage royal pensioners to
come to serve the King, G. Canestrini and A. Des-
jardins, Negociations diplomatiques de la France avec
la Toscane, D.L, vol.i (Paris, I859), p^ 294.
14.
reduced to 14,000 by 1500-1, though It had again climbed
to 17,000 by 1502-5.-^ Jean de Foix enjoyed a pension
of 18,000 livres tournois in the year 1491-2. By 1495
it had been cut down to 11,000, whence it rose to 17,000
the next year. In 1497, Foix's pension stood at 12,000
livres (although it was not promptly paid, but remitted
onto the budget of 1498, whilst one third of the pension
of 12,000 livres for this year was postponed until 1499).
By 1499, Foix's gratuity had climbed again to 14,000
"58
livres tournois per annum. We can see from these two
examples how the large pensions of peacetime did not long
survive the outbreak of war in Italy and the consequent
demands on the royal finances. Whilst Charles VIII seems
to have been unhappy to reduce gratuities to the level
which his budget required, relying by contrast, to some
extent, on remitting payments to following financial years,
Louis XII had fewer qualms. The pension of 6000 livres
of Louis d'Armagnac for 1497 was too much for that year's
budget to cope with; half the sum was deferred to 1498.
But by 1502, Armagnac's pension had dropped to 5000 livres
tournois.Others took a more radical drop in pay -
57. B.N., p.0.25, nos. 211 and 268, B.N., fr. 2927, fol.
55 vo„ The figures in Luchaire, Alain le grand,
p.69, n.l, cannot be relied on, since they are based
simply on individual receipts which do not always
represent Albret's total pension for a given year.
58. B.N., Clair. 225, nos. 25 and 45; B.N., p.o. 1174,
no. 216; B.N., Fr. 26104, no. 1166; p.o. 1174,
nos. 222 and 227.
59. B.N., p.o. 95, nos. 594, 597 and 407.
15.
Jehannot de Tardes, gentleman of the household, had his
pension halved between 1498 and 1501, from 800 to 400
40
livres tournois per year.
Although most, perhaps all pensions appear to
have suffered from the economies of the later 1490s, they
did not necessarily fall in proportion to each other.
When considering his benefactions the King evidently
treated his greater subjects as individuals, rather than
as simply more or less prestigious members of the upper
class. One result of this approach was that one's status
could change. In 1494 the pension of Gratien d'Aguerre,
a man of modest beginnings, but of proven worth and a
captain of fifty lances, stood at 2000 livres; by 1516
41
this sum had been cut by half, although Francis I was
as well-known for his largesse during the earliest years
of his reign as any King of France. But Gratien was now
an old man who had effectively been in retirement for
years. On the other hand, Gabriel d'Albret, seigneur de
Lesparre, whose pension only stood at 1,200 livres in
421492, received 2,000 in 1496 , a rare increase during this
period. However, by the latter date Lesparre was viceroy
of Apulia, so that his gratuity had risen with his status.
Odet de Foix, vicomte de Lautrec, received a modest 1000
40. B.N., p.o. 2795 (dossier Tardes), nos. 12-13.
According to a Venetian source,"Louis XII abolished
many of his predecessor's pensions, Diarii, vol.ii,
col. 763.
41. B.N., fr. 26104, no. 1005 and fr. 26115, no. 190.
42. B.N., p. o. 25, no. 208 and p.o. 26, no. 380.
16.
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livres in 1503 , although within seven years he had
become lieutenant-general in Lombardy, and, apart from
other benefits, was to enjoy 12,000 livres tournois
annually in that capacity, on the Milanese treasury.
It would seem, therefore, that the evidence of
Gascon pensions bears out Contarini's assertion that such
payments were entirely at the Crown's discretion. The
King dispensed gratuities at will, in accordance with the
standing of potential recipients in his service and favour,
and with the state of his finances. Technically, of
course, the Venetian was correct. However, noblemen who
enjoyed little obvious favour with the King, nor fulfilled
any notable service, can be found in receipt of fat pensions.
If the King could follow his personal preferences in
dispensing gratuities and honours to those whom he trusted
and those whose fortunes largely depended upon his favour,
it is doubtful if he was so free of constraint in his
treatment of powerful landlords whose loyalty might be
uncertain. In short, the Crown also paid out pensions as
bribes, or at least felt it expedient to maintain such
43. B.N., p.o. 1175* no» 362. On the whole, under
Louis XII the amount of money devoted to pensions
declined: in 1492 they had accounted for 633*000
livres; by 1498 this had dropped to 498,000.
Henceforth the figures were as follows:
1502 - 529,000 l.t.,
1503 - 647*000 l.t.,
1505 - 202,000 l.t.,
1511 - 105,000 l.t.,
1514 - 383,000 l.t.,
A.Spont, "La taille en Languedoc", in Annales du
Midi, vol.ii (189O), pp. 365-84 and 476-513, and
vol. iii (1891)* pp. 482-94; vol.ii, pp. 508 and
510. No doubt Louis was able to cut French
pension payments so drastically in mid-reign by
shifting part of the burden onto the Milanese
finances.
17.
payments to individuals for whom the King might have no
great liking, but who were powerful in their own right.
How else can we explain the 4,000 livres' annual pension
paid to Jean de Foix, seigneur de Lautrec, by Louis XII,
44
for instance? Lautrec was a servant of the Albret
rulers of Navarre, and commanded their army in warfare
against their rival, pretender to the Foix inheritance,
4R .
Jean de Foix-Narbonne. ^ In 1493* he appears to have
been involved in a campaign of intimidation in the county
of Foix, on behalf of his patrons. Louis XII favoured his
brother-in-law's and nephew's claim to the Foix estates,
in opposition to the established occupants, yet he still
paid Lautrec a handsome pension, and his eldest son, Odet,
46
a smaller one, plus 1,200 livres as seneschal of Guienne.
It is interesting that the one man who appears
to have received more cash from the King of France than any
other during our period, was not only the greatest land¬
owner in the realm, after the Crown, but also an inveterate
opponent of royal policy. According to Luchaire, by 1504
Alain d'Albret was a man for whom Louis XII felt little
44. B.N., p.o. 1173* no. Ill, for 1504, for instance.
45. C. Higounet, Le comt6 de Comminges de ses origines
a son annexion h. la couronne, vol. ii (Toulouse-Paris,
1949)* P- 622.
46. B.N., carr6s d'Hozier 260 (dossier Foix), no. 212;
B.N., p.o. 1175* nos. 35^-5 and 357-9.
18.
47 »
but ill-will, yet two years later Alain s pension still
48
stood at 17,000 livres tournois. He remained a captain
of fifty lances until 1507. But such benefits from a
presumably grudging Louis XII were nothing compared with
the massive 192,500 livres which Charles VIII promised
Albret for the surrender of Nantes in 1491, during the
Breton succession war.^ Ironically, in 1490 Anne of
Brittany had promised Alain 20,000 6cus a year, for five
50
years, for his services in ridding Brittany of her enemies.
Later, the King granted Albret 6,000 livres rent in Gascony
and the royal claim to the county of Gaure and town of
Fleurance, in return for the right Albret claimed on the
51
duchy of Brittany itself. In other words, Alain
47. Luchaire, op.cit., p. 4l.
48. B.N., fr. 25268, fol. 5. Royal disfavour did,
however, take its toll of Albret family honours
thereafter - it seems likely that Alain's pension
was suppressed between 1507 and 1512, although by
1516 he again received 12,000 livres, and Charlotte
d'Albret's gratuity was cut in 1507. Moreover, even
when in receipt of a pension, Alain sometimes had to
bribe royal officials to hand over his due. Finally,
in 1508, Albret was deprived of the captaincy of
Bayonne, although he retained the wages of office,
Luchaire, op.cit., pp. 69, n.l, 70, 40, 71 and 76,
n.3, respectively.
49. B.N., p.o. 25, nos. 209-10. In June 1491, Albret
acknowledged the receipt of 50,000 livres, saying that
he had already had 12,000, ibid., no. 212.
50. B.N., Moreau 570, p. 200. Alain was promised an
annual pension of 12,000 livres, plus 100 lances and
other benefits, by Anne of Brittany, according to a
modern authority, J.S.C. Bridge, A history of France
from the death of Louis XI, vol. iT (Oxford, 1921),
p.214. Presumably he received nothing of this bounty,
after his betrayal of the duchess.
51. B.N., Moreau 570, p. 204; Luchaire, Alain le grand,
pp. 70 and 150.
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d'Albret made a stupendous profit from his politicking and
double-dealing during the Breton succession crisis. Nor
did the rewards of his involvement in affairs of state
stop there; 10,000 francs, assigned to C6sar Borgia by
Louis XII, for the dowry of Albret's daughter, Charlotte,
Cesar's wife, finally came to Alain after Borgia's disgrace,
52in 1505. Meanwhile, the marriage contract had obliged
Borgia to pay Albret 100,000 livres, for which sum the King
stood security; by January 1503 one fifth of the amount had
55
been paid to Alain. ^ Doucet claims that French noblemen
received honours from the King at this time, in return for
restrictions on their independence; that an understanding
had developed on these lines, which undermined the rights
h4
of lords in such matters as taxation and private war.
If such a tacit agreement existed, Alain d'Albret turned it
on its head quite successfully. In return for vast sums
of money and honours for himself and his children, Albret
not only rebelled against the Crown and held it to ransom
at Nantes, as we have seen, but he presided at the head of
a family empire in.which Estates flourished,and whose
52. B.N., Doat 228, fol. 194.
53. B.N., p.o. 26, nos. 3^5-6. C6sar and Charlotte would
have received 100,000 livres from Louis XII, according
to Luchaire, op.cit., p.32.
54. R. Doucet, Les institutions de la France au XVIe.
siecle, vol" IT (Paris, 1948), pp. 44-5.
55« Russell Major, Representative institutions, p.19.
In December 1499* the three Estates of the county of
Foix did homage to the King and Queen of Navarre
(Jean d'Albret and Catherine de Foix), B.N., Doat
227, fol. 223.
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resources were sometimes mobilised for private warfare,
as in the Foix-Navarre inheritance dispute. Furthermore,
Bearn retained its autonomy throughout Alain's lifetime.^
When Jean d'Albret, King of Navarre and Alain's eldest
son, did homage to Louis XII for his French territories
in 1502, B6arn was not included amongst them.-^ Some
time before this, Louis had written to the King of Navarre,
lord of B^arn, asking if he might expel French criminals
S8 t
from that territory. Louis XII s writ did not prevail
in Bearn.
In his discussion of French affairs, Machiavelli
wrote that the King "... alone sold or gave away every
office and employment in the realm.Like Contarini,
some twenty years earlier, the Florentine was impressed by
the power of patronage which the King of France enjoyed,
and the subservience of his subjects to his will. Never¬
theless, the King of France himself might well have felt
56. Bearn retained its independence largely because of the
threat of Spanish intervention, in the event of French
expansion, A. Viala, Le Parlement de Toulouse et
1'administration royale laTque (1420-1525 environ),
vol. IT (Albi, 1953) * PP^ 198-237. See also P.
Tucoo-Chala, La vicomte de B6arn et le probl6me de
sa souverainete (Bordeaux, 1961), pp. 101-20.
57. B.N., Doat 227, fol. 247.
58. B.N., n.a.fr. 1462, no. 198.
59. N. Machiavelli, "Sketch of the constitution and
affairs of France", in Works of Nicholas Machiavel,
tr. E. Farneworth, 2nd ed., vol. Ti (London, 1775)>
pp. 493-512; p.506.
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less sure of his own autonomy in the matter of dispensing
office. Noblemen believed in their right to serve as
the chief officers of the King, by dint of their birth,
or at least intended that the Crown should so believe.
At the Estates-General of Tours in 1484, a major noble
grievance concerned the number of official positions held
by foreigners, in the royal household, in the provinces and
so on.^ Although the Tours assembly took place during
the minority of Charles VIII, a time which pandered to
disputes and jealousies of such a nature, the grievances
expressed were, in great measure, a reaction against the
arrogant policies of Louis XI. But if Louis made enemies
with his unconventional promotions, he also recognised the
sensibilities of his servants. For example, Jean de
Foix-Narbonne was made governor of Guienne in 1467, but
the creation of the Duchy of Guienne as an apanage for the
royal brother, Charles of France, left Narbonne redundant,
so that in 1469 the King granted him 4,000 livres rent on
the county of Comminges. When, in 1472, Comminges was
made over to Odet Aydie, compensation had again to be
found for Narbonne. In 1475 he received the county of
Etampes.^ Later, in 1497* Jean de Foix-Narbonne was
compensated for his failure to become count of Comminges
by being granted the governorship of Dauphine by Charles
60. Masselin, Journal des Etats generaux, pp. 668-9.
61. J. de Jaurgain, Deux comtes de Comminges bearnais au
XVe siecle (Parish 1919)* p. 62.
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VIII. In 1491, by the terms of the Nantes treaty,
Alain d'Albret was accorded the offices of governor and
seneschal of Guienne by Charles VIII; since these posts
were then held by Gaston de Foix, comte de Candale, the
latter was accommodated with the governorship of La
Rochelle. But what of the former governor? He, one
Olivier M^richon, appealed to the Parlement of Paris
6^
against his dismissal. Charles VIII was more careful
to respect his subjects' 'rights' over the matter of the
mayoralty of Bayonne, in 1492. Roger de Gramont, seigneur
de Bidache, had been deprived of the seneschalship of
Lannes, as that office had been required to reward another.
It was decided that Gramont should become maire of Bayonne
in exchange, but first the existing holder would have to
be removed. This was none other than Etienne Makanan,
the ennobled merchant who was to have commercial dealings
with Durfort-Duras. Makanan was asked if he might be
willing to vacate his office in favour of Gramont, and he
proved to be agreeable, on condition that he were paid off.
As a result Makanan was granted an annual 500 livres and
64
a lump sum of 1,000 livres tournois.
62. C. Higounet, "Charles VIII, Jean de Foix-Narbonne
et le comt6 de Comminges", in Revue Historique,
vol. cxcvii (1947)* PP» 216-20; p. 220.
63. Q.R., nos. 20138-9.
64. B.N., fr. 25717, no. 135- The wages of the mayoralty
of Bayonne also amounted to 500 livres a year. The
seneschalship of Lannes was worth 365 livres.
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This sense of proprietorship of an office¬
holder, illustrated by the parvenu Makanan's bargaining
with the King over the terms of his redundancy, is also
demonstrated by the incidence of hereditary succession
to office. We have noted how Jean de Foix-Narbonne
asked Louis XII to permit his son, Gaston, to succeed
to the governorship of Dauphinb, and to the other benefits
which Narbonne held of the King; which request was
granted, despite Gaston's youth. Less illustrious
families were similarly favoured. By 1525* Roger de
Gramont had been replaced as maire and captain of Bayonne
6q
by his heir, Jean de Gramont. ^ In the same way, after
the death of Menaud d'Aguerre, a Basque adventurer who
distinguished himself in Italy, his position as captain,
castellan and viguier of Sommieres went to his nephew,
Martin.^ The son of Gratien d'Aguerre, Menaud's
brother, was not so fortunate. After Gratien's death,
his office of governor of Mouzon was granted to Louis de
Hangest, seigneur de Montmort, whilst Gratien's company
also went to the newcomer. As lieutenant of his
father's company, Jean d'Aguerre might have entertained
a reasonable expectation of its inheritance, but his
claims failed to stand up against the desire of Francis I
65'. B.N., p.o. 1388 (dossier Grammont), no. 50.
66. B.N., p.o. 1^32 (dossier Guerres), no. 17. Martin
held Sommibres from 1504, at the latest; the wages
were 40 livres tournois per year.
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to promote a more favoured individual. But despite
this exception, the frequency of family succession must
lead us to assume that in many cases an office-holder
had an important say in the selection of his replacement.
Thus Roger de Beam was succeeded as captain of Mauleon
68
and governor of Soule by his brother, Menaud, and
Raymond de Cardailhac, seigneur de St. Cirq-Lapopie, was
followed as seneschal of Quercy in 1501 by his son,
Jacques, although the latter had to attest before the
Parlement of Toulouse that he had not bribed his way into
office.^
The pressure exerted on the Crown in the matter
of the distribution of patronage did not derive simply
from one direction, from the claims of noblemen to bounty.
The King was not alone in his concern for the wealth of his
estate. In 1484, there had been complaints at Tours over
the abundance of pensions included in the budget which the
deputies were asked to peruse; such gratuities, they
claimed, should only be paid as rewards for outstanding
67. J. de Jaurgain, "Profils basques, Menaud et Gratien
d'Aguerre", in Revue des Basses-Pyrenees (partie
historique de la Revue de Bdarn), vol. Tv (1886),
pp. 1-59, 135-78 and 331-72; pp. 145-6; B.N.,
fr. 21510, no. 946. Jean d'Aguerre left the
company when Hangest assumed command, although he
did receive his father's pay as captain, for the
first three months of 1516, B.N., Clair. 3* no.70.
68. J. de Jaurgain, "Les capitaines ch&telains de Mauleon,
gouverneurs de la vicomt6 de Soule", in Revue de
Beam, Navarre et Lannes, vol. ii (1884), pp. 113-41
and 241-341; p. 253.
69. G.R., nos. 20138-9.
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service. Others took more serious action to attempt
to flout the enjoyment of gifts from the King. Again
in 1484, Charles VIII granted to the children of the late
Jacques d'Armagnac, who included Louis d'Armagnac, the
territories which they claimed as successors to their
maternal uncle, Charles d'Anjou, until such time as the
Parlement of Paris had determined the rightful possession
of the lands. The royal procureur of the Parlement
insisted that Anjou's legacy formed part of the King's
domain and so could not be alienated, and he even
prevented the receipt by the Armagnac of 6,000 livres a
year on the estates, which Charles VIII had previously
ordained to the children, until the fate of the lands was
71
decided. Some years later, after Charles gave Jean de
Foix-Narbonne the seigniorial rights to Fontenay-le-Comte,
for ten years, the royal receveur of Poitou refused to
allow Narbonne his due profit. The Chambre des Comptes,
protesting that Fontenay-le-Comte formed part of the
Crown domains, had, it seems, failed to inform the local
yo
official of Charles' decision. Sometime during the early
years of his reign, Louis XII granted to Louis d'Armagnac
the revenues of the greniers of Nemours and a number of
70. Masselin, op.cit., pp. 578-9-
71. B.N., p.o. 95* no. 564. The Armagnac prevailed
eventually, and the grant was confirmed in May 1492,
. B.N., fr. 2919, fol. 88.
72. B.N., fr. 10238, fol. 109.
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other towns, for one year, but some of the grenetiers held
on to monies to which Armagnac was entitled.^ Although
in the latter case the motive for opposition to the King's
instructions might well have been compounded of self-
interest, it is evident from the other examples that some
officers of the Crown at least did not recognise the royal
patrimony to be simply the personal property of the King
himself. On the contrary, the monarch had a responsibility
to conserve the Crown's domains. The patrimony was to be
protected against the whims of the man who occupied the
throne of France, as if by accident.
The Parlement of Toulouse was notorious for its
opposition to royal alienations. During the 1480s this
institution fought to establish its competence to adjudge
the fate of Alain d'Albret's county of Gaure, whose owner¬
ship had been confirmed by royal sanction in I48j5 and had
been supported by judgements of the Parlement of Bordeaux.
Albret's rebellion against the Crown gave Toulouse its
chance to reunite Gaure with the royal domain- in 1489,
but after Alain's reinstatement, the Parlement continued
its opposition to the alienation of Gaure, and did not stop
at the arrest of royal agents in the county. The
Parlement of Toulouse installed its own administration in
Gaure, by force of arms. In 1492, Albret retook
Fleurance, capital of the county, but although he was able
to retain Gaure till 1506, some Parlement officers were
73- B.N., fr. 5093, fol. 179.
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still depriving him of certain revenues as late as 1496.^
The Parlement of Toulouse also had a history of opposition
to royal attempts to grant away the county of Comminges;
to compensate Jean de Foix-Narbonne for his failure to make
good his claims to the Foix inheritance, Charles VIII
intended to make him count of Comminges, but both Parlements,
of Paris and Toulouse, were unwilling to sanction the gift.
The King was persuaded by Toulouse's demonstration of the
strategic importance of the Pyrenean territory, in view of
Spanish hostility, but under Louis XII the Parlement was
again obliged to fight when the King granted Comminges to
another claimant, Lautrec. This opposition failed, yet
by continued pressure the counsellors managed to ensure
that by 1502 the county returned to the King's estate in
theory, even though the Lautrec continued to enjoy its
fruits
When Jean Guillemette, procureur in Lauragais,
explained to Charles VIII the good reasons why Comminges
74. Viala, op.cit., ii, pp. 76-8; Luchaire, op.cit.,
pp. 146-52 and 200.
75. The struggle for Comminges is recounted in Higounet's
two works, Le comte de Comminges, ii, pp. 609-27*
and "Charles VIII, Jean de Foix-Narbonne et le
comte de Comminges," in Revue Historique, vol.
cxcvii, pp. 216-20. In August 1499, an agent of
the Parlement of Toulouse acknowledged the receipt
of 36 livres tournois, for two trips to Comminges,
to ensure that "... the said county went into royal
hands, not those of Lautrec or others", B.N., fr. 26106,
no. 96.
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should not be alienated, he noted that the barons of the
county could provide thirty men-at-arms and sixty archers.^
The power of the nobility, and hence its essential
potential threat to the Crown, stemmed from its military
resources. The troops which followed noble banners to
battle no longer, by our period, constituted a feudal
army. By the fourteenth century the system of clientage
was evolving, and armies were formed of paid soldiers who
77
may, or may not have been vassals of the army commander. '
The practice of paying one's retainers, in a time of
financial stringency, had not, however, emasculated the
military potential of the great Gascon landowners,
although the noble demand of 1484 that the Crown pay for
the service of the feudal levy, or ban, reveals that this
duty of armed service was regarded as a financial burden
TJ O
by those eligible for summons. At the start of
Charles VIIl's reign, Jean de Foix-Narbonne led a force
of 5*000 men into Lauragais, in pursuance of his quarrel
79
with the rulers of Navarre, over the Foix inheritance. ^
Alain d'Albret raised 5,000 troops to fight Narbonne a little
76. Higounet, "Charles VIII", p. 218.
77. Contamine, "The French nobility", in The Hundred
Years War, ed. Fowler, p. 148.
78. Masselin, op.cit., pp. 666-7.
79. Jaurgain, Deux comtes de Comminges, p. 154.
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later, whom, together with 1,000 mercenaries recruited in
Spain, he despatched to Brittany in 1488, during the
fin
succession crisis. Albret's status and resources in
south-west France made him the natural lieutenant for the
King in the region, despite his sometimes dubious loyalty.
In 1495 he was charged with guarding Languedoc against
possible Spanish incursion, and he had under his command
O-j
1,000 infantry and 150 lances, petite paye. In July
1503, Albret was made lieutenant and captain-general "...
Op
in the war... in Guienne, " and had the duty of leading
the ban and arriere-ban of much of southern France to the
threatened frontier, after the levies had assembled at
8"5 1
Agen. ^ But if Albret s power in Gascony made it
convenient for the King of France to use him as his local
war-leader, it also posed a threat to royal policy. For
instance, in 1498 Albret attempted to capture the castle
80. Ibid., p. 150. Luchaire gives larger figures for
Albret's forces at various times, including seven
or eight thousand men assembled at Nontron in i486,
for service in Brittany, and seven thousand at the
siege of Fleurance in 1492, op.cit., pp. 145 and 14?.
Such troops were no doubt usually mercenary
soldiers, as were those employed by Jean de Foix-
Narbonne in his war for the county of Foix - when
ordered to leave Mazeres in i486, after royal
intervention to pacify the Foix inheritance dispute,
Narbonne's troops threatened to desert to the enemy,
ibid.., p. 192.
81. B.N., fr. 26104, no. 1069 and p.o. 25, no. 220.
82. B.N., Doat 228, fol. 48.
85. B.N., fr. 26108, no. 469; this is a commission to
lead the levy of Auvergne to Agen, by 4th August 1503.
Alain guarded the Atlantic frontier with five thousand
men, Auton, vol. iii, p. 190, n.4.
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of St. Sulpice, which had been a possession of the late
Boffile de Juge and had subsequently been adjudged to the
Crown by the Parlement of Toulouse; the sousviguier of
the seneschalship of Toulouse was obliged to defend the
castle against "... a great number of lackeys and vagabonds
Oh
..." in Albret's service.
Albret's influence was an embarrassment to Louis
XII. At the beginning of 1503* C6sar Borgia asked the
King if he might raise 200 men-at-arms and 1,000 foot in
Gascony, for service in Italy. Albret was given the task
of raising the troops, owing to the extent of his domains
in the south-west; the Venetian envoy in Prance predicted
that the soldiers would be 'relatives' of Albret's.
Fearful of Borgia's intentions, the Venetians expressed to
Louis their preference for delay in despatching the new
troops to Italy. The King told them that they would not
be sent before May, but the Venetian representatives pointed
out that Albret could send the force on his own initiative,
owing to his great power. At this the King grew angry,
exclaiming that "... there was only one King in Prance, and
84. B.N., fr. 26106, no. 45. According to Luchaire,
St. Sulpice had formed part of the Albret patrimony
since the reign of Charles VII, although the
possession was contested by the Parlement of Toulouse,
which adjudged it to the Crown in 1510, Alain le
grand, p. 204. However, the document cited
refers to St. Sulpice as a property of the late
Boffile de Juge - no doubt it formed part of the
county of Castres, which Juge bequeathed to Alain
in 1494, ibid., p. 212.
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he would say when troops crossed the Alps"
Gascony was a region in which the authority of
the Crown was relatively weak:, compared with most other
parts of France. Not only was it distant from the
political centre of the country, but there was also a
recent history of rebellion against the King. For
example, it is interesting to look at the Gascon captains
of the Ordonnance during the Italian Wars, and to find that
86
if only Alain d'Albret and Odet Aydie le Jeune had
waged war against Charles VIII, two others, Louis
d'Armagnac, whose father, Jacques, was executed for treason
in 1477, and Jean de Durfort, whose father,Gailhard,served
Henry VI of England and was exiled from France for decades,
were but one generation away from serious opposition to
the Crown. Nevertheless, the chief foundation of
Gascony's independence was surely the fact that so much
of the territory was the property of only a handful of
individuals, even as late as the sixteenth century, and
despite incorporating no apanages of the Crown. In 1520,
the Venetian ambassador to Milan stressed the point when
he maintained that the house of Foix had "... the following
85. Diarii, iv, cols. 647 and 774-5.
86. In 1487* he defended Blaye against a royal army,
and the next year ChSteaubriant, Jaurgain, Deux comtes
de Comminges, pp. 144-5 and 150-1.
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of all of Aqultaine.He exaggerated somewhat, and
besides, he must have included the Albret family in 'the
house of Foix', to which it was indeed closely related
by blood and marriage; but the Venetian went on to
explain the implications of such a concentration of
resources: Odet de Lautrec, in whom the envoy was chiefly
interested, possessed lands and castles in abundance in
south-west France, whence he drew a rent of 7 to 8,000
ducats, and moreover, he could raise 12,000 footsoldiers
OO
in his territories. In fact, the Albret strength was
more impressive. By marrying his son, Jean^to the heiress
of the King of Navarre, count of Foix, Alain had united the
two great empires of the south-west in 1484. Even after
the loss of haute-Navarre to Spain in 1512, this Foix
inheritance represented weighty military potential. For
example, a contemporary history of the counts of Foix
recounts how at least 1,500 men-at-arms, of France and
Navarre, attended the coronation of Frangois Phoebus,
King of Navarre, in l48l. The number was fairly modest,
continues the history, since at the present time there
were over 1,000 gentlemen owing homage to Jean d'Albret
and his wife, Catherine de Foix, in the lands of Foix and
Bearn. There were 700 in Beam alone.^
87. Gianjacopo Caroldo's relation of 1520, in Relazioni
degli ambasciatori veneti al senato, ed. A. Segarizzi,
vol. IT (Bari, 1913)* pp. 3-29; p.12.
88. ibid., p. 13.
89. B.N., p.o. 1177, fol. 686; this work was evidently
composed during the latter part of the reign of .
Louis XII. Even as relatively modest a landowner
as the comte d'Astarac was able to provide 2500
Gascon crossbowmen, 400 mounted crossbowmen (two-
thirds of them "gentlemen") and 60 men-at-arms, for
service in Italy in 1495* L-G. P6lissier, "Notes
italiennes de l'histoire de France: une lettre
politique de Guillaume Briconnet", in Annales de
Bretagne, vol. ix (1893-4)! pp. 417-25; p.421.
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Such military potential could only be made
effective by means of money; so that in the last analysis
the power of the aristocracy, relative to the Crown,
depended upon the comparative value of the income of the
two. Landowners were not entirely reliant upon the King
for a large cash income, as we have seen. Contamine
reckons that the average landed fortune of a captain of
the Ordonnance of middling rank, in the later fifteenth
century, was perhaps 2,500-4,000 livres per annum.In
1497, the sum which Jean de Foix-Narbonne was promised
for renouncing his rights to the Foix inheritance amounted
to an annual rent of 4,000 livres tournois.^ in 1501,
In return for renouncing his claim to the county of La
Marche and other territories, Louis d'Armagnac was
granted 2,500 livres' tournois rent per annum by the Duke
92
of Bourbon, redeemable on a lump sum of 50, 000. These
90. Contamine, Guerre, Etat et societe, p. 440. The
more lowly man-at-arms was a proverbially impecunious
figure: Henri Baude's "gorrier bragart" is hard-up,
having recklessly expended his resources in the army,
on fine clothes, and he attempts to recoup his loss
through gambling. He has, he says "... a property
in pawn for more than its worth, from which he takes
the fruits; but it is of no consequence to him,
for he will take such a wife that the match will
make his fortune", J. Quicherat, "Henri Baude,
po£te ignore du temps de Louis XI et Charles VIII,"
in B.E.C.. vol. x (1848-9), pp. 93-133; pp. 121-2.
Although gendarmes of this type were not pensioned
by the Crown, they would become indirect clients
of the King through their attachment to a great man,
such as their company captain.
91. B.N., Doat 228, fol. 67.
92. Tjfcres de Bourbon, vol. ii, no. 7524.
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figures, used to settle claims to extensive territories,
appear trifling compared with the pensions which men like
Narbonne and Armagnac received from the King. Besides,
the nobility had no great opportunity to raise its -
income, outside royal service, whereas the King enjoyed
the privilege, or rather, by our period, the right to tax
his subjects. The nobleman might augment his wealth by
a judicious marriage: Jean de Foix-Narbonne received
10,000 livres from the Duchess of Orleans after marrying
her daughter Marie, in 1473;Louis d'Armagnac was
promised a dowry of 80,000 livres for his wife, Frangoise
t 94
d Alengon, in 1500. But such outlets were obviously
rare. On the other hand, we have seen how in 1484 the
frustration caused by permanent alienation of fiefs to
the Crown surfaced at Tours, and also how assiduously
Crown officials watched over the King's grants of lands and
revenues to his servants. Once a territory was lost to
the Crown, it must have been especially difficult to redeem
it. For example, when Isabeau de la Tour, the mother of
Jean d'Albret, seigneur d'Orval^and his brother, Gabriel
de Lesparre, consented to exchange a number of possessions
in Poitou with Louis XI, she appears to have failed to
acquire her agreed compensation, in the form of some
lordships in P^rigord. At least, her sons were deprived
of their enjoyment, it seems. As a result, in 1483
Charles VIII paid off Orval and Lesparre with an award of
93. B.N., p.o. 1174, no. 173.
94. Titres de Bourbon, ii, no. 7525*
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15*000 livres tournois.^ Besides, Jean d'Orval received
an annual 1750 livres from the Crown, throughout our
period, for certain territories which his wife had abandoned
in favour of Louis XI, for the "welfare and use of the
realm. The enjoyment of a private estate was converted
into maintenance by the Crown.
Meanwhile, the income of the King had ceased to
bear much resemblance to that of a nobleman, however
extensive his estates. It derived only in small measure
from rents, and rested principally upon direct taxation.
Contarini's relation of 1492 suggests that royal expenditure
at the time totalled twice the value of the 'ordinary'
revenues of the Crown. Direct taxation, therefore,
95* B.N., fr. 20432, p.33* The major advantage of a
royal pension over domain revenue, for the nobleman,
was that it consisted entirely of cash and was, it
seems, usually regularly paid. A contemporary
reckoned Alain d'Albret s revenue at a quarter of a
million livres - a stupendous figure, even by the
standards of his peers. But this was partially
payable in kind the county of Castres, for instance,
was worth 10,000 livres per annum, but only 6207 of
these were payable in cash, Luchaire, op.cit.,
PP. 59-60. The receipt of a royal pension, though
not always without its problems itself, must have
seemed a more convenient method of financing heavy
expenditure than struggling with obdurate domainal
officials, to ensure delivery of dues, and fighting
off the encroachments of royal agents and others.
For Albret's case, see ibid,, p. 203. The pursuit
of royal favour seems to have become something of
an undignified scramble - Jean Bouchet thought La
Tr6moille a worthier man for having been, according
to his biographer, the least importunate magnate at
Court,Le panegyric du chevalier sans reproche, in
Collection des...m§moires, ed. M. Petitot, vol.xiv,p.445•
96. See, for example, quittances of Orval in B.N., p.o.
25* nos. 215-6 and 227, and p.o. 26, no. 370.
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was used to fund half the government budget. 1 The
Venetian Included many customary revenues, such as the
gabelle, under his umbrella of 'ordinary' income, not
just domain receipts. Even so, his assertions were off
the mark. In fact, the taille was responsible for a good
deal more than half of Crown revenue. Although the
King's income from his domain increased considerably
during our period, the importance of such funds had long
since been belittled by 'extraordinary' income; and, on
the whole, this latter source of funds even grew in
relative importance during our period. In 1483* the
taille was responsible for 3»9 million livres out of a
total Crown income of 4.6 million; by 1497 the ratio was
2.3 to 3.5 million (excluding the receipts from Burgundy
and Provence, which were minimal); by 1314 the ratio
was 3*7 to 4.9 million (again with the same exclusions).-^
Between these dates, the level of income from
the taille varied considerably, although it never reached
the heights of the last year of Louis XI's reign, 1483.
Contarini explained in 1492 that the defeat of the pre¬
tensions of the Estates-General in 1484 to regulate
97. Contarini's relation, in Relazioni, ed. Alberi, iv,
pp. 17-8.
98. Spont, "La taille en Languedoc", in Annales du Midi,
ii, pp. 368 and n.l, 369 and ns. 1 and 2, 505 and 509-
There seems to be some inconsistency in the taille
figure for 151^* variously given by Spont as 2.89
million livres (p.369* n.2) and 3*7 million (p.509)*'
the latter figure is quoted in the text, as it is
obviously the correct one.
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direct taxation at two-yearly intervals had left Charles
VIII free to fix the taille level at whatever rate he
99
pleased. ^ Two decades later, Machiavelli echoed this
conclusion. Louis XII laid imposts on his people "...
according to his pleasure," being sovereign in matters of
taxation. Machiavelli could never gain any statistics
for Crown finances when he was in France, but he was
always told that royal revenue and expenditure were
"... as much as the King pleased to make them.""1"^ When
we realise also that French nobles were forbidden to levy
taxes or loans on their tenants, whilst those loans which
the King demanded of them were very seldom repaid,"''^"'' we
may understand by how much the King had out-distanced his
greater subjects in financial resources. Besides, in 1498
Louis XII confiscated all offices dispensed by his
102
predecessor, and resold them.
In fact, the King was not entirely free to fix
the rate of direct taxation as he pleased. The 1484
Estates failed to establish a precedent for control of the
99. Contarini, op.cit., p.20.
100. Machiavelli, "Sketch of France", in Works, tr. Farneworth,
ii, p. 503. On page 506, the author incorrectly
talks of an annual Estates-General being convoked for
tax purposes.
101. Ibid., pp. 504 and 503.
102. L-G. P6lissier, Louis XII et Ludovic Sforza, vol. i
(Paris, 1896), p. 383-
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taille, whilst violent opposition to taxation had largely
ceased by the middle of the fifteenth century, and even
then the opposition had never accused the Crown of
103
abusing its authority by raising taxes. ^ In Languedoc,
however, the privileges of the province insisted that
consent of the regional Estates be obtained before taxes
were levied. Louis XI flouted such privileges success¬
fully at times, and Louis XII had few disputes with
Languedoc, but in 1494, when Charles VIII attempted to
impose a crue on the province without consent, he faced
objections. But Languedoc only accounted for about 10
per cent of the national tax levy anyway. Normandy, a
much more important tax area, providing a quarter of the
national taille throughout our period, had no real control
of its levy.104
A more effective brake on excessive taxation was
quite simply the pressure of public opinion and the
sensitivity of the Government. Charles VIII kept his
tax level relatively low, by comparison with the previous
reign, although he ran into trouble because he failed to
cut expenditure accordingly.10^ His father's exactions
103. P.D. Solon, "Popular response to standing military
forces in fifteenth century France", in Studies in
the Renaissance, vol. xix (1972), pp. 78-111; p.91.
104. Spont, op.cit., ii, pp. 485-502, and iii, p. 484, n.2.
105. Ibid., ii, p. 508.
39.
had become legendary, so much so that Contarlni could
recount in 1492 that the taxes of Louis XI had driven
thousands from France."1"0^ It was perhaps the memory of
his father's unpopularity which led Charles VIII to tread
somewhat warily when determining the taille rate. When
in May 1494 he informed the elus of Arques of the im¬
position of an increment of 25 per cent on the rate for
that year, Charles held out the prospect of the revenues
of Naples, which would soon fall into his hands, so that
"... the people ... could henceforth be greatly relieved.""1"^
In 1496, Charles VIII offered his subjects the justification
of considerable economies, including the disbandment of 500
lances, for his decision to levy a third of the taille for
108
the following year, in advance. Louis XII was
109
more successful in cutting expenditure but even so was
perhaps more solicitous of the public weal. The conquests
of Milan, Genoa and Naples had been undertaken without any
increase in the tax burden, the King wrote from Asti in
September 1502, seeking to disarm potential opposition to
110
his policies. In October 1513* the King told the
106. Contarini, op.cit., p.20.
107. B.N., fr. 26104, no. 995.
108. P. de Commynes, Memoires, ed. Mile. Dupont, vol.
iii (Paris, 184873 p3 4~29«
109. Spont, op.cit., ii,pp. 509-IO.
110. B.N., fr. 25718, no.65.
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elus of bas-Limousin of his multifold financial commit¬
ments and of his exhaustive search for money, by engaging
his domain, accepting gifts, cutting salaries and imposing
loans, when informing them of his decision to increase
111
the taille for 1514. One of the financial expedients
which Louis had used some years before, to evade an
intolerable tax burden, was the appropriation of a third
of a million livres from the clerical tithe, accorded by
112
Alexander VI for crusading purposes.
Sensitivity to public opinion is not, however,
the equivalent of control of Crown revenues by public
representatives. If the King felt unwilling to push
his demands up to the level of the early 1480s, he did
nonetheless retain the flexibility accorded by his
position of near-sovereignty in tax matters. Furthermore,
the conquests in Italy brought a new dimension to the
113
finances of the French monarchy. There is no doubt
that by our period the King of France was an economic
giant, compared with even his greatest subjects. And
111. B.N., fr. 25719, no. 209.
112. B.N., Clair. 635, fol. 167.
113. The Neapolitan budget of 1502 anticipated a receipt
of at least 571,000 livres tournois, B.N., fr. 2930,
fol. 18. The revenue of Milan rose from 716,000
livres in 1510 to over a million by 1517* A.N.,
J.910, nos. 1 and 5.
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the respective positions of the two sides would only grow
further apart as the sixteenth century progressed. By
1546, the Venetian ambassador, Cavalli, could maintain
that, "the princes, being poor, dared try nothing against
the King...". The nobility was indeed harnessed into
royal service under Charles VIII and Louis XII. It was
the exclusive, selective nature of Louis XI*s patronage
which had offended so many - noblemen simply could not
afford to be ignored by the Crown.
114. M.Cavalli's relation, in Relations des ambassadeurs
venetiens sur les affaires de France au XVIe siecle,
tr. and ed. M.N. Tommasco, vol. i (Paris, IFjB"),
pp. 249-3563; pp. 276-7.
42.
CHAPTER TWO
CAPTAINS OF THE ORDONNANCE AND THEIR COMPANIES
In his old age, Blaise de Monluc, Marshal of
France, looked back upon his military career, and recalled
how, in 1521, he had been preferred to an archer's place
in the compagnie d'ordonnance of Thomas de Foix, seigneur
de Lescun; such a position was "... highly regarded at
that time. For great men served in the companies, and two
or three even as archers. But since then everything had
degenerated....""^ Even after taking due account of the
prejudices of a bitter old soldier whose ambitions have
been frustrated, it is still probably true to say that
Monluc joined the Ordonnances when they were already past
their peak. The period of the early Italian Wars marked
the heyday of the French heavy cavalry, although even then
the inadequacies of the arm were becoming apparent.
BrantSme had heard from retired captains that it was during
the reign of Louis XII that the companies reached the
highest quality, perfected in countless campaigns against
2
Italians and Spaniards, feared throughout the world.
1. B. de Monluc, Commentaires (1521-1576), ed. P.
Courteault (Bibliotheque de la Pleiade, 1964), p.J>0.
2. P. de Bourdeilles, seigneur de BrantSme, Oeuvres
completes, ed. P. M6rim6e and L. Lacour, vol. iii,p.90.
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During the years of Charles VIII and his successor there
was no shortage of recruits. The companies were attended
by bands of young adventurers seeking places in the ranks.
The greatest nobles of France were included amongst the
captains.
Some expressed doubts about the worth of the
standing army, such as Thomas Basin, who described the
Ordonnances of Louis XI as "... troops as numerous as
they were useless...^", but on the whole the military
value of the companies was rarely called into question.
Complaints arose largely out of the burdens imposed by
standing forces both on the taxpayer and the inhabitant
of the garrison town. The nobles of France, rather than
mercenary soldiers, were the natural defenders of the
realm, many cried, such as Jean Masselin at the Estates-
General of 1484, although the deputies lacked the con¬
viction to advocate complete abolition of the Ordonnances,
4
but only recommended a reduction in numbers. The
nobles' grievances at the same assembly echoed this view,
but they went on to complain about the frequency of ban
summonses and the lack of opportunity to secure commands
q
in the regular army . A return to the old ways could not
3. T. Basin, Histoire de Louis XI, tr. and ed. C. Samaran
and M-C. Garand, vol. iii (Paris, 1972), p. 321.
4. Masselin, Journal des Etates generaux, p. 371.
5. ibid., pp. 666-9-
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really be contemplated. The compagnies d'ordonnance had
driven out the English and their original captains had
now become literary heroes. The Italian Wars spread
the reputation of the French heavy cavalry abroad.
Machiavelli, writing in 1512, thought that the essential
strength of the companies lay in their ability to recruit
younger sons of the nobility, owing to French customs of
primogeniture; anyway, they were "... reckoned the best
soldiers in the world..."^.
During those same Estates-General of 1484, the
Chancellor of France gave expression to the official view
of the army: it was the "right arm" of the body politic
and lent "majesty and royal splendour" to the prince;
at once a comfort to the King and his realm and a deterrent
Q
to their enemies . Yet, how much authority did the King
exercise over his own army? We have seen how the nobility
of France was recruited into royal service during the
fifteenth century, and how its members clamoured for
positions and favours - but to what purpose, to serve the
Crown or themselves? In 1484, the Chancellor said that
the fact that Charles VIII was a minor made a strong army
6. Solon, "Popular response to standing military forces",
in Studies in the Renaissance, vol. xix, pp. 105-4.
7. Machiavelli, "Sketch of France", in Works, tr.
Farneworth, vol. ii, p. 495*
8. Masselin, op.cit., p. 535»
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all the more necessary. In view of the involvement of
royal troops in the strife of the next few years, we may
doubt the wisdom of his words. The loyalty of the
companies in Italy will be studied in a later chapter.
But first it might be useful to look at the personnel of
Gascon companies in some detail, to enquire how tightly
the rank-and-file were tied to their captains.
The King was entitled to appoint captains as he
pleased. At the beginning of his reign, Louis XI had
sacked two-thirds of his father's commanders, to replace
them with his own men. Subsequently, however, he came
to regard his drastic action as one of the major causes
of the League and War of the Public Good. The men Louis
had cashiered had signed up for the Duke of Brittany
o
and Charles of France, in opposition to the Crown .
Certainly, one of the aims of the leaguers was to regain
control of the compagnies d'ordonnance"'" . But although
Louis was forced to re-establish some of his father's old
servants as a result of the opposition, he retained a free
hand in appointments for the rest of his reign - of forty-
three captains in 1483, only seven had served for ten








preferred before foreigners to army commands, reflects
Louis Xl's obstinately self-centred policy, and the
frustration caused by it. On the other hand, in reaction
to Louis' ideas, the Beaujeu regency at first retained a
maximum number of captains (although the size of their
companies was cut down) including amongst them the greatest
princes of the land - Orleans, Lorraine, Beaujeu, Albret,
Angoftleme, Dunois. Yet, as a result of the involvement
of numbers of these men in the Guerre Folle, the Govern¬
ment was not afraid to dispose of such rebels; between
i486 and 1490, thirty per cent of the captains of the
12
Ordonnance were dismissed
Alain d'Albret was one of those who lost his
company in this way. Until his rebellion, he had not
scrupled to make use of it in his own affairs, such as the
Foix succession War1^. On the other hand, in 1485, the
100 lance Albret company descended upon the captain's
county of Gaure, announcing that it would remain there
until paid by Alain. In the event, the main town,
Fleurance, was besieged for a week, taken, and occupied
12. Ibid., pp. 410-11.
13. Luchaire, Alain le grand, p.74. Albret's company
was used for private war as late as 1492, when it
helped capture Alain's rebellious town of Fleurance,
capital of Gaure, Viala, Le Parlement de Toulouse,
vol. ii, p. 78.
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and ransacked for six months . In other words, both
Albret and his gendarmes held the captain to be something
of a proprietor of his troop, even though the Crown was
in fact responsible for paying wages. So far, this
ambivalence of loyalties had not been tested, but when
Albret joined the league of princes of i486, in opposition
to the Crown, the members of his company faced the contra¬
diction squarely and they were required to make a poli¬
tical decision. During the course of 1487, Albret made
two vain attempts to reach Brittany, the centre of the
coalition, and reinforce the league with his troops. His
compagnie d'ordonnance, under the effective command of
its lieutenant, Raymond de Cardailhac, seigneur de St.
Cirq-Lapopie in Quercy, was not, it seems, involved in
these attempts to run the gauntlet between Gascony and
Nantes. It was evidently stationed elsewhere, outside
Alain's control. However, as Charles VIII wrote in
February 1488, Albret had "... used such persuasion by
means of letters and messages, that the said seigneur de
St. Cirq and several others of the company had abandoned
(royal) service, notwithstanding their oaths sworn to
(the King), nor the wages they had received, and had
14. Luchaire, op.cit., p.144.
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gone over to the said rebels...^". It is not clear
exactly what proportion of the company defected, though
it was certainly large. Some, perhaps most of the
defectors were posted to ChSteaubriant, which was be¬
sieged by the royal army for a week until it yielded on
terms on 23rd April 1488. Thirty or thirty-five men-at-
arms of the garrison, instead of marching away according
to the surrender terms, asked to be forgiven and re¬
instated. They seem to have claimed to have had mis¬
givings, at least, about the treachery of the company.
The King was inclined to believe that they were largely
innocent of deceit, and he pardoned them. He did not,
however, trust them sufficiently to allow them to remain
in camp, "... fearing that some of them, or their men,
could pass information to the other side...", and they
were dispatched to Picardy. This was a wise move. The
men of Albret's company who surrendered Ch&teaubriant
were unpaid and hungry - their loyalty to the King might
have lasted only until these conditions were remedied.1^
15. Lettres de Charles VIII, ed. P. P^licier and B. de
Mandrot, vol. j , pp. 289-92. Another royal
letter suggests that the whole company deserted,
ibid., ii, p.27. Exactly when Albret was deprived
of his captaincy is not clear; Luchaire indicates
that he had lost command by l486,op.clt., p. 73, n.2;
but it is evident from Charles VIII's correspondence
that Albret was still a captain of the Ordonnance
in 1487, though not by early 1488, Lettres, i, p.291.
16. ibid., ii, pp. 17-19, 6 and 30, respectively.
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Later in the year, more gendarmes either
deserted Albret or were captured. In early May, Charles
VIII announced that twenty or twenty-five men-at-arms,
recently come from Brittany, were to be put under the
✓ 17
command of Aymar de Prie, seigneur de St. Andre . '
In July, the King revealed that more men of the Albret
company had been captured, including one called Pierre
de Buffibre, whose life was to be spared, through the
intercession of Anne de Beaujeu; but he was to remain in
-| o
custody . The other captives, by implication, were
destined for execution. However, it appears that most
of the rebel gendarmes of Albret's company escaped
charges of treason, by surrendering voluntarily and
begging to be reinstated. It is difficult to know how
many, if any, had had genuine reservations about following
their captain into rebellion. Obviously we cannot trust
their loyal claims made upon surrender. The Crown was
under no illusions. The loyalty of its army, it realised
only too well, depended in large measure upon the treatment
it received. The best defence against desertion was
regular payment: the Marshal de Gie, who was to have
charge of some of Albret's men in Picardy, "... would
have them well treated and would be able to ensure that
17.
18.
Ibid., ii, pp. 92-9.
Ibid., ii, pp. 181-2.
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there would be no fault in their payment^."
Alain d'Albret was reappointed captain of 100
lances in 1491, when he made his peace with Charles VIII.
This reinstatement was part of Albret's remarkable return
from rebellion in Brittany, that has been discussed in
the previous chapter. However, the favourable denouement
of Alain's crisis with the monarchy could not disguise
the fact that, when put to the test, his compagnie
d'ordonnance had failed him - apart from a few trusted
hands, its members could not be relied upon. Most had
deserted Albret's cause (or been captured, as we have
seen) even before the battle of St. Aubin-du-Cormier.
The Breton crisis proved to be a watershed in the relations
between Alain d'Albret and his company, as in so many
other fields. From now on, the troop of horse which
bore Albret's name gradually parted company with its.
20
captain. It had been halved in size by 1495 , although
19. Ibid., ii, p.18. This emphasis on prompt payment is
apparent in an earlier letter as well, ibid., ii,
p.6; and in a piece by Malet de Graville, in
Correspondance de Charles VIII et de ses conselllers
avec Louis II de la Tremoille, ed. Louis de la
Tremoille (Paris, 1875), pp. 72-3•
20. B.N., p.0.25, no. 218. This document clearly shows
that Alain had a company of only 50 lances throughout
1495. The information given by H. de L'Epinois,
putting its strength at 55 lances, is therefore
incorrect, "Notes extraites des Archives Communales
de Compiegne", in B,E.C., vol. xxv (1864), pp. 124-61;
p.138. Luchaire, on the other hand, notes that
Albret had 150 lances in 1495, op.cit., p.73, n.2,
and p.75. These were, in fact, 150 lances "b. la
petite paye", troops raised to defend the frontier
of Languedoc, and not the same as Alain's regular
company. B.N., p.o. 25, no.220. Luchaire's figures
for Albret company strength, as for the size of his
pension, should be treated with caution.
Albret hung on as captain until, by 1509* his company had
passed, seemingly without hiatus, into the hands of
21
Jean de Durfort, lieutenant since at least 1503
Despite the change of command, only seven gendarmes present
at a muster at Parma in June 1507 (the last surviving
review roll of Albret's company), fail to appear at the
Crema muster, over two years"later, at which Durfort is
22
first signalled as captain. Apparently, the displace¬
ment of Albret as captain caused no significant dislocation
of personnel. The troop was quite simply inherited by
its lieutenant. After all, Albret had relinquished
effective command long before 1509. His company had seen
a good deal of service in Italy, but he himself never
ventured there. It is doubtful whether his company was
of any more use or interest to Alain, by the time of
Durfort's takeover, than as a source of income - something
of a change from the 1480s. The ties between Alain
d'Albret and his compagnie d'ordonnance, eroded over many
years, were finally cut altogether by Louis XII; the
man who had bargained with Charles VIII for massive favours
in 1491* was ignominiously sacked, not two decades later,
21. B.N., Clair. 158, no. 80, and 241, no. 639; B.N.,
fr. 21506, no. 728. Luchaire observes that Albret
had lost his company by 1508, op.cit., p. 73> n.2.
From 1512, Luchaire continues, Alain was only a
'nominal' company captain, ibid., p. 75. However,
after 1508, Albret seems to have been permanently
dismissed from the regular army; it is certain that
he never recovered command of his original company -
the Durfort company.
22. B.N., fr. 21507, no. 78O; B.N., Clair. 241, no. 639.
Only 47 gendarmes, out of a maximum of 50, mustered
in 1507* however.
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simply because the King did not care for him. Nor were
Albret's sons provided with army commands, until in 1512
Jean was appointed a captain, during the great expansion
of the army that year.
If Alain d'Albret, the most powerful Gascon of
our period, had lost effective control of his company
by the first decade of the sixteenth century, it should
not surprise us to find lesser men holding no greater
claims to proprietorship of their troops by this time.
Whatever authority a captain exercised over his gendarmes
on a day-to-day basis, the King retained the ultimate
sanction, as employer and paymaster of both commander
and rank-and-file. When drawing up his will, Jean de
Foix-Narbonne felt obliged to ask Louis XII to allow his
2"5
son Gaston to inherit his company . The succession was
no foregone conclusion (although Gaston did in fact
inherit). The Foix company, which was acquired by its
lieutenant, Roger de B6arn, after Gaston's death in 1512,
at a strength of 100 lances, was cut down to 50 lances by
24 ✓ t
1517 j and following Beam's death the following year, the
company was split up and its personnel divided between
2R
Odet de Lautrec and Anne de Montmorency . A company
could not simply be handed over to a relative, like so
much property. Although the fate of Durfort's company
25. Boucher de Molandon, "Le testament de Jean de Foix",
in Bulletin historique et philologique (1885)# P«55«
24. B.N., Clair. 244, no. 789; B.N. p.o. 257 (dossier
Beam), no. 17.
25. B.N., Clair. 244, no. 801.
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after his death is uncertain , we have seen already how
Gratien d'Agnerre's unit was acquired by Louis de Hangest,
rather than by Gratien's son and lieutenant, Jean2^.
It was this company which Aguerre no doubt employed in
his war with Metz in 1489, in league with the Duke of
28
Lorraine, his old patron . In somewhat similar vein,
Odet Aydie le Jeune was quietly relieved of his small
company of gendarmes soon after its return from Charles
VIIl's expedition to Naples, and henceforth was to devote
himself to the profession of captain of foot. Yet it
was this man who in 1487 had defended the castle of Blaye
against a royal army, on behalf of his more illustrious
brother and namesake, the Lord of Lescun, presumably
using troops normally retained by the Crown for the
29
purpose .
In short, despite some evidence of the use of
compagnies d'ordonnance as private armies by Gascon
noblemen in the years before the Italian Wars, it is
clear that by the sixteenth century the destinies of
companies - the issue of their leadership, size, or indeed
existence at all - lay firmly in royal hands. Gendarmes
had become part of one large corps of cavalry, whose
members could be shuffled between units without difficulty.
The majority of soldiers did not maintain ties with their
26. By 1517 this company was down to a strength of 30
lances, B.N., n .a.fr 1481, no.73; B.N.,clair.245,no.781.
27. B.N., fr.21510,no.946; Jaurgain, "Profils basques",
in Revue des Basses-Pyren6es, vol. iv, pp. 145-6.
28. ibid., p. 39. Jaurgain,
29. B.N.,fr. 25717,no.207;/ Deux comtes de Comminges, pp.
145-6. Aydie s and Lescun's men at Blaye deserted
to the Crown, during the siege of the place.
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captain which were strong enough to prevent movement
from company to company. The continuity of service of
most of the men-at-arms of the Albret company through
the Durfort takeover has been noted above. It suggests,
at the very least, that the claims of Alain d'Albret on
the services of most of the men of his company took
second place to the claims of the King. In more general
terms, it may be useful to look at the rates of turnover
in personnel of companies, to establish at least one
aspect of the link between captain and gendarme - the
length of service in the same unit.
Contamine has calculated the average rates of
turnover in personnel, within a given company, for certain
30
periods of the fifteenth century-^ . He has found that
30. Contamine, op.cit., pp. 470-1 (for gendarmes) and
461-2 (archers). The author bases his calculations
on the number of new men - men from outside a given
company - who appear in the ranks between two dates.
Since promotions from archer to gendarme were much
more frequent than movements in the other direction
(demotions being, in fact, very rare indeed), a
proportion of gendarme replacements would usually
be promotees, whilst, almost always, every new
archer would be from outside the company in question.
Hence, rates of replacement for archers are higher,
for this reason, than those for gendarmes (besides
being generally higher anyway), and, correspondingly,
average career-lengths for archers are artificially
low - the time spent as archer by a gendarme is
incorporated into gendarme careers, in Contamine's
formula, but not the time spent as gendarme by an
archer into archer careers. Does Contamine take
account of this when he concludes that, on average,
men-at-arms' careers in a given unit were about
20% longer than archers' careers, ibid., p. 471?
Contamine's formula has been followed in the analysis
of Gascon companies, in the interests of comparison,
but it should be remembered that so-called career-
lengths are rather statistical devices than
meaningful indications of how long a soldier could
expect to stay in a given company in reality.
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the average annual replacement rate in the compagnies
d'ordonnance in his survey, between 1451 and 1461, was 5/
for gendarmes and 5/ for archers; between 1469/70 and
1475 the rates had risen to 9/ and 15/ respectively;
whilst from 1487 to 1492 the gendarme proportion stood
at 8/, with that of archers at 11/, for roughly the
equivalent time span. If these figures are converted
into average career-lengths within one company, or, in
other words, the time it would take a given company
to replace its personnel entirely, based upon the rates
of replacement quoted above, they appear perhaps more
meaningful. In the case of gendarmes, the average length
of career (including time spent as an archer in the same
company where applicable) drops from 55 years down to 11,
before rising slightly to 12.5 years; this pattern is
mirrored by the archers, whose career-lengths (excluding
time spent as gendarme in the same company) begin at 20
years and plummet to 7»5> before rising again to 9 years.
In short, the relative stability of service of the gendarmerie
under Charles VII is undermined under his successors, by
casualties of war certainly, but also by the increased
turnover amongst captains, and probably by a rise in the
number of dismissals from the ranks after about 1470, when
51
royal supervision of the army was tightened up. The
strong ties which were no doubt formed between captain and
51. Ibid., p. 462.
men under the stable conditions of the 1450s, when the
relative integrity of a company was assured for years,
must surely have been weakened later on.
This insecurity of career under Louis XI and
during the early years of Charles VIII continues into the
period of the Italian Wars, at least in the case of the
Gascon troops under scrutiny in this study. The average
annual replacement rate amongst gendarmes of the Aguerre
company between 1495 and 1499 is 7% (career-length 14
years); amongst archers the rate is 11% (career-length
9 years). In the period 1509 to 1515* 5% of the gendarmerie
of the Durfort company are replaced on average each year,
from outside the unit (career-length 20 years) whilst the
rate for archers is 9>5% (H years). The Foix-B6arn
company, over a similar span, 1510 to 1515* reveals a
gendarme rate of 15*5$ (career-length 7.5 years) and a
rate for archers of 15$ (7 years). Turning to Aguerre's
company in the first decade of the sixteenth century
however, the picture is somewhat different. Never again
employed in Italy after its return from Charles VIIl's
Neapolitan venture, this unit was, it seems, continuously
stationed on the comparatively peaceful borders of
Champagne throughout these ten years. The average annual
turnover rate amongst the Aguerre company's gendarmes
between 1499 and 1510 was 7>% (career-length 53 years),
with that of the archers at 5*5$ (18 years). It would
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seem reasonable to adduce the peaceful conditions of
service of this unit as the major cause of the remarkable
stability among its personnel during this time, although
the particular capacity of the Aguerre company to find
new gendarmes from within the ranks of its own archers
also contributes to the low gendarme replacement rate.
War service, and especially war service abroad, no doubt
undermined the solidarity of a company, not only through
casualties suffered (which will be examined below) but
also through the inevitable resignations, transfers,
perhaps even desertions, which must have followed in the
wake of the upheaval of change from garrison life at home
to campaigning in Italy. The contrast should be qualified
- army life in the peninsula very quickly settled into a
garrison routine in most places for much of the time.
But when a harsh campaign is confronted, rates of replace¬
ment in the ranks rise sharply. Both the Albret and Foix
companies fought in the Garigliano battle of the winter
1505-4. Between 1503 and 1505* the average annual
turnover rate for gendarmes was 30 and 26$ respectively,
for archers 35 and OCiaL
32. There seems to be no doubt that archelr turnover was
usually higher than that of gendarmes. However,
the difference is lessened if we add the time spent
as gendarmes by archers to our archer career
calculations, which Contamine does not:-
Company Dates Annual Rate of Career-Length
"
Turnover
Aguerre 1493-99 10% 10 years
Durfort- 15O9-I5 12.5 years
s
Foix/B6arn I5IO-I5 15$ 7
Aguerre 1499-1510 4$ 25
Albret 1503-5 55^ 5 "
Foix 1503-5 27$ 4 "
In conclusion, it might be argued that service
in Italy helped to weaken ties between captain and rank-
and-file. In the case of Alain d'Albret, his company was
removed from his influence, when in Italy, simply by means
of geographical separation, as we have seen. And to some
extent this trend must have applied to almost all companies.
Rare was the captain who spent as much time in Italy as the
men under his command. Furthermore, ties were weakened
by accelerated turnover in personnel, as a result of
campaigning abroad. Only one of the fifty gendarmes of
the Foix company of 1510 survived from 1493; only one out
of fifty in the Albret-Duras company in 1509 was a veteran
of sixteen years before. Six out of forty-nine men-at-arms
of the Aguerre company of 1510 survived from 1493-
Movements of soldiers from one company to another
were frequent, and although the notives for such transfers
are almost always mysterious, the moves themselves can be
documented through a laborious investigation of muster
rolls. Some work along these lines was published by
Jaurgain, based on the personnel of Gratien d'Aguerre's
company . The fifty men-at-arms of this troop were
reviewed at Vitry-en-Partois in April 1493- Jaurgain
found nine of these men in other compagnies d'ordonnance
during the lifetime of the Aguerre company - four moved on
to the Baudricourt company, quite soon after the Vitry
33• Jaurgain, "Profils basques", pp. 41-8.
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muster, from which unit, incidentally, one of them had just
transferred to Aguerre's troop anyway; four others soon
moved on to various other companies, including those of
Foix and Armagnac, although one later returned to Gratien's
company; the last gendarme was a former member of a
different unit. All these moves - and some of these men
did not cease to change after just one transfer - took
place at the level of man-at-arms. In other words, they
were not obvious promotions. Such transfers can be
documented amongst Gratien's archers too, although here we
can no doubt adduce the desire for promotion to gendarme
as a motive at times. It is probable that one Petry
d'Ansa, an archer of Aguerre in 1495* who subsequently
became an archer in a different company, was enticed back
to his old unit by the promise, or chance, of promotion -
by 1499 he is a man-at-arms. More commonly, however, the
departing archer is on his way to fill an equivalent post
elsewhere.
Soldiers also transferred to posts outside the
army. More lucrative positions in the royal household
and in the provinces beckoned experienced men in the ranks.
Odet de Verduzan left the Albret company in 1499 and by
1502 he was captain of Dax castle, which he held throughout
our period, till 1520 at least^ . At first sight this
34. B.N., p.o. 2964 (dossier Verdusan), nos. 5-9; B.N.,
Clair.Ill, no. 134.
seems like a poor exchange, for the salary of 100 livres
a year at Dax was less than a gendarme's wages. On
the other hand, no doubt the job of castellan involved
fewer expenses and fewer risks. Besides, there was
always the chance of additional employment at Court - by
1515 Verduzan was one of the hundred gentlemen of the
35
household"^. Here the pay was over twice as lucrative
as in the gendarmerie. Perhaps Gilles de Nocaise, who
joined the gentlemen in June 1512, at the salary of 390
livres per year, is the same man as Captain Nocaise, who
36
served in the Foix company until 1510 at least^ . Pierre
de Lur left the Albret company sometime in 1502-3; by
1515 he was captain of St. Sever and a gentleman of the
royal household*"^. Monseigneur d'Andouins, who served
as lieutenant in the Foix company in 1492-3* also seems
to have been one of those who left for more profitable
employment, as a captain of foot with an annual pension of
38400 livres-^ . Le Basque de Tardes, one of eleven royal
6cuyers d'ecurie by 1511-12, at 400 livres per annum,^
served in the Foix company in 1492-3* leaving before the
35. Gj^R., no. 13967.
36. A.N., K.502, no.5.
37. G.R., no. 13980. St. Sever was worth 100 livres
tournois per annum.
38. B.N., Clair, 244, no. 33.
39. B.N.* fr. 9501* fol. 315.
6l.
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turn of the century . Of course, it was possible to
combine office-holding with service in the gendarmerie,
but this seems to have been rare, except amongst captains
and lieutenants, who both stood to reap far more financial
reward from their positions than did a simple gendarme.
To remain in the Ordonnances and hold down a job in local
government would require the employment of a lieutenant
in the latter post - profits would be small, the only
benefit prestige.
Even if a captain of the Ordonnance managed to
retain his command for years therefore, the composition
of his company would have undergone continual change;
in other words, continual erosion of its solidarity.
But how much authority did a captain exercise over his men,
thus impermanently under his command? Royal ordinances
dealing with the army reflect the struggle for power
between King and captains. For his part, Louis XI
attempted to initiate radical changes in 1476, by intro¬
ducing a revised system of recruitment: from now on, the
King was to raise new gendarmes for a given unit from
amongst the archers of the same company, although the
captains were left to select the latter, preferably from
the pool of valets; subject archers, archers who served
as retainers to a man-at-arms, and whose pay went straight
to him, were abolished. The reform was not popular,
although it did aid the cause of archer promotion
40. Two men-at-arms called Tardes, Pierre and Jehannot,
served in the Foix company at the same time, but the
former seems more likely to have been the man who
became an 6cuyer d'ecurie - see Maulde's note in
Auton, vol.i, p.44, n.l.
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temporarily, and an ordinance of 1484 authorised a return
to recruitment by captains and the institution of subject
41
archers . But the powers of the captain continued to
be severely circumscribed. On the one hand, the King
could always intervene in recruitment matters if he wished;
42
reviewers could reject men at muster ; and from 1484
captains were forbidden to dismiss any troop on their own
authority - this was the task of the commissioners of war
4^
and the marshals On the other hand, the competence of
the marshals' provosts, in judicial matters, increased as
the fifteenth century progressed, at the expense of both
44
the civil authorities and the captains . One of the
first legislative acts of Francis I was his army ordinance
of January 1515* which gives us a view of the relative
balance of powers by the end of our period. On the whole,
the clauses of the act try to strengthen the ties between
captain and troops, in the interests of military discipline:
soldiers might only change company with their captain's
permission; vacancies in the ranks caused by death were
41. Contamine, Guerre, Etat et soci6te, pp. 468-9.
42. In 1492, it was stipulated that new recruits might
only join a company at review-time, ibid., p. 489,
This law seems to have remained something of a dead
letter, judging by the number of soldiers entered
on muster-lists who had received payment for less
than one quarter-year, and had therefore enlisted
between reviews.
45. Ibid., pp. 489-93.
44. Ibid., pp. 517-8.
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to be filled by captains; all members of the company,
down to page, were to wear their captain's livery. The
1515 ordinance also tried to ensure that captains reside
with their company for at least part of the year, that
they obtain consent to leave garrison, and that they employ
experienced men as lieutenants, one of whose roles was the
policing of the company Was the Crown's authority
over its captains now so secure that, far from attempting
to undermine the proprietorial nature of his command, as
in the days of Louis XI, it was primarily concerned to
underpin the captain's power and encourage his sense of
responsibility for his company?
It is clear that by 1515 the Monarchy no longer
felt threatened by dangerously divided loyalties within
its army. The embarrassment of noble abuse of troops
in royal pay had been overcome. The major interest was
now to fashion the as yet still imperfect instrument into
a finer tool of policy - in other words, to enforce stricter
45. Ordonnances des rois de France: regne de Frangois Ier
vol. i (Paris, 1902), no. 17. Absenteeism of
captains was a problem in the fifteenth century and
an ordinance of i486 attempted to ensure that captains
reside with their company, Contamine, op.cit., p.436.
It is perhaps unwise to assume that captains were
necessarily present at muster if their name appears
on the list, as Contamine apparently does, ibid.,
p.437. Alain d'Albret regularly appears on the
lists of his unit's reviews in Italy, whilst
Gaston de Foix is present in all muster-lists of his
company, even when he cannot have been present -
although his case is admittedly exceptional, since
he became a captain of the Ordonnance when only a
child.
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discipline in the ranks, through the agency of the
Crown's executives, particularly the captains of the
Ordonnance. The complaint of Gaguin's gendarme (circa.
1490) that he is "subject and serf to the will and
bidding of the captain who has power over him,^°" is
hardly an expression of devotion to a lord and benefactor.
On the contrary, it roughly reflects the control which
the Crown itself attempts to enforce in the decrees of
1515* Contemporaries seem to have been in little doubt
who was really in charge by our period. The anonymous
historian of Charles VIII describes the gendarmes of the
Ordonnance as "... nobles all, and subjects of the King,
chosen, dismissed and paid by him alone, and not by the
47
captains, as in Italy. In almost every particular
this contemporary statement is imperfect, for not all
gendarmes were noble, nor royal subjects, and the captains
were responsible for recruitment - it could be no other
way, despite the determination of Louis XII, at the start
48
of his reign, to assume this function , for decentralised
recruitment was far more efficient. Besides, some
gendarmes at least received financial or material rewards,
46. R. Gaguin, "Le debat du laboureur, du prestre et du
gendarme", in Epistole et Orationes, ed. L. Thuasne,
vol. ii (Parish 1904), pp. 360-86; p. 36.O.
47. B.N., fr. 17519, fol. 117.
48. Diarii, ii, col. 764.
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if not wages or pensions from their captain. And can
we really believe that no gendarme was expelled from the
ranks on the authority of the captain alone? However,
despite its over-generalisation, the statement is
fundamentally correct. As an institution of state, the
Ordonnances of the King of France were the finest troops
in Western Europe - no other army could match them in
serviceability and amenability to royal control; their
organisation had been copied in Brittany and Burgundy
during the later fifteenth century, as they presented for
40
contemporaries the best model army that could be devised .
In short, it does not appear that the conclusions
of some modern historians on the respective influence of
captain and king in the army can be sustained, at least as
far as our period is concerned. Zeller, for example,
claimed that captains were virtual proprietors of their
HO
companies-^ . Russell Major insists that the first
loyalty of the gendarmerie was to their captain, and
cites the wearing of his livery as evidence of this over-
Si
riding bond^ . However, we have seen that in 1515 the
Crown itself encouraged company livery in the interests of
discipline and control. To maintain, as Russell Major
49. Contamine, op.cit., pp. 502-4 and 541-2.
50. G. Zeller, Les institutions de la France au xvie.
si6cle (Paris, I94o), p. p16.
51. Russell Major, "The Crown and the aristocracy", in
American Historical Review, vol. lxix, p. 640.
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does, that the standing army was "... but a small step
forward from the feudal levies of the Middle Ages..."^2
seems somewhat ungenerous. The process of transformation
from feudal to royal army was gradual, but nonetheless
radical for that. We can perhaps take two dates as useful
symbols of the beginning and culmination of the change,
although, of course, the evolutionary course of royal
control of the nation's main forces cannot be strictly
confined between the two. The first is 1439* when Rodrigo
de Villandrando left France, recognising that the insti¬
tution of the Ordonnances weakened the authority and status
of the independent captain-^. The second is 1490, by
which date the majority of the princes of the realm had
become permanent captains of individual companies, and
to that extent had truly entered royal service. In 1445*
such men had been loath to accept command of as small a
division as one company, prefering to lead a group of
companies as a superior commander^. BrantSme claimed
that a captaincy was not granted to a man out of favouritism
or because of his high social rank^ , but of course it
52. Russell Major, Representative institutions, p.9-
Russell Major does point out, however, that royal
ordinances encouraged the use of the captain's livery
or device by companies, as a disciplinary measure,
"The Crown and the aristocracy", loc, cit..
53. Solon, "Popular response to standing military forces",
p.92.
54. Contamine, op.cit., pp. 426-7.
55. BrantQme, Oeuvres, iii, p. 150.
often was - Gaston de Foix became a captain of the
Ordonnance when only eleven years old, in 1500. Yet,
appointments of princes to captaincies were not so much
an admission of weakness on the Crown's part, as a triumph
of assimilation of the greatest subjects in the realm to
their new role as illustrious subordinates of the King.
Despite the relative strictness of royal control,
however, there was still room for the captain to infuse
his company with his own character. Indeed, we have seen
the Crown itself encourage this trend. Units varied in
the degree to which their captain's identity was displayed
in their ranks, according to their history and his interest
in the company, but none can have utterly escaped their
captain's influence. This is most obvious in the question
of geographical bias - a brief glance at the muster rolls
of Gascon companies is sufficient to reveal it. Indeed,
this tendency was so evident that a Venetian informant in
1511 noted that the soldiers of Durfort's company were
"all Gascons-^".
The analysis of geographical origin of names in
muster lists presents many problems. Apart from the
difficulties afforded by the state of the manuscripts
themselves and the lack of a standard spelling of many
names, there is the problem of geographical identification
itself. Many towns, villages and castles in France
share a common name with one or more other settlements.
56. Diarii, xiii, col. 245.
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Besides, there is no guarantee that a man actually lives
in the place from which he derives his family name.
The Poix and Albret families are interesting examples: by
our period, the main line of the Foix was established in
Navarre, and their capital was Pamplona, hundreds of
miles from Foix itself; as for the Albret, they had by
our time largely discarded Albret, or Labrit, for the
greater attractions of N6rac, Casteljaloux, and later
Pau. Other difficulties also arise, such as non-geographical
names, like nicknames, or, quite simply, untraceable
locations. Nevertheless, with a sufficiently large sample
a generally valid pattern of geographical bias can be
B7
drawn. 1
At the beginning of our period, the Foix company
was heavily populated by gendarmes from that part of
France now incorporated within the boundaries of the
57• The following sources have been used in the preparation
of the geographical analysis: P. Joanne, Dictionnaire
g6ographique et administratif de la France^ 7 vols.
(Paris, I090-I9O5); P*^ Raymond, Dictionnaire
topographique du d.6partement des Basses-Pyren6es
(Paris, I863) ,* le Vicomte de Gourgues, Dictiormalre
topographique du d6partement de la Dordogne (Paris,
1875 j; a map of the Gouvernement Gen6ral de Guienne
et Guascogne, publ. by N. Sanson d'Abbeville (1679JT
Michelin map series, Hcale 1/200,000; Institut
G^ographique National series of Cartes Touristiques,
scale 1/100,000; details of the Estates and
composition of B6arn and related lands (later
sixteenth century), in B.N., cabinet d'Hozier 32
(dossier B6arn), pp. 52-76.
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departement of Pyr6n6es-Atlantiques. Jean de Foix-
Narbonne himself was B^arnese by birth and upbringing,
although his major possessions included the county of
Etampes, south of Paris, and the viscounty of Narbonne,
in Languedoc. Poix, then, recruited compatriots, but
rarely neighbours or vassals. On the contrary, the
Bearnese and Navarrese gendarmes of the Foix company
were, ironically enough, the subjects of Jean's great rivals,
Catherine de Foix and Jean d'Albret, Kings of Navarre and
sovereigns of B6arn. The sixty men-at-arms of the Foix-
p- O
Narbonne company mustered at Lisieux in August 1^92 ;
eighteen names are definitely B^arnese or Basque; another
nine are probably B^arnese, and many of the remainder are
Gascon-^. Over 10$ of the gendarme complement is Basque.
58. B.N., Clair.298, no. 361.
59. B|arnes_e: Andoins, Sus, B^arn, Gan, Pontaut, Ponteac,
Casemajor, Loubix, La Mousque, Lescun,
Lussagnet.
Navarrese: Gramont, Echaux, Masparraute.
Other Basques: Tardes X 2, Laxague, Palaitz.
Probable Bfearnese: Nogaret (Nogaro ?), St. Vic (St.
Abit? ), Cassagnes (Cassaigne? ),
Barrault x 2 (Barrante?), Ste.
Colombe x 2 (Ste. Colomme?),
St. Laurens (St. Laurent?),
Moniquet (M^niquet?)
Gascons: Foix, La Plume, Caupenne, Luppe, Nestier,
Castelbajac, Merville, La Marque, Arcamont,
Estang, Comminges, Aure, Binos, St. Elix,
La Mazere.
Guiennois; Esquirol x 2.
Languedociens; Villemur, Segreville, La Bruguiere.
Other southwesterners: La Mote, Montpezat.
The most common reason for the inclusion of a
name under the heading 'Probable B^arnese', rather
than 'B^arnese^ even when the name in question
closely resembles, or is indeed identical to a town
on the map, is the existence of other settlements
70.
By 1499* and the time of the first Lombard campaign, this
B^arnese-Basque weighting has increased. Fifty gendarmes
mustered in Lombardy at the end of October^; almost half
the unit, twenty-two men, have B^arnese or Basque names,
and another seven are probably in the same category.
Another ten men are certain Gascons^1. At least 22%
of the complement is Basque by this stage. But the review
of June 1509, at Plaisance , marks the high-point of far-
59• Cont/...
of the same or similar name elsewhere in France.
These other settlements are, however, usually to be
found in the south-west of the country. 'Gascon'
is defined here on lying to the south and west of the
Garonne-Arifege line (in other words, the area of
Gascon-French speech today). 'Guiennois' come from
the region to the north of this divide (those parts
of Bordelais, Bazadais and Agenais north of the
Garonne, plus Quercy, P6rigord and Limousin), whilst
'Languedociens' originate from the area to the east
(Rouergne, Albigeois, Toulousain and Foix, east of
the Ariege). Names put under the heading of 'Other
southwesterners' are generally those which are
common throughout these regions.
60. B.N.,n.a. fr. 8612, fol.
61. B^arnese: B6arn, Lescun, Gan , Sanguinados, Gurs,
Araux, Ponteac, Casemajor, Fanget, Gabaston.
Navarrese: Lic6rasse , Gramont x 2, Aguerre, Uhart,
Masparrante x 4, Echaux, Alfaro
Other Basque: Domezain
Probables; Barrault, St. Abit, Maisonnave, Lannebraz
(Lannegrasse?), Marie (Maria?7* Ste.
Colombe, St. Laurens.
Gascons: Foix, Lupp6, La Plume, Bazillac, Lannecanne,
St. Elix, Maul6on, La Marque, ,Saurat, Merville.
Languedociens: Lautrec, Fendeille, Segreville, Toulouse,
62. B.N., fr. 21506, no. 720. ^ Bruguiere.
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western Pyrenean dominance in the Foix company, as far as
its history is told in muster rolls - no less than half
the gendarme complement, twenty-six soldiers, are now
B^arnese or Basque, with three more probables; a half-
63
dozen or so more men can be identified as Gascons
At least 20$ of company strength in Basque, at gendarme
level. This regional bias declines somewhat with the
last two reviews studied. In February 1506^ only
fifteen of fifty names, and one probable, fall into the
Pyr6n6es-Atlantiques group; a few more Gascons and other
63
south-westerners can be identified , but by now the
63. Bearnese: Bearn, Fanget, Gabaston x 2, Lescun, Le
Lion, Arros x 2, Arbouet, Sanguinados, Ara. x-le
Basque, Gurs, Aydie, Anescat, Casemajor, Gayrosse.
Navarrese: La Carre, Masparrante x 4, Aguerre, Uhart,
Echaux, Gramont, Alfaro.
Probables: Maisonnave, Lannebraz, St. Abit.
Gascons: Foix, Lupp6, La Marque, Lannecanne, Saurat
Guiennois: Esquirol x 2.
Other southwesterner: Bernet.
We would of course expect the Bearnese bias of the Foix
company to be kept up by its effective commander from
1500, Roger de Bearn, Foix's lieutenant.
64. B.N., fr. 21507, no. 765.
65. B^arnese; B^arn x 2, Fanget, Le Lion, Aydie, Anescat,
Arros, Gabaston, Sanguinados.




Gascons: Foix, Bazillac, Mascaron, Benesse.
Guiennois: Esquirol, Carles.
Languedocien: Mirepoix
Other southwesterners: Bernet, La Mothe.
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recruitment net seems to have been spread more widely -
we can find a Fleming, one, perhaps two Germans, Italians,
and maybe more non-French troops. The Basque proportion
has dropped back to 12 %. These 1506 results are mirrored
in the last Foix company muster, of March 1510^:
fourteen names are B^arnese or Basque, plus three probables,
67
and there is a clutch of definite Gascons 1. Again there
is a sprinkling of foreigners.
When we turn to the Albret company, the emphasis
shifts northwards, away from the Pyrenees towards the
heartland of Gascony, particularly the area now included
within the borders of the departement of Gers. Forty-
nine gendarmes were reviewed at Castres in June 1498^:
some fifteen names fall into the region between the
66. B.N., fr. 21507, no. 8l4.
67. B^arnese: Beam, Fanget, Gan, Anescat x 2, Le Lion,
Lubieng, Sanguinados.
Navarrese: Le Carre, Licerasse, Masparraute.
Other Basques: Laxague, Urtebie, Athac.
Probables: Esteven, Garrou (Garroa?), Poyau (Puyoo?).
Gascons: Foix, Bazillac, Comminges, Benesse,
Arblade, Lupp6, Mascaron, Coussan, La
Borde.
Languedociens: Ambres, Rennes
Other southwesterners; La Mothe, Laroque x 2.
68. B.N., fr. 21504, no. 607.
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Pyrenean d6partements and the Garonne river; most of the
remainder are south-western names, a few from Albret's
territories north of the Garonne, Perigord and Limousin0^.
70
The muster at Asti of February 1502' reveals a roughly
similar distribution - twelve to fourteen names from the
area centred on Gers, and a smattering of men from
71
Perigord, Quercy, and the Pyrenees . In the muster at
72
Parma in July 1505* of only forty-two men-at-arms, we
have ten to eleven names from the major region and small
69. Heartland Gascons: Albret, Armagnac x 2, Caupenne,
Gabarret, Puypardin, Bezolles x
3, Polastron, Caussens, Puydraguin,
Serillac, Espagnet, Verduzan.
Probables: Roquetaillade, Arques.
B6arriese and Basques: B^arn, Espellete, Laxague.
Bigorran: Aure.
Guiennois: Cardaillac, Montbeton, Boissieres,
Ambazac, St. Chamassy, St. Chamant,
Marqueyssac, Sermet.
Other southwesternes: Labat, Castres, Cassaignes,
La Barte, La Mote, Durfort,
La Faurie, Rabastens, Roydde.
70. B.N., fr. 25783, no. 41.
71. Heartland Gascons; Albret, Armagnac, Caupenne,
Bezolles x 2, Gabarret, Polastron,
Espagnet, Stuc, Tartas, Serillac.
Probables: Roquetaillade, Arques.
Bbarnese and Basques: Beam, Espellete, Coarraze,
Laxague.
Bigorran: Aure.
Guiennois: Cardaillac, Villemade, Montbeton, Espinas,
Ambazac, St. Chamassy, Marqueyssac,
Sermet.
Other southwesterners: Durfort x 2, La Mote, La Hitte,
Roydde, Labat, La Faurie.
72. B.N., fr. 25784, no. 82.
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contributions from the lands north of the Garonne^.
Between 1505 and the next review in the survey, at Crema
74
in August 1509 3 Jean de Durfort-Duras assumed command
of Albret's unit. The latter muster shows a complement
of only seven to ten names from the lands south of the
Garonne, whilst those from Guienne are about nine^.
76
When we come to the Duras company muster of May 1515 >
the recruitment pattern seems to have moved a little
further north again - the identifiable names are split
77
roughly into two groups of equal size by the river Garonne'1.
73* Heartland Gascons: Albret, Tournemire x 3* Polastron,
Millet, Toujouse, Andirans, Merens,
Olivier.
Probable: Roquetaillade.
Guiennois: Duras, Espinas, Foissac, Le Maine.
Probable: Murat.
Other southwesterners: La Faurie, La Mothe, Montclar,
La Borde.
74. B.N., Clair. 241, no. 639-
75* Heartland Gascons: Olivier x 2, Tournemire, Polastron,
Barbotan, Andirans, Merens.
Probables; Roquetaillade, Montault, Mauleon.
Bearnese: Campsor.
Guiennois: Duras x 2, Combebonnet, Espinas, Foissac,
Esquirol, La Bourlie, Negrepelisse, Le
Maine
Other southwesterners: La Faurie, Salles, Montclar,
La Mothe, Laroque.
76. B.N., fr. 25786, no. 5.
77. Heartland Gascons; Olivier x 3* Polastron, Leon,
Andirans, Eenquet.
Probables; Fargues, Bessac (Berrac?), Arsse (Ausse?),
Maul6on.
Guiennois: Duras x 3* Lustrac x 2, Espinas, Espanel,
Hautefort, Esquirol, Negrepelisse.
Probables: Montauban, Le Buisson, Le Maine.
Pyreneans: Campsor, Foix.
Other Southwesterners: Montclar, Beaupuy, La Mothe.
75.
Both the Foix and Albret-Duras companies, there¬
fore, show a marked tendency towards recruitment of
compatriots of the captain into the ranks of the gendarmerie.
But the most spectacular example of this bias is provided
by Gratien d'Aguerre's unit^®. Gratien was a Basque, but
he held property and royal office in Champagne; his
company, after its return from Naples at the end of
Charles VIIl's reign, was stationed almost continuously,
it appears, at Mouzon in the Ardennes, where Aguerre was
governor. Indeed, Gratien's ties with his homeland would
seem non-existent, were it not for the personnel of his
cornpagnie d'ordonnance. Basques and other Gascons abound
within its ranks. The April 1493 review ^ shows that at
this stage about one half at least of his gendarmerie were
Basques, including men from Spain and Spanish Navarre.
A similar proportion of Basques, between 40 and 50$ of
gendarme strength, is revealed in all the subsequent
muster rolls of the company which have survived. Such
men must have been conspicuous travellers on the roads
linking the Pyrenees to the Ardennes, as they rode to
join the company at Mouzon, or headed home on leave.
What are we to make of the results of this
geographical study? It is clear that a captain of the
78. Valuable information on this subject is provided by
Jaurgain, in "Profils basques", in Revue des Basses-
Pyrenees, iv, pp. 41-8 and 138-9.
79. B.N., fr. 21503, no. 499-
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Ordonnanee tended to recruit gendarmes who were his
compatriots, even though his company might rarely see
service in his country. Both the Foix and Albret-Duras
companies spent much of our period in Italy, yet both
maintained a hard core of Gascons, indeed of B^arnese
and Basques in the case of Foix, amongst the gendarmerie
throughout the Italian Wars. Gradually a greater
number of foreigners enter the ranks, no doubt largely
as a result of service in a cosmopolitan war-theatre;
to
yet the change is hardly dramatic. As for Gratien
i
d'Aguerre, his links with the south-west appear to have
been negligible, certainly from the time that he assumed
Oa
command of a company in 1479 # but fellow Basques and
other Gascons dominate his unit throughout our period.
The racial solidarity of the Aguerre company is maintained
more surely than in other Gascon companies, owing to the
relative stability of its existence, its lack of
casualties and its isolation. We can also note how
the Albret company, under the command of Jean de Duras
for some years by 1515# was by this date more heavily
populated by soldiers from the Garonne Basin area, where
Duras itself is located, than it had been under Alain
d'Albret, when the emphasis had been on the Gascon heart¬
land.
80. Jaurgain, op. cit., p. 51.
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Enlistment appears to have been a matter of
personal rather than physical contact. A recruit did
not so much enter his local company as the one in which
a relative, friend or acquaintance already served, be
he the captain, an under-officer or simple man-at-arms.
In this way, for instance, Monluc became an archer in the
Lescun company in Italy - a maternal uncle served in the
On
unit already and procured a place for his nephew
Regional solidarity was not based upon service location
but upon the geographical origin of the personnel.
Consequently, racial uniformity was not much impaired
by constant travel, service abroad, or even necessarily
by change of captain.
Apart from the Fontrailles company, for which no
muster rolls survive, and the Orval company, which saw no
Italian service, the Foix-B6arn, Albret-Duras, and Aguerre
companies were the only Gascon-led units which existed in
the Grande Ordonnance for any length of time between 1494
and 1515. Within this context, the preponderance of men
from B6arn and the Basque country within the ranks of
these 'Gascon* companies is striking. Did this small
area produce an inordinate number of soldiers? It is
true that both Jean de Foix-Narbonne and Gratien d'Aguerre
were natives of the area, and we would thus expect a fair
8l. Monluc, Commentaires, p. 30.
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representation of compatriots. Roger de B6arn also was
obviously B^arnese, and after he assumed command of the
Foix company it continued to include a nucleus of men
Op
from the western Pyrenees, as one would expect. Further¬
more, Alain d'Albret, who was the father of the King of
Navarre, sovereign of Beam, did not attract many recruits
from the Pyren6es-Atlantiques area. After such consider¬
ations are recalled, however, the domination of Gascon-
led companies by B6arnese and Basques is still remarkable.
When the King of Navarre was granted a company of 100
lances in 1512, he recruited a good number of these types,
8~3
without apparently attracting men from existing units. ^
The other Gascon-led company formed at the end of Louis
XII1s reign, the 50 lances of Odet de Foix-Lautrec, was not
84
particularly Gascon in flavour according to Jaurgain,
even though Lautrec was Navarrese by upbringing. Many
Gascons served in the ranks of other French companies,
but many of these who are brought to our attention in
82. Muster of 4th September, 1515 (100 lances complete),
B.N., n.a. fr. 86l6, fol. 6. The following
Bearnese and Basques can be identified amongst the
gendarmerie: B6arn x Crouseilles, Anescat,
Doumy, M^ritein, Maubec, Navailles, Perroix,
Gramont x 2, Troisvilles, Beaumont, Laxague x 2,
Urtebie, P6ritz de Garro, Negonavarre, Lobieng,
St. Abit.
85. Muster of December 1512, of 70 lances of the Navarre
company, B.N., fr. 21508, no. 856. The following
Bearnese and Basque men-at-arms are identifiable:
Angos, Agnoas, Doumy, Auga, Angous, Laas, Castella,
Estibaire, Dous, B^arn, Sadirac, Labatut, Arricau,
Lascar, Baudreix, Viellepinte, Castetpugon,
Armendaritz x 2, Belsunce, Echaux, Aguerre, Le
Basque x 2.
84. Jaurgain, op.cit., p. 158, n.1.
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literary sources, for example, are from the Western
Pyrenees too. Although Beam and basse-Navarre must
only have accommodated something between 17 and 20% of the
85
population of Gascony, the area was well known for its
large number of noble families - over eight hundred in
Beam according to a German traveller88, seven hundred
according to a contemporary history of the counts of
Foix87.
Within this broad geographical context, more
definite relationships between captain and man-at-arms
can be identified. The captaincy of a body of gendarmes
provided an important opportunity to advance the careers
of members of one's own family. Gratien d'Aguerre made
use of the chance. Although his son and heir, Jean, only
entered his father's company, as lieutenant, in 1511#
having already served in the unit of the Marshal de Gi6
and later the hundred gentlemen of the household, Gratien's
bastard son, Menaud, served in the company from 1507 at
85. This estimate is based on the figures for parishes and
households in 1328, F. Lot, "L'etat des paroisses et
des feux de 1328", in D.E.C., vol. xc (1929), pp.
51-107 and 276-315. However, we are told that
B^arn was largely untouched by the devastation of
war in the fifteenth century, compared with, say,
the Agenais, or, to a lesser degree, the Bordelais,
Boutruche, "The devastation of rural areas", in
The recovery of France, ed. Lewis, p. 29. Perhaps,
therefore, the proportion of Gascony's population
housed by B6arn was somewhat greater in 1500 than it
had been in 1328.
86. E. Deprez, "jerdme Milnzer et son voyage dans le midi
de la France en 1494-5"* in Annales du Midi, vol.
xlviii (1936), pp. 55-79; P. 73-
87. B.N., p.o. 1177# fol. 686.
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least . Amongst Gratien's nephews, four were members
of his company at various times,^ whilst four others
90
served in other units . A great-nephew also served in
Gratien's troop from 1510, and a first cousin, Pierre de
la Carre, until 1507^1. To a considerable extent,
therefore, the military careers of members of this family
revolved around the company of its most illustrious
representative. Indeed, so close were the ties between
the Aguerre that, when Gratien died, all but one of his
relatives in the company, son Jean, nephew Jehannot, and
a certain Francisque, whose identity is unclear, left as
92
well, as the unit was taken over by Louis de Hangest^ .
At any time between 1501 and 1514, the muster
rolls of the Aguerre company show us that about 10$ of
his gendarme strength was made up of close relatives,
including himself, with sometimes one other kinsman
serving as an archer, awaiting promotion after his
apprenticeship. This calculation even excludes other
soldiers called Aguerre, who are always present but whose
family ties with Gratien are uncertain. If such a con-
88. Jaurgain, op.cit., pp. 354, 331-2, and 148, respectively.
The post of lieutenant had been held by Gratien s
brother-in-law, Jehannot d'Athac, some thirty years
before Jean's arrival, ibid., p.5*
89. Ibid., pp. 152-3, 155 and n.l. The B&tard de Luxe,
gendarme of the Aguerre company until 1510 at least,
is called a 'nephew' of Gratien's in a letter of
1498, L-G. Pelissier, "Note e documenti su Luigi
XII e Ludovico Sforza", in A,S.I., ser. 5, vol.
xxiii (1899), pp. 145-54, p. 153. Jaurgain does
not seem to have known of this particular connection,
so that Luxe has been added to the three nephews
cited by him.
90. Jaurgain, op.cit., pp. 35, 153-4 and 157-8.
91. Ibid., pp. 164 and 44, respectively.
92. B.N., fr. 21510,no.946. Great-nephew Guilhemto stayed with
Hangest.
centration of relatives is less evident in the other
companies under scrutiny, it is no doubt as a result of
the higher social status of men like Alain d'Albret,
Jean de Foix and his son Gaston, and Louis d'Armagnac,
whose family members were destined for loftier posts
than plain man-at-arms. Besides, both Gaston and Louis,
for a number of reasons, suffered from a distinct
shortage of serviceable, close kinsmen. Jean de Foix's
lieutenant from at least 1497, and later Gaston de
Foix's as well, was Roger, baron de B^arn, whom Jean
called his 'nephew' in his will^, although he was in
fact his second cousin. After B^arn himself had in¬
herited the Foix company, it included three of his
relatives, as lieutenant and prominent gendarmes,
94
Bertrand and Frangois de Beam, and Francois de Gramonm .
This pattern is mirrored in the Albret-Duras company: on
the assumption of command by Jean de Durfort-Duras, a
man of inferior pedigree to Alain d'Albret, a greater
admission of relatives into the company is apparent.
By 1515* two other Duras have entered the ranks, including
a son, Frangois; also a certain Jean de Foix, who is
possibly a kinsman through Durfort's second wife,
Catherine de Foix. Finally, the lieutenant is now
99. Boucher de Molandon, "Le testament de Jean de Foix,"
in Bulletin historique et philolcgique (1885), P-35-
94. Muster of 4th September, 1515# B.N., n.a. fr. 86l6,
fol. 6; see Anselme, vol. iii, pp. 392-5-
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Bertrand de Lustrac, who married Durfort's daughter.
Marguerite, in 15Hj and one Anthoine de Lustrac,
doubtlessly a relative of Bertrand, has also become a
qg ,
gendarme-^. The short-lived company of Odet d Aydie
was headed by two other Aydies, apart from Odet himself,
in 1495^* Jayme de St. Colombe, lieutenant of the
company of Odet de Foix-Lautrec, was his captain's second
• 97cousin^ .
Gendarmes were sometimes personal servants of
their captain. Lieutenants in particular were their
captain's men, throughout our period. A Venetian
ambassador in Milan made this clear in 1520 when he
observed that company lieutenants received pensions from
Q8
their captain, as well as from the King^ . To Jean de
Foix, his lieutenant Roger de B6arn was his "... very
dear nephew and servant...", to whom Foix bequeathed a
QQ
lordship in his will^ . Roger was also bailli and
95- Muster of Jlst May, 1515# B.N., fr. 25786, no. 5;
Anselme, v, pp. 735-5] Lauzun, "Le chateau de
Duras", in Revue de l'Agenais, vol. xlviii, p.171.
Frangois de Duras served in the St. Andre company
during 1512-14, despite his father captaining a
unit during these years, B.N. fr. 21508, nos. 857 and
874.
96. B.N., n.a. fr. 8612, fol.I.
97. Jaurgain, Deux comtes de Comminges, pp. 76-81;
Anselme, iii, pp. 373-5.
98. Caroldo's relation, in Relazioni degli ambasciatorl
veneti al senato, ed. Segarizzi, vol. i'i, p.20.
99* Boucher de Molandon, loc.cit..
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captain of Etampes from 1491 to 1517* offices at the
disposal of the Foix till 1512"^®. Although the ties
between Foix and B6arn were obviously close, their
strength was never tested, as were those between Alain
d'Albret and his one-time lieutenant, Raymond de
Cardailhac. We have already seen how Cardailhac led
perhaps the bulk of the Albret company to Alain's aid in
Brittany in 1487; subsequently, unlike most of the
deserters, he stood by his captain and was rewarded for
his loyalty by inclusion in the terms of the Treaty of
of Nantes in 1491 - he was to receive a royal pension of
1200 livres and a company of 50 lances of his own'1"^"''.
100. G.R., no. 12364. Roger did not rely only upon the
Foix for advancement. In March, 1511* the seigneur
de Boissy wrote to Louis XII, asking that B^arn
be promoted to the seneschalship of Valentinois, in
Dauphin<§, B.N., fr. 2928, fol. 17- Soon after
B6arn got this post, Boissy became governor of
Dauphine, G.R., no. 7856. The link between the
two men lasted until Roger's death, with Boissy
as count of Etampes and B6arn as bailli of the
same, ibid., nos. 12364-5-
101. Luchaire, Alain le grand, pp. 70 and 75- P6li.cier
notes that Cardaillac was one of three men who
negotiated the surrender of Nantes with Charles VIII*
on Albret's behalf (for which the three were paid
18,000 livres by the King), Lettres de Charles VIII,
vol. i., p. 192, n.l. Another of the three was
Arnaut de St. Chamant, seigneur de Lissac, who had
replaced Roger de Gramont as seneschal of Lannes by
1492,G.R., no. 13874 - further remuneration, perhaps,
for his services at Nantes. As part of the surrender
terms, Albret's son, Gabriel, also replaced the count
of Ca-ndale as seneschal of Guienne, ibid., nos. 13470
and 20138-9; ironically enough, Candale was the very
man who had defeated Alain at Nontron in 1487,
Lettres, i, p. 189, n.l. Evidently, those who
stood by Alain d'Albret were not let down. However,
by the time of the wars in Italy, Lissac appears as
a loyal servant of the Crown, commanding the
artillery in Naples in 1502, for example, Auton,
vol. ii, p. 278 and n.3 - another reformed rebel.
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Cardailhac was an inveterate companion of Albret: near
Orleans in 1483, for instance, he had signed as a witness
1 OP
an engagement of his master's . Although he was soon
to lose his new company, he did become seneschal of Quercy
103
in 1493 • The relationship between Albret and Jean de
Durfort-Duras is less clear. Jean's younger brother,
Georges, was lieutenant of the Albret company in 1492-3,
during an interlude in Cardailhac's tenancy of the post.
Certainly a plaintiff against Duras, Jean Aubin, seigneur
de Surgieres, did not underestimate the strength of the
ties which bound the defendant to Alain d'Albret -
Surgiferes wanted his case to be transferred from the
Parlement of Bordeaux to the Great Council of the King,
because his opponent, Duras, was the "lieutenant-general
of Monsieur d'Albret, governor of Guienne, who had
influence and favour" in the Parlement"1"^. Lieutenants
continued to be personal appointees of captains throughout
our period. The Crown accepted this: in 1515, Francis
102. C. Samaran, La malson d'Armagnac au XVe sibcle et
les dernieres luttes de la feodallte dans le Midi
de la France (Paris, 1907), pieces justificatives,
p.44l. In 1487, both he and Lissac were to be
handed into royal custody as hostages, amongst
others, for Albret's good behaviour, Lettres, i,
p. 192.
103. G.R., no. 18654. Cardailhac is another who, after
a rebellious past, settles into a career of service
to the Crown, in Quercy and in Italy.
104. B.N., fr. 21503, no. 501.
105. Viala, Le Parlement de Toulouse, vol. ii, p. 451.
85-
I simply insisted that lieutenants be experienced warriors"1"^
- it was not the client status of these men that interested
the King, but their military quality, in this most impor¬
tant of posts in the standing army.
The ties of clientage reached down into the
lower ranks as well. Every captain had always maintained
a number of gendarmes and archers in his retinue, and even
Louis XI had been unable to abolish the practice. Since
these soldiers would accompany the captain in his movements
(and many captains spent much time away from their companies)
107
the tendency obviously weakened company strength . The
maintenance of retinues continued throughout our period,
however, and was even sanctioned in law: the 1515
ordinance authorised a detachment of six gendarmes and
ten archers for a captain of 100 lances, when he was in
attendance upon the King; four and eight respectively
when the captain was absent from his company for any other
reason. In the captain's absence, his lieutenant must
remain with the company, but he too, and more junior
108
officers, were entitled to a small archer guard
As Lieutenant-General in Milan, Odet de Lautrec kept a
court of twenty-five gentlemen from his company who
received pensions from him, apart from their wages as
royal soldiers"*"^. Jean de Foix left 400 gold ecus
106. Ordonnances de Francois ler, i, no. 17* clause 19-
107. Contamine, Guerre, Etat et soclete, pp. 484-5.
108. Ordonnances, i, no. 17, clauses 12 and 14.
109. Caroldo's relation, p.13.
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to one of his gendarmes, Jehannot de la Plume, in his will,
whilst the document itself, drawn up at Orleans when the
Foix company was almost certainly elsewhere, was witnessed
by Jehannot de Gan, one of Foix's mattres d'hQtel and a
gendarme of his company, a certain Raoulin le Natier, an
archer of the company, and one Jean Horin, valet de
chambre and also an archer of the Foix company, amongst
others.'1""1"® Another of Jean de Foix's gendarmes, Gaston
de St. Laurens, was a long-standing servant: he was
granted revenues "... in consideration of the good and
agreeable services which... he had performed since the
time of his youth, as valet de chambre ordinaire, as well
as in other ways...'1'"1''1"". One of Alain d'Albret's
henchmen, Helyot de Rouffiac, served in the Albret company
112
until June 1503 > he was one of those who had guarded
Charles d'Armagnac when he was imprisoned at Casteljaloux
castle by Alain'1"'1'^.
110. Boucher de Molandon, op.cit., pp. 35-6.
111. B.N., p.o. 1174, no. 226. All these servants of
Jean de Foix-Narbonne can be found in the review
of his company on 27th October, 1499, B.N., n.a.
fr. 86L2, fol. 33.
112. B.N., fr. 21503, no. 501; B.N., Clair. 239, no
451. Despite his noble status, Rouffiac had been
demoted from gendarme to archer by 1498, after the
Albret company had been halved in size, B.N., fr.
21504, no. 607.
115. Samaran, op.cit., pp. 275 and 465.
87.
Other, less formal connections between captain
and gendarme can be established. Gaspard de Villemur,
who served in the Foix company in 1492-3, was made
governor of the county of Comminges in January 1496, to
114
see particularly to its defence . It was at this time
that Charles VIII was attempting to install Jean de Foix-
Narbonne in the county. Pierre de Tardes, a man-at-arms
in the company at the same time as Villemur, is later found
as castellan of three places in Dauphine, at the time when
llg
Gaston de Foix was governor of this province. ^ Jean
Segnier, who may well have been the same man as he of that
name who served in the Foix company between 1497 and 1504,
was viguier of Narbonne between 1509 and 1513^"^* the
viscounty of Narbonne was held by the Foix until 1507* so
perhaps Segnier was simply continuing in the post he had
held under his former company captain. Finally, it
seems probable that Roger de Beam's lieutenant as captain-
castellan of Mauleon, governor of Soule, 'noble Jehannot,
seigneur de Faget', was the same man as Jehannot de
Fanget, who served as man-at-arms in the Foix company
(under the effective command of Bearn) between 1498 and
1510"l"1"^. No doubt examples of this sort could be multi¬
plied, but it would be a mistake to think of such relation¬
ships being necessarily detrimental to the interests of
114. B.N., Clair. 238, no. 36I; B.N., fr. 21503, no. 495;
G.R., no. 21901.
115. Ibid., nos. 9198, 9927* 12052 and 12054.
116. B.N., fr. 21505, no. 627 and fr. 25783, no. 51;
G ,R. * no. 5909 bis.
117. Jaurgain, "Les capitaines de MaulSon," in Revug de
B6arn, vol. ii, p. 253; B.N., fr. 21505* no. 627 and
fr. 21507* no. 814.
the Crown. For once powerful nobles had become tied to
the Monarchy by means of pensions and offices, their
clients, who became indirect recipients of royal bounty,
came to have a vested interest in the maintenance of the
tie. Company solidarity was, as we have seen, actively
encouraged by the Crown. Besides, only a minority of
gendarmes and archers were ever involved in the personal
service of their captain. A Venetian envoy to France,
reporting in 1492, even implied that the positions of
gendarme and servant were mutually exclusive: "... apart
from their companies, they maintained their familiars,
lift
more or less of them, according to their pensions ,"
he claimed, when discussing the French nobility.
* * *
The gendarmerie of the king of France was the
heavy weapon of his army, and its ideal role in combat was
akin to that of the battlefleet in the heyday of the
Dreadnought battleship. It was to smash into, and reduce
to disarray, the enemy line, by sheer weight, velocity
and fury. Given the battle-role, the equipment of a
gendarme appears logical enough. The man-at-arms wore
full armour, from head to toe, and carried a wooden lance
118. Contarini's relation, in Relazionl degli
ambasciatori veneti al senato, ed. Alberi, vol.
iv, p. 21.
as his basic offensive weapon. Equally important and
more expensive than this equipment was the gendarme's
horse. The number of horses per lance has been the
subject of differing opinions. All that need be said
is that the man-at-arms would have had more than one
mount, including one big horse for use in combat^"1"^.
The returning Venetian ambassador's report of 1492 noted
that the heavy horse of the gendarme was armoured with
120
bards , although a modern authority cites an Italian
eyewitness, who saw 900 lances at Reggio-Emilia in 1494
121
and counted only four pairs of bards amongst them
Bards or no, this heavy cavalry, supported by a larger
body of light horse, called 'archers' by the French, was
a formidable, if rather inflexible tool. This quality
depended to a large degree upon the quality of the horses.
They certainly impressed the Italians: for example, the
men of the Fontrailles company at Treviglio in 1509 were
described as "... in excellent condition, in regard to
both weapons and mounts", whilst the company of Jean de
119. Caroldo, op.cit., p. 20.
120. Contarini, op.cit., p. 20.
121. Y. Labande-Mailfert, Charles VIII et son milieu,
1470-98 (Paris, 1975), P- 247. Part of this
force consisted of the company of Louis d'Armaganc.
It seems probable that bards were not being worn
on this occasion simply because the troops in
question were not in readiness for battle.
90.
Dur fart-Duras, stationed at Crema in 1512, also excited
the admiration of the Venetians, for it was composed of
"... very good men, fine-looking," and with "... beautiful
122
horses... ". After the surrender of Crema by Duras to
the Venetians, he and his men were afraid lest the Swiss
forces nearby should carry out their threat to hack the
French to pieces; Duras wanted protection from Venice.
Her representatives suggested a retreat eastwards as far
as Venice itself, or some other secure location. This
plan would have entailed the French abandoning their horses
(presumably because the intention was to embark the company
for a sea voyage back to France), so that Duras declined
the offer: "The French love their horses very much and want
to take them back to France", concluded the spokesman of
123
the Republic . The fine quality of French horses in the
, 124
archers ranks also impressed the Venetians
122. Diarii, vol. viii, col. 215 and vol. xv, cols. 82-5-
The French garrison which surrendered at Treviglio
in 1509 possessed one hundred and fifty "... perfect
chargers" and two hundred other horses, even though
it numbered only 50 or so men-at-arms, some light
horse and 1500 foot, ibid., viii, cols 205, 210
and 215. The Fontrailles company of 30 lances -
soon to be increased to 40 - formed the bulk of the
cavalry, therefore. As a cavalryman, the gendarme
had to act as blacksmith as well as soldier: the
B&tard de Luxe, of the Aguerre company, carried a
maintenance kit for his horse, with hammer, pliers,
shoes and nails, Pelissier, op.cit., in A.S.I.,
ser. 5, xxiii, p. 154.
123. Diai'ii, xv, col. 99.
124. Caroldo, op.cit., p.17.
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Perhaps the combat role of the gendarmerie
also partially helped to determine its moral character¬
istics. Essentially an offensive weapon, furious in
the charge but vulnerable in the face of well-defended
fieldworks, the Ordonnances were often intolerant of
lengthy operations requiring the qualities of patience
and doggedness. Machiavelli thought the French
gendarmerie impetuous rather than courageous, for it was
impatient of hardship: the gendarmes "... were more than
men at first, but afterwards less than women", he con-
12S
eluded, in reference to the Ravenna campaign of 1512 .
He was simply echoing a cliche of the times, for
Commynes had mentioned the inveterate dictum: "... on
their arrival the French are more than men, but in retreat
they are less than women." Commynes, however, was more
willing to accept the first part of the aphorism than the
last - the cavalry were "... truly the fiercest men that
126
could be encountered in the whole world' ." The
contemporary image of the gendarme as a lusty rogue of
extravagant tastes and dubious morals complements this
wartime personality. He is a man full of show and
bravado, but basically a shirker, even a coward. This
is a picture we can accept more readily when we remember
125. Machiavelli, "Sketch of France", in Works, tr.
Farneworth, ii, pp. 496-7.
126. P. de Commynes, Memoirs, tr. I. Cazeaux, ed. S.
Kinser, vol. ii, (Columbia, 1973)* P* 5^1*
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that the average age of both gendarmes and archers was
only about 28 years, (although that of captains was
perhaps 40 to 50)1'"'''.
Gaguin's gendarme is a rough type, much given to
swearing, who despises both the priest and the labourer
with whom he argues - the former is not only a "weakling"
but a miser, whilst the latter is chastised as a coward
123
and drunken imbecile . The gendarme rounds off his
discourse by concluding that "... if St. Peter himself had
lived amongst gendarmes he would have become coarse... for
such was the nature of war and arms.'1"2^" The Estates -
General of 1484 were treated to complaints about soldiers'
bad language: "... without fear or respect they swear,
lie and blaspheme the name of God, the Virgin, and the
130"
blessed Saints. ^ And as well as a blasphemer, the
gendarme was a notorious womaniser. Compagnies d'ordon-
ance were normally attended by a band of hangers-on,
including prostitutes; this was condoned by the authorities,
131
although subject to occasional regulation ^ . One article
of the 1515 army act simply proscribes the use of horses
127. Contamine, op.cit., pp. 456 and 4l6.
128. Gaguin, Epistole et Orationes, ii, pp. 36O-5.
129. Ibid., p. 565.
Ij50. Masselin, Journal, p. 207.
151. Contamine, op.cit.,pp.451-2.
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by women camp-followers - their presence as such was not
1"52
apparently questioned . Gaguin's labourer complained
that he had to provide "... white bedsheets for (the
gendarme's) whore"'"" whilst a contemporary song
celebrates the abduction of a girl by gendarmes on their
way to Italy:
"Have you seen the lass
The gendarmes took away?
They dressed her like a page,
To pass through Dauphin6...
Proverbially, the gendarme also spent money
immoderately. It appears that he was addicted to many
aspects of the noble life - hunting, gaming, sports -
without necessarily being of noble birth by any means.
Contamine suggests that perhaps only between a half and
three-quarters of gendarmes were noblemen, although a
career in the Ordonnances might be regarded as proof of
gentility, or at least act in support of a claim to such
lbb
status ^ . At all events, the ranks of the gendarmerie
included a whole range of men of varying fortunes, and it
can well be imagined how the humbler type of recruit ran
132. Ordonnances de Frangois Ier, i, no. 17, clause 35*
133* Gaguin, op.cit., p. 352.
134. Chansons du XVe siecle, publ. by G. Paris (Societe
des Anciens Textes Frangais) (Paris, 1875), P* ^1-
135. Contamine, op.cit., pp. 472-6 and 498. Archers
were not usually noblemen, ibid., p. 465.
into financial difficulties in his attempts to ape the life¬
style of his richer colleagues - a tendency common enough,
for example, in British cavalry regiments in the late
Victorian army. Apart from the expense of equipment and
1*56
horses ^ , luxury items emptied the purse. The 1515
ordinance complained that troops had been transporting
baggage with them on campaign, and granted this privilege
137
only to officers . More scathing criticism of the love
of finery is available in literary sources. Gaguin's
priest accuses his victim of excessive devotion to
fashionable clothes, leaving the gendarme with no option
but to live off the populace, once he had spent all his
money. The priest goes on to chide the soldier with
softness - instead of enjoying his "... coffers, dogs and
birds", he should go and do some fighting"1"^®. At the
Tours Estates, many gendarmes were accused of presumptuous
extravagance: "... everyone is now dressed in velvets
and silks, which is a most harmful situation, both for
the prosperity of the realm and for its morals; for there
is not a musician, valet, barber, or a man-at-arms - (I
am not speaking of the nobles amongst them) - who is not
clothed in velvet, with a collar and gold ring, like the
princes... I do not see the point of silk and velvets in
156. Contamine calculates that during the period 1440-60,
full equipment would have cost at least 220 livres
tournois, the equivalent of the revenue of a fine
fief, or nearly fifteen months' pay, ibid., p. 510*
See also annexe XII, section D.
137. Ordonnances, no. 17, clause 4.
138. Gaguin, op.cit., p. 358.
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]_3ZQ
war... ." The image of the sumptuously dressed but
penniless gendarme is a recurring theme in contemporary
literature. The poet Henri Baude sets up this stock
character as a figure of fun, "puffed-up like a toad,"
in his "Ballad of an elegant dandy1'"*"^. Another song
tells of "dainty dandies" dressed in their fashionably-
cut doublets, with their extravagant headgear and fancy
shoes, who are finally unable to pay for their modest
l4l
lodgings . In both poems, the gendarme is not only
over-dressed but a shirker too; Baude's soldier wears a
torn coat so as to give the impression of having just
142
returned from action . As for the "dainty dandies",
143
they require two pails of water for washing each morning .
Naturally, these images are caricatures. Yet
there is no doubt that gendarmes valued appearances
highly. BrantSme, who does not write ironically, tells
us that Lautrec always bore scars on his face, from wounds
sustained at the battle of Ravenna - they were "... marks
of honour worthy of esteem"1"^. " Gentlemen of the time,
BrantSme assures us, despised the study of letters as
139. Masselin, op.cit., p. 209.
140. Quicherat, "Henri Baude", in B.E.C., vol. x, p.121.
141. Chansons, pp. 130-1.
142. Quicherat, loc . cit..
143. Chansons, p. 131*
144. BrantSme, Oeuvres, iii, pp. 188-9.
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effeminate, although the author thinks this attitude
foolish; Lautrec's brother, Lescun, whose company Monluc
joined, was no exception, so he quit the law for the
145
army ^.
The role of Gascony in providing the bulk of
Prance's native infantrymen during our period is well-
known. Machiavelli excluded from his general deprecation
of French foot "... some regiments of Gascon infantry...
who were somewhat better than the rest; for, as they lived
near the confines of Spain, they seemed to have caught a
146"
little of the Spanish discipline and spirit. Other
commentators identified the south-west of France as the
source of her best troops, whether of foot or horse. In
1520, the former Venetian envoy to Milan wrote that
Aquitaine "... was full of courageous infantry and
cavalry"1"^," and another representative of the Republic
agreed, some eight years later, that Gascony "... provided
148
the best soldiers in France ."
1.45. Ibid., pp. 196-8.
146. Machiavelli, op.cit., p. 495*
147. Caroldo's relation, in Relazioni, ed. Segarizzi,
• ii* P. 13.
148. A. Navagero's voyage, in Relations des ambassadeurs
venetiens, tr. and ed. Tommaseo, vol. T~, pp. 1-39*
p. 19. As late as 1561, a Venetian envoy was saying
the same - the Gascon footsoldier was the nearest
thing France had to a Spaniard, M. Suriano's
commentaries, ibid., pp. 465-563; p. 495*
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The Gascon proportion of the compagnies
d'ordonnance is, of course, impossible to establish
without thorough investigation of all surviving muster
lists. But some idea of the importance of Gascons in
the regular army can be gained by other means. Firstly,
although the majority of budget rolls of the Ordinaire
des Guerres - in other words, the lists of companies
which a given war treasurer was responsible for paying
in a given year - have disappeared, a few remain: in 1501,
for instance, the French finances had charge of 2170 lances,
of which 180 were led by Gascon captains'1"^. Other
troops were probably already supported by Milan at this
date, but it is not until 1505 that we know the composition
of this force: of 655 lances paid by the Milanese war
treasurer, only 30, the Fontrailles company, were
149. B.N., fr. 2960, fol. 14 and fr. 2927, fol. 34.
The following Gascon-led units were paid by the two
French treasurers of war: Foix company (50 lances),
Albret (50), Orval (30), Aguerre (50). We know
that the company of Louis d'Armagnac was also in
existence at this time, so it must have been
supported by Milan. Ferdinand Lot has presented a
list of the strength of the Ordonnances for each
year throughout, and beyond our period, in his
Recherches sur les effbctifs des armees franqaises,
des guerres d'ltalie aux guerres de religion (1494-
1562) (Paris, 1962), pp. 241-7. However, those
troops paid by Italian treasurers are not included
in the list, and hence the full complement of the
French army is frequently understated.
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150
Gascon-led ^ . The only complete list of the whole army
during our period, which is known to the author, details
Louis XIl's forces, following the big expansion in
strength in 1512; 3590 lances are listed, of which 575
151
are led by Gascon captains . The proportion for the
year 1513* therefore, was about one-sixth, but it was
above average for our period as a whole, even though the
152
Gascon proportion remained high during the next few years J .
We must Imagine about 10$ of all lances being under Gascon
captains normally. If Gascony contained about 12$ of the
155
population of the realm at this time ^ , this figure is
roughly commensurate with that; however, some companies
150. B.N., fr. 7882, fol. 2. This document, together
with the first account of 1501 cited above (B.N.
fr. 2960, fol. 14), have both been partially
reproduced by Pelissier in "Note italiane sulla
storia di Francia," in A.S.I.. ser. 5* vol. xx
(1897), PP. 108-17.
151. B.N., fr. 2928, fol. 10.
^ The following Gascon-
led units are entered: Bearn company (100 lances),
Lautrec (100), King of Navarre (100), Orval (100)
Duras (50), Aguerre (50), Fontrailles (50), Baron
de Caussade (25).
152. For instance, one of the French war-treasurers paid
1480 lances in the second half of 1514, of whom
250 were Gascon-led, B.N., Clair. 132, fol. 66.
153. ' Gascony' is defined here as the region now incor¬
porated by the departements of Pyrenees-Atlantiques;
Hautes-Pyrenees, Landes, Gers, Gironde, Haute-Garonne,
Lot-et-Garonne and Ariege. See Lot, "L'etat des
paroisses et des feux de 1328," in B,E.C., xc,
pp. 51-107 and 236-315.
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were not led by French subjects at all - in 1513, for
instance, some 325 lances were led by Italians alone.
We have already seen that most of the Gascon-led units
were heavily populated by men from the south-west. At
the same time, there is evidence that Gascons were common
in many other companies as well. Jaurgain, for instance,
studied a selection of them from the beginning of our
period and identified a fair proportion of Gascons,
Bearnese and Basques within them: the gendarmerie of
the Orleans company in 1495 was 8% Gascon, of the Ligny
company in 1494, 9%> including the lieutenant, of the
Montfaucon company in 1495* 8%^^. In 1501, the company
of 30 lances of Robert de la Marck contained at least
seven Gascon gendarmes, including the lieutenant, and at
IBB
least six Gascon archers ^ . The patronage of Gascons
by La Marck seems to have been a tradition, for Fleuranges
tells us that in 1512 the guidon of the company was one
154. Jaurgain, "Profils basques", pp. 49* n.l, 50, n.l
and 51, n.6. Other smaller companies noted by the
author reach even higher proportions of Gascon
strength, up to 20^, ibid., pp. 49, n.l_, 52, n.3j
53, n.l and 58, n.4. Compare the muster-lists of
the unit of Lous Malet de Graville, published by
G. Beaurain, in his article, "Lettre de commission
du roi Charles VIII relative k un deplacement de
troupe, 1496, 15 juin," in Le Moyen Age, vol.
xlii (1952), pp. 252-60.
155. Jaurgain, op.cit., p. 137* n.3«
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Gratien d'Armendaritz, "... from the frontiers of Navarre,"
who died at the assault on Ravenna that year, whilst In
1513 half of the now enlarged company was led by the
Gascon, Bastard Jeannot, who had been lieutenant of the unit
since 1500 or so^^. Here are shades of Aguerre's company,
with Pyrenean soldiers crossing the length of France to
serve in a company stationed on the northern fringes of the
kingdom.
* * *
How large a part did Italian service play in the
careers of Gascon companies between 1494 and 1515? Two
units can be set aside fairly promptly: the company of
Jean d'Albret, seigneur d'Orval, seems never to have
crossed the Alps, whilst that of Gratien d'Aguerre, after
its return from Naples in 1497 or 1498, never again went
to Italy - every known review of Aguerre's company after
this time took place in northern France, and there
is no mention of its service in the peninsula in any other
156. Robert de la Mark, seigneur de Fleurange,
Histoire des choses memorables advenues du reigne
de Louis XII et Franqois Ier, in Collection des
Memoires, ed. Petitot, vol xvi, pp. 213, 252 and
148.
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source ->. Two more units, those of Louis d'Armagnac,
due de Nemours, and Jean d'Astarac, seigneur de
Fontrailles, are known to have been closely involved
with Italy, but documentary evidence of their movements
over a number of years is lacking, especially in the form
of muster lists, so that their members are largely un-
188
known to us as well . The only long-service Gascon
157 • Twelve muster-rolls survive for the span 1495 to
1518; the first and last locate the Aguerre company
at Vitry-en-Partois and Rheims, respectively -
all the rest were drawn up at Mouzon: 5:^:1^95
(B.N., fr. 21505, no. 499); 10:4:1499 (fr. 21505,
no. 652); 22:7:1499 (ibid., no. 658); 28:5:1501
(fr. 215C9, no. 881 - this roll has been inserted
under the year 1515); 11:5:1504 (B.N., fr. 25785,
no. 56); 18:7:1506 (B.N., Duchesne 7, fol. 269
- copy); 51:5:1507 (B.N ., fr. 21507, no. 779);
12:6:1510 (fr. 21508, no. 822); 16:9:1510 (ibid,
no. 828); 17:12:1510 (B.N., Clair. 241, no. 657);
9:12:1514 (B.N., fr. 25785, no. 220); 17:2:1518
(B.N., fr. 21510, no. 946).
158. We have three muster-lists of Armagnac's company:
it was reviewed on 25th November, 1492, at Guise
(B.N., fr. 25782, no. 114), on 9th August, 1495,
at Vercelli, in Piedmont (B.N., Clair. 259, no. 455)
and again at Vercelli in the same year (part of the
date being obliterated) (B.N., fr. 21505, no. 558).
Comparatively few Gascons appear in these surviving
lists. No muster-rolls can be found of the Armagnac
company which took part in the second Neapolitan
campaign and had as its lieutenant Gaspard de
Coligny, seigneur de Fromontes, Auton, i, p. 6l, n.2
and ii, p. 280. The unit appears to have included
a fair number of Gascons by 1502, however, ibid♦,
ii, p. 280. There are no extant review-lists of
the Fontrailles company. It is the only Gascon-led
unit of which we have documentary proof of payment
by Italian funds, during our period. The Milanese
war-treasurer's accounts for 1505 and 1506 show that
the Fontrailles company was mustered in five different
locations between October 1505 and June 1507,
usually in south Piedmont: La Morra, Montault
(unidentified location), Bra, Pinerolo and Cherasco,
Cont/.
Italian
companies, with important/careers, whose movements and,
more especially, whose personnel can be studied over an
extended period are the Foix and Albret-Duras companies1-^.
158. B.N., fr. 7882, fols. 83 vo. and 238. Jean
d'Auton tells us that this unit's customary base
was in the Astisan, which accords well with the
treasurer's evidence, Auton, iv, p. 162. At this
stage the Fontrailles company numbered 30 lances,
but in 1509 it acquired 10 more, from the
Chatellart company, B.N., fr. 21507, no. 799. It
seems highly probable that the Fontrailles company
remained in Italy continuously, until 1512 or
possibly until 1513 (since we have a reference to
its station at Milan castle, which held out till
that year, in July 1512, Letters and papers of the
reign of Henry VIII, vol. i, pt. I, ed. J. Brewer
and R.H. Brodie ("London, 1920), p. 598). The
only indication of the personnel of the Fontrailles
company is contained in the list of captives taken
at Treviglio in 1509, but the names have been
italicised beyond certain recognition, Diarii, viii,
col. 217.
159. The companies of Aydie, Lautrec, Navarre and Caussade
are not included, owing to their short life during
our period.
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The Foix company was continually Involved in
campaigns in Italy. It took part in Charles VIII's
Neapolitan expedition, returning north with the King in
1495"^^* (although no muster rolls survive for this
period). Towards the end of Charles' reign, the unit
appears to have been stationed at Asti"1"^1, and it later
participated in the conquest of Lombardy in l499'L^2.
For the next few years, the Foix company seems to have
been garrisoned on either side of the Alps, at different
times. It apparently had no role in the reconquest of
Lombardy in 1500, nor did it form part of the Lombardy
l6l
garrison after this success , but it was dispatched to
164
Italy in the winter of 1501-2 . The first muster we
have after 1499 locates the Foix company at Plaisance
160. J. de la Pilorgerie, Campagne et bulletins de la
grande armee d Italie (Nantes, 1666), p~. 274.
161. Diarii, i, col. 583.
162. Musters at Montregrosa (21:2:1499)* B.N., fr. 21505*no.627;
Annona (19:8:1499)* B.N., Clair. 240, no. 519;
Salles (27:10:1499), B.N., na. fr. 8612, fol. 33.
At the siege of Alessandria, towards the end of
August, a number of Foix's soldiers distinguished
themselves: the Masparrautes fought well (two of
whom appear as gendarmes at the Annona review
with two more being promoted from archer at the end
of August), whilst the archer Bertrand de Bayonne
was badly wounded, Auton, i, pp. 42 and 57-
163. ibid., pieces annexes, p. 383.
164. B.N., fr. 25718, no.57.
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in 1503* probably one of the towns of that name in
Gascony rather than the Italian city of Piacenza1^.
By August that year, the unit was crossing the Alps on
its way to join the relief force for Naples"1"^. After
service on the Garigliano during the winter , the Foix
company returned by sea to Genoa, where it was reviewed in
January 15041^. During the years of relative peace
which followed the expulsion from Naples, the Foix company
169
was usually, if not always, to be found in the Milanese .
165. 5th June, 1505 (B.N., fr. 21506, no. 720). Two
considerations favour Plaisance over Piacenza: firstly,
we know that within two months the Foix company was
reviewed at Aisone, on the Italian side of the Col
de Larche, and that it subsequently moved south to
the Garigliano - a muster at Piacenza would have
meant that the unit inexplicably marched to the
Alps, before doubling back southwards. Secondly,
'Plaisance' is not qualified in the muster roll,
and it is usual for Milanese locations to be
described as "in the duchy of Milan".
166. Muster at Aisone (4:8:1505), B.N., fr. 21506, no. 726.
167. Auton, iii, p. 262.
168. Muster at Genoa (15:1:1504), B.N., fr. 25785, no. 51.
169. All surviving review-rolls of this period place the
company in the duchy: Salles (25:7:1505)* B.N.,
Clair. 241, no. 597; Valenza (5:10:1505), ibid.,
no. 601; Salles (19:2:1506), B.N., fr. 21507, no.
765, Parma (1:1:1507), ibid., no. 775-
105.
Indeed Jean d'Auton, Louis XIl's historiographer,
170
asserts that Salles, near Pavia, was its customary home
The company took part in the expedition to Bologna in 1506,
171
and the reduction of Genoa in 1507 * before joining the
major offensive against the Venetian territories in 1509.
In fact, it seems almost certain that the Foix company
remained in Italy from this date through to 1512 without
172
interruption, and it fought at the battle of Ravenna
In 1513j the company, now under the captaincy of Roger
✓ 177
de Bearn, fought in the Novara and Flemish campaigns ,
170. Anton, iv, p. 160. Auton's editor notes that
Salles was a fort guarding the Ticino river, ibid.,
p. l6l, n.3«
171. Ibid., pp. 70-1* 160 and 196.
172. Apparently, the unit had left Italy and returned
in early 1509* and was then stationed at Trezzo,
Diarii, vii, col 766 and viii, cols. 47 and 91-2.
We have one muster from the 1509* Venetian campaign,
at Peschiera, on 29th August (B.N., fr. 21507* no.
798). There are numerous indications of the Foix
company in Italy in subsequent years: muster at
Joursenove (location uncertain, but evidently in
Italy) on 1st March 1510 (ibid.., no. 8l4); noti¬
fications of the unit at Brescia in April 1510,
Parma in June 1511 and with the field army under
Gaston de Foix in 1512, Diarii, x, col. 282, xii,
cols. 268-70 and xiii, cols. 425-7; references to
the Foix company at Ravenna can be found in ibid.,
xiv, cols. 172-4 and in Histoire du gentil seigneur de
Bayard par le loyal serviteur, ed. M.H. Roman, S. II. F. (Pari
177. Fleurange, Histoire, p. 2j54; Diarii, xvi, cols. 319-
20; B.N., fr. 2929, fol. 16.
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before finally taking part in the expedition of 1515,
culminating in the battle of Marignano1^.
The Albret company also gained wide experience
of Italy, although it was late in the field, taking no
part in the expeditions of 1494 and 1499^^. At last,
however, this unit was ordered to Italy in late 1501^^,
and it was reviewed at Asti in February 15021^^. In
later 1509* the Albret company moved south to fight on the
1 (yO
Garigliano ' . During the years of peace that followed,
the company seems to have formed part of the Lombardy
garrison and it was involved in the Bolognan and Genoese
expeditions of 1506 and 1507, respectively^^. The unit,
174. Muster at Turbie (Turbigo?), on 4th September,
1515 (B.N., n.a.fr. 86l6, fol.6).
175. The Albret company spent the early years of our
period on frontier duty at home: musters at D6le
(11:4:1495), B.N., fr. 21505, no. 501; Beauvais
(1495), L'Epinois, op.cit., in B.E.C., vol. xxv,
p.158; Castres (27.6.1498), B.N., fr. 21504, no.
607; move to Champagne, from Languedoc (1498),
B.N., fr. 25718, no. 17 and B.N., p.o. 2090
(dossier Narbonne), no. 60, and muster at Neufville
(8:11:1498), B.N., Clair. 259, no. 495; muster at
Bethune (9:5:1499)* B.N., fr. 21505, no. 654; musters
at Doullens (15:8:1499)* B.N., n.a.fr. 8612, fol. 51*
and (10:2:1500), B.N., fr. 21505, no. 662. One more
muster-list survives for this period, but both the
date and location have been obliterated, B.N., Clair.
259* no. 451.
176. B.N., fr. 25718, no. 57.
177. Muster at Asti (28:2:1502), B.N., fr. 25785* no. 41.
178. Muster at Lugagnano (6:8:1505), B.N., fr. 21506,
no. 728, and Auton, iii, p. 262.
179. Musters at Parma (27:7:1505), B.N., fr. 25784, no.
82, and (17:6:1507), B.N., fr. 21507, no. 780;
Auton, iv, pp. 70 and 160-1.
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now under the captaincy of Jean de Durfort, participated
in the war against Venice in 1509* during which the town
of Crema was captured, and this place became the unit's
l80
base . Prom now on, the Duras company was continuously
in Italy, and although it did not fight at Ravenna, it saw
1 O -j
action in the Venetian siege of Crema in mid-1512
Afterwards, the company did service in both the Novara and
-1 Op
Marignano campaigns
It is evident that during our period some French
companies developed into Italian-based forces, whilst
others remained centred upon the frontiers of the homeland.
The Foix and Albret companies must be included in the
former category, even though they were the responsibility
of the French treasurers of war throughout. The Fontrailles
180. Diarii, viii, cols. 91-2, muster at Crema (30:8:1509)*
B.N., Clair. 241, no. 639.
181. Diarii, x, col. 282 and xii, cols. 268-70; B.N.,
Dupuy 262, fol 86; Diarii, xiii, cols. 425-7.
Favre, in his Precis historique sur la famille de
Durfort-Duras. p. 52, maintains that the Duras
company fought at Ravenna, basing his claim on a
list of troops engaged in the battle, from the
Chambre des Comptes of Grenoble. Favre's claim
is unconfirmed in any other source known to me, but
seems to stem from a misreading of the Grenoble
document, or a fault in the latter itself - Venetian
information records the same French line-up for the
battle as Favre, except that the 50 lances of 'Duras'
have become 50 lances of 'Dars', in other words the
well-known captain, Louis d'Ars, Diarii, xiv, cols.
172-4. Louis d'Ars was captain of 50 lances at the
time and they were indeed engaged at the battle of
Ravenna, Loyal serviteur, op.cit., p. 433.
182. Diarii, xvi, cols. 319-20; muster at Alessandria
(8:9:1515), B.N., Clair.243, no. 729, and Diarii,
xxi, cols. 329-30.
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company, paid by the Milanese war treasury, probably as
long as this office remained in French control, was
another Italian-based unit. We may term the Orval and
Aguerre companies French-based. It is perhaps safest
not to categorise Armagnac's company in one or other
group, for it did not survive long enough to establish
any definite pattern of service. No doubt such a pattern
depended largely upon the company captain, the nature of
his duties in France, his status as a soldier, his appetite
for involvement in Italy, or upon his lieutenant, if the
captain himself took little part in the running of his
compagnie d'ordonnance. Although captains did serve in
Italy at times when their units stayed at home, and
conversely, companies went into the peninsula without their
captains, and remained in garrison there sometimes even
without their lieutenants, it seems to be a general rule,
nonetheless, that the service record of companies largely
follows that of their commanders. The Duras company took
a more prominent part in Italian affairs than it had when
under Alain d'Albret, and was even based at Crema after
Duras became governor of this place. The Orval company
stayed close by its captain, who held the important frontier
18^5
governorship of Champagne from 1488 to 1524 . Similarly
185. G.R., no. 6956.
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the Aguerre company was continuously based at Mouzon,
in Champagne, from the beginning of Louis XIl's reign
right through till Gratien's death, and Gratien d'Aguerre
was governor of Mouzon. He had been governor, however,
1 P)U
since about 1479 * so that the long sojourn in Naples
seems like an aberration in a career dominated by the
Imperial frontier, for both captain and company. The
reason why Gratien became involved in Charles VIII's
expedition is not so hard to guess as the reason why he
never returned to Italy under Louis XII, after such a
determined performance in Naples in the 1490s - perhaps he
wore himself out (he was about 50 years old even in 1494"'"®^),
perhaps his experience convinced him that Italy offered
little but a better chance of an early grave.
How did service abroad affect the composition
of these Italian-based units? The Foix company was much
more susceptible to the infiltration of foreigners than
was the Albret-Duras company. This latter contained no
recognisable aliens as late as August 1503* whilst even in
June 1507 only one Italian gendarme and two Italian archers
can be identified.1507 was the high-point of alien
penetration, and by the end of our period only one Italian
184. Jaurgain, "Profils basques", in Revue des Basses-
Pyrenees, iv, p. 31.
185. ibid., p. 140.
186. B.N., fr. 25784, no. 82 and B.N., fr. 21507, no. 780.
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archer can be picked out In the ranks of the Duras com-
"I 87
pany . The Foix company presents an entirely different
picture. Although Italian recruits are sometimes
difficult to identify, owing to the presence of Spanish
and Pyrenean names in the lists, and owing also to the
tendency of treasury clerks, drawing up the muster rolls,
to gallicise foreign names anyway, the trend of foreign
penetration is unmistakable. In August 1492, the Foix
company had just a sprinkling of aliens amongst its archers,
perhaps two or three Spaniards. By February next year,
188
the unit had acquired an Aragonese gendarme . Later,
during the 1499 campaign in Lombardy, the company still
contained very few recognisable foreigners, again just one
18q
or two Spanish archers . The change occurs during the
period 1499 to 1503, but no muster rolls survive for this
187. Muster at Beauregard-en-Q,uercy (7:9:1516), B.N.,
fr. 21509, no. 914.
188. Musters at Lisieux (28.8.1492), B.N., Clair. 258,
no. 361, and at Doullens (18:2:1493), B.N., fr.
21503, no. 495).
189. We know also that a certain gendarme serving at
this time, one Michel de Rovis (Vj* was an alien under
the law, A.N., JJ. 234, no. 367. It Is possible,
however, that he was B^arnese or basse-Navarrese,
subject of the King of Navarre, not the King of France,
and such men are treated as Gascons in this study.
In 1502, Louis XII had acquired all Rovis' goods in
France, following the latter's death, by exercising
his right of 'aubaine', by which property of
foreigners, who died without heirs, escheated to the
Crown, ibid., loc.cit.. Later, as part of Louis
XIl's attempt to establish his suzerainty over B^arn,
the Parlement of Paris granted French legal status
to the Bearnese, in 1505, Tucoo-Chala, La vicomte
de Beam, p. 110.
span, until that of June 150j5; still the ranks of the
gendarmerie have largely resisted foreign incursion, but
amongst the archers there now appear eleven Albanians, a
Turk, four Italians, four others who look like recruits
from the peninsula, and two more foreigners of uncertain
nationality"1"-^. The Albanians can be definitely
identified in the muster lists, because their names are
normally qualified by their nationality - "Albanois".
In August 1503 and January 1504, the numbers are roughly
the same1"^, until by July 1505 the proportions have again
increased: six to eight foreign gendarmes, and, amongst
the archers, fourteen Albanians, two Turks, eight Italians,
192
two other probable Italians, and three more foreigners .
193
Similar numbers are maintained through the next few years ^ ,
until we reach the apogee of Albanian penetration in 1509-
10. In August 1509* although there are only perhaps
three foreign men-at-arms, there are twenty-three
Albanian archers, plus a Turk, two Italians, two other
194
probable Balkan types, and three more aliens . In
March 1510, we have about six foreign gendarmes, twenty-
three Albanian archers, and also in the archer ranks,
190. B.N., fr. 21506, no. 720.
191. Ibid., no. 726 and B.N., fr. 25785, no. 51.
192. B.N., Clair. 24l, no. 547.
195. Ibid., no. 601; B.N., fr. 21507, nos. 765 and 775.
194. Ibid., no. 798.
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three Turks, three other Italian or Balkan soldiers, and
two other foreigners of some sort1^. We may surmise that
the expulsion of the French from Italy in 1512 led many
foreign recruits to foresake their adopted colours, for by
September 1515# the Bearn company, now twice the size of
its predecessor, the Foix company, contained perhaps nine
foreign gendarmes, but only three Albanian, nine Italian,
and three other foreign archers'.
We can only guess at the reasons why the Foix
company attracted so many local recruits in Italy. The
responsibility must lie with Roger de B^arn, the effective
commander of the unit throughout these years of infiltration.
No doubt, once a company attracted a handful of Albanians,
for example, it was not difficult to recruit more and more.
Surviving muster rolls are too few to tell us whether these
foreigners were recruited in small numbers or en bloc.
Perhaps Bearn enrolled whole bodies of Albanians to replace
heavy losses, as a result of the Garigliano campaign, for
example. Certainly the French came to respect the martial
qualities of stradioti in Venetian and Milanese service ,
after a number of campaigns in which the two were involved
on opposite sides; quite soon in the Italian Wars, however,
stradioti were evidently coming over to French service
and from 1509 even fought against their former employer,
195. Ibid., no. 814.
196. B.N., n.a. fr. 8616, fol. 6.
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Venice. Indeed, by 1509-10 almost one-quarter of Foix
company archer strength was Albanian and other, non-
Gascon companies must also have recruited stradioti, as
well as the special units of light horse which Louis
XII developed.
It is interesting that no Albanian ever became
a man-at-arms in the Foix company, as far as we know,
except for a certain Chevalier Baste, and possibly one
Dromedes Grec. This was principally due, no doubt, to
the essential nature of the stradiot, a light horseman,
not dissimilar to the French archer. But other reasons
suppressed the claims of archers aspiring to the
gendarmerie. In the great majority of cases, archers
were non-noble, and their promotion to man-at-arms was
197
rare, in the fifteenth century at least ^ . The division
between gendarme and archer was of social as well as
military importance, in the main. Did service in Italy
do anything to undermine this divide? In other words,
were opportunities for archers widened by the inevitably
greater turnover in personnel during wartime?
There are two lines of investigation here. On
the one hand there is the question of absolute numbers of
197. Contamine, Guerre, ptat et soci6t6, p. A65. See
annexe, v, pu 6lb, for promotion ratios in
selected companies during the fifteenth century.
114.
archers promoted to higher rank within the same company
over a given period; we would expect this number to
increase during wartime, since there were always a few
promotions from the archers' ranks, and war losses would
surely provide more opportunities during the given period.
On the other hand, we have the issue of the relative
importance of archers as a source of recruits to the
gendarmerie. Would companies, fighting far from home and
occasionally suffering more or less unexpected troop
losses, not find themselves short of ready replacements?
Hasty promotions of archers in the field might be the
result. Was this what happened in the Foix company, leaving
many archers' places open to the only major source of
recruits on the spot, Albanians and Italians? In other
words, was warfare in Italy not likely to raise the number
of archer promotions qualitatively as well as absolutely?
Between its two surviving muster rolls of 1493
and 1499# the company of Gratien d'Aguerre went through
the first Neapolitan campaign1^®. Eleven to twelve of
the archers of 1493 had been promoted to gendarme by 1499
- say 11% of archer strength. Between 1499 and 1510, °n
the other hand, during which time the unit was garrisoned
in Champagne, 13% of the archers of 1499 were promoted1*^.
198. B.N., fr. 21503, no. 499 and fr. 21505# no. 632.
Only 49 men-at-arms and 99 archers mustered in 1499*
199. B.N., fr. 21508, no. 822. Only 49 gendarmes mustered
here.
115.
The numbers of places in the ranks of the gendarmerie
falling vacant over these two periods are roughly similar
- thirty-two and twenty-seven, respectively. In other
words, it was the peaceful era of Aguerre company history
which witnessed relatively greater scope for archer
promotion - 55$ of the gendarme vacancies between 1493
and 1499 were filled by Aguerre company archers, 48$
between 1499 and 1510. Our scenario above seems to have
been turned on its head.
Between 1503 and 1505* only one Albret company
archer was promoted - 1% of archer strength. During
this time the company fought in the costly battle of the
Garigliano, and twenty-seven vacancies appeared in the
gendarme ranks2^0. Between 1509 and 1515* on the other
hand, a span of years of relative calm for this company,
some eight to ten archers were elevated to the gendarmerie,
although only twenty-four places fell vacant during the
201
period . In short, during the early years of heavy
fighting and relatively rapid gendarme turnover, only 4$
of vacancies were filled by archers, whilst during the
latter period of stability, 38$ of vacancies went to
promoted archers. As for the Foix company, it is difficult
to find a period of peace in its career which can be
adequately investigated through muster lists: between
200. B.N., fr. 21506, no. 728 and fr. 25784, no. 82.
Only 42 gendarmes and 98 archers appear at the
second review.
201. B.N., Clair. 24l, no. 639 and B.N., fr. 25786, no. 5
(muster at Beaumont-de-Lomagne on 31st May, 1515).
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1503 and 1505* it also was engaged on the Garigliano -
three archers were promoted and they filled up 10$ of
202 •
gendarme vacancies ' between 15IO and 1515# the
company also did some hard campaigning - four to six
archers were promoted, representing 12$ of vacancies20-^.
From this admittedly small sample, it appears that
archers stood a better chance of promotion in peacetime
than in wartime. The reasons for this tendency are
baffling. Certainly it was not the result of very high
archer casualties in times of war, as far as can be
ascertained. If we calculate the proportion of archer
promotions as a percentage of all archers who survived
in a given company during our sample spans, rather than
simply as a percentage of all archers serving at the
first date, the following figures are obtained:
Aguerre company 1493-99 - 25$
1499-1510 - 25$
Albret-Duras company 1503-1505 - 5$
1509-1515 - 18$
Foix-B6arn company 1503-1505 - 7$
1510-1515 - 20$
In other words, even if an archer continued to serve in a
company for some years, his chances of promotion were, by
202. B.N.,fr. 21506, no. 726 and B.N., Clair. 241, no.597.
203. B.N., fr. 21507# no. 8l4 and B.N., n.a.fr. 8616, fol.6.
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our sample, at best 25$.
Finally, it is interesting to note the relative
ease of mobility within the Aguerre company, compared with
the other two units. This is brought out more clearly
if we look at a broader perspective: forty-nine gendarmes
of the Aguerre company mustered at Mouzon in June 1510,
of whom twenty-seven are known to have served in the
company as archers at some stage since 1493 (plus three
others perhaps, whose definite identification is difficult).
Since six of the forty-nine were also gendarmes in 1493,
only some thirteen to sixteen men at most can have entered
this company at gendarme level between 1493 and 1510.
Compare this with figures for the other two units: fifty
gendarmes of the Albret-Duras company mustered in August
I509, of whom only ten or eleven are known to have served
as archers in the same company, at some time since 1493 -
as many as thirty-eight or nine may have come straight in
as gendarmes. The fifty gendarmes of the Foix company,
on the other hand, were reviewed in March 1510; only
twelve are known to have served as archers since 1493;
as many as thirty-eight or nine may have come straight in
as gendarmes. The fifty gendarmes of the Foix company,
on the other hand, were reviewed in March 1510: only
twelve are known to have served as archers since 1493,
and a maximum of thirty-seven had entered the gendarmerie
directly. Each of these three inquiries is based upon a
roughly equivalent number and range of muster lists, so
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that there can be no doubt that the Aguerre company
maintained less social distinction between gendarme
and archer than the other two units. Perhaps this is
only to be expected in a company captained by an
adventurer, whose status could not compare with that of
Foix or Albret, or even that of Duras and Bearn. From
Gratien down, the unit probably consisted mainly of
soldiers of fortune, obscure Basques whose army career
was their livelihood. Perhaps this may partially explain
why Charles VIII was prepared to make a gift to the
company of "... twenty-five suits of armour, and fifty
breastplates, with fifty helmets, adorned with fifty
plumes...", after the return from Naples.2<^
* * *
The investigation of the small sample of
compagnies d'ordonnance in this survey has revealed little
evidence to support the contention that companies were the
property of their captains - that they were little more
than private armies dressed up to look like royal troops.
On the contrary, Philippe Contamine is surely right when
he concludes that, although only a small minority of noble
families would have been represented in the ranks of the
204. B.N., p.o. 13 (dossier Aguerre), no.17.
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regular army at any one time, nevertheless it was "for
the King one of the essential means of disciplining his
nobility, of unifying it, rewarding or maintaining it,
of inculcating it with loyalty to himself*^." Doucet,
a quarter of a century earlier, said the same thing, that
the standing army helped to discipline the nobility and
sever it from its landed base - in other words to dis¬
orientate the class20^. It seems probable that the
export of the army to Italy helped to disorientate the
nobility further. Already fairly subservient to the
Crown by 1494, despite some recent but rather half-hearted
treachery, the army was fashioned into a finer tool of the
King's will in a foreign land, far from the domestic
quarrels of its captains. Solidarity was bred by companies
campaigning together in a hostile environment, where one's
only real friend was the King of France, or his representative.
This is not to say, however, that the Crown deliberately
pursued a policy of foreign war to attain these ends -
there is no evidence for such a view.
205. Contamine, op cit., p. 479.
206. Doucet, Les institutions de la France au XVIe sibcle,
vol. ii, 'p. 621. Perhaps a little too much has been
made, however, of the noble complaint of 1484 that
tenants had been constrained to serve outside their
lord's company, on military service, Masselin,
Journal, p. 667. Luchaire believed that this
complaint stemmed from the military reforms of
Charles VII, Alain le grand, p. 2j53* but it seems
to have been concerned with the raising of the
feudal levy - a more or less redundant institution
by our period - rather than with recruitment for the
regular army.
CHAPTER THREE
PROFIT AND LOSS IN ITALY
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An investigation of the causes of French involve¬
ment in Italy lies beyond the compass of this study,
opening up as it would whole fields of dynastic,
diplomatic and political history, and comprehending
aspects of social, economic and cultural life in sixteenth-
century Europe. One feature which would have to form
part of such an investigation does, however, force its way
into view: namely, the popularity or otherwise of Italian
service within the French army. The influence of the
search for sociological causes of great, political events
has made its presence felt in the meagre historiography of
our period, even though the only detailed studies of the
origins of the Italian Wars are the work of nineteenth-
century scholars, men whose investigative priorities lay
firmly within the realms of dynastic and diplomatic
research.'1' In their review of the state of the debate
on problems of the Italian Wars, for example, the authors
of the relevant volume of the "Clio" series on the history
of Europe remarked, some thirty years ago, that "from a
social point of view, the Italian Wars could also find their
1. H.F. Delaborde, L'expedition de Charles VIII en Italle
(Paris, 1888) and L-G. Pelissier, Louis XII et Ludovlc
Sforza, 2 vols. (Paris, 1896).
explanation, if not their justification. The French
nobility, brought to heel by the royal power, could no
longer indulge in feudal war and its turbulence looked
for an outlet in foreign adventure, reminiscent of
crusades. It was significant that hardly was the era
2 •
of the Italian Wars over than the Wars of Religion began ."
Unfortunately, in the absence of research in this area,
such an explanation, however plausible, has more to do
with speculation than documented history.
It becomes evident very soon that the French
expeditions to Italy will bear little comparison with the
Crusades proper, or with any crusade for that matter.
Apart from the obvious lack of any important religious
dimension, a main point of difference between the two
phenomena is that the former were not achieved as part
of the expansion of a self-confident and self-conscious
people, like the Crusades, or in the manner of the
Normans of the eleventh century or the Castillians of
the sixteenth. The French involvement in Italy was never
a mass-movement, but the business of Kings and was, in
the last resort, initiated and directed by them alone.
Of course, there were those who willingly grasped their
2. H. See, A. Rebillon and E. Preclin, Le seizibme siecle
(Paris, 1950), p. 103.
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opportunity for gain, adventure and recognition across
the Alps, provided by royal policy: Louis de la Tr6moille's
biographer, Jean Bouchet, tells us that in 1494 many lords
travelled to Italy without royal subsidy, apart from what
they received from their offices in France^. Jean
d'Auton notes how the promise of battle attracted young
4
men to Lombardy in a hurry early in 1500 . Robert de la
Marck seigneur de Fleuranges,describes how in 1510 he set
off for Italy with many other young gentlemen who had been
"brought up with him", and how they were joined by others
at Lyons on the way . Yet for the majority, less ambitious
and less foot-loose, who were constrained 'to serve abroad
by their oath of loyalty as soldiers of the King, the
prospect of an expedition to Italy was often hateful.
Francesco della Casa, Florentine ambassador in
France, reveals in his dispatches the unpopularity of
Charles VIII's plans in 1494. No great lord and few others
approved of the prospective enterprise and "to most of the
gentlemen and gendarmes who had been assigned to go to
Italy, it appeared that they were heading for manifest
perdition and destruction". However, they were resigned
9. J. Bouchet, Le panegyric du chevalier sans reproche,
in Collection... des memoires, ed. M. Petitot, vol.
xiv, p. 410.
4. Auton, vol. i, pp. 296-41.
5. Fleuranges, Histoire des choses memorables..., in
Collection... des memoires, ed. Petitot, xvi, p. 191*
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to their fate, in obedience to the King's will .
Commynes tells us that when the army had reached Piacenza,
support for the expedition had even weakened, whilst
after the return of the bulk of the force from Naples in
1495, almost no-one was in favour of any attempt to
7
relieve Novara, besieged by the Milanese . The short¬
lived success of the Neapolitan enterprise did nothing to
encourage support for further involvement in Italy.
Commenting on the forthcoming invasion of Lombardy, a
correspondent of the Duke of Milan wrote in September 1499
that "... the French extended much ill-feeling towards
Q
that expedition, saying that Italy was their grave... ."
The plans for a second Neapolitan conquest in 1501 were
Q
obnoxious to council and the Queen , a constant opponent
of Italian adventure. Naturally, hostility was strongest
following calamity and failure, particularly after the
defeat of 1512, when the whole realm was weary of Italian
affairs and tired of paying for them10, but even after a
6. G. Canestrini and A. Desjardins, N^gociations
diplomatlques, vol. i, pp. 278, 292 and 306.
7. Commynes, Memoirs, ed. Kinser, vol. ii, pp. 462 and 549*
8. L-G. P6lissier, Trois relations snr la situation de
la France en 1498 et 1499 (Montpellier, 1894), pi 2*6.
9. Machiavelli, Opere, vol. v (Milan, 1805), p. 85.
10. Bridge, A history of France, vol. iv (Oxford, 1929),
p. 169; Diarii, xiv, col. 46 and xv, col. 193*
successful campaign, as In 1509 against Venice, many who
came back to France dreaded a return - "the gentlemen
and lords of this kingdom view nothing more odious than
talk of going back to Italy", observed an envoy at Blois
in December of that year"*'"'". Machiavelli, writing from
France in September 1510, summed up the reasons for such
distaste: without exception the gentlemen of the realm
were tired of Italy, where life and fortune had been lost
in the past; but such objections, which had been voiced
for the last ten years, never prevented an expedition, as
12
the King's will always prevailed . No doubt those who
remained in garrison in Lombardy through long years came
to accommodate themselves to Italian service, and Milan
became as reassuringly familiar as France; but this
development hardly made other, more dangerous areas of
15
the peninsula .more attractive, rather the reverse .
After the catastrophes of 1512 and 1513# Milan itself,
securely in French hands as it had been for the first
decade of the sixteenth century, became again a place of
11. Canestrini and Desjardins, op.cit., vol. ii (Paris,
1861), p. 451.
12. Machiavelli, Opere, vol. vii (Milan, 1805), p. 280.
13. It was reported in July 1510* for example, that the
French troops on campaign in the lower Po area were
anxious to return to Lombardy, Diarii, x, 846.
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menace: the retiring Venetian ambassador to Milan noted
in 1516 that "... the French did not like Lombardy,
because they said that after ten years they were expelled,
with great loss, and the acquisition of the Duchy had
cost the lives of so many fine gentlemen that it would
have been better to remain in France and enjoy that
Kingdom121"."
Although we can see how strongly the fear of
death weighed in the minds of those committed to serve in
the peninsula, fear of inadequate payment was perhaps
equally daunting. Delia Casa had heard in 1494 that the
troops destined for Naples would be paid a bonus, but
nevertheless, the Florentine reported later that the
gendarmes were unhappy with the expedition "... not so
much through fear, but because they would have difficulty
living in Italy on their ordinary wages1^." Allowance
for the increased cost of living in Lombardy was made
for a proportion of its garrison, from 15IO at least, with
16
an increment of one-third on normal wages , although
there is no evidence that the Neapolitan garrison of 1502
14. Ibid., xxiii, 168.
15. Canestrini and Desjardins, op.cit., vol.i, pp. 306
and 311*
16. A.N., J. 910, nos. 1, 2 and 2 bis. (Milanese budgets
for 1510-12). The retiring Venetian envoy to Milan,
Caroldo, writing in 1520, implies that the whole
Milanese garrison received such an allowance,
Relazioni degli ambasciatori veneti al senato,
ed. Segarizzi, vol. ii, p. 17- The increment must
have been introduced after 1506, for there is 110
mention of it in the Milanese war-treasury accounts
of 1505-6, B.N., fr. 7882, fols. 2 and 186.
17
received any increase , and all surviving muster rolls
of Gascon companies in Italy indicate payment only at
the domestic rate of thirty livres, per lance, per month.
The generous salary-increment for part of the Milanese
garrison was accorded, no doubt, both as a result of
popular pressure within the army and perhaps also in the
interests of harmonious local relations, for the penalty
of indebtedness was severe - in 1516 the former Venetian
envoy in Milan commented that although "... there were no
Jews, Milanese usurers charged twenty-five or thirty per
1 ft
cent, without the slightest compunction ."
For the majority of French gendarmes serving in
Italy, however, rates of pay were the same as those to
which they were entitled at home. Moreover, payment was
made at similarly capricious intervals in both countries.
Contamine has noted how standards of punctuality declined
during the fifteenth century, until by Charles VIIl's reign
1Q
only one-sixth of companies were being paid on time .
17- The Neapolitan budget for this year assigns normal,
domestic rates of pay to its companies, B.N., fr.
2930, fol. 13.
18. Diarii, xxiii, col. 169.
19. Contamine, Guerre, Etat et society a la fin du
moyen £ge, p. 505- The author points out, however,
that this declining standard still remained superior
to that enjoyed by French troops both before the
establishment of the compagnies d'ordonnance and
afterwards, in the case of soldiers outside the
Grande Ordonnance.
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Gendarmes were accustomed to long delays in receiving
their salary in France: the Albret company is known to
have been paid three or more months in arrears on at
least two occasions during the 1490s, before it ever
saw service in Italy, although the normal time-lag for
this unit during the period 1493 to 1500 seems to have
20
been about six weeks . As far as can be judged, this
delay of about six weeks continued to be usual when the
Albret company was in Italy in 1502-3. The muster
lists of the Foix company, on the other hand, reveal that
payment was made, on average, again some six weeks after
the termination of the appropriate pay-•■quarter, but at
irregular intervals, until 1503* irrespective of location -
delays were, if anything, longer in France than in Italy.
During the middle years of Louis XIl's reign, however,
pay-arrears became grossly over-extended. In January
1504, the Foix company received a salary-installment some
three-and-a-half months late, although this delay was
compounded by the unit's service on the Garigliano during
the winter^ but even during the years of peace that
followed, the Foix company could, it seems, only expect
to be paid after postponements of between three and almost
five months. The two surviving muster rolls of the
Albret company for this same span, 1505-7* show that this
20. Only six serviceable muster rolls of the Albret
company survive for this period.
128.
unit was paid some four to five»and-a-half months late,
whilst the record of the Milanese war-treasury for this
period was scarcely better, with the Fontrailles company
being paid after anything between two and six months'
21
delay in 1505-6 . Unfortunately, these years are not
well documented in Aguerre company rolls, but this unit,
fairly regularly paid after delays of about two-and-a-half
months as it seems to have been for most of Louis XII*s
reign, when it was continuously in France, did suffer from
a long postponement of five-and-a-half months in 1504.
For the remainder of our period, after the aberrations
of 1504-7, pay-arrears of Gascon companies appear to have
settled pretty regularly around the two-month mark,
although the evidence is sparse, until delays again
became inconsistent and often immense under Francis I,
for troops in both France and Italy.
On the whole therefore, to judge by our sample,
payment of the gendarmerie was equally dilatory on both
sides of the Alps. The chronological rather than the
geographical factor provides perhaps a more reliable clue
to the interpretation of the workings of French military
finances. After all, Lombardy was scarcely more distant
from Paris, the financial centre of the realm, than the
outlying parts of France and, besides, had its own war-
21. B.N., fr. 7882, fols. 85 vo. and 258.
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treasury to cater for at least part of its garrison. It
is clear that Louis XII did something to speed-up the
payment of salaries, after the often long delays of
Charles VIIl's reign, in line with his order that the
compagnies d'ordonnance be paid promptly at the end of
22
each quarter-year . But the good performance of the
early years obviously could not be sustained, and we have
seen how the system creaked in mid-reign; the later years
may have shown some improvement before evidence of gross
2^5
inefficiency after 1515 • Long delay in receiving
payment was usual then, wherever a unit was stationed, but
if the delays were at least regular and their length could
thus be anticipated, only the first few months of service
22. B.N., fr. 25718, no. 5. Pelissier notes how the
companies destined for the conquest of Lombardy in
l49'9 were promptly paid, in the context of the
overall efficiency of the preparations for the
expedition, with the four French treasurers-general
establishing themselves at Lyons, Louis XII et
Ludovic Sforza, vol.i, pp. 592-5*
25. For example, the Duras company was paid for the October
quarter of 1515 on the 7th. September, 1516, over eight
months late, B.N., fr. 21509, no. 914; for the
January quarter of 1517 only on the 28th,June, three
months late, B.N., Clair. 245, no. 781, and for the
following April quarter as late as the 16th. March, 1518,
eight-and-a-half months late, B.N., fr. 21510, no. 9^9.
The B^arn company, on the other hand, was paid its
July quarter of 1515 over three-and-a-half months late,
B.N., fr. 21509, no. 901; its January quarter of
1517 almost five months late, B.N., Clair. 244, 110.
789; and its July quarter following almost seven
months in arrears, ibid., no. 801.
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in the ranks would be difficult as a result. Zf payment
was usually in arrears in France, it was, nonetheless, more
likely to arrive at fairly regular intervals here than in
Italy, where companies were more often in transit and on
campaign, and where the transport of specie was frequently
more difficult and sometimes impossible. Whilst the
Aguerre company, more or less permanently stationed at
Mouzon following its return from Naples, appears to have
been able to expect payment of its wages after a reasonably
constant wait of some two to two-and-a-half months for
most of Louis XIl's reign, the Foix and Albret-Duras
companies, involved in campaigns in the peninsula, had no
such guarantee. It remains difficult, however, to account
for those uncommonly long and irregular delays suffered by
our units in Italy between 1505 and 1507. These were
comparatively peaceful years, during which the Foix, Albret
and Fontrailles companies rarely strayed from their base-
areas in Lombardy and Piedmont, and the reasons for the
poor record of both French and Milanese treasuries during
this time are unclear.
In theory, the payment of the Ordonnances should
have presented few problems. Both the complement of the
companies and their rate of salary were fixed factors, so
that budgeting was a simple task, except in a national
emergency, as in 1512 when hundreds of new lances were
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raised . It was the Extraordinaire des Guerres, pay¬
master of foreign mercenaries and other irregular levies,
which faced sudden demands which it might not be able to
meet with its allocated resources. The records of the
Chambre des Comptes make frequent reference to the
transfer of special funds to this treasury, over and
above its original budget. At times however, the
Ordinaire des Guerres suffered similar financial
embarrassment - in May 1500, for instance, the French
treasurers of war were ordered to raise and dispatch to
Lyons 30,000 gold 6cus as quickly as possible, for the
payment of gendarmes in Italy; when the cash arrived,
24. The year 1512 was particularly difficult, for not
only were 1,200 new lances raised, in view of the
menace to the frontiers of the realm, but expulsion
from Milan threw the maintenance of §40 more lances
back onto the French finances, B.N., fr. 25719* no.
209* The composition of the new force is detailed
in B.N., fr. 2928, fol. 11 (another copy in B.N.,
n.a. fr. 7645, fol. 3^3); this expansion increased
the burden on the Ordinaire des Guerres to a
massive 3590 lances in all. Royal orders for extra
funds to pay the new levies can be found in B.N.,
fr. 25719, no. 174, and B.N., Clair. 155, nos. 107
and 101. Although more serious than ever before
during Louis XIl's reign, the situation of 1512 was
not new, however, for in 1506 the raising of new
companies had necessitated the transfer of more
money than originally assigned to the Ordinaire des
Guerres, ibid., no. 103.
Cardinal d'Amboise announced that he had secured
sufficient funds from other sources and the money was
2R
used to pay troops in Burgundy and Champagne
The reasons for such confusions are not usually
apparent, but it seems that part of the trouble was the
expropriation of regular-army funds to subsidise urgent
commitments elsewhere: in 1511, money was transferred
from the account of the Ordinaire des Guerres to pay
P
fifty lances of the Marquis of Mantua, a French ally
In 1515, part of the cash for the April quarter was used
to reward German mercenaries, and later in the year it
was reported that funds for the gendarmerie had been
diverted for use in pacifying the Swiss2^. In 1520, the
retiring Venetian envoy to Milan noted that the weight of
extraordinary expenditure in the Duchy was such that its
revenues could not support its gendarme garrison,, so that
pO
treasurers often had to come from France with money
The prompt payment of the standing army was evidently
not the first priority of the Crown - a backhanded tribute
25. B.N., fr. 25718, no. 45.
26. B.N., n.a.fr. 1485, no. 26.
27. A. Spont, "Marignan et 1'organisation militaire sous
Francois I", in Revue des questions historiques, vol
lxvi (1899), PP. 59-77, P. 75.
28. Caroldo's relation, in Relazioni..., ed. Segarizzi,
ii, p. 16.
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to its loyalty. Moreover, since urgent financial commit¬
ments were more likely to arise in Italy, it was the
Italian garrison which was more liable to bear the cost.
In view of the comparative ease in budgeting
for the Ordonnances however, it seems likely that delayed
payment was more often to be ascribed to difficulties in
the movement of cash and officials to local garrisons and
campaigning armies, than to a simple lack of funds. A
. serious dilemma confronted the Crown: in the interests
of military discipline it was obviously desirable to muster
and pay troops frequently, but at the same time, the greater
the frequency of review the heavier the burden on the
military machine. The mediocre record of the treasuries
in dealing with Gascon companies, at home and abroad, shows
that even as few as four musters a year placed considerable
strain on the system. One method of alleviating this
pressure was to amalgamate pay-quarters. There is some
evidence that this was done deliberately at times, with a
view to the prospective movements of troops - we know, for
example, of an undated commission to muster units in Milan,
who were about to go on campaign and who were to be paid
for six months2^. In January 1518* moreover, Francis I
ordered that his companies be reviewed in May and paid for
nine months, as well as in February and August or September
50
for three months each^ , in an attempt, no doubt, to clear
29. B.N., fr. 5500, fol. 28.
30. B.N., fr. 2963, fol. 1.
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the backlog of arrears. Indeed, commonly the amalgama¬
tion of pay-quarters simply reveals that a given company
had missed its quarterly review: in April 1500, the
Marshals of France instructed a commissioner to muster
and pay three units in Lombardy for the previous October
"51
and January stages-^ . The Fontrailles company was paid
two installments at Bra in Piedmont, on the 9th of June
15C6, whilst the company of the King of Navarre was
reviewed in Bigorre in January 1515* and paid for six
"52
months of the previous year at once^ .
Despite this last example of a home-based unit
suffering in a time of financial stringency, it was in
Italy that contact with treasury clerks and commissioners
was more easily lost^ . We have noted how the muster
roll evidence of some Gascon companies appears to
demonstrate that, broadly, payment was equally dilatory on
both sides of the Alps, with perhaps the main advantage
of home-service being a greater consistency of delay.
Unfortunately, the distribution of surviving rolls is such
31. B.N., fr. 26106, no. 168.
32. B.N., fr. 7882, fols. 83 vo. and 238; B.N., n.a.fr.
8615, fol. 27 and B.N., Clair. 242, no. 691.
33. It was perhaps in consideration of this tendency that
Louis XII drew the attention of one of his
commissioners to the fact that the Foix and Albret
companies were bound for Italy, when he ordered him
on the 21st November, 1501, to take their musters
for the previous July quarter, B.N., fr. 25718, no.
57.
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that they tell us nothing of the companies' involvement
during the years of hectic campaigning in northern Italy
from 1510 to 1512 and in the ultimate collapse of French
power in Lombardy in that year, and little of their
history in Naples, either during the first expedition or
■34
in 1503 • Surviving reviews of other Gascon units give
us some idea of the consequences of inclusion in these
campaigns - the company of Odet de Lautrec, after partici¬
pating in the fighting and final d6b£cle in northern
Italy in 1512, was paid for the first quarter of that year
qq
only on the 50th.of August, at Sens^ . Other evidence
points to the hardship caused by delay in payment during
these later years of service in Italy: in January 1511*
Chaumont d'Amboise, governor of Milan, wrote to the King
as follows - "The payment of the lances for the last July
quarter was very late; could you order the treasurers to
ensure that last October's installment be here by the 8th.
of February next, for I promise you Sire that the gendarmes
are impoverished and cannot obtain food without paying for
"it, in the places where they are stationed^ ." It seems
54. We only have the muster roll of the Foix company,
drawn-up at Genoa on the 15th January 1504, which
tells us how and by what date this unit had returned
from the Garigliano disaster, B.N., fr. 25785, no.51.
55. B.N., fr. 21508, no. 851. Lautrec's company was paid
for the following quarter on the same day, B.N.,
Clair. 242, no. 665.
56. B.N., Dupuy 279, fol. 57.
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probable that the Foix and Duras companies would have been
affected by these arrears. Indeed, the latter's troubles
did not end here, for by September 1513, after involvement
in the abortive campaign of that year in Lombardy, the
Duras company was on the verge of mutiny, owing to lack
37
of payv .
Naples afforded yet greater risks. Despite
considerable embarrassment of the royal finances in 1494,
it seems that all the companies in Italy were fully paid
38
for that year^ . Insufficient cash was available for the
first installment of 1495* however, and it appears that
those units assigned to remain in Naples were given
priority. The company of Louis d'Armagnac returned north
with Charles VIII, for example, to be reviewed at Vercelli
on the 9th.of August, and paid for the January quarter -
39
over four months late^ . The Foix company no doubt
suffered a comparable delay, but of the two Gascon units
37• B.N., fr. 2928, fol. 16 vo. (copy in B.N., n.a.fr.
7648, fol. 52 vo.).
38. A recent authority suggests that, thanks to Milanese
aid, Charles VIII was able to pay his companies in
Italy their October quarter on the first of that
month, Labande-Mailfert, Charles VIII et son milieu,
p. 283, n. 401. It is extremely doubtful that any
company was paid so early, however - the Aubijoux
unit, for instance, only received its last install¬
ment for 1494 on the 3rd.February 1495* B.N., fr. 21503,
no. 536. Even so, such a delay represented
comparatively prompt payment, by the standards of the
time.
39. B.N., Clair. 239, no. 433. The Guise company may
well have received its April quarter on the very same
day, although we cannot be precise, owing to damage
to the appropriate roll, B.N., fr. 21503, no. 538.
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left in the south, we know that one at least, Odet Aydie's
company, was paid for the January quarter as early as the
28th.of April^®. It seems likely that Aydie's company
formed part of the garrison of Castel Nuovo in Naples,
which surrendered on the 8th. of December 1495 and was
4l
allowed to return to France . In other words, this unit
was probably assured a fairly speedy deliverance from the
Neapolitan disaster, and in 1497 it disbanded with a golden
handshake of three months' wages "... to enable (the troops)
42
to return to their homes ." The company of Gratien
d'Aguerre, on the other hand, had to undergo a much longer
ordeal. It may well have been paid for the first quarter
of 1495, but how much it received afterwards is very
debateable. In view of the rapid collapse of French rule
in the Kingdom of Naples after Charles VIII's departure in
May, local revenues must have quickly dwindled. Indeed,
a correspondent wrote to the King in April 1496 that
"... since his leaving the gendarmes had not had a single
payment;" they were living by requisitions on the
populace. The garrison was also suffering from a lack
40. B.N., n.a'.fr. 8612, fol. 1.
41. Commynes, Memoirs, ed. Kinser, ii, pp. 547 and 568;
A. de Boislisle, Notice biographique et historlque
sur Etienne de Vesc, senechal de Beaucaire
(Paris, 1884), pp. 153 and n. 3 - 154.
42. B.N., fr. 25717, no. 207.
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of military equipment, since lost or damaged items could
47
not be replaced locally . "The gendarmes were so
poor that no-one could imagine it...", writes Commynes,
who later tells us that those at Atella in mid-1496 had
44
been without salary for one-and-a-half years . Although
the Aguerre company was no doubt with its captain in the
Abruzzi at this time, its members must have been similarly
impoverished - certainly without regular pay - although
they might have received something of the 40,000 ducats
4q
which Commynes tells us Charles dispatched to the south ,
and which presumably arrived at Gaeta. In 1498, soon
after their return from Naples, the men of the Aguerre
company were granted four-and-a-half months' worth of
stipend "... in favour of and recompense for service...
in the Kingdom of Sicily, where they stayed for a long
time, without receiving any payment^" Around the
same time the unit also acquired some new equipment from
43, B.N., Dupuy 26l, fol. 27. This letter has been
published in Commynes, Memoires, ed. Dupont, vol.
iii, p. 437.
44. Commynes, Memoirs, ed. Kinser, pp. 565 and 570.
^5* Ibid., p. 566. It is not clear when this money
arrived, but at all events Commynes says it was
dispatched too late to be of any purpose.
46. B.N., n.a. fr. 5849, no. 520. This was meagre
enough compensation if it represents all the back¬
pay the Aguerre company received.
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47
the Crown , no doubt to replace losses sustained In
Naples.
The collapse of the second French regime In
Naples was attended by even greater financial disarray,
since larger forces were involved. A major proportion
of the garrison was assigned its salary on Neapolitan
revenues, and may therefore have been regularly paid
until these revenues began to be disrupted in later 1502.
Even so, the company of the late Jean de St. Prest, put
into the charge of Louis d'Armagnac, was only paid its
third installment of 1501 after a delay of almost four
months, although at this stage the unit was still the
48
responsibility of the French treasury and the long delay
reflects the hangover from the recent campaign of
conquest in the south. Whatever the improvement in the
delivery of salaries in Naples during 1502, the ameliora¬
tion was to be short-lived: by February 1503* for
instance, the wages of the company of Aymar de Prie,
stationed in the isolated Apulian town of Castellaneta,
were over six months in arrears, owing to administrative
, 2fQ
faults, according to Jean d Auton . More French troops
were precipitated into the Neapolitan war after the defeat
47. B.N., p.o. 13 (dossier Aguerre), no. 17.
48. B.N., Clair. 240, no. 553; B.N., fr. 2960, fol. 15.
49. Auton, iii, p. 136.
140.
at Cerignola, including the Foix and Albret companies.
Both units were paid in August 1505, for the second
quarter of that year, after an uncommonly brief delay
50
of a month or soy , and were hurriedly dispatched south
with the rest of the relief army; the Foix company was
51
not paid again till mid-January^ and the Albret company
no doubt suffered a similar delay. Both troops were
shipped to Genoa in January 1504, after the surrender
of Gaeta, together with the bulk of the defeated army's
cavalry; here they were well treated, according to
52
Auton^ , and of course we know that the Foix company was
promptly paid upon arrival. Neither Jean d'Auton's
testimony nor the record of payment of the Foix company
accords well with the desperate correspondence of
Chaumont d'Amboise in January 1504, however: "... I
pray you get me a reply to all the letters I have written,
especially about all these companies which have returned
from Naples, and have received absolutely no payment...",
he implored Louis XII's secretary, Robertet, on the 25th;
Chaumont went on that it would have been better to sort
out those units to be dismissed rather than to have simply
abused them all. A similar complaint was dispatched to
50. B.N., fr. 21506, nos. 726 and 728.
51. B.N., fr. 25785, no. 51.
52. Auton, iii, p. 505-
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Georges d'Amboise a little later, whilst on the 31st.
Chaumont wrote to the King that "... the gendarmes who
had returned ... were penniless and all on foot...". The
peasants of the countryside were attacking the troops for
their depredations, and Chaumont was at a loss what to
do, since "... some said they were due four or five
quarters and it was the greatest pity imaginable... "
"The King was most displeased..., both with the gendarmes
who returned, whom he did not wish to see nor hear of,
as well as with the treasurers," notes La Tr6moille's
B4
biographer on the same subject^ . This severe attitude
is confirmed by Auton, although he suggests later that
Louis XII used funds recouped from peculatory financial
officials to compensate poor captains.^5
If Italian service increased the risk of break¬
down in the already imperfect system of payment of the
regular army, It did at the same time open up wider
opportunities for plunder than existed at home. Complaints
against arbitrary impositions by the gendarmerie were
common enough in France, but an established network of
local government officials, allied to the army's own
machinery of control, helped to discipline the military
life. Control was generally less tight in Italy, and
53. B.N., Melanges de Colbert 13# fol. 55# B.N., Dupuy
279, fol. 50 (copy in Melanges de Colbert 13# fol.
67); ibid., fol. 43 vo..
54. Bouchet, Le panegyric du chevalier sans reproche, p.444.
55• Auton, iii, pp. 306 and 3^7.
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forced levies on the populace even had to be tolerated
at times, to enable unpaid garrisons to subsist. The
abuse of the host population by French troops was not
simply a response to poverty, however, but an activity
engaged in whenever possible - a perquisite of the
soldier's trade; the cities of Lombardy lamented it*^
and French commanders took it for granted if proper
supervision were not maintained^'. This sort of petty
pilfering was only one of many opportunities for gain
to be had at the expense of enemy and neutral alike, and
one of the least important. After all, no-one was going
to make his fortune by holding to ransom the mean house¬
hold of some Italian peasant, or urban labourer or
artisan. The peculiar advantage of service beyond the
Alps was that Italy was a war-zone, and although rigid
discipline might be enforced within a French army when on
the march, this control was necessarily relaxed after a
battle was won; then a marauding search for loot was
unleashed, which might last for days. The military
authorities provided only a feeble impediment to this
activity, partly because they were unable to do more,
partly because it was recognised that plunder oiled the
56. L-G. P6lissier, Documents pour 1'histoire de la
domination francaise dans le Milanais (1499--1 63-2)
(Toulouse, 18915 > p"» 70 (for Milan in 1502) and' p.
215 (for Crema in 1509).
57. B.N., Dupuy 262, fol. 86.
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wheels of the army.
It is difficult to find precise evidence of an
individual soldier making his fortune through plunder in
Italy - by its very nature the acquisition of loot is ill
documented. Perhaps the nearest thing we possess to a
Gascon example is the story of the Quercian, Tardieu, a
companion of Bayard in Naples in 1503* whose half-share
of a Spanish money-convoy enabled him to marry a rich
58
heiress after his return home^ . Such spectacular
windfalls obviously eluded most, but at the same time,
few soldiers, from generalissimo to common infantryman,
would have been satisfied if a successful campaign had
not yielded him his profit - only due reward, after all,
for his exertions. The absence of cupidity in those
paragons of contemporary knighthood, La Tremoille and
Bayard, was accounted an extraordinary virtue by their
biographers. The richest rewards were to be had at the
expense of hostile towns and enemy castles. A city might
yield to a fine, to escape the consequences of further
resistance - Louis d'Armagnac exacted fines of 18,000 and
5000 ducats respectively, from the rebellious towns of
Bitonto and Castellaneta, during his reign in Naples in
58. Histoire du gentil seigneur de Bayard, par le loyal
serviteur, ed. Roman, p3 116. The heiress was one
Franqoise de St. Martin, G. Lacoste, Histoire
generale de la province de Quercy, vol~. iv. (Cahors,
1883), PP. 2j5-4.
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1502-9 , whilst in 1511 Monfalcone surrendered to
Fontrailles' lieutenant, St. Blancard, and his troop,
and was taxed for 500 ducats^. The acquisition of an
enemy fortress might yield a store of riches, such as
those handed over to the French captains from Bologna
castle, after the deliverance of this friendly city
f) 1
from papal occupation in 1511 • The interests of
commanders were best-served by the composition of terms
of surrender with a hostile town, or by the orderly
distribution of loot relinquished by a defeated garrison.
The rank and file stood to gain more by putting a town
to the sack. Interestingly, the conflicting ambitions
of captains and men came to a head at Ravenna in April
1512, following the famous battle. La Palice, the French
commander after Gaston de Foix's death, negotiated for the
surrender of the city of Ravenna, with the provision of
money payments to all his captains; despite the conclusion
of such a pact, however, the infantry succeeded in gaining
entry to the place and, joined by the gendarmerie they
62
plundered the whole town
59. Dlarii, iv, cols. 477 and 840.
60. Ibid., xiii, 299.
61. Lettres de Louis XII, 4 vols. (Brussels, 1712),
vol. IT, p^ 249.
62. Fleuranges, Histoire des choses memorables, p. 221.
\
145.
The sack of Ravenna had been preceded by an
even more monstrous affair at Brescia, in February.
This was one of the richest cities in Italy and, moreover,
was consigned to pillage with the sympathy of the French
commander, Gaston de Foix. The breaching of Brescia's
walls set off something like an immense explosion, at the
centre of which men and property were consumed in a chaos
of devastation, whilst debris was flung far and wide.
As some three million 6cus' worth of loot was bled from
the place, the French army all but disintegrated^.
Brescia was briefly turned into a great emporium for
luxury goods - whilst "... plate, purple silks and furs
were sold in all parts of the city by the soldiers^",
carts and mules loaded with plunder were escorted towards
6g
the west by footsoldiers and cavalry alike . Much of
the stuff evidently found its way to Milan, to be traded
there^. Other convoys would have been threading north
towards Germany, since German troops were well represented
at Brescia. There is no doubt, however, that French
knights took their fair share, and Fleuranges notes how
"... there were gendarmes... who made such a haul that they
and their children reaped the rewards all their
63. Loyal serviteur, op.cit., p. 284.
64. Letters and papers (domestic and foreign) of the reign
of Henry VIII, 2nd edition, ed. J. Brewer and R.H.
Brodie, vol. i (London, 1920), pt. I, p. 518.
65. Diarii, xiii, cols. 525 and 528.
66. Ibid., xiv, 23; G.A. Prato, Storia di Milano, in
A.S,I., ser. I, vol. iii (1842), p. 297. Prato notes
that the purchase in Milan of looted goods from
Brescia led to two years of plague in the capital,
since Brescia had been infected at the time of the
sack.
146.
57life When the Spaniards took Trezzo from Roger
de B^arn in January 1513# they found a stock of booty
from both Brescia and Ravenna; in fact, Roger had
amassed some 10,000 ducats in coin and 5000 in silver
here^, although by no means all of this would have been
plundered from the two great cities, for B6arn had been
pillaging in the Milanese during the later months of
1512^9. we may imagine that the rebellious city of
Bergamo, which settled for a fine of 60,000 ducats with
the French, a little after the sack of Brescia^, felt
itself mightily relieved in the circumstances.
Despite such spectacular prizes as Brescia and
Ravenna, however, the staple diet of profits of war was
provided by the capture of enemy soldiers, their equipment
and lodgings. On rare occasions a glittering windfall
might be unearthed - Fleuranges describes, for instance,
how a horde of treasure, plundered from all parts of Italy,
was discovered by his troops in an abbey outside Alessandria
in 1513, where it had been abandoned by retreating Swiss
71
and Spanish forces' . More commonly, victorious soldiers
67. Fleuranges, op.cit., p. 212.
68. Diarii, xv, cols. 467 and 484.
69. ibid., col. 88.
70. ibid., vol. xiv, col. 9«
71. Fleuranges, op.cit., p. 237.
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had to make do with handfuls of ransom-money or with what
could be stripped from a corpse or found littering the
field. Only the ransoms of notable prisoners are
recorded, but even so the 100 ducats' ransom which
Gaston de Foix's mattre d'hStel negotiated with a captive
Venetian gentleman at Brescia in 1512, or the quarter-
share of the 200 ducat value of the Podestk of
72
Casalmaggiore, to which Ste. Colombe was entitled in 1509 *
were only equivalent to minor pensions. No doubt Ste.
Colombe was to derive more from his capture of the great
77
Venetian general, Andrea Gritti in 1512 , but important
prisoners were at the disposal of the King and there is
no chance that Ste. Colombe's share of Gritti's ransom
approached anything like its full value. Even these
relatively modest sums are put in their place by what we
know to have been the usual ransom fees of the time. The
Franco-Spanish convention, operating during the Neapolitan
campaign in 1502-5, fixed the value of a man-at-arms at
twenty-five ducats - the equivalent of about three
months' pay - and that of a footsoldier at five ducats,
although more could be had for officers and superior
nobles, and a captor could also expect to appropriate the
74
horse and equipment of his victim' . Later, a Venetian
officer described how he and his commander escaped death
72. Diarii, xiii, 529 and viii, 164-5. In 1509* Ste.
Colombe was lieutenant of the company of Yves d'Alfegre,
becoming Lautrec's second-in-command in 1511* when the
latter became a captain of the Ordonnance, B.N., fr.
25785, no. 161.
75* Diarii, xiii, 521-2 and xiv, 52.
74. Ibid., iv, col. 840; P. Giovio, Le vite del Gran
Capitano e del Marchese di Pescaral trans. EI Domenichi,
publ. by C. Panigada (Bari, 1951)* P- 83; Auton,
vol. iii, p. 110.
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at the sack of Brescia by proffering fifteen and twenty-
five ducat ransoms . Finally, if the defeat of
Spaniards and Venetians yielded only modest profits, that
of the Swiss was even less propitious: in 1516, the
Florentine envoy to France reported on the Marignano
campaign, noting that "... on other occasions when the
French had undertaken successful expeditions to Italy...
individuals had been enriched; but that had not occurred
this time, for the Swiss were poor men and the troops had
returned to France without a penny^."
By the same token as profits of war were made,
so they were lost, and new losses incurred. The balance
of credit and debit is impossible to calculate in
individual cases, but looking at the French army as a
whole, we may safely say that for each city sacked so was
a store of treasure abandoned, for each captive ransomed
so was a ransom to be paid. Indeed, so unsuccessful
were the French expeditions to Italy in the main, that it
is difficult to believe that losses did not outweigh
gains. French success was often so short-lived that
the profits of war were never in fact realised. The
75» Diarii, xiii, col. 516.
76. Canestrini and Desjardins, Negociations diplomatiques,
vol. ii, p. 763.
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army which headed northwards from Naples in 1495 lost the
bulk of its baggage at the battle of Fornovo^; on the
other hand, the garrison of Gaeta, which surrendered in
1496, embarked with three ships full of loot, but one,
laden with treasure ransacked fronu.Neapolitan churches,
foundered on the journey home whilst another was
rj O
captured . In short, we may well believe Bayard's
biographer when he comments that "there were several
gentlemen who brought back precious little from this
Neapolitan enterprise^." The second campaign in the
south was, if anything, less profitable than the first,
with the loss of the army's baggage at Cerignola and the
notorious poverty of the troops who returned from Gaeta
in 1504. And if the enjoyment of the fruits of Naples
was almost invariably temporary, the booty accumulated
in campaigns in the north was also easily lost. We have
seen how Roger de Beam was obliged to abandon his haul
when he surrendered Trezzo in 1513; the treasure unearthed
by Fleuranges' men near Alessandria in the same year was
probably lost in the confusion of the battle of Novara a
77. Ibid., i, pp. 624-5; La Pilorgerie, Campagne et
bulletins de la grande armee d Italie, p. 559;
D. Malipiero, Annali veneti, in A . S , I. , ser. I,
vol. vii (184377 pt. T~, p7 556.
78. Boislisle, Notice sur Etienne de Vesc, p. 169.
79. Loyal serviteur, op.cit., p. 63.
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little later . As defeat in Italy took Its toll of
plunder gained, so it left prisoners to be redeemed.
Gaspard de Coligny, Louis d'Armagnac's lieutenant, who
was captured at Cerignola, was one of those who was
released without ransom by the terms of the surrender
on
of Gaeta in January 1504 . It seems probable that
Fontrailles, imprisoned at Venice in 1509* was also
relieved of the need to purchase his freedom, being part
82
of an exchange deal . Gabriel d'Albret, seigneur de
Lesparre and viceroy in Apulia in 1495* was less
fortunate however; captured near Otranto in late May
or early June 1495, Lesparre was ultimately exchanged the
following January for the son of the commander of the
papal army in Naples®^. In addition, 6000 ducats'
ransom was to be paid, and we know that Lesparre was
unable to meet the figure without help from his brother,
who borrowed about a third of the sum from a fellow
courtier, Germain de Bonneval. In a letter to Charles
VIII of March 1496, Lesparre asked the King for consider¬
ation of his ransom, and indeed it was Charles who
80. The baggage was lost at Novara, B.N., n.a.fr. 5126,
fol. 56.
81. Auton, iii, pp. 304-5.
82. Diarii, vol. ix, col. 422.
83. G. de Villeneuve, M6moires, in Collection des




In general, there appears to have been
comparatively little opportunity to make a fortune In
Italy, by means of private enterprise - the risks of
loss seem to have outweighed the potential for gain.
If men made profits from the sack of an Italian city,
such outlets were rare and, as often as notjthey were
but brilliant interludes in campaigns which ended in
wretched failure. Only in Lombardy, during the years of
uninterrupted French rule between 1500 and 1512, • -was
there scope for the accumulation of wealth, when a man
might build on his initial success, largely free from
the attentions of an enemy. But whilst these peaceful
conditions removed the threat of loss, they also narrowed
the prospect of gain. Lombardy was a royal duchy where
most rewards were at the disposal of the King of France.
If Frenchmen saw in Italy the chance for independent
advancement denied them at home, their hopes must have
been usually disappointed - on the whole, service across
the Alps reinforced the dependence of the nobility upon
the Crown, when a new range of appointments, pensions and
sinecures appeared on the market. As governor and
84. B.N., Dupuy 26l, fol. 10; (this letter of Lesparre
has been published in Commynes, Memoires, ed.
Dupont, vol. iii, p. 4^2); B.N.^ fr. 25105,
no. 1243.
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lieutenant-general in Milan in 1511-12, Gaston de Foix
was assigned a pension, or salary, of 12,000 livres per
annum, whilst Louis d'Armagnac had received a similar
8s
wage as Viceroy in Naples in 1501-2 . Although not
as large as the pensions of some of the great magnates
at home, such as Alain d'Albret, this was a substantial
sum and, besides, was additional to existing domestic
subsidies: thus in 1502, for example, Armagnac
O/T
received a total of 17,000 livres from the Crown , as
much as Albret himself. On the other hand, the prose¬
cution of the King's affairs no doubt involved consider¬
able personal expenditure by both Armagnac and Foix,
especially as their reigns coincided with periods of
continual warfare. Foix's predecessor in Milan,
Chaumont d'Amboise, adduced expense as a motive for
wishing to be discharged from his post, in September 1509*
when he complained that he had disbursed in five months
almost the whole of his annual salary on official
business^. Nevertheless, it was believed that Chaumont's
85. A.N., J. 910, no. 2 bis.; B.N., fr. 2950, fols.
14 vo. and 19 - although only documented for 1501-2,
it seems probable that Armagnac would have been
assigned a similar salary the next year.
86. 12,000 livres in Naples and 5000 in France, B.N.,
p.o. 95, nos. 597 and 407.
87. B.N., Melanges de Colbert 15, fol. 59 vo..
!53.
profits from Italy were not negligible, a belief which
fathered the irreverent catch-phrase "Milan and
88Meillant" , his sumptuous new palace in Berry.
BrantSme reckoned that Italy had made the fortune of
Odet de Lautrec, governor of Milan under Francis I, and
of his brother, Lescun - although of good birth, they
had not been rich when they entered royal service, but
Milan "... had set them both up very well" Un¬
fortunately, neither Armagnac nor Foix lived long enough
to reap similar benefits.
The King's Italian revenues also provided
sustenance for lesser men. On the one hand, distinguished
soldiers whose companies were stationed in the peninsula
were pensioned: the Milanese treasury assigned 2000
livres to Duras, 1200 to Fontrailles, 400 to Roger de
B^arn and 200 to Ste. Colombe between 1510 and 1512.
In Duras' case, his Milanese pension was additional to a
French one of 500 livres. From 1511, Gaston de Foix's
ensign, Bertrand de B^arn, received a pension of 400
livres, whilst Odet de Lautrec was assigned one of 2000
00
livres in 1512, aside from 3000 he took in France^ .
Similar pensions had been entered in the Neapolitan budget
88. BrantSme, Oeuvres completes, publ, by M6rim6e and
Lac our, vo~ iii, p7 177 •
89. Ibid., p. 206.
90. A.N., J. 910, nos. 1, 2 and 2 bis..
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of 1502, although Fontrailles, with 300 livres, was the only
Gascon included^. On the other hand, payments were made
as salaries for the new posts which Italy afforded: Roger
de B6arn was paid 600 livres a year for the captaincy of
Trezzo, the same rate of wage as a captain of fifty lances,
and six times as much as B^arn himself was due as governor
of Soule, on the Spanish frontier. The Gascon, Guillaume
de la Hicte had 1000 livres as captain of the ChStellet
of Genoa. Perot d'Ognoas, a relative of Odet Aydie,
received 400 livres as captain of Brivio and another 400
as an artillery commander. These were fairly large
salaries, many more being of the order of 100 livres or
less, such as that of one Augustin Charles, late of the
Foix company and castellan of Valenza by 15H. Besides,
a large proportion of those pensioned by the Milanese
treasury were Italian gentlemen, whilst a number of ducal
castles were donated to local magnates, so that the stock
92
of potential appointments was necessarily diminished .
The transfer of ducal castles in Lombardy leads
us to the question of gifts of property in Italy to royal
servants. If French soldiers had a better than equal
chance of holding pensions and military posts in the
peninsula, compared with the King's Italian partisans, the
latter certainly predominated in the acquisition of con-
91. B.N., fr. 2990, fol. 17 vo..
92. A.N., J. 910, nos. 1, 2 and 2 bis..
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fiscated or vacant estates and in the receipt of grants
of land from the ducal or royal domain. Such benefits
were an expected profit of conquest: following the
capture of Brescia, for instance, Gaston de Foix asked
Louis XII "... what his pleasure was regarding the
confiscated goods to reward his captains... (who) had all
served well, sparing neither funds nor thoughts for their
95 nlives^ . But Italians were the chief beneficiaries,
certainly of the larger type of property. The reasons
were perhaps two-fold: firstly, Frenchmen may well have
preferred cash to fixed assets in a foreign country,
particularly when the future of French rule was un¬
certain - the French who received property in Naples in
1495 did .their best to realise its value, particularly
94
after news of the prospective departure of Charles VIII^ .
Furthermore, Frenchmen on the whole preferred land at home
to its equivalent in Italy: thus in 1500 the Marshal de
Gi6 exchanged a Milanese lordship for Ch&teau-du-Loir
95
with Gian-Giacomo Trivulzio-7 . In the second place,
95. B.N., n.a.fr. 7647, fol. 258.
94. Delaborde, L'exp6dition de Charles VIII, pp. 569 and
599. De Maulde notes that in 1501 also, wise men
tried to cash their lands in the south, Auton, ii,
p. 248, n.l. Examples of Frenchmen selling property
in Italy can be found in B.N., fr. 5085, fol. 58.
(the grandmaster of artillery granted permission to
sell a Milanese lordship); fr. 5093* fols. 278 and
290 (sale of confiscated rebel goods by Louis
d'Ars); and fr. 5500, fol. 99 (a company lieutenant
selling a house outside Milan).
95- B.N., fr. 16589, fol. 307.
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Italian property was a political resource which the
Crown needed to distribute with care. Local allies
must be encouraged by judicious patronage. If the
donation of over thirty places in the realm of Naples
to the Colonna family by Charles VIII was not vindicated
, q5
by that clan s subsequent loyalty to France-^ , then at
least the generous treatment of the powerful Trivulzii
in Lombardy was rather more fortunate this family
was the single most favoured group in the distribution
Q7
of estates by Louis XII in the north-", and was consis¬
tently loyal to the French cause. Away from the big
business of political trading in land, a select few
Frenchmen could expect to acquire handsome estates but
others had to be satisfied with morsels. Charles VIII
had been liberal enough in Naples where, for example,
Gratien d'Aguerre was granted the county of Montorio, and
also came by a newly-built galley captured in the stocks,
96. Commynes, Memoirs, ed. Kinser, ii, p. 507.
97. For the favours showered on this family see P^lissier,
Documents pour la domination, nos. 15 and 16; see
also documents notified throughout the same author's
Les sources milanaises de l'histoire de France
(Paris, 1692) and Documents relatifs au regne de
Louis XII et a sa politique en Italie (Montpellier,
1912). Trivulzio also received a pension in France,
amounting to 10,000 livres in 1506 and 1510# f°r
instance, B.N., fr. 25268, fols. 6 and 40; other
members of his family were accorded smaller sums.
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which was launched with some pomp in May 1495^®. After
the second conquest of 1501, the Crown again kept only a
few fiefs in the Kingdom of Naples^, but it seems that
little was granted to Frenchmen - as far as we know, even
the Viceroy, Louis d'Armagnac, enjoyed only 2000 ducats,
or 5500 livres on the duchy of Nola"1"^. The new French
regime awas anxious to keep well in hand the settlement of
conflicting claims on estates in Naples and to leave
sitting tenants in possession until the credentials of
plaintiffs were duly investigated"1"^"1". In 1495 "the
confusion of rival claims had led Charles VIII to revoke
102
on the 16th. of March all cessions made since his arrival
In the climate of political expediency and careful economy
in which Louis XII aimed to settle his new, though much-
reduced kingdom of Naples, there was little room for the
territorial ambitions of the French soldier.
The acquisition of property in the realm'of Naples
98. Boislisle, op.cit., pp. 109 and 290; A. de la Vigne,
Le vergier d honeur, in Archives curieuses de
I'histoire de France, ed. L. Cimber and F. Danjou,
ser. I, vol. i (1854), pp. 556-7.
99. Auton, ii, p. 248, n.l. See the list of tenants and
confiscations in the Abruzzi, in B.N., fr. 2926, fol.
35.
100. B.N., fr. 2950, fols. 14 vo. and 18 va..
101. Auton, ii, pieces annexes, p. 597 C^^moire sur
1'organisation du Royaume de Naples").
102. Delaborde, op.cit., p. 569.
158.
could provide no lasting benefit anyway, owing to the
short duration of French rule here, except in as much as
it could be converted into exportable cash"*"^. In the
north, gifts of land were of more permanent value, but here
also Italian partisans and a favoured circle of French
magnates largely cornered the market. Outstanding parti¬
cipants in the conquest of Milan might expect reward from
the confiscated property of Sforza's supporters, and
104
Fontrailles received 200 ducats a year rent in this way
Somewhat later, it appears, Roger de B^arn was granted the
10S
confiscated estate of the rebel, Girolamo di Corto .
Even so, donations were not always without conditions, but
were often used apparently as inducements to keep French
soldiers in Italy: the list of gifts on rebel goods in
Lombardy, drawn up in 1500, specifies that the recipients
must remain in Italy for two or three years or more, and
when they might wish to return to France, half the value
106
of any sale of property was to go to the ducal treasury
105. Gi6 sold lands he had received to their former owner,
Alberico Caraffa, for 12,000 livres, Anton, ii, p.248,
n.l.
104. P6lissier, Documents pour la domination, no. 15
("Liste des donations faites sur les biens de
rebelles confisqu6s" (1500)), p. 56.
105. Catalogue des actes de Francois I, vol. v (Paris, 1892),
no. 16065•
106. Pelissier, op.cit., p. 55.
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The enjoyment of the fruits of conquest was to be chiefly
for those who made their career in the peninsula.
Rewards for service in Italy also took the form
of straight cash payments - in 1516, for instance, Roger
de B^arn received 1000 gold ecus soleil "... in acknowledge¬
ment of the good and agreeable services which he had per-
107
formed... against the Swiss... '," in other words at the
battle of Marignano. More commonly, however, this type
of payment constituted compensation for losses incurred.
After his return from Maples, Gratien d'Aguerre was
accorded 2000 6cus couronne, or 5500 livres "... to help
him both maintain himself in (royal) service and cover
the large expenses he had made on behalf of the late...
King Charles..., particularly in the conquest of the
kingdom of Sicily,vhither Aguerre... had accompanied him
and had stayed afterwards for a long time, and also to
compensate him somewhat for his (lost) offices and
108
pensions whilst he had been there ". Already Charles
VIII had granted Gratien 5550 6cus soleil, or over 6000
109
livres to pay his debts to the Prefect of Rome , his
main ally in Naples during the twilight of the first
occupation. Quite often, service in Italy involved a
107. B.N., fr. 26115, no. 146.
108. B.N., p.o. 15, no. 19 and B.N., n.a.fr. 7645, fol.
515 and vo..
109. B.N., p.o. 15, no. 16.
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financial outlay which royal soldiers usually expected
to be made up by the Crown. Even before the outset of
the first Neapolitan expedition, Gabriel d'Albret,
seigneur d'Avesnes, borrowed 625 ecus from Philippe de
Commynes to finance his trip110, a remarkable transaction
in view of the wealth of Gabriel's father, Alain d'Albret,
but testimony to Alain's lack of ready cash111. In a
letter to Charles VIII after his release from prison,
Lesparre lamented that he was penniless, and asked to be
considered for his pension for the previous and present
112
years,"... for he had not received a sou ." If
compensation were not forthcoming a very dim view of royal
gratitude could arise; following the collapse in Lombardy
in 1512, matters came to a head - the Duke of Bourbon,
summoned to Blois by Louis XII, told the King that he would
gladly return to Italy, but only if he were better treated,
referring to the great expense he had incurred in the
latter's service there; other captains who returned from
Italy at this time, including Roger de B6arn, were so
incensed by Louis' disregard of their past efforts that
110. B.P., E. 157.
111. Luchaire, Alain le Grand, p. 64.
112. B.N., Dupuy 26l, fol. 10. We know he got his
pension of 2000 livres for 1496 at least, the year
of his complaint, acknowledging receipt of it
towards the end of May, B.N., p.o. 26, no. 980.
Less than a month later, Lesparre was dead, expiring
at Lyons on the l8th.June, B.N., dossiers bleus 9>
p. 58.
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".. if the Queen had not openly given them money they
would have quit his service...; they wished the King
were dead and Angoul§me in his place"1""1"^."
Strangely enough, despite the notoriety of his
114
meanness during his lifetime , Louis XII finally left
behind him an enviable reputation for fair-dealing.
The apparent contradiction is explained by the Milanese
chronicler, Prato, who admits to the King's tight-
fistedness but adds that this stemmed from Louis'
wish to pay his troops well and not burden his subjects
with excessive taxes'1"''"^. In the long run, Louis'
economy proved more popular than the impetuous generosity
of Charles VIII, whose unbridled liberality necessitated
the annulment of donations made to soldiers who had
accompanied him to Naples, owing to lack of funds, in
•1 -i /T
December 1495 > the careless prodigality of Francis
I, whose financial difficulties were predicted by the
Florentine envoy to France11^, and whose "... extreme
113* Letters and papers of the reign of Henry VIII,
Addenda to vol. i~, (London, I929T» P~« 52;
ibid., i, pt. I, p. 745-
114. "The King hates spending money", was the verdict
of a Florentine diplomat in 1511, Canestrini and
Desjardins, N6gociations diplomatiques, ii, p. 544.
115. Prato, Storia di Milano, p. 525»
116. A.N., K. 76, no. 6.
117. Canestrini and Desjardins, op.cit., p. 760.
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liberality", in the opinion of Trivulzio, "would drain
11 O
the very blood from his veins ." For Monluc, in the
later part of the sixteenth century, Louis XII repre¬
sented the model of fairness; Monluc had heard that
not only had Louis kept a "book of honour" in which he
recorded the names of the loyal servants he wished to
reward, but also maintained a special coffer, full of
money-bags for distribution to meritorious soldiers,
119
enabling him to by-pass his grasping financial officials
Even if this fond memory, as well as BrantSme's conten¬
tion that Louis XIl's companies never missed a pay-
120
quarter , betray the signs of a folk-image distorted
by time, they do nevertheless bear witness to the
relative success with which Louis handled his army, and
to the real benefits which were to be derived from royal
service.
As far as the army was concerned, Italy was
central to the provision of such benefits but it was not
normally the direct source of bounty. French rule in the
peninsula was marked by so many catastrophes that
financial gains were all too easily forfeited in defeat.
The key to fortune was provided by the Crown, which used
118. R. Brown, Four years at the court of Henry VIII,
vol. i (London, 1854), jn 49.
119. Monluc, Commentaires, ed. Courteault, pp. 814-5.
120. BrantSme, Oeuvres completes, vol. iii, p. 90.
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the material resources of its Italian possessions to
supplement French funds. The early years of the sixteenth
century saw the rise to fortune of a number of Gascon
soldiers, none perhaps so notable as that of Roger de
Beam, the illegitimate son of a scion of the house of
Foix, Jean, seigneur de Gerderest, executed in 1488 for
121
treason by the Queen of Navarre ; by 1515 Roger was
captain of a hundred lances and seneschal of Valentinois.
The efforts of two others, Jean de Durfort, seigneur de
DuraSjand Jean d'Astarac, seigneur de Fontrailles, were to
establish their houses in the front rank for the rest of
the century. An historian of the Duras family contends
that Jean's functions in Italy, particularly his governor-
122
ship of Crema, proved very lucrative , and although the
direct evidence for such an assertion appears to be wanting,
the house of Duras certainly seems to have suffered from
no shortage of money by 1515 - in November that year, a
Venetian correspondent in Milan told how he had befriended
Duras' son, "... a great French lord..., up to his eyeballs
in ducats, which he was gambling away for want of a use
to put them to," although he was sending to Bologna for a
goshawk or falcon12-^. In 1567 Monluc reminded Michel
d'Astarac, grandson of our Fontrailles, that although his
grandfather had been a valiant captain, his house had been
121. R. Antony and H. Courteault, Les testaments des
derniers rois de Navarre (Toulouse-Paris, 1940),
p. 41, n.3.
122. Favre, Precis historique sur la familie de Durfort-
Duras, p. 50.
123. Diarii, vol. xxi, cols. 34-6-7.
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as poor as Monluc's own, and implied that the present
fortune of the Fontrailles family stemmed from Jean's
union with the heiress of Castillon, whose rents had been
worth 7 or 8000 livres, a marriage instigated by Louis
124XIIx .
At a time when the ambitions and energies of
the Kings of France were turned above all towards Italy,
the peninsula provided French soldiers with their greatest
opportunity for advancement in royal favour and service.
A young man in search of fortune looked to Italy as the
scene of action, as Monluc recalled: "... he decided
he wished to go (there), having heard of the fine feats
of arms which commonly took place (across the Alps)12^."
If wealth depended upon the goodwill of the Crown, the
fortune-seeker must participate in the King^'s grand
designs or forever remain in the shadows. The regularity
with which Italian service is adduced as a justification
for the grant of some office or other favour bears this
out. The attempted donation of the county of Comminges
to Jean de Foix-Narbonne in 1495 and the confirmation of
the same man as governor of Dauphin^ in 1498 are vindicated
126
in this way . The grant of the right to appoint men of
his own choosing to the royal offices in his lands of
124. Monluc, op.cit., p. 601.
125. ibid., p. 50.
126. Lettres de Charles VIII, vol. iv, p. 2^4 and supple¬
ment, p. 29; B.N., Clair. 954, p. 109.
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Guise and Lunel, accorded to Louis d'Armagnac in 1496,
and the licensing of two fairs a year and a weekly
market in Guynot de Lauzieres' towns of La Chapelle,
Lauziferes and Pezenas, in 1501, are similarly
127
justified . A certain weight attached to the standing
of a man who had served in Italy - thus, one of Charles
VIII's chief servants wrote to the Chambre des Comptes
from Turin in September 1495* ordering the prompt
expedition of letters-patent to confirm Odet Aydie in
the enjoyment of the revenue of the grenier of Libourne,
and emphasising that Aydie "... was one of the King's
good servants and one of those who had followed him
1 pO
faithfully in his Neapolitan enterprise ." Indeed,
a commendable record might prove of value years later,
as in the case of Jacques de Durfort, seigneur de Deime,
who was pardoned in 1518 for the murder of a vassal, in
view of his Italian service, particularly at Agnadello and
129
in the reconquest of Lombardy in 1515 • Reward could
even be reaped after death - in 1512, for example, the
descendants of Raymond de Cardaillac were granted permission
to embellish their coat of arms, considering their late
forbear's services to the Kings of France, at home and
abroad1-^0. in short, even though Italy may have provided
127. B.N., fr. I6589, fol. 185; A.N., JJ. 254, no. l8l.
Duras' son, Frangoisswas granted similar privileges
for his towns in 1520, B.N., Ch6rin 69 (dossier
Durfort), fol. 6 vo..
128. B.N., fr. 10258, no. 156.
129. B.N., p.o. 1044 (dossier Durfort), no. 546.
139. Lacoste, Histoire... de Quercy, iv, p. 55*
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few fortunes, holding as it did more risks than
opportunities for gain, it remained nonetheless the
principal field of action in which the French soldier
sought to demonstrate his loyalty to the King, in the
reasonable hope of advancement in his career, if not




In March 1495, Charles VIII wrote from Naples
to his regent In France, the Duke of Bourbon, and
announced triumphantly that "there was no longer any
talk in Italy of the cemetery of the French.1" The
King was alluding to the notoriety of the peninsula as
the historical grave of the French soldier, particularly
in view of the unsuccessful Angevin and Orleanist
O
campaigns of the fifteenth century. Charles' optimism
was premature. On the whole, for the French, the Italian
Wars became bloodier as they grew older, and as they drew
in every major power in Europe, save the Turk. At the
same time, it seems likely that the proportion of French
blood contributed by the gendarmerie - a proportion which
was never very great anyway - decreased as time went on.
Apart from the protective advantages which his armour,
his steed (especially in a rout) and Indeed his status and
worth gave the gendarme over his inferior colleague on
1. J. de la Pilorgerie, Campagne et bulletins de la grande
arm6e d'ltalie, p. 215. The expression was something
of a platitude; there is reference to Anne of Brittany
using it in Diarii, vol. ii, col. 768.
2. For a brief catalogue of French defeats in Italy in
the mid-fifteenth century, see M.E. Mallett,
Mercenaries and their masters (London, 1974), pp. 233-4.
An account of the careers of three Gascon adventurers
in Italy, in earlier periods, can be found in P.
Durrieu, Les Gascons en Italie (Auch, 1885).
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foot, the evolution of French tactics over the years
ended by effectively withdrawing the heavily-armoured
horseman from his traditional role as the battering-
ram of the army. We can gauge this evolution by looking
at the two battles of Cerignola and Ravenna, at both of
which the French command was faced by the same tactical
circumstances: whilst in 1503 the gendarmerie was hurled
against the enemy line from the first, nine years later
it was only committed after the hostile position had been
thoroughly mauled by artillery and infantry-assault.
Bayard, from the depths of his despair over the French
losses at Ravenna, thought that the nation would not
recover in a century, yet deaths amongst French men-at-
4
arms at the battle totalled only about one hundred , in
this the biggest and bloodiest encounter of our period.
Indeed, Bayard's pessimistic prediction is a measure of the
sort of losses which contemporary, genteel opinion must
have considered intolerable - it was not so much the
thousands of dead footsoldiers whom he lamented (many of
whom were Germans anyway) but the comparatively few men
of quality who had fallen.
3. Le loyal serviteur, Histoire du gentil seigneur de
Bayard, ed. Roman, p~ 434•
4. This is the estimate of a Burgundian eye-witness, B.N.,
n.a.fr. 5126, fol.55.
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As in all wars, casualties did not result only
from enemy action, of course. The toll taken by those
traditional scourges of the soldier, disease, exposure
and neglect, in addition to less obvious depredations,
from accidents to the activities of vengeful mobs in town
and countryside, increased an army's woes. Here again,
however, the gendarme surely suffered less severely than
his low-born comrade. He was richer and could afford to
eat and clothe himself when conditions deteriorated and
his lesser colleague starved and froze; he was no doubt
better fed and housed at the best of times, and consequently
less susceptible to disease; he was attended by personal
servants who protected and cared for him; and finally,
the Crown itself was quicker to relieve the distress of
its gendarmerie than its infantry, whose soldiering, after
all, had more to do with the baseness of a mercenary life
than the honour of a noble calling. In January 150^# it
was the remnant of the defeated army's foot, many of whom
were Swiss, which was left to make its own way back from
Naples overland, as best it could, whilst the cavalry was
evacuated by sea.
It will not do to belittle the dangers which
faced the regular army in Italy, however. The gendarme's
greater immunity to the perils of war, compared with his
footsoldier colleague, was the result of natural and
technical advantages rather than of any relative deficiency
in morale - in other words, the man-at-arms was no less
brave in the face of danger than his comrade, perhaps even
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the reverse. How can we attempt to evaluate the impact
of these dangers? Literary evidence and contemporary
correspondence give us more or less accurate casualty
figures for particular battles and campaigns, but even
if we possess precise details of the size of contending
forces, the conditions and duration of battle, the
proportion of casualties borne by particular sections of
the armies involved and the way those casualties were
inflicted, such figures remain somewhat unreal. We
must isolate small groups of men who regularly lived and
fought together, and try to determine the impact of battle
upon them. The muster lists of the compagnies d'ordonnance
provide us with such an opportunity, which we may take by
correlating rates of turnover in the personnel of a given
company with its career. Admittedly, this is a most
imperfect approach - surviving muster rolls are few- and
far between and they give us no indication of the fate of a
departed soldier anyway. But if this means that we have
no hope of establishing even fairly precise casualty-rates
in particular units, details of our companies' history, and
of the circumstances of the actions in which they were
engaged, are sufficiently well known, and the range of their
sur\ivlng muster rolls sufficiently broad, to enable us to
construct some interesting comparisons and connections.
In the winter of 1497-8, Gratien d'Aguerre
returned with his company to France, after some three years'
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campaigning in southern Italy: of the 50 men-at-arms
of his unit who had been serving when it was mustered in
April 1493, only 17 remained in the review of April 1499,
with one more still in the company as an archer^. These
statistics represent an extraordinary rate of turnover,
compared with the subsequent history of the Aguerre
company. In May 1507, when it was again reviewed^, 97
of the gendarmes of 1499 appear in the list. In December
1514, a further muster roll^ shows that 28 of the men-at-
arms serving in 1507 were still with the company. In
other words, during the first span, of six years, Aguerre's
company lost 64$ of its original gendarme strength; over
the second period, eight years in length, only 25$; and
during the last span, of seven-and-a-half years, the
company lost 44$ of its original complement. We may
reasonably ascribe the uncommonly heavy turnover in
personnel within this Basque company between 1499 and 1499
to its service in Naples during most of this period. The
Aguerre company appears to have been the longest-serving
French unit in the south of Italy during the first
Neapolitan expedition. In April 1496 the governor of
Taranto wrote to Charles VIII, describing the casualties
amongst the troops left in the south after the King's
departure: "Sire", he began, "you would do well to send
5. B.N., fr. 21509, no. 499 and 21505, no. 692. Only
forty-nine gendarmes appear in the latter list.
6. B.N., fr. 21507, no. 779.
7. B.N., fr. 25785, no. 220.
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us four or five hundred young gentlemen to fill our
companies, for most of the Frenchmen who remained here
are dead... Gratien's unit may have suffered less
heavily than others; perhaps the provision of twenty- '
five suits of armour to Aguerre's company in 1498^,
only half the quantity of equipment needed to refurbish
its gendarmerie, when at full strength, gives some
indication of the number of Gratien's men who had ceased
to serve by the time the unit returned to France. On
the other hand, it seems probable that, likewise, about
half the company's gendarmerie at least came back from
Italy and in a fit state to continue military service.
The Aguerre company was never to return to the peninsula,
but was consigned to garrison duties on the frontiers of
Champagne for the remainder of its existence.
The period covering the Aguerre company's
service in Naples also witnessed a high rate of turnover
amongst the unit's archers. Between the reviews of 1499
and 1499, the company lost 70$ of its archers, although
this proportion includes 11 or 12$ who were promoted
within the company between the two dates. On the other
hand, between 1499 and a muster of June 1510'1'0# only 6l$
of archers disappeared (including 19$ promoted). In
other words, over six years, mostly spent in Naples,
8. B.N., Dupuy 26l, fol. 27.
9. B.N., p.0.19 (dossier Aguerre), no.17.
10. B.N., fr. 21508, no. 822.
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Aguerre's company as a whole lost about 58$ of its
original complement of archers, whilst over eleven years
of garrison duty in Champagne, only 48$ was lost. Lastly
it might be noted that both gendarmes and archers of the
Aguerre company had roughly equivalent turnover rates
during the period dominated by service in Naples.
Although it is true that this analysis of muster lists
provides no clear indication of the number of Aguerre-
company members lost to the army as a result of service in
Italy, its findings nevertheless furnish circumstantial
evidence of a fairly heavy war-toll.
Unfortunately, the distribution of surviving
records is such that we are unable to obtain any clear
picture of changes in personnel within the other Gascon
companies which participated in Charles VIIl's expedition,
over the period in question. We know, however, that the
Armagnac company of forty lances, which was reviewed at
Vercelli in August 1495* soon after its retreat from
Naples with the King and its service at the battle of
Pornovo, mustered at full strength. As this unit's pay
was so far in arrears, it was reviewed again at the same
place, on the same day or soon afterwards.11 Between
the two reviews at Vercelli, eight gendarmes left the
ranks, a remarkably high turnover in so short a span -
12
after all, between October 1492 and August 1495 the
11. B.N., Clair. 239, no. 433 and fr. 21503, no. 558.
12. B.N., fr. 25782, no. 114.
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Armagnac company lost only twice as many members of its
original complement of men-at-arms. The turnover amongst
archers between the two reviews of 1495, on the other
hand, was appreciably lower, although damage to the
manuscripts precludes a precise evaluation. Further¬
more, the lack of other extant muster rolls for this
company means that little can be deduced from our figures
by means of comparison with other periods, but it is
possible that the relatively heavy loss of gendarmes in
1495 betrays the imprint of the first Neapolitan campaign.
The retreat from Naples in 1495 was, if not costly in life,
at least a strain on morale and perhaps health: a
correspondent wrote home from Asti in July and told of his
pity for "the poor gendarmes", with their rusted armour
and exhausted horses - for everyone the fifty-six-day march
northwards had been a thing of "great trouble, woe and
.1 15
worry .
During the second Neapolitan war, two Gascon
companies whose composition is fairly well documented took
part in the Garigliano campaign of 1505• A modern
authority estimates the total of French deaths in this
14
affair at between three and four thousand . In early
15. la Pilorgerie, op.cit., p.559.
14. C. Oman, The art of war in the XVIth century (London,
1957), P."t^7
-L75-
December, Machiavelli in Rome had reported that there
were no longer 900 fit gendarmes in the French camp1^.
A few days later, it was announced from Milan that
1 f)
3000 French had perished to date in the realm of Naples ,
an estimate which seems to include all casualties since
1501. In addition, horses in particular suffered on
the Garigliano, with nothing to eat but olive leaves1^.
The enemy commander, Gonzalo de c6rdoba, reckoned that
whilst the French army had contained 1500 men-at-arms and
8000 foot at the opening of the battle, only 200 and 600
1 ft
respectively were left by the 28th of December . The
Spaniard's figures appear to refer to the numbers of troops
who were in position on the right bank of the river when he
attacked across it on the 28th. Owing to the foul weather,
most of the French had retreated to find shelter, the cavalry
Traietto and Fundi^^ and since also most of the cavalry
horses were dead by the end of December, only 200
20
odd gendarmes remained to face the enemy . It was the
infantry, however, which underwent the greater privation;
two-thirds had perished even before the final Spanish
15. N. Machiavelli, Opere, vol. vii (Milan, 1805), p.162.
16. Diarii, vol. vf col. 590.
17. Ibid., cols. 485 and 505.
18. Ibid., col. 713.
19. P. Giovio, Le vite del Gran Capitano e del Marquese
di Pescara, publ. by Panigada, p. 141.
20. Auton, vol. iii, pp. 297-9.
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assault, according to Jean d'Auton . Many others were
obliged to trudge northwards, after the surrender of
Gaeta on New Year's Day, on the long road to Rome - from
here it was reported on the 8th of January that soldiers
were arriving "... destitute and naked, who buried them-
2p
selves up to the neck in dung-heaps, to escape the cold.
The Roman populace only screamed abuse at these hundreds
of miserable refugees who were dying of exposure and
hunger, although a handful of synpathetic Cardinals
managed to embark the survivors by sea for France2-^.
Perhaps the greater part of the defeated army,
certainly all or most of the gendarmerie, was shipped
directly from Gaeta to Genoa. Amongst these more fortunate
survivors were accounted the companies of Foix and Albret.
The roll of the muster and review of the first of these
two units, held at Genoa on the 13th of January 1504, is
oil
preserved : of the fifty lances, 49 gendarmes and 98
archers appear in the list, virtually a full complement.
Payment at Genoa was being made for the July quarter of
1503, well before the battle, so that all these men
survived their ordeal on the Garigliano (given that they
had all actually served there, which seems probable) -
21. Ibid., pp. 293 and 297.
22. Diarii, v, col. 696.
23. Ibid., cols.695-6 and 722.
24. B.N., fr. 25783, no. 51.
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at most, the Foix company lost one man-at-arms as an
immediate consequence of the battle2^. However, between
1504 and the next surviving roll, of July 1505 , there
occurred a remarkable shake-out of personnel. Only 21
gendarmes from Genoa appear again in that review, one-and-
a-half years later - a ratio of turnover of about 56$, which
compares with one of only 70$ between the musters of February
1499 and August 15032^, a period of almost four-and-a-half
years, during part of which the Foix company went through
the first Milanese campaign. On the other hand, between
2 8
1505 and our next muster, of New Year's Day 1507 > only
eight gendarmes leave the ranks, a proportion of just 16$,
over a comparable period of one-and-a-half years. In
other words, we have two spans of years of similarly
peaceful conditions, one of nineteen, the other of
seventeen months' duration, during which the
25. The persistent practice of paying troops in arrears
makes the interpretation of muster rolls a little
confusing. When the Foix company was reviewed in
August 1509, for the April quarter, one of the
men-at-arms later paid at Genoa for the following
quarter was absent, another man being in his place;
in other words, a given muster list does not
necessarily record the names of soldiers actually
serving with a company at the time of review,
rather those serving during the pay-quarter in
question. In practice, however, a soldier would
have had to remain with his company after termination
of his contract, in order to attend muster and receive
his back-pay, thus in effect providing the Crown with
any amount of gratuitous service.
26. B.N., Clair.241, no. 597.
27. B.N., fr. 21505, no. 627 and 21506, no. 726.
28. B.N., fr. 21507, no. 775-
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Foix company lost 28 and 8 gendarmes respectively. The
evidence for Garigliano casualties is surely unmistakable
- Foix's men-at-arms may not have died in the swamps south
of Gaeta in December 1503* but it appears that many were
induced to quit serving after their return north, perhaps
through illness above all.
The Albret company was reviewed in Lombardy in
August 1503 and again in July 15052^. Only 18 of the
gendarmes who mustered in 1503 were still present at the
later date, although by this stage the effective strength
of the unit was down to 42 men. This turnover of 57$
over a period of about two years is markedly higher than
that of 31% which is revealed between this company's
reviews of June 1498 and February 1502-^ , a span nearly
twice as long. During this earlier period, the Albret
company saw little or no war service, but was usually to
be found on garrison duty on the frontiers of France.
By contrast, however, the period of one-and-a-half years
between the musters of February 1502 and August 1503 saw
Albret's company lose 23 gendarmes, or 46$ of original
strength. The reasons for such an abnormally high level
of replacement during these months are not obvious - the
29. B.N., fr. 21506, no. 728 and fr. 25784, no. 82.
30. B.N., fr. 21504, no. 607 and fr. 25783, no. 4l.
Only forty-nine gendarmes appear at the earlier
date.
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unit did not apparently see active service during this
time. Perhaps the resignation of the company lieutenant,
Raymond de Cardailhac, which took place at some stage
during this period, brought in its train a number of
others, of members of the company who were attached to him.
At all events, such an unexpectedly high level of turnover
does serve to remind us of the need for caution in
ascribing disappearances in the ranks to casualties of
war, or indeed to any other cause. Nevertheless, for the
two years between the Albret company reviews of 1505 and
tz I
1507 t the turnover of gendarmes declines again to 19$.
The surprising loss during 1502-3 notwithstanding therefore,
the muster rolls of Albret's company appear to confirm
expectations of substantial losses for participants on the
Garigliano. The impact of the battle is surely revealed
also in the case of the archers of both Albret and Foix
companies. Only 29 of the former's one hundred archers
of I503 survive until 1505, with one more promoted to the
gendarmerie; on the other hand, 75 or 76 of the ninety-
eight of 1505 turn up again two years later, with three
others promoted. These figures represent turnover
proportions of 69 and 21$ respectively. The Foix company
lost fewer archers between 1503 and 1505* as between 42
and 45 of the original complement appeared at the later
date, with three men promoted; this ratio of 53$ or so
is still substantially higher than that of only 26$ for
31. B.N., fr. 21507, no. 780. Only forty-seven gendarmes
mustered in 1507.
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the years 1505 to 1507, however.
We know that both the Foix and Albret-Duras
companies were normally to be found in Italy during the
middle years of Louis XII's reign. Until 1509 however,
warfare in the peninsula was only intermittent; but from
this date onwards, the intensity of fighting gradually
increased to reach its climax in 1512 at the battle of
Ravenna. The composition of our two Gascon units is
not particularly well documented for this period, but such
as it is, the evidence appears to indicate that neither
company again suffered as badly as it had in the aftermath
of the Garigliano campaign. The low rates of turnover
during the relatively peaceful years 1505-7 have been
noted above. Between its review in 1507 and its next
^52
known muster, of August 1509 , the Albret-Duras company
took part in the early stages of the campaign against
Venetian-held Lombardy, and although there is no definitive
evidence that it fought at the Battle of Agnadello on the
14th of May 1509* the company was certainly part of the
French army assembling in preparation for the coming
■x-z
offensive, to the west of the Adda in April^ . We must
surely presume therefore that this unit did serve at
52. B.N., Clair. 24l, no. 659-
35. The unit was reported to be at Lodi on the 13th of
April, Diarii, vol. viii, col. 92.
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Agnadello, but even so the muster roll of 1509, which
covers the pay-quarter April to June, shows that the
company suffered no casualties amongst its men-at-arms;
amongst the archers, one man left towards the end of
June and another on the 14th of May, almost certainly a
battle casualty. Indeed, the period of almost two-and-
a-quarter years between the two Albret-Duras company
reviews of 1507 and 1509 witnessed a turnover amongst
the gendarmerie of only Vo%.
Again it seems highly probable that the Foix
34
company fought at Agnadello^ , an assumption strengthened
by the knowledge that three of its men-at-arms left the
ranks on the l4th of May 1509"^. The French army
included a total of some 23OO gendarmes, of whom about
fifty died and many were wounded, but since the vanguard
of some 600 lances was the only body of horse which really
36
engaged the enemyy , the bulk of the losses must have been
34. This unit was reported to be at Trezzo on the 13th
of April, although the same report puts another
"Foix company" at Cassano and eighty more lances
of "Foix" at Melzo, ibid., cols. 91-2. The fifty
lances reported at Trezzo no doubt represent the
veritable Foix company, but the French army was
concentrating for its offensive all along the Adda
in April anyway.
35. Muster at Peschiera (29:8:1509) for the previous
April'quarter, B.N., fr. 21507, no. 798.
36. Bridge, A history of France, vol. iv, pp. 24 and
30-4; P. Pieri, II Rinascimento e la crisi militare
italiana (1952), p^ 464. ~
borne by this force. Nevertheless, the battle of
Agnadello proved to be a relatively costly victory for
the French cavalry, and both our companies appear to
have escaped lightly enough in the circumstances, although
two of Foix's gendarmes and seven of his archers left the
ranks at the end of May, departures which perhaps betray
the after-effects of the battle and subsequent drive
eastwards. In fact the turnover of gendarmes in the
Foix company during these middle years was much higher than
that in its fellow unit, 48$ leaving between the musters
of January 1507 and August 1509. No doubt this is partly
to be expected, since the span is longer by nearly six
months than the one used to measure turnover in the Albret-
Duras company, and besides includes that period when the
Foix company was involved in the Genoese expedition of the
spring of 1507. Even after considering these factors,
however, and also allowing for the probability that the
Foix company suffered a few casualties during the Agnadello
campaign, the rate of turnover in this unit seems rather
high in comparison with the Albret-Duras company, especially
as all available indications suggest that the careers of the
two units were not dissimilar during the period 1507 to
1509. It seems likely that the high rate of turnover
amongst gendarmes of the Foix company, during these years
of almost continual duty in Italy, had more to do with the
type of recruit acquired by the unit at this time than
with any particularly severe demands imposed by campaigning.
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In the late summer of 1509, Roger de B6arn led part of
the Folx company to the siege of Padua, as part of the
force of French cavalry under La Palice, designated by
Louis XII to help the Emperor Maximilian I retake the
-ZSj
city from the Venetians . Twelve of Foix's men-at-arms
who mustered at Peschiera in August 1509 had left the
ranks by the time of this unit's next known review, of
38
March 151Cr , most of them in November or December 1509
- again a remarkable rate of loss, but not readily
attributable to the siege of Padua which, although long,
39
was hardly gruelling^ . It is interesting, however, to
find that nine of those gendarmes who left were compara¬
tively recent recruits to the Foix company, having been
first signalled in the muster roll of 1509; in other
words the losses of 1509-10 were largely confined to
short-service soldiers. The Foix company maintained a
core of veterans even during a period of heavy replace¬
ment - almost half its gendarmerie, 23 men, continued in
service between the musters of 1507 and 1510; in fact
as many as 21 of these figure in the roll of July 1505*
Unless we believe that new recruits were more liable to
become casualties of war than their more established
37. Le loyal serviteur, op.cit., p. 149.
38. B.N., fr. 21507, no. 8l4.
39. Le loyal serviteur, op.cit., pp. 156-87.
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comrades, we obviously cannot ascribe the comparatively
heavy rate of turnover In the Foix company during the
middle years of Louis XIl's reign to death and wounding
in battle. The majority of losses were of men none too
strongly attached to the company, often foreigners
recruited in Italy, who resigned to take up other employ¬
ment. At the same time, Foix, and more particularly
his lieutenant, Roger de B<§arn, the effective leader of
the unit, maintained a group of long-service veterans,
the foundation of the company's solidarity and identity,
who were for the most part Bearnese and Basques. The
proportion of long-service men-at-arms remained substan¬
tially lower in the Foix company than in that of Albret-
Duras, nonetheless•over the four years or so between
July 1505 and August 1509* the Foix company retained 48$
.40
of its gendarmes, the Albret-Duras 71$
No Foix or Duras company muster lists survive
for the last few years of Louis XII*s occupation of
Lombardy. Only in 1515 do we again have the chance to
scrutinise their personnel, when both units were reviewed
40. The fact that in the case of the latter company
this calculation rests on a base of only forty-two
men-at-arms for 1505* the unit being depleted
somewhat at the time, may serve to over-emphasise
the relative solidarity of this company a little,
but even if this is indeed the effect, there
obviously remains a substantial difference between
our two units. Besides, since the Albret company
also underwent a change of command during this
period, the continuity in service of its members
is all the more notable.
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In September, shortly before the battle of Marignano .
Whilst the turnover amongst Duras' gendarmes between
1509 and 1515 was only 48$, that in the Foix-Bearn company
over a slighter shorter time-span was as high as 74$.
This higher rate of loss is reflected amongst the archers
- between fifteen and seventeen of Foix's archers of 1510
survive till 1515* with four to six more having been
promoted to the gendarmerie; the Duras company retains
forty-two or three of its archers of 1509* with eight to
ten promotees. It seems probable that Foix's much
heavier loss of archers can be partially explained by the
resignation of many Albanians and Italians (important
constituents in the ranks of his company) presumably in
1512, following the expulsion from Lombardy. We have
noted also how the Foix company attracted a number of
foreign men-at-arms who were usually attached to the unit
only temporarily, as well as other short-service recruits.
However, since such men tended to replace each other
continually, leaving a more or less inviolable core of
veterans serving for years, we must look to the different
careers of the Foix-Bearn and Duras companies to help
explain their widely different levels of gendarme turnover
41. B.N., n.a.fr. 8616, fol. 6 (Beam company, now 100
lances strong) and B.N., Clair. 245, no. 729 (Duras
company).
186.
between 1509/IO and 1515.
The Duras company was apparently usually to be
found In garrison at Crema until 1512. We do know
however that this unit formed part of La Palice's
detachement, co-operating with the Imperialists to the
42
east of the Adige in 15H . The army suffered
considerable deprivation, La Palice himself reporting
at the beginning of October that "there were so many ill
213
that it was a great pity , and the Florentine ambassador
to Milan predicting a little later that all would perish
if victuals were not brought from Friuli, for from
Treviso to Verona the land was "plundered and almost
empty^" ." By the time that La Palice had retreated to
Verona, a Venetian informant could observe that the Duras
company had only 22 men-at-arms left in the ranks , and
indeed the Florentine envoy had reported earlier that La
Palice's army had lost over eighty men-at-arms dead from
fever and others who had deserted, so that the original
complement of 1200 lances had surely been greatly
46
diminished . Quite obviously, the Duras company can
have lost nothing like the number of gendarmes implied by
the remarks of our Venetian informant, at least not
42. Diarii, vol. xiii, col. 243.
43. Lettres de Louis XII (Brussels, 1712), vol. iii, p.62.
44. Canestrini and Desjardins, Negociations diplomatiques
de la France avec la Toscane, ii, p. 537.
45. Diarii, xiii, col. 245.
46. Canestrini and Desjardins, op.cit., ii, p. 538.
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permanently, but La Palice's campaign may nonetheless
have been its most costly operation between 1509 and
1515; for the company escaped the severities of Gaston
de Foix's offensive of early 1512, being faced only with
a siege at Crema by a Venetian army, with local support,
later in the year, from which Duras' company emerged
relatively unscathed. It seems probable that the
company fought at Novara in 1513# but although a defeat
for the French, this battle claimed few lives amongst the
47
gendarmerie, which was scarcely engaged with the enemy '.
After involvement in the indecisive campaigning
of 1510-11, the Foix company followed its illustrious
captain in most of his movements during the spectacular
offensive which ended at Ravenna. It is probable that the
unit participated in the recapture of Brescia in February
48
1512 , where losses were heavy, certainly more than the
, 4q
fifty dead suggested by Bayard s biographer .
47. A Venetian source notes the Duras company as part of
the French army of invasion, Diarii, vol. xvi, cols.
213-4 and 319-20. Losses were negligible according
to Fleuranges, in Histoire des choses m6morables,
in Collection des memoires, ed. Petitot, vol. xvi,
P. 247.
48. The bulk of the French field army followed Gaston
de Foix from Bologna to Brescia, and Bayard's biographer
seems to imply the Foix company's presence at the
siege, le loyal serviteur, Histoire de... Bayard, p.
280.
49. Ibid., p. 284. The most conservative Venetian
estimate puts the total of dead gendarmes alone at
180, Diarii, xiii, col. 522, although of course
Venetian sources would tend to Inflate French losses.
Fleuranges notes that a Gascon gentleman, a cousin
of Gaston's, was killed at Brescia, op.cit., p.211.
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In April, the company fought at the battle of Ravenna,
and here again casualties were comparatively high,
especially for a victory - perhaps a hundred dead-^.
The Foix company bore its fair share of the toll: the
day before the battle, a prominent man-at-arms of the
unit had an arm shot off by cannon-fire in a raid on the
enemy s camp, whilst others fell in the main engagement^ ,
including Gaston de Foix himself. By mid-July 1512,
a report from Alessandria could note that the Foix company
52
was reduced to twenty-five lances, out of fifty^ , al¬
though it is difficult to have much confidence in this
information, owing to an obscurity in the text and to the
fact that we know the Foix company to have been 100 lances
strong by 1512. Perhaps a proportion of the company
50. B.N., n.a.fr. 5126, fol. 55. Oman notes that French
losses were almost entirely borne by the infantry
and light horse, The art of war in the XVIth
century, p. 147.
51. The man who lost his arm was Bazillac, called Pierre,
baron de Bazillac by Roman but entered in company
rolls as Emery de Bazillac, le loyal serviteur,
op.cit., p. 308 and n.l. The company formed part
of the "battle" of the French army, ibid., p. 433,
and was evidently heavily engaged, ibid., pp. 320-2
and 433. Bayard's biographer makes references to
the fate of one of Foix s gendarmes, who had his brains
blown out by gunfire, ibid., p. 322.
52. Letters and papers of the reign of Henry VIII, vol.i,
part I, p. 598.
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retreated with Roger de Beam to Trezzo, which held
fifty horse, according to Venetian information in
August^. At all events, the B^arn company took part
in the battles of Novara and Guinegate in 1513* although
neither was particularly taxing. In fact, at least
fourteen of the Foix company men-at-arms who had
g4
mustered in 1510 survived through to 1515 . Only five
of these fourteen were veterans of 1505 however, but
five others are first signalled at the review of 15IO
itself. In other words, although the Foix-Bearn company
was by no means annihilated during its turbulent career
in the later years of Louis XIl's reign, these years -
and probably one in particular, the year 1512 - did see
the almost total break-up of that core of long-service
gendarmes which had formed the backbone of the Foix company
for so many years.
Some days after their musters of September 1515*
both the B^arn and Duras companies fought at the two-day
battle of Marignano, another bloody encounter like Ravenna -
perhaps even a Pyrrhic victory-^. Both units were again
53« ' Diarii, xiv, col. 576.
54. This figure includes one man who appears in the muster
list of May 1515* B.N., fr. 21509* no. 879* but who
has left by the September review. The roll of the
May muster is damaged, and hence is not totally
reliable as a basis for calculation.
55. Spont," Marignan et 1'organisation militaire sous
Frangois Ier.,"in Revue des Questions Hlstoriques,
vol. lxvi, p. 71.
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reviewed the next year-^, . the B6arn company a
little over four months after Its muster of the previous
September, during which time about 11 men-at-arms had
quit serving, out of one hundred; the Duras company, on
the other hand, lost only 5 men-at-arms between September
1515 and its review of almost exactly a year later. If
losses suffered at Marignano are hidden within these
statistics they were obviously rather small, especially
as, in the case of Beam's company, whose muster of 1516
covers the period of service at the battle, at least ten
of the eleven departures took place before the confron¬
tation. A participant at Marignano wrote, with a hint
of pride, that nearly everyone on the French side had
been wounded - or at least his horse had been^'; it is
not difficult to see why the writer felt he had to qualify
his claim.
We are brought back to our earlier remarks, that
the gendarmerie suffered disproportionately low casualties
in Italy, compared with footsoldiers. Although that
reckless courage commonly associated with the French
cavalry was no fiction, being amply demonstrated at
Cerignola in 1505 for instance, it was nevertheless
56. B.N., fr. 21509* no. 901 (Beam company) and no. 91^
(Duras company); the Bearn company muster list is
slightly damaged.
57. B.N., fr. 5925* fol. 87.
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exhausted In the face of setbacks. It is after all
much easier to accept the inevitability of losses in
the confidence of ultimate victory and of an opportunity
to display one's prowess, than in the dread apprehension
of an uneven contest with fieldworks and firearms.
Careless bravura could not be indefinitely sustained
amongst the changing conditions of warfare in Italy. In
consequence, despite the increasing size of armies and the
growing ferocity of their weapons during the Italian wars,
the gendarmerie's losses did not rise apace.
The B6arn and Duras companies which accompanied
Francis I to Lombardy in 1515 bore scant resemblance to
their former selves of the opening years of the reign of
Louis XII: the B^arn unit retained only one member of the
gendarme complement of 1499* the captain himself, and the
Duras company just three of its men of 1498. Soldiers left
the companies at almost every measurable stage in their
history during these periods, but the rates of loss were by
no means steady. If one stage stands out particularly in
the evolution of both units it is the span 1505-1505* the
period of the Garigliano campaign and, more significantly,
as we have seen, of its aftermath. When our companies
were reviewed in 1505, the Foix still had fifteen men-at-
arms of its original complement of 1499, and the Albret
eighteen of those of 1498: by 1505* eleven and ten of
these veterans respectively had disappeared. Between
I505 and 1509* the Foix company lost no more veterans, and
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the Albret-Duras only three. The soldiers of both
companies who survived the span 1503-5 had a good chance
of remaining in the ranks for the next few years - from
amongst the twenty-one gendarmes of Foix's unit who did
so, twelve still served in 1509* and from amongst
Albret's eighteen, as many as fifteen are still to be
found in the ranks. We might almost say that the old
companies of the 1490s, of Jean de Foix-Narbonne and
Alain d'Albret, were finally destroyed at the Garigliano,
and subsequently reborn. The reborn Albret company,
inherited by Jean de Durfort-Duras, survived in large
measure through till 1515* with almost 40$ of its
gendarme complement of 1505 atill serving ten years later.
The Foix company, by contrast, was liquidated for a second
time, with only 10$ of its 1505 complement surviving to
1515« Yet this second destruction, achieved over years
of campaigning in northern Italy and France, years which
saw the Foix-B6arn company involved in the exhausting
offensive of Gaston de Foix, the collapse of the summer
of 1512, the battles of Novara and Guinegate, and much
more besides, was not much more devastating than the impact
of one winter battle in Naples. The Garigliano campaign
assuredly represents a special turning-point in the
careers of our two Gascon compagnies d'ordonnance.
The prospect of capture and imprisonment was
perhaps a more insistent menace than that of death or
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mutilation in battle. If only two prominent Gascon
soldiers, Louis d'Armagnac and Gaston de Foix, were
killed in action during our period, the threat of capture
was more commonly realised. Treatment of French prisoners
varied a great deal, but at least no man of quality is
known to have been murdered after capture, nor to have
otherwise died in an enemy cell. This is somewhat
surprising, in view of the rough treatment sometimes dealt
out by the French to their victims. After the battle of
Fornovo, Commynes, negotiating with the Marquis of Mantua
for a truce, was embarrassed by the latter's plea that the
prisoners of the French be well treated - very few had been
taken because those men-at-arms who had not been able to
flee were for the most part bludgeoned to death, although
with some difficulty owing to their protective armour, by
swarms of valets-^ . Reporting on the battle of Agnadello,
the Florentine ambassador to Milan noted that few Venetian
men-at-arms were taken prisoner by the French, for most of
59
those unable to escape were out to pieces-^ . We may
ascribe such behaviour variously to the viciousness of
plebeian troops or to the natural impetuosity of the
French in battle, but an element of deliberate brutality
58. Commynes, Memoirs, ed. Kinser, vol. ii, pp. 53^ and
532.
59. Canestrini and Desjardins, Negociations, vol. ii,
p. 330.
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was also Involved - of which the French were a little
proud, in as much as it proved their virility^®- and in
this context it was not unknown for enemy prisoners to
be executed, in order to discourage resistance: in
1509 Louis XII himself had the Venetian captain of
Peschiera hanged from the battlements of the place, after
its capture, despite the protests of his lieutenants and
6l
the prospect of ransom . The Venetians appear to have
been remarkably tolerant of this kind of savage treatment.
The expectation of ransom gain on the captor's
part was usually enough to guarantee a captive's safety,
if the latter were of sufficient quality. On the other
hand, the possession of a high marketable value also had
its drawbacks. In April 1509* Jean de Fontrailles, his
company, a body of infantry and other miscellaneous troops
were installed in Treviglio, a recently-captured Venetian
town in Lombardy. Soon afterwards, Treviglio was cut off
by a counter-offensive of the main Venetian field army and,
60. For example, an anonymous historian, commenting that
the French showed no mercy at Fornovo, notes that
for Italians this was a new style of waging war,
betraying the customary scorn for Italian effeminacy
in battle, B.N., fr. 17519* fol. 176.
61. Canestrini and Desjardins, op.cit., ii, p. 556;
Fleuranges, op.cit., p. 177. Bridge claims that
the captain's two sons were hanged as well, A history
of France, iv, p. 57.
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after some resistance, the garrison opened negotiations
with the enemy. The French captains offered the town to
their assailants on the basis of guaranteed freedom for
themselves, though with the fate of the remainder of the
garrison at the discretion of the Venetians. The latter,
however, insisted that the whole garrison surrender itself,
since they wished to exchange the French captains for some
Venetian prisoners in Milan. On the 8th of May,
Fontrailles and his companions were obliged to accept the
enemy's terms. The Venetians selected four dozen or so
men of worth to retain, and sent the rest on their way,
after relieving them of their arms, horses and belongings,
and extracting from them an oath to desist from fighting
62
against the Republic for one year . The prisoners were
first conducted to Brescia, where it appears a fair number
were released, for only twenty-four seem to have been
transported to Venice itself. In the evening of the 15th
of May two barks arrived from Padua to deliver seven of the
captives at the Doge's Palace - those of highest quality
"... with their gowns of crimson velvet, edged with gold."
Late that night they were put into the State prison of
Torricella at the Palace. On the 22nd, seventeen more
French captives arrived, but by now the Signory was
running out of prison space, and four of the newisomers
were promptly released and the rest installed in some low
62. Diarii, vol. viii, cols. 205-6, 209-10, 215 and 236.
Sanuto notes that some people in Venice were sorry that
the Gascon footsoldiers were allowed to escape
with their lives, ibid., col. 206.
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dungeons^.
After the battle of Agnadello and the capture of
Bartolomeo Alviano by the French, the Venetians were anxious
to use Fontrailles and his comrades in an exchange for their
lost captain. Louis XII would not consent to this, even
though the Signory offered all their Treviglio captives for
64
just this one man . Whilst the wrangle continued,
Fontrailles and the others languished in the Torrlcella.
Here they became the obvious scapegoats for any Venetian
hostility to the French - in mid-July, the Signory heard
that Venetian captives in Milan were being badly treated,
so that the Doge ordered that conditions in the Torricella
6R
be worsened . The prisoners remained in captivity
throughout 1509# until the Republic finally agreed to
Louis XIl's terms for an exchange, which took place at
Lignago in January 1510. This was none too soon for
Fontrailles and friends, who evidently complained about
63- Ibid., cols. 210, 254 and 300.
64. Ibid,, viii, cols. 3^6, 391 and 4l8, and ix, col. 54.
65. Ibid., ix, col. 518. The Torricella consisted of a
set of appartments in the upper part of the Palace -
a fairly comfortable prison, W. Carew Hazlitt, The
Venetian Republic, 2 vols. (London, 1915)# 11# P- 595*
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their treatment to their compatriots.
The status and reputation of Fontrailles, which
had made the Venetians so lothe to part with him for
anything but the highest return, served Roger de B6arn
well some years later. After months of defiance, Beam
surrendered Trezzo-on-Adda to the Spaniards on the J>rd of
January 1519• However, he managed to negotiate his own
immunity from arrest, along with that of perhaps part of
his garrison, with the Marquis of Padula. The rest of
his men were deprived of their arms, horses and other
67
goods by the victors. ' Brant6me notes that Padula
treated Roger well, as he knew his reputation and respected
him, a Gascon, as a neighbour^®. By the 9th, B6arn was
66. Diarii, ix, cols. 422, 436 and 506, and x, cols. 223
and 525. The nature of the complaints by the former
captives is not clear; we have seen how in July it
was ordered that conditions of imprisonment be made
less congenial, the French having been "excellently
treated" to date, ibid., viii, col. 518. Even '
if such an order were not enforced, conditions in
the Torricella may still have become unpleasant, because
of overcrowding, as it was reported in July that the
prisons in the Palace were full, ibid., col. 557.
Perhaps French complaints stemmed more from the length
of their captivity, for it seems that at the surrender
of Treviglio it had been arranged to exchange
Fontrailles and company for Venetian prisoners already
in French hands, ibid., col. 48l. The capture of
Alviano obviously changed the picture, and despite
repeated moves by the Republic s executive to arrange
an exchange on the agreed terms, such propositions were
continually outvoted in the College.
67. Ibid., vol. xv, cols.460-1. According to another
report, all but Roger were plundered, ibid., col. 484.
68. BrantSme, Oeuvres, vol. iii, p. 171.
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riding for France, after having been escorted to Milan
by Spanish troops, no doubt as a protection against the
fury of the Swiss who threatened to massacre the French
from Trezzo.^9
Although Roger de Beam may well have owed his
freedom in part to the kind regard of his adversary, the
strength of his fortress surely also stood him in good
stead when it came to treating for the surrender of
70
Trezzo' . A similar advantage did much to allow Duras
at Crema to escape the fate of Fontrailles. Duras even
managed to protect his troops from being robbed, but he
needed great persistence to ensure that his terms were met.
On the 9th of September 1512, he agreed to yield Crema to
the Venetians, on condition of freedom for the garrison
71
and security of its property . The threat of the proximity
of a Swiss force had led Duras to come to terms, for the
French "would sooner have been Turkish slaves than to have
72
fallen into Swiss hands' ." Duras, however, determined
69- Diarii, xv, col. 484.
70. Ibid., col. 191. Venetian reports differ somewhat
in their understanding of the motives leading to
Trezzo's surrender: pressure from local inhabitants,
kinship with the enemy, and simply a severe artillery
bombardment are variously invoked to explain the
surrender of a fortress which was obviously held to
pose a stern test to any besieging force, ibid♦, cols.
467 and 484.
71. Ibid., col. 56.
72. Ibid., cols. 60, 75 and 74-5»
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to hold on to the castle of Crema, with his son a
hostage for its eventual surrender, pending receipt
of safeconducts from Venice, the Pope, and Cardinal
Schinner, leader of the Swiss. With such guarantees,
he hoped to be able to retreat with all his men, and all
their horses, arms and goods, to Genoa or Pisa, and
embark: for France^. The Republic's safeconduct was
7 4
quickly delivered' , but since it was Milanese territory
through which Duras aimed to retire to France, this
concession was of little help. The Pope and Schinner
would not issue their guarantees, the former apparently
being swayed by the Spanish envoy in Rome, who thought it
a mistake to allow French troops to depart with full
equipment. As a result, the Signory tried to persuade
75
Duras to retreat eastwards through Venetian territory ,
but he would not be moved until he had his safeconducts,
especially as he still feared that the Swiss might block
his retreat, even through Venetian lands'^. Duras'
obstinacy was finally rewarded, however; Rome relented,
the Pope signing a safeconduct on the 22nd of September,
although Schinner's was not accorded until 20th of
73. Ibid., cols 52, 107, 109-10; F. Sforza Benvenuti,
Storia di Crema, 2 vols. (Milan, 1859-60), vol. i,
p. 332.
74. Diarii, xv, col. 42.
75. Ibid., cols. 99 and 113.
76. Ibid., col. 110.
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October . The Papal safeconduct was the crucial
document - the Swiss being in Lombardy as Rome's allies -
and soon after its issue Duras yielded Crema castle^.
A Papal envoy was detailed to accompany the French to
Genoa, but further complications seem to have arisen
79
over a Genoese safeconduct , and it appears that Duras
only left Crema on the 22nd of October and then travelled
8o
overland to France . At all events, the French
garrison of Crema escaped from enemy territory with all
8i
their goods
Duras and his company were able to escape
relatively unscathed, partly because the Venetians feared
that the Swiss might sieze Crema from under their noses
if matters were not quickly settled, and partly because
82
Crema castle was virtually unassailable . Neither
dissension amongst his enemies nor the strength of his
fortress were able to save Menaut d'Aguerre, Charles VIII's
castellan at Ostia. Menaut had been put into the place
77- Ibid., cols. 143 and 256-7.
78. Ibid., cols. 124 and 134.
79. Ibid., cols. 192-3.
80. Ibid., cols. 293> 307 and 337-8.
81. Ibid., col. 346.
82. Ibid., col. 83.
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as early as December 1494, and thereafter preyed on
shipping in the Tiber. Papal forces were apparently
unable to reduce Ostia without Spanish help, and on the
19th of February 1497 Gonzalo de C6rdoba entered Rome
83
with a small force . The prospects of success seemed
feeble, for, as Venetian sources reported, the Spanish
troops were very poorly accountred whilst Ostia's garrison
84
was in fine spirit and amply provisioned . Nevertheless,
what Papal excommunication and blockade had failed to
achieve was quickly delivered by Spanish assault - on the
8s
9th of March, Menaut surrendered . Although the lives
of the defenders were spared, .Menaut was some days later
paraded through the streets of Rome, mounted on a
"scrawny nag" as the centrepiece of Gonzalo's triumph.
When the procession reached St. Peter's, where Alexander
VI and his Cardinals were assembled, the fate of Aguerre
was decided - whilst he humbly knelt at the Pontiff's
feet, c6rdoba managed to secure his victim's freedom from
a reluctant Alexander®^.
S3. Ibid., vol. i, col. 539.
84. loc. cit
85. L. M. de Lojendio, Gonzalo de c6rdoba, el Gran Capitan
(Madrid, 1942), pp. 129-30.
86. Ibid., pp. 130-1; Giovio, Le vite del Gran Capitano
e del Marquese di Pescara, pp. 46-9• A more recent
biographer of Gonzalo claims that Menaut was chained
to his captor's page, and that when confronted with
the Pope he miserably asked for pardon "... in
repetitive phrase, to which the Pope for some time
deigned no reply", G. de Gaury, The Grand Captain
(London, 1955)* PP* 49-50.
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All sources agree that Menaut d'Aguerre owed
his salvation to Gonzalo de C6rdoba. Perhaps the
Spanish commander felt that the Basque had suffered
sufficiently through humiliation in the streets of Rome,
perhaps Gonzalo wished to recruit his ferocious adversary
Orr
to his side '. Such speculation is prompted by the
knowledge that the Spaniards acquired a certain notoriety
amongst the French for the ill-treatment of prisoners.
Jean d'Auton's description of the second Neapolitan
campaign is sprinkled with references to the Spanish
flouting of the "conventions of war, which, according to
88
military statutes, should be strictly observed... ."
Hostages given for the safe-conduct of the defenders of
Canosa in 1502 were threatened with the galleys or a
prison if they refused to change sides, and French
garrisons which surrendered Castellaneta and Ruvo the next
year were refused ransoms, and some of their members
89
manacled and incarcerated in lethal, low dungeons .
Later on, the troops who yielded Gioja in Calabria, after
the defeat at Seminara, were either imprisoned or dispatched
to the galleys, a fate which also awaited Aubigny's men at
Rocca d'Angito and those who survived the capture of
87. Diarii, i, cols. 555-6.
88. Auton, vol. ii, p. 294.
89. Ibid., ii, pp. 293-4, and iii, pp. 137> 1^6 and 148.
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Castel dell'Uovo in Naples, in June 1503^°. Whatever the
extent of exaggeration involved in these accusations, it
remains undeniable that, as Auton asserted, Gonzalo de
Cordoba was often loath to permit his captives to be
Q1ransomed^ , despite the contrary claim of a Spanish
• QO
chronicler that he was scrupulously correct in the matter .
Gonzalo's chivalrous tastes were made to take second place
to his appreciation of the need to deprive his enemy of as
much manpower as possible. The result was months of
imprisonment for those who fell into Spanish hands, fourteen
in the case of the company of Aymar de Prie, taken at
Castellaneta in February 1503 - during this time these
troops had no change of clothing, so that upon release from
prison in Taranto the first task of their lieutenant,
Louis de St. Bonnet, was to purchase new shirts and shoes,
, q-5
with money donated by Louis d Ars^ , who was still holding
out in the south in the spring of 1504. The majority of
French captives taken during the long campaign in Naples
were promptly released by the terms of the surrender of
Gaeta in January 1504, however, although almost all of them
were naked and penniless^. No doubt, Gonzalo de C6rdoba
90. Ibid., iii, pp. 166, 179-81 and 184-5.
91. Ibid., p. 110.
92. Lojendio, op.cit., p. 195*
93. Auton, iii, pp. 324-5.
94. Ibid., p. 305.
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had been only too happy to free Menaut d'Aguerre in 1497,
since the latter's release could have had no bearing on
the future course of a campaign already as good as won.
Consignment to an enemy galley was an especially
cruel sentence, as the fate normally reserved for criminals
qp;
and infidels . Captives of the Venetians had little to
fear in this direction, since the Republic of St. Mark
maintained free galley crews, but for the Spaniards and
Neapolitans, the temptation to provide French prisoners
to their galleys seems to have been considerable, although
whether this was done to gratify hatred or simply in
response to the needs of the fleet is not clear. It
appears that some or most of those condemned to the galleys
96
in the south in 150j5 were released the following year .
Besides, it was recognised by the enemy that on the whole
95* It is interesting that the Batard de Luxe, a man-at-
arms of Aguerre's company, had a page or valet whom
he had redeemed from the galleys - in other words
the page was a former convict, P^lissier,"Note e
document! su Luigi XII e Ludovico Sforza,"in A.S.I.,
ser. 5> vol. xxiii, p. 154.
96. At least Auton notes that Malherbe, a companion of
Aubigny's in Calabria, who was sent to the galleys
with the others who yielded Rocca d'Angito, was
released in 1504, and besides, Louis XIl's
historiographer makes clear that he interviewed a
number of those who shared Malherbe's fate, Auton,
iji, pp. 179-80 and 505. Some of those who were
consigned to the galleys after the surrender of
Castel dell'Uovo managed to escape by killing their
sleeping guards, ibid., p. 185.
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a sentence in the galleys was no fit penalty for a
gentleman; at least the more notable French captives of
1503^ like La Palice and Aubigny, escaped this fate.
Guillaume de Villeneuve describes how, when he was
imprisoned in Castel Nuovo in Naples in 1496, thirty
or forty French soldiers, including three gentlemen,
were brought to the place as captives - whilst the
gentlemen were locked up, the others were consigned to
the Neapolitan galleys^. in Villeneuve's own case, a
galley had served as a dungeon, following his capture at
Trani in August 1495. He had been joined in October by
Gabriel d'Albret, seigneur de Lesparre, who had at first
been incarcerated in an island fortress in Brindisi
harbour, and who had given the miserable Villeneuve half
his borrowed purse of ten ducats. Both men were
transported round the Calabrian coast and put into Castel
q«
Nuovo, after its capture-^ . To judge from Villeneuve s
account, Lesparre's treatment compared favourably with
his own, and he was obviously recognised as a nobleman
of the highest rank. He did not long outlive his release
in January 1496, however^.
97. Villeneuve, Memoires, in Collection des memoires,
ed. Petitot, vol. xiv, p. 315*
98. Ibid., pp. 274-5, 286-7 and 304.
99. Lesparre died on his way home from Naples, at Lyons,
on the 18th of July, 1496, B.N., dossiers bleus
9, P. 58.
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In terms of casualties of war, as in terms of
its profits, the south of Italy proved to be a more
hazardous field of operations than the north. Not
only was French enterprise in Naples less successful than
in Lombardy, but it was more difficult for the garrison
to escape the potential consequences of defeat - the
country was isolated, communications with France, and
even Lombardy, immensely long, possible relief months
away: after all, it took Charles VIII almost two months
to travel from Naples to Asti in 1495# moving at top
speed. If a posting to Naples was hardly the equivalent
of a sentence of death, it was at least the nearest thing
to it in the contemporary soldier's military career.
Service here took a continuous toll of the French garrison:
in November 1502, for example, the Venetian governor of
Trani presented a list of this garrison, with the
theoretical complement of all units of horse and foot
involved; at the end he noted, however, that about one-
fifth of those in his list were either dead, ill or had
de parted"'"^. At this stage, the battle of Cerignola was
over five months away, and the difficult part of Nemours'
campaign had not yet begun. In the north, geographical
conditions permitted more flexibility - communications
within Lombardy and with the homeland were excellent, and
troops and supplies could be transported by means of an
100. Diarii, vol. iv, cols. 526-9.
extensive system of waterways; orders and information
travelled swiftly whilst strategic retreats and counter-
offensives were practicable. If such geographical
circumstances meant that the Milanese was particularly
vulnerable to attack, owing to its want of readily
defensible frontiers, they did at least facilitate the
evacuation of armies westwards - the route to safety was
straight and rarely impeded.
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CHAPTER FIVE
LOYALTY AND DISCIPLINE IN THE ARMY IN ITALY
The French army of 1494 Impressed Italians on many
counts, but above all perhaps on account of its amenability
to royal control, from which advantage most of its other
qualities appeared to flow. Charles VIIl's prospective
expedition was, as we have seen, highly unpopular with the
standing army. As the Florentine ambassador noted in June
1494, "... many of (the gendarmes) would have sooner been
paid off then to have gone (on the expedition);" however,
"... to satisfy the King, and in obedience to him, each man
consented and let himself be led on"1"." The Florentine
explained the contradiction in the following terms: "the
gendarmes can and are obliged to go wherever the King commands,
without any increment in salary, since they are paid their
wages continuously and regularly ." In 1499 a Venetian
envoy expressed this same view rather more lyrically,
suggesting that "these troops, even if ordered to India,
would only have received their regular pay and would have
been obliged to go"5." The obligation to serve anywhere,
1. Canestrini and Desjardins, Negociations diplomatlqucs de
la France avec la Toscane, vol. i, pp. 311 and 292
respectively.
2. Ibid., pp. 905-6.
3. Diarii, vol. ii, col. 764.
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and at any time, at the bidding of the King was not deter¬
mined exclusively by regular receipt of the King's pay,
however. As an informant of the Venetian annalist, Malipiero,
remarked, on the French cavalry returning north through Rome
in 1495, "they were fine troops, spirited and devoted to their
lord^." In other words the French soldier was bound to his
King not only by his salary but by loyalty as well.
Here in effect we have the enunciation, and the
attribution to the gendarmerie of Charles VIII and Louis XII,
of those two principal distinguishing characteristics of a
modern, national army, which set it apart from the medieval
host and the mercenary band alike - namely Its permanent
upkeep, in peacetime as well as wartime, and its possession
of a common, sovereign loyalty. The foundations and impli¬
cations of this overriding bond between gendarme and King were
explored by Guicciardini in a eulogy of the compagnies
d1ordonnance, which, if a little over-optimistic in parts,
does reveal something of the envy with which those who had to
rely on mercenary troops viewed the resources of the Kings of
France. The French army was "... formidable,... not because
of its numbers but because of the valour of its soldiers.
Since the gendarmes were almost all the King's subjects, and
not common types but gentlemen, whom the captains could not
enlist or dismiss simply at their will, and who were paid not
by their officers but by the royal ministers, the companies
not only retained a full complement but the men, their horses
4. Malipiero, Annali veneti, in A ,S . I., vol. vii, pt.I,
P.345.
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and arms were in excellent trim, for they were rich enough
to provide for themselves in this regard. All this made the
soldier try to serve better, in search of honour, which was
nourished in the heart of the troops as they were born
noblemen, as well as because through courageous deeds they
could hope for reward, both outside and inside the army,
so that one might ascend to a captaincy. The captains had
similar incentives, were almost all barons or lords (or at
least of very noble blood), nearly all subjects of the King
and had no other intention but to merit praises from him,
since the size of their company was restricted, because
according to French custom no-one was granted more than one
hundred lances^."
For Guicciardini therefore the gendarmerie
demonstrated all those admirable qualities for which
Italians looked in vain within their own armed forces.
Reliance upon mercenary arms was for Machiavelli too the
chief cause of the ruin of Italy in his time:
"...mercenaries are disunited, thirsty
for power, undisciplined and disloyal; ...
brave among their friends and cowards before
the enemy; ... in peacetime you are despoiled
by them, and in wartime by the enemy. The
reason for all this is that there is no
loyalty or inducement to keep them in the
field apart from the little they are paid..."
In short,
"mercenary armies bring only slow, belated and
feeble conquests, but sudden, startling
defeat ... And the result of their prowess
has been that Italy has been overrun by
5. F. Guicciardini, Storia d'ltalia, publ. by C.
Panigada (Bari, 192971 vol. T~, pp. 72-9-
.Charles, plundered by Louis, assaulted by
Ferdinand, and outraged by the Swiss."g
In some contrast to all this stood the regular army of the
King of France, for "... if his infantry had been as good as
his gendarmes, he would have been able to make head against
all the princes in Europe'." Clearly, contemporaries saw
the French standing army as fundamentally different from the
type of force which had dominated warfare in Italy in the
decades before Charles' invasion, and they measured its
superiority in terms of loyalty rather than equipment,
tactical skill or the quality of its command. Although
the traditional classification of the Italian condottieri
as little more than players at war has recently come in for
O
some critical examination , it would be idle to deny that
the French army established a distinct moral superiority
over Italian arms during our period. To what extent,
however, was this simply a natural advantage enjoyed by the
forces of a united monarchy opposed to the armies of small
states, which could only face the French on equal terms with
the help of unreliable allies? If the loyalty of the
compagnies d'ordonnance to the King of France was impressive,
their discipline was less so. Machiavelli wrote on
another occasion that the French men-at-arms were "... as
6. N. Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. G. Bull (Penguin
edition, 1961), pp. 77 and 81-2.
7. Machiavelli, "Sketch of the constitution and affairs
of France", in Works, trans. Farneworth, vol. ii,
p. 496.
8. Notably by Pieri, in II Rinascimento e la crisi
militare italiana, and Mallett, in Mercenaries and
their masters.
insolent and dangerous as (those of Italy).." The
French Kings of the fifteenth century had attempted to create
an army of undivided allegiance and single purpose. What
does the performance of this army in its first major test
abroad tell us of its development as a cohesive, disciplined
force?
"Inside every army is a crowd struggling to get
out...", a modern, military historian has remarked; he goes
on to explain that "... a crowd is the antithesis of an
army, a human assembly animated not by discipline but by
mood..."L<~)" . Throughout the Italian Wars the French army
was liable to succumb to its crowd-like instincts under
pressure. In writing about the retreat from Naples in 1495
Commynes noted that the fighting spirit of the troops
gradually waned: "this is what people say about the nature
of us Frenchmen, and the Italians have written it in their
histories, that on their arrival the French are more than men
"11
but on their retreat they are less than women. Commynes
did not believe, however, that this was a peculiarly French
characteristic. It was natural that morale should suffer
in adversity. In fact, as Commynes makes plain, the
discipline of the retreating army of 1495 remained firm and
a participant wrote from Asti at the end of the ordeal that
9. Machiavelli, The art of war, trans. E. Farneworth,
revised edition (Indianapolis, 1965)# P« 22.
10. J. Keegan, The face of battle (Penguin edition, 1978),
p. 175.
11. Commynes, Memoirs, ed. Kinser, vol. ii, p. 541.
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he "pitied the poor gendarmes who had served so well."
Nevertheless, circumstances combined to hold Charles' army-
together during its flight northwards from Naples - the need
for solidarity in the face of superior numbers, the prospect
of relief at the end of the road, the very presence of the
King in the ranks. No such incentives were allowed those
who were marooned in Naples. In 1495 about one hundred
gendarmes who had been ordered to remain in the south left
their posts for home"1"^. Jean d'Auton regarded the Garigliano
disaster as a national disgrace, caused by want of spirit.
Louis d'Ars, who continued a guerilla campaign in Apulia into
1504, was compared favourably by the chronicler with those
who had shirked their duty at the Garigliano1^.
Failures of morale in Naples should perhaps
occasion less surprise than the redoubtable, but ultimately
doomed, stands of men like Ars and Gratien d'Aguerre.
French operations in the south were usually so badly
supported from home and payment of the Neapolitan garrison
so irregular that one is prompted to conclude that on
occasion the Crown received the loyalty it deserved.
Nonetheless it is clear that as the wars in Italy continued
the morale of the French army declined - fatigue replaced
12. La Pilorgerie, Campagne et bulletins de la grande armee
d'ltalie, p. 359.
13. Contamine, Guerre, Etat et societe a la fin du moyen
age, p. 455.
14. Auton, vol. iii, p. 322. Louis' historiographer did
however absolve the rank and file of responsibility
for the Garigliano fiasco - the leaders were to blame,
ibid., p. 295.
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confidence, defeat in the field was increasingly accompanied
by panic, the all too rare successes greeted with relief
rather than exultation. Machiavelli saw the cause of this
demoralisation in French dependence on Swiss footsoldiers,
for "... the mounted troops... had come to believe that
without them they could not win a battle1^." Certainly it
is tempting to date French decline in morale from the time
that Swiss armies began to intervene in Lombardy on their
own account - in other words from 1510 onwards. The
Venetians heard that during the Swiss invasion of the Milanese
in December 15H many Frenchmen fled towards Novara, "fearing
that they would be cut to pieces" by the invaders^. The
ejection of the French from Lombardy in the summer of 1512
was remarkably rapid, the precipitate flight of La Palice's
army suggesting panic; indeed a modern authority maintains
that some members of the Ordonnances quit the campaign even
17
before the enemy had crossed the Adda . The battle of
Novara in the following year did nothing to bolster French
courage in the face of the Swiss, and when subsequently
Burgundy was invaded the humiliation of the army was complete.
15. Machiavelli, The Prince, p.86.
16. Diarii, vol. xiii, col. 367.
17. C. Kohler, Les Suisses dans les guerres d'ltalie
(1506-12) (Geneva, 1896), p. 973*
Dijon, besieged by the Swiss in September, was commanded by
La Tremoille, who lamented, according to his biographer, that
"... the fortitude of the French was so corrupted and their
hearts so enfeebled by fear and pusillanimity, by God's
l8
wish... ." The hard-won victory over a smallish Swiss
army at Marignano only partially restored French confidence
- after the engagement many of the victors went home and many
more would have liked to do so, fearing another Swiss attack1^.
Indeed, by the reign of Francis I the French had acquired such
a reputation for faint-heartedness that Venetian envoys to
20
Milan could dismiss their courage with scorn , in a way
21
which would have been unthinkable in earlier years.
This deterioration of morale reflects a growing dis-
18. Bouchet, Le panegyric du chevalier sans reproche, in
collection des memoires, ed. Petitot, vol. xiv, p. 476.
19. Spont, "Marignan et 11 organisation militaire sous
Frangois Ier.," in Revue des Questions Historiques,
vol. lxvi, pp. 71 and 74.
20. The ambassador Trevisan noted in 1516 that "... when
the French turned their backs they did not return in
a hurry, and were terrified of the Swiss," Diarii,
vol. xxiii, col. 165; Caroldo reported in 1520 on an
action he had witnessed in Lombardy when attached to
Lautrec, recalling that "... (the French) had retired
to Milan, the armies full of fear and confusion, as
(they) were used to display in retreat," Caroldo's
relation, in Relazioni degli ambasciatori venetl al
senato, ed. Segarizzi, vol. ii, p.5-
21. Sanuto had noted, for example, the general opinion in
the Venetian College on 7th of March 1512, as Gaston
de Foix prepared for his offensive in Emilia - it had
been that the prospects of the Holy League were bleak,
since "... the French were brave and masters of the
art of war," Diarii, vol. xiv, col. 17.
216.
Illusion with Italian adventure, as it became apparent that
any French success would lead inevitably to a coalescence of
hostile powers and must invariably therefore be short-lived.
It also reflects the declining efficacy of the French army,
confronted by both old enemies possessed of new weapons, like
the Spaniards, and by fresh ones, like the Swiss. French
fear of the Swiss was real enough - they were after all
disciplined, ruthless in battle and merciless in victory -
but it was a symptom of declining morale, not its fundamental
cause. This lay in an appreciation of the general, depressing
history of French intervention in Italy and of the alarming
developments in warfare. In short, declining morale was both
natural and logical. In the circumstances, the comparative
ease with which the French Kings continued to be able to
launch campaigns into Italy is remarkable. If the growing
trepidation of the gendarmerie undermined discipline on the
battlefield, there seems to be little evidence that it led
to an increased incidence of mutiny or desertion. Outbreaks
of the latter had always been rare, but when they did occur
were almost invariably determined by financial stringency,
and more particularly by grievances over pay. A Florentine
envoy wrote from Lyons at the end of January 1504, and told
how the troops recently returned from Gaeta no longer wished
to remain in Italy, and how many had already left, in
defiance of orders and despite the commission of a senior
22
official to regulate affairs . These refugees from the
Garigliano were no doubt unpaid and had certainly suffered_
22. Machiavelli, Opere, vol. vii, p. 184. The envoy was
not in fact Machiavelli but his colleague, Valori.
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much hardship in Naples. Similarly, the army of La Palice
operating in Friuli in 1511* from which many desertions were
reported, was severely afflicted by a dearth of supplies,
aggravated by peculation2^. In the same way, the refusal
of the Duras company to obey the orders of La Tremoille to
advance in 1513 - incidentally the only known instance of
mutinous behaviour on the part of one of our Gascon units -
24
was caused by faulty payment . We have seen that irregular
remuneration was a constant hazard for the gendarmerie;
usually the deficiency could be made up by extortions from
the civil population, but when this was not possible deserters
and mutineers could no doubt justify their behaviour, since
the Crown had in effect broken the terms of their contract of
service.
At muster company members were obliged to swear to
serve the King against all comers. But it was always easier
to exact oaths of allegiance and prescribe sanctions than to
enforce adherence to the rules. Absenteeism of gendarmes was
a perennial problem but only in war-time was it a serious
offence it seems; nevertheless the prescription of death for
offenders, operating at the end of Louis Xl's reign, was
mitigated by Charles VIII to exclusion from the Ordonnances
and a fine - no doubt for reasons of practicality. Ideal
justice had to be tempered by compromise and it is interesting
25. Canestrini and Desjardins, op.cit., vol. ii, pp. 537-8.




that men who departed on leave were obliged to surrender
their war-horse and other equipment, so as to minimise any
temptation to abscond - in other words prevention was better
25than cure . Strictly, absenteeism is not quite the same as
desertion anyway, for the latter implies a sense of perma¬
nence. Many recorded 'desertions' were probably only
temporary, for how could one escape the punitive consequences
of real desertion from an elite corps of troops, whose names
were inscribed in muster-rolls and whose faces were known to
captain, lieutenant or ensign? At all events, whether for
this reason or because of more regular payment, surer devotion
to the King's cause or superior professional pride, the
gendarmerie was undoubtedly less liable to desertion than
other branches of the French army. On one occasion Chaumont
d'Amboise wrote to the governor of Dauphine, Gaston de Foix,
complaining that the gentlemen-levies of that province had
deserted him after he had paid them out of his own pocket,
whilst waiting for funds from France; if they went unpunished
O
their example would be followed by the men of the Ordonnances^
The Florentine ambassador to Lombardy, on the other hand,
wrote from Peschiera in 1509* noting that although a number
of both horse and foot had deserted from the field-army, all
members of the Ordonnances, as well as the household troops,
27
were still serving . In short, regular troops were more




Contamine, op.cit., pp. 491 and 501-2.
B.N., Dupuy 279* fol. 59*
Canestrini and Desjardins, op.cit., ii, p. 555*
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make up numbers. Footsoldiers were notoriously inconstant.
They deserted when operations foundered, as at the siege of
28
Pisa in 1501 , or when success had yielded them their
29
reward, as at the sacks of Brescia and Ravenna in 1512 .
Although we should not underestimate the role of the royal
supervision and control in keeping the gendarmerie in place,
its greater constancy should no doubt also be ascribed to its
ethos of service. If the conscript-levy went to war because
he had to, and the mercenary-footsoldier in search of booty,
the gendarme served because soldiering was his profession.
The gravest offence for a gendarme was to defect
to the enemy. The penal code drawn up in 1506 - although
never applied - prescribed torture and devouring by wild
beasts or hanging for anyone convicted of such a crime.
Many offences merited death in the code, such as being the
first to flee in battle, selling one's equipment, abandoning
one's dead captain, mutiny, suicide or wounding, but only
30
defection, and treason, carried the penalty of torture as well^ .
28. Auton, vol. i, p. 911• In this case the infantrymen
were mainly Gascons.
29. Bayard's biographer thought that the sack of Brescia
was the ruin of the campaign of 1512, Le loyal serviteur,
Histoire du gentil seigneur de Bayard, ed. Roman,
pT 284, whilst Fleuranges believed that the battle of
Ravenna could never have been won had Ravenna itself
been captured beforehand, Histoire des choses
memorables . . ., in Collection des memoires, eel. Petitot,
vol. xvi, pp. 215-4.
50. Contamine, op.cit., pp. 521-2.
pop,<— c.\J •
In fact evidence of desertion by gendarmes to the enemy is
almost non-existent. News from Naples in 1502 suggested that
some French men-at-arms had gone over to the Spaniards'51 but
the claim cannot be confirmed. Those men who are known to
have served both the King of France and later his enemies were
either borderers, like La Marck and Vergy, who both held
lands on either side of the Franco-Imperial frontier, or
foreigners, like Oger d'Aguerre, nephew of Gratien and a
Navarrese, who served in the Lautrec company in 1512 and later
fought for the King of Aragon in Navarre-52. If there were
other foreign members of the Ordonnances who changed sides -
and there must have been some - they are not known to us.
Certainly there is no evidence of Navarrase men-at-arms
defecting to the Spaniards in Italy and it is indeed hard to
envisage any general temptation to have done so, beyond the
exigencies of the moment. When Gonzalo de Cdrdoba was
besieging Taranto in 1501, for instance, the mutiny in his
army over lack of pay was only made more dangerous by news
of Cesar Borgia's recruitment campaign reaching the camp-5-5.
In fact when Gonzalo had first arrived in Calabria earlier in
that year he had been joined by 800 Spaniards, hitherto in
Borgia's service-^. It is one of the ironies of the wars
in Naples that the French were defeated by an enemy possessed
31. Diaril, vol. iv, col. 541.
52. Jaurgain, "Profils basques, Menaut et Gratien d'Aguerre",
in Revue des Basses-Pyrenees, vol. iv, pp. 155-6.
55. Lojendio, Gonzalo de Cordoba, pp. 171-2.
34. Ibid., p. 168.
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of a less well-developed military system, particularly in
terms of finance. There are a number of references in
literary sources to offers made to French captains by
foreign powers to enter their service, but always without
success - Gonzalo tried to recruit two French hostages in
1502, whilst the Pope bid for the services of Louis d'Ars in
1504, for example*^ - and on the whole, as far as named
captains are concerned, the impression is rather one of
movement in the other direction, into French service: a
certain Capitaine des Pietres (who seems to have later
joined the Foix company) left the ranks of the Burgundian
contingent in Sforza's army at Novara in 1500 to join the
French; the Spanish captain, Peralta, deserted c6rdoba in
b6
Naples in 1502 to enter enemy service"^ ; and, most famously
of all, Pedro Navarro was recruited by Francis I in 1515*
If the King of France could usually count on the
loyalty of his gendarmes he could be less sure of the service
of others of his subjects and his army. Although the
defenders of the fortress of Monte San Giovanni (chief
Neapolitan obstacle in the path of Charles VIII in 1^95)»
35 • Auton, vol. ii, p. 293, and iii, p. 327. It seems
that the Venetians considered employing Menaut d'Aguerre,
who was recommended to them by Gie as "a valiant man
and experienced in many campaigns," Diarii, vol. iii,
cols. 422-3. This was, however, in 1500, when Venice
was an ally of France. There is no evidence that
Menaut left French service anyway.
36. Auton, i, p. 232 and ii, p. 295.
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amongst whom were numbered Frenchmen, Normans, Picards and
Gascons, were dismissed by a chronicler as "thieves, murderers,
-yj
exiles and criminals without ears^', it is certain that not
all French subjects who were recruited to the service of
foreign princes and states were simply outlaws. On the
contrary most were plain mercenaries, like the Gascons hired
by Caterina Sforza in 1499 to fight Borgia"^ or those engaged
in the defence of Treviso for the Venetians in 1511, in
■50
opposition to a Franco-Imperial army^ . Many such mercenarie
began no doubt as soldiers of the King, such as the companions
of Guillaume de Villeneuve, governor of Trani in Apulia, who
40
were bribed into changing sides in 1495 • Others may never
have been in French service at all. By whatever means
mercenary soldiers reached Italy, however, the peninsula must
have at all times been populated by rootless adventurers
looking for employment, but particularly after completion of
57* La Vigne, Le vergier d'honneur, in Archives curieuses
de l'histoire de France, ed. Cimber and Danjou, ser. I,
vol. i, pp. 527-8.
38. E. Breisach, Caterina Sforza (Chicago, 1967), p. 215.
39. Diarii, xiii, cols. 239-40. At the same time, however,
the attackers thought that the very presence of these
Gascons in Treviso might be to their advantage, as they
hoped to persuade them to defect.
40. Villeneuve, Memoires, in Collection des memoires, ed.
Petitot, vol. xiv, p. 270.
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a major campaign, when footsoldiers were paid off. One
particular group of mercenaries had fewer ties than most -
Albanian light-horsemen. It is clear that the services of
these soldiers could be easily bought and that their employer
could rely on little more than monetary incentive to retain
them. This did not prevent the French from incorporating
Albanians into the compagnies d'ordonnance as archers, but
41
they remained of no firm allegiance
By the standards of the time, therefore, the
loyalty of the gendarmerie to the King's cause was solid
enough. But the desire that gendarmes should obey royal
orders, and particularly that they should keep the King's
peace, was less readily realised. Violence was the
gendarme's trade and it would have been hopeful in the ex¬
treme to have expected him to confine his blows exclusively
to the enemy. Although most of the registers of the Tr6sor
des Chartes for our period have disappeared, details of royal
pardons for members of Gascon companies, issued only during
the few years up to 1501, give us some idea of the propensities
4l. In late 1502, for instance, the Venetian governor of
Monopoli wrote that some captains of stradiots had said
that although they were presently in French service
their true loyalty was to Venice, Diarii, iv, col. 477•
On the other hand, the Spanish chronicler, Torres,
noted how thirty-two Albanians deserted to the camp of
the League prior to the battle of Ravenna, as they were
starving, P. de Torres, Sucesos de las armas de Espana
en Italia (1511-12), con la jornada de Ravenna (extracted
from Collecion de documentos ineditos para la historia
de Espana, vol lxxix ), p. 268. We do not know whether
these men were members of the Ordonnances, however.
of these men. In 1489 a number of men-at-arms of the Foix
company were pardoned for a murder in Picardy, and in the
same year one Savary de Sus, again of the Foix company,
received a similar favour. In 1491 Tristan de Haux, of the
42
Aguerre company, was pardoned for killing his archer . Yet
the very grant of these pardons shows that the King did not
regard the above as serious crimes. Domestic and local
quarrels impaired discipline but were not flagrant breaches
of royal command. It is unlikely that many gendarmes would
have been persistent offenders, on a level with some captains
of foot. At least there seems to be no evidence of the King
writing about a gendarme in the way that Louis XII described
the Cadet de Bon Repos, who, together with the captains
Molart and Maugiron, was suspected of some crime in Italy,
for "he was said to have been five or six times condemned to
4^5
hang by the Parlement of Toulouse ."
This is not to say that the gendarmerie was
especially disciplined or compliant however. The Florentine
envoy to France remarked in 1494 that "...it was the most
difficult thing to control these French gendarmes, who
without compunction sallied through and lived off the country¬
side^." In Italy official policy seems to have been to
lodge .troops in largish towns, rather than far-flung villages,
42. C. Samaran, La Gascogne dans les registres du Tresor
des Chartes, D.I.(Paris, 1986), nosT 1649, 1648 and 1651
respectively.
49. Letters and papers of the reign of Henry VIII, ed. Brewer
and Brodie, vol. i^ pt^ T~, p. 285.
44. Canestrini and Desjardins, op.cit., vol. i, p. 294.
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in order to ensure better supervision of their behaviour^,
but it was always difficult to keep men in place. On one
occasion Louis XII wrote to the seneschal of Beaucaire,
comphining about absentees:
"...we have written and made known to all the
captains of our Ordonnances..., both on this
side of the mountains and in our duchy of
Milan, that they should return to their
garrisons and make their gendarmes do the
same... However, it has come to our notice
that the said gendarmes are making little
effort to do so, and, by their neglect of the
service they owe us, a great surprise could
ensue... "
The King ordered his seneschal to publish an order in his
area that all gendarmes return to garrison (whether it be in
France or Italy), irrespective of leave from their captain
46
and on pain of rigorous penalty . This kind of dispersion
made the concentration of forces in preparation for a campaign
a trying ordeal; for instance, the Venetians heard in April
1509> just before Louis XII's offensive against their
territories, that an order had been issued to French troops
in the Lodi area (where the Duras company was stationed at
. 47
the time) to return to lodgings, on pain of the gallows '.
But at least these troops, although dispersed, were already
in Italy. Companies on the move between stations were
normally provided with an escort to ensure a reasonably
48
disciplined progression , but the system was by no means
45. B.N., Dupuy 262, fol. 86.
46. B.N., fr. 20615, fol. 57.
47. Diarii, vol. viii, col. 120.
48. In 1498, for example, the Albret company marched
through Languedoc on its way to the eastern frontier,
accompanied by supervisory officials, B.N., fr. 25718,
no. 17.
entirely effective. Whether because of inadequate super¬
vision, or perhaps because trans-Alpine movements presented
added problems, three or four units ordered to Italy by
Charles VIII in 1496 disintegrated en route in Dauphin^.
Despite having been paid when in the district of Vienne,
most of the members of these companies then dispersed west¬
wards and southwards, "destroying everything". It seems,
however, that some at least of these troops were newly-
4q
raised, not established members of the Ordonnances .
The problems of control of the army in war-time
were rather different. If it was easier to supervise one's
forces when concentrated than when scattered across the
country in garrison, it was of course much more difficult to
restore order to a large army once the fetters of control
were removed than to coerce small groups of disobedient
soldiers. If the fetters of control were never deliberately
cut, they were at least consciously loosened at times, in
order to vent the natural ferocity of the army on the enemy.
For example, it was reported from Milan in 1509 that "the
determination of (Louis XII) was to put to sack, flame and
sword all cities, towns and castles which might await a
single shot from his artillery.^" But an army was like
some huge, unwieldy vehicle which, once released from its
blocks, could only with difficulty be deflected from its
path - could only in fact be brought under control as its
momentum died.
49. Commynes, Memoires, ed. Dupont, vol. iii (preuves),
P. ^57-
50. Canestrini and Desjardins, op.cit., ii, p.333.
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The history of the campaigns of Louis XII for the
conquest of the Milanese illustrates the dangers of slackening
the reins. The advance of 1499 opened with the massacre of
the garrisons of two small towns, with official blessing, to
put fear into the enemy. Then at Alessandria the army took
its own decisions and officers were unable to prevent the sack
of the place. This outrage persuaded the military authorities
to impose a sterner discipline and the army marched for Pavia
under strict supervision, "... the rope ready to punish
offenders^"1"." But disorder persisted after victory, for,
following the fall of Milan, every day saw a French soldier
hanged there for some crime, until by mid-September the city
S2
was again as calm as usual-^ . It was still necessary in
October, however, for the government of Milan to give notice
to all citizens to report misconduct by French troops^ .
After a brutal campaign, during which French soldiers were
encouraged to treat the Milanese without compassion, victory
brought the problem of how to protect the King's newly-
acquired property and subjects from a rapacious, conquering
army. The contradiction was more pronounced in the following
year, when the French were first expelled from Milan and then
retook it definitively. The counter-offensive was character¬
ised by a sense of retribution, since the Lombards had rebelled
against their lord. After their final victory and capture
of Ludovic Sforza at Novara, Louis' captains found that they
51. Auton, vol. i, p. 89.
52. Pelissier, Louis XII et Ludovic Sforza, vol. ii, pp. 223
and 228.
53- Pelissier, Documents pour la domination franqaise dans
le Milanais, p. 10.
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had reduced Lombardy to chaos. "The Cardinal (d'Amboise) ...
is extremely angry at the pillaging done by the gendarmes on
this side of the Ticino," wrote Trivulzlo from Milan in
April, "... for... there is not a town or village in the
area which has not been plundered and put to ransom." Amboise
wanted La Tremoille (to whom Trivulzio was writing) to gather
ciL
his lieutenants together to find out where their men were .
Over the following weeks a number of orders were issued in an
attempt to re-establish control - troops were to return to
their units, stay in their cantonments and pay for their
victuals; redundant soldiers were to leave the duchy, no
lodging was permitted in unassigned billets and the locals
were not to be insulted^ . The scene of worst disorder was
the road between Milan and Vercelli. La Tr^moille ordered
it closed at the frontier with Piedmont so that captives
could be reclaimed, but his chie f military-policeman,
Peytavy, reported that without written authority the
gendarmes paid no heed to him, nor to his colleagues; he had
managed to reclaim some distinguished Milanese prisoners
e;6
from their hands however-^ . Authority, once lost, could
only be slowly reasserted over a rampaging crowd of an army.
54. Auton, i, pieces annexes, p. J>QO. Prato concluded
that "... in brief, the whole Milanese was plundered,"
Storia di Milano, in A.S. I., ser. I, vol. iii, p. 259*
55. Pelissier, Louis XII et Ludovic Sforza, vol. ii, pp.
197-8.
56. R. de Maulde-la-Claviere, La conqu^te du canton du
Tessin par les Suisses (I5OO-O3) (Turin, 1590), pp". 14-15.
Examples of mass-behaviour tell us something of the
extent to which the King of France might rely upon his army
to serve his interests. However, they tell little, and then
only obliquely, about personal motives, values or allegiance
- little, for example, about concepts of honour and duty.
For these we must turn to individuals, but recorded actions
tend to be those of men of a certain standing and by no means
therefore necessarily typical of the bulk of gendarmes, let
alone of members of the army as a whole. When Louis d'Ars
returned north from Naples in 1504 he was acclaimed as a
national hero, "the most triumphant Gaul of the times-^",
who had scorned surrender to pursue the war against the
Spaniards; on the other hand, "his men had only asked for
booty and they had received it in equal shares," according to
i S8
Jean d Auton^ . Nonetheless, the behaviour of French
captains no doubt served as a model for their dependants and
followers, and it is interesting to look at the performance of
some of them in circumstances which were likely to test their
moral qualities.
Menaut d'Aguerre was put into Ostia by Charles VIII
in 1494^9 an(j held the fortress there, a modern and powerful
one^, until 1497. Ostia occupied an important position -
57. Auton, iii, p. 525. Ars had fought entirely at his
own expense.
58. Ibid., p. 189.
59. Ostia belonged to the Cardinal of St. Peter-in-chains
(afterwards Julius II), a partisan of Charles VIII;
by the terms of the agreement which the latter
negotiated with Alexander VI the place was to be
handed back to the Cardinal upon completion of the
Neapolitan expedition, Commynes, Memoires, ed. Dupont,
iii, p. 582.
60. Mallett, Mercenaries and their masters, p. 240.
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for the French as an essential staging-post on the sea-route
to Naples, for the Pope as the main point of entry for Rome's
imports^1. Menaut continually ravaged the Roman food-supply
until the city was oppressed by dearth, especially of wine,
since few ships dared enter the Tiber and those that did were
apprehended, looted and sunk. The obsession of Alexander
62
VI with the thorn of Ostia is revealed in his correspondence
In August 1495 the King wrote to Menaut ordering him to relent,
but this instruction seems to have had little effect since the
Pope complained only two months later to the Catholic Kings
of the continued interruption of imports . Early in 1496
the Duke of Milan was assured by Charles VIII that Menaut
had been commanded to release certain Milanese merchants he
64
had detained . After his surrender to the Spaniards,
Menaut protested that he had simply been faithfully serving
his master, the King of France. But to Paolo Giovio the
captain of Ostia was nothing but a "terrible pirate" and
"horrible monster^." It seems clear that Menaut d'Aguerre
61. L. Suarez-Fernandez, La politica internacional de
Isabel la Cat6lica, vol. iv (Valladolld, 1971)> p.386.
62. Giovio, Le vite del Gran Capitano e del Marquese di
Pescara, trans. Domenichi, publ. Panigada, p. 47, and
Lojendio, Gonzalo de Cordoba, pp. 127-8; Alexander's
concern can be gauged from his letters published by
Suarez-Fernandez, in op.cit., vol. iv.
63. Lettres de Charles VIII, ed. Pelicier and Mandrot, vol.
iv, pi 269; Suarez-Fernandez, op.cit., p. 458.
64. Lettres de Charles VIII, vol. v, p.4.
65. Giovio, loc . cit..
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overreached his brief and he may have embarrassed Charles
VIII somewhat. On the other hand he was far from being a
mere pirate. He acted as a vital link between the King and
his garrison in Naples, lent money to an eminent French
refugee to enable him to return to Grenoble^ and was recog-
67
nised by Charles as a loyal servant 1. He might well have
abandoned Ostia as the French position in the south deterior¬
ated, but instead held on till the last in hostile territory,
defying both excommunication and calls to yield. Indeed
his captor, Gonzalo de Cbrdoba, appears to have appreciated
his valour as it was reported that he wished to take Menaut
back to Spain^.
One of those members of the Neapolitan garrison for
whom Menaut d'Aguerre provided a link with the north was his
younger brother, Gratien^. When Gaeta surrendered in
November 1496 and the French thus lost their last remaining
port on the Tyrrhenian coast of the Kingdom of Naples, Gratien
d'Aguerre rejected the offer of evacuation which was accepted
by his French comrades and moved inland to Rocca-Guglielma, on
the Garigliano. This was one of those places on the frontiers
66. Commynes, Memoires, ed. Dupont, vol. iii, p. 467-
67. Charles told the Pope in August 1495 that "he had
always known (Menaut) for a worthy man", Lettres, iv,
p. 265. As a member of the League of Venice,
Alexander VI was in effect an enemy of France from
April 1495 but Charles VIII seems to have been lothe
to treat him as such. Menaut d'Aguerre was evidently
more of a realist.
68. Diarii, vol. i, col. 556. In fact Menaut returned to
France.
69. In July 1496, for instance, the Cardinal of St. Malo
told the King of the receipt of letters from Menaut,
with news of both Ostia and of Gratien in the Abruzzi,
B.N., Dupuy 262, fol.4.
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of Naples and the Papal States which was held by Giovanni
della Rovere, Prefect of Rome and a French partisan, with
whom Gratien had established close ties in the Abruzzi earlier
in the campaign. In December the King of Naples confronted
Guglielma but Aguerre was "not... accepting terms", for his
70
fortress was strong and set in barren country . It is
not clear whether Gratien finally yielded in the face of
Spanish battery or simply because of the truce between France
and the members of the League of Venice which came into force
towards the end of April 1497• At all events Gratien proved
to be an exceptionally stubborn defender of Charles VIII's
last toe-hold in the Regno and was, as we have seen, to be
71
rewarded for his efforts upon his return to France. With
hindsight Gratien d'Aguerre's obstinacy appears rather futile,
but prospects probably looked somewhat less hopeless at the
time: the Angevins held a number of strong positions in
Gaeta's hinterland even as late as the fall of that port,
and Ostia was within easy reach. In February 1497 Gratien
was still able to recapture Rocca d'Evandro, one of these
72
places which had fallen to the enemy1 . Besides, there was
70. Boislisle, Notice sur Etienne de Vesc, pp. 168-9
and 175-6; Giovio, op.cit., p. 49; Diarii, vol. i,
cols. 423, 451 and 46o.
71. As late as September 1497 the King could still write that
Gratien was in Naples, in charge of some troops, B.N.,
p.o. 13 (dossier Aguerre), no.l6. The reason for such
a long delay in his returning northwards is not clear,
but he eventually did reach France sometime in the
winter of 1497-8.
72. Diarii, i, col. 527«
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always hope that the balance of forces might change - a new
army might be sent south by Charles VIII, whilst Guicciardini
notes that the defection of the powerful Prince of Salerno
from the Aragonese cause led these last few French garrisons
to continue resistance for longer than they otherwise would
have done^. Perhaps more remarkable than the efforts of
Gratien d'Aguerre was the defiance of Taranto, Monte San
Angelo and Venosa into 1497, places on the other side of the
74
Regno with no hope of relief' .
The tenure of Trezzo on the Adda, some miles east
of Milan, by Roger de Beam in 1512-13 provides some parallels
with the case of Menaut d'Aguerre at Ostia. Trezzo was
another strong fortress dominating a curve in the river, and
Roger was its castellan when he retreated thither with a body
of troops during the collapse of French rule in Lombardy in
June 1512. By the end of that month the Venetians had
received news that the remnants of La Palice's army were at
the foot of the Alps and "they all wished to cross over'-^."
It was a time of disintegrating morale. From Trezzo Roger
pursued a successful campaign of harassment and pillage in
the Milanese. A French correspondent wrote from Turin in
September 1512 that "... the Baron de Beam, who held Trezzo,
had raided almost as far as Milan and had captured a deal
73. Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, publ. Panigada, vol.
i, p. 276.
74. Taranto surrendered in January 1497 and by the end of
March only those places held by Aguerre and Delia Rovere
remained in French hands, according to Boislisle, in
op.cit., p. 175-6. However Delaborde contends that
Monte San Angelo and Venosa (both under the command of
Captain Domjulien) also held out until the April truce,
L'expedition de Charles VIII en Italie, p. 682.
75. Giovio, op.cit., p. 218; Diarii, vol. xiv, col. 438.-
of loot. He had ridden towards Lugano, in which area he had
made a thousand good raids on the villages and hamlets which
were holding for the Holy League, and had taken and killed
men and burned houses - in effect he was stirring the enemy
up wherever he went. It was said he had locals with him who
joined in his robberies and served for scouts and spies'^."
The Swiss, who were by this time the effective rulers of
Milan, intended to expunge Trezzo, incensed by such raids,
but it was left to the Spaniards with their heavy artillery
to bring B^arn to terms. He yielded on the 3rd of January
1513* under pressure from Trezzo's citizens, according to one
77
report1 . His surrender left the castles of Cremona and
Milan itself as the only remaining Lombard fortresses in
French hands^®. It is clear that Roger de B^arn had no
scruples over helping himself to the property of the King's
subjects in Lombardy, but his activities hardly conflicted
with royal interests. In the circumstances he had no choice
in the manner of waging war, short of simply waiting for a
new offensive from France. His operations can have given
nothing but satisfaction to Louis XII whose Lombard subjects
deserved punishment as rebels.
Another Lombard town which was held for Louis
as his main army retired towards the Alps in June 1512 was
Crema. The governor of this place, Jean de Durfort-Duras,
76. B.N., Dupuy 26l, fol. 135.
77. Diarii, xv, col. 467-
78. Ibid., col. 461.
actually hurried back to Lombardy from France, It seems, upon
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news of the enemy s advance'^. Together with his company,
Duras controlled Crema castle (a very powerful position,
well-stocked with artillery and topped by the red flag with
white cross of France) whilst the town was held by a few
hundred Italian footsoldiers in French pay. Duras wrote to
La Palice telling him of his determination to maintain Crema
Oa
for the King and that "he should not doubt it... ." A
little later, with some reluctance, he agreed with his
Italian colleagues that the majority of the town's population
should be expelled and this was achieved, with some brutality
- a wise decision, since the loyalty of most Cremans to the
French cause was doubtful, victuals were scarce and the place
8l
had been overcrowded anyway . It was later reported that
Duras had boasted that he and his men "would eat the flesh
of babies before yielding to the Venetians...", whilst in
September, during talks with Duras' lieutenant, the Venetian
commander was told that the governor "would rather eat horse-
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meat - and his son had already done so - than suffer shame ."
As is clear from such boasts the French at Crema ran low on
food, but by various means Duras kept himself supplied. He
85
even sold his own plate to pay his men . However resistance
did not last long, for Venetian investment of Crema only
79. Sforza Benvenuti, Storia di Crema, vol. i, p. 922.
80. Diarii, xv, col. 8l and xiv, cols. 919 and 989.
81. Ibid., xiv, col. 405 and Sforza Benvenuti, op.cit.,
pp. 922-6.
82. Ibid., p. 929; Diarii, xv, cols 99-40.
89. Sforza Benvenuti, op.cit., p. 928.
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began in earnest in early August and the place was in their
hands within a month. In the event Duras had decided to
yield because he feared that his Milanese colleague, Crivelli,
84
was ready to deliver Crema to the Swiss , who would have
cut the French to pieces. In fact Crivelli arranged to
surrender Crema to the Venetians and Duras was obliged to
concur with this, having no power to continue serious
8s
resistance alone .
The conduct of Duras at Crema was exemplary and only
appeared more admirable compared with that of Crivelli, who
sold out to the enemy for personal gain. The worldly
Venetians had cast a somewhat cynical light on French motives
however: they had wanted to sustain a hundred cannon-shots,
"for their honour", then they would come to terms, or, in the
words of another correspondent, Duras yielded, "saving his
honour by such means as were customary amongst soldiers.
The appearance of behaving in good form was evidently impor¬
tant, but it would be misleading to conclude from this that
the 'honour' of men like Duras was specious, some kind of
fraud perpetrated in the hope of reward and praise for false
courage. There had to be some notional standard of good
conduct against which a man might judge his own performance.
Such a standard was most readily provided by the example of
84. Diarii, xv, cols. 73-^»
85. Sforza Benvenuti, op.cit., pp. 332-33*
86. Diarii, cols. 36 and 75.
237.
one's peers - thus the embattled French captain of Bergamo
told his Venetian attackers In 1512 that he would surrender
when he knew that Brescia had done so, whilst after the fall
of Crema two members of its garrison went to Brescia to
persuade it to come to terms^. The diligence with which
isolated French strongholds like Trezzo and Bergamo kept in
touch with one another by gunshots and fire-signals perhaps
owed something to the desire to maintain a common standard of
OO
behaviour.
The wish to measure up to standards of good conduct
was no doubt strengthened by fear of royal punishment in the
event of a lapse. Another Gascon, Guillaume de la Hitte,
captain of the Castelletto of Genoa, surrendered it to the
Holy League in August 1512, and a Venetian correspondent
thought that "the French deserved hanging for having yielded
it like cowards^". When La Hitte reached Lyons he was
90
arrested and imprisoned by order of the King"^ . However,
a sense of duty was by no means simply the product of the
threat of royal displeasure. According to an envoy to
Milan, writing in 1520, Lautrec, the governor, "valued
neither life nor wealth, compared to honour^1". Luckily
such devotion to an ideal coincided with royal interests on
the whole, since honour could only be proved in honourable
87. Ibid., cols 84 and 102.
88. Ibid., xiv, cols. 434 and 591# and xv, col. 5^*
Trezzo and Bergamo are about ten miles apart.
89. Ibid., xv, col. 45.
90. Ibid., col. 45. According to Guicciardini, La Hitte
extorted 10,000 ducats from the Genoese before yielding,
op.cit., vol. iii, p. 236.
91. Caroldo's relation, in Relazioni, ed. Segarizzi, ii,p.l3«
war. This is made clear by Fleuranges when he notes that
"... war (is the) noblest pursuit for a prince or gentleman,
when it is a just quarrel*^;" and nothing could be so mani¬
festly unjust as warring against one's sovereign, nothing so
laudable as supporting his cause. The reverse side of this
sense of honour, an intolerant pride, could be less helpful
however. It was reported that many company captains - and
these included Duras and Fontrailles - had not deigned to
serve under La Palice in his campaign in Friuli in 1511,
whilst the same unfortunate man seems to have been begrudged
the devotion of B^arn and Lautrec when he took command of the
0^5
army in Lombardy the following year^ . The loyalty of
French captains to the King was no dumb submission to his
will - even if one might be forgiven for sometimes believing
so, in view of the obsequiousness of tone revealed in some of
their letters to him - but a submission on condition of fair
treatment and respect for their status. In its turn this
loyalty was the reflection of something more personal, the
essential determinant of behaviour, a code of honour which is
best characterised by a contemporary appellation which became
a clich6 - "knight without fear or reproach". This term
was applied by biographers to their noble subjects - men like
Bayard and La Tremoille, was used to epitomise the qualities
of a knight like Fontrailles and was inscribed on the tomb
, 04
of Gratien d Aguerre.
92. Fleuranges, op.cit., p. 278.
99- Diarii, vol. xiii, cols. 242-9 and xiv, col. 917.
94. BrantSme, Oeuvres completes, vol. iii, p. 149; Jaurgain





Soldiers were almost universally unpopular in
Renaissance Europe. Bands of armed men living within a
community or moving through the c.ountryside caused perpetual
conflict with local populations. When Charles VIII was
collecting money in 1494 for his forthcoming Neapolitan
venture, one of the incentives offered to the French tax¬
payer was that the expedition would rid the country of
troops, "... which would be a relief for the people and
would bring an end to extortion1." In later 1498 Louis
XII wrote to his generals of finance to authorize payments
to certain officials who had escorted a body of horse,
including men of the Albret company, through Languedoc on
its way to Burgundy and Champagne, so that the troops might
travel "... with the least oppression of the poor people as
p
possible ." In the same year the King granted an indemnity
to the Norman convent of Royal Pr6 in consideration for the
damage it had suffered at the hands of members of the Foix
company-^. A list of complaints or dol£ances of the three
1. B.N., fr. 21604, no. 995-
2. B.N., fr. 25718, no. 17.
3. Catalogue analytique des archives de M. le baron de
Joursanvault (Paris, I838), no 1631. The soldiers in
question are in fact referred to as "men of the King
of Navarre", but it seems likely that this means members
of the company of Jean de Foix-Narbonne, pretender to
the throne of Navarre, rather than troops of the
veritable King, Jean d'Albret, who did not possess a
compagnie d'ordonnance at this time.
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Estates of Languedoc, published early in Louis' reign, is
heavy with criticism of the army: the soldiers in garrison
at Narbonne would not pay for their supplies, claiming that
they themselves had not been paid. In addition, they mis¬
behaved by extorting money and violating women. The
Estates wanted to be rid of garrisons and expressed concern
that armies move rapidly through their province and not
4
linger . These indications of the friction between soldier
and civilian within France should lead us to be careful to
distinguish between the different levels of hostility which
greeted the French soldier in Italy, as far as is possible -
hostility towards him as a foreigner, as an invader and
conqueror, and as a member of an ill-disciplined and un¬
predictable group of armed men. The dearest wish of any
municipality was to be spared conversion to a barrack^.
The French army was not alone in being unwelcome in town
and countryside in Italy. The Spanish chronicler of the
Ravenna campaign details the trials of Ram6n de Cardona's
army as it marched north from Naples to Emilia in 1511#
entirely through officially friendly territory. At
Roccasecca, still in the Regno, forcible entry had to be
gained to the town, whilst later, near Vorsano in the papal
4. B.N., fr. 2930, fols. 68 vo. - 75-
5. In December 1502, for instance, the city of Milan
complained of abuse by royal troops, asked that the
latter be withdrawn from the duchy and implored that
"neither in town nor country the Milanese people be
oppressed by the burden of lodging (soldiers),"
Pelissier, Documents pour l'histoire de la domination
franqaise dans le Milanais, p. 70.
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states, a pitched battle was fought with local inhabitants^.
Contemporaries feared armies in peacetime as well as war¬
time, in the same way as they feared the civilian mob.
The invasion of Charles VIII undoubtedly opened
a new era in Italian history - from now on the political
fortunes of the peoples of the peninsula were to be deter¬
mined at least as much by the strategies and whims of
foreign princes and powers as by their own policies.
Foreign intervention in Italian affairs was not in itself a
new phenomenon however, and indeed the Holy League of Venice
of 1454 had in part been designed to remove the threat of
external involvement, particularly in view of the distaste¬
ful activities of French troops during the recent war for
7
the succession of Milan'. Educated Italians were conscious
of a common kinship, if not nationality, amongst the peoples
of the peninsula, and this awareness was probably heightened
after 1494, with the embarrassing failure of Italian arms
to provide effective resistance to foreign invasion. The
contemporary commentator, Cagnola, makes the Marquis of
Mantua say before the battle of Fornovo that the allied
army was about to fight for the honour of Italy and to
demonstrate her military prowess. The fact that these
aims were not obviously achieved - in as much as the
Italians suffered heavier casualties in the battle than
the French - is explained away by Cagnola in terms of the
difference between the races, for "the French are more
cruel and bloodthirsty, the Italians more merciful and
O
benign ." The defeat of Venice by the French in 1509
6. Torres, Sucesos de las armas de Espana en Italia,pp.2^4-9.
7. G. Mattingly, Renaissance diplomacy (Peregrine edition,
1965), PP. 81-2.
8. G.P.Cagnola, Storia de Milano (1029-1497)in A.S.I.,
vol. iii (1842), pp. 199-'200.
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came as a shock to some in Italy, according to Guicciardini,
for with the subjection of the other states of the penin¬
sula the Republic had become the repositary of Italian
pride, "... had, above all others, maintained the common
fame and estimation...9" Whatever the political differences
between the Italian states, they nonetheless constituted a
self-conscious and exclusive community whose boundaries were
breached when the Frenchman, and after him the Spaniard,
Switzer and German, crossed the Alps or disembarked in
Naples. The French soldier and his fellow ultramontanes
could expect to be greeted by some in Italy not only as
foreigners but also as 'barbarians', the name by which all
those from outside the Italian community were sometimes
collectively known.
However, although it is clear that a sense of
Italian kinship existed, its political significance remained
negligible. The foreign policies of princes and republics
continued to be determined almost exclusively by consider¬
ations of dynastic and particularist advantage, and the
French never had to fight a campaign in the peninsula
without the support of Italian allies. Nor did the rulers
of the states of Italy enjoy any automatic devotion from
their subjects. Outside the republics of Venice and
Florence, these rulers were almost all tyrants of dubious
legitimacy and there was no shortage of powerful malcontents
in Naples, Milan or the papal states on whom the French
might rely for aid - the invasion of the Milanese in 1499
was even led by a Lombard exile, Trivulzio. As for popular
nationalism it is doubtful that it existed at all in
9. Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, publ. by Panigada, vol.
ii, p. 289. At the same time, notes the author,
others relished the humiliation of Venice.
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Renaissance Italy. Certainly it did not express itself
in any desire for national self-determination and it is
interesting that when the Milanese rebelled against French
rule they cried 'Sforza!', not 'Milan!' It was not so
much the nationality of a ruler that was important but rather
the quality of his administration.
According to Jean d'Auton the Milanese always
supported the winning side10. The French never had to
besiege the city of Milan during our period, the defeat of
the field-army of the Sforza sufficing to yield the capital
into their hands. Furthermore the popularity of the French
in Lombardy was at first enhanced by the strange belief that
the subjects of the King of France only paid taxes if they
wished. When in 1499 Trivulzio demanded the customary
excise payment from Piacenza, the city fathers replied that
they were now "... under the Royal Majesty of France, by
reason of which all ought to have been free", they having
lately rescinded the Sforza toll in Louis XII1s name11.
Indeed it was the fiscal policy of the rulers of Lombardy
which more than anything determined the level of their
acceptability. Ludovic Sforza undermined the loyalty of
many by his financial exactions. In 1495 the rebels of
Novara (which had been entered by the Duke of Orleans) had
torn up the salt-tax account books, crying "long live France,
10. Auton, vol. i, p. 225.
11. D. M. Bueno de Mesquita, "Ludovic Sforza and his
vassals", in Italian Renaissance Studies, ed. E.F.
Jacob (London^ I960), p. 214.
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death to the gabella! " The French invasion of 1499
provided the occasion for another outburst of vengeance when
in Milan the ducal treasurer was hacked to death^. As it
became apparent that Louis XII intended to maintain Sforza's
taxes, his popularity naturally slumped and in October 1499
there was a riot in the capital, which led the King to
exempt the city from the wine-tax in return for an oath of
14
fidelity . Eventually Louis, in Lombardy as well as in
France, came to be remembered rather fondly for the modera¬
tion of his financial demands. Certainly this was the
opinion of the Milanese patrician, Prato: "truly in (Louis')
thirteen years as Duke of Milan we never paid taxes except
15
for the fine for our rebellion...", he maintained . Even
though Prato seems to be referring only to direct taxation,
and not the regular sales-taxes or excises, his memory
deceived him, for the French certainly placed extraordinary
imposts on the Lombards, such as the subsidy of 100,000
ducats required by Louis XII to help his Venetian campaign
in 150916.
12. Cagnola, op.cit., p. 197.
l^. Storia dl Milano (Fondazlone Treccani degli Alfieri),
vol. vii (T95F77 p. 504.
14. Ibid., p. 405, n.3 and Prato, Storia di Milano, in
A,S.I., vol. iii, pp. 2^4-5.
15. Ibid., p. 325.
16. In April I509 Pandolfini reported that Chaumont
d'Amboise had arranged with representatives from the
cities of the duchy that the capital should contribute
45$ of this subsidy and the provincial towns the
remainder, Canestrini and Desjardins, Negociations




In retrospect Louis XIl's regime in Milan appeared
financially benign. The weight of Sforza taxation following
the expulsion of the French in 1512 caused civil distur¬
bances, beginning in July of that year and culminating in
the serious disorder of June 1515* when Massimiliano Sforza
had to abandon his proposed impost after armed conflict
between Milanese citizens and his own Swiss guard, amidst
17
cries of "no more taxes" . The new Swiss-dominated ad¬
ministration had quickly come to be unfavourably compared
with its predecessor, for in September 1512 the Venetian
College heard that a large tax had been imposed on Milan,
leading to popular protests that it had been better to pay
under the French, when the money had at least stayed in
l8
Lombardy, than now when it all went into Swiss pockets
In 1515 Massimiliano managed to raise fanatical support from
the lower orders in Milan, helped by a promise to abolish
the gabella, whilst later in the year, upon his victory,
Francis I imposed a largish demand, to help to pay off the
defeated but still dangerous Swiss army in Lombardy, and
immediately promised not to do the same again1! The
French continued to be resented by most Milanese as an
occupying power: in 1516 the Venetian envoy Trevisan wrote
that the Lombards hated all non-Italians and hankered after
17. G.M. Burigozzo, Cronaca di Milano (1500-44), in A.S.I
iii, pp.424-5, and Prato, op.cit., pp. 525-51.
18. Diarii, vol. xv, cols. 46-7.
19. Prato, op.cit., pp. 558 and 548.
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the house of Sforza . His successor confirmed this
opinion some four years later. Most Milanese now inclined
to the Ghibelline party, because of their hatred of the
French, who had been introduced by the Guelfs, notably
Trivulzio. "The Milanese would have liked a duke, so that
offices would have been open to them and they could have
raised their sons in the court of an Italian prince; but
this was very true: that having to put up with ultra-
montanes, they affirmed that the French were better than
21
the others, using many reasons as evidence... ." It is
clear that the sentiments outlined by the Venetian applied
in particular to the Milanese of quality, and they betray a
concern for personal advancement and a general attachment
to Italian ways rather than a longing for home-rule.
At the popular level dissatisfaction with French
rule had perhaps more to do with a hostility towards
government as such than with patriotism, and particularly
a hatred both of taxation, as we have seen, and of soldiers.
But when the French were in control such hostility expressed
itself in racial terms. Xenophobia had its roots in
ignorance of the foreigner: Prato notes, for example, that
when the Gascon infantry lodged outside the gates of Milan
in September 1499* the inhabitants "... thought them most
odd, being unfamiliar with their barbarous speech and their
20. Diarii, vol. xxiii, col. 169.
21. Caroldo's relation, in Relazioni degli ambassiatori




customs. " But it was raised to a pitch by the brutality
of the French soldier. In waging war the French made few
concessions to humanity. An historian of Charles VIIl's
campaign wrote that they "believed they had a right to kill
until all resistance stopped2^." Jean d'Auton reports the
words of two sets of heralds calling for the surrender of
Italian towns. In 1500 Pisa was warned that "... the way
of the French was to abandon all towns and castles taken by
assault to fire and sword." To Capua it was announced the
following year that should an assault be necessary "... the
24
sword would spare neither sex , " and here the threat was
fulfilled. Often brutality was premeditated and sometimes
not even justified by desire for revenge, but simply used
in the interests of terror: a little before the sack of
Capua, the two hundred men of the garrison of Marigliano, in
the Kingdom of Naples, were hanged from the battlements of
the place, because they had taken too long to decide on
surrender2^. As for Lombardy, the first campaign of 1499
began with the massacre of the Milanese garrisons at Rocca
d'Arazzo and Annona and was clinched by the fall of
Alessandria, which was ransacked2^. When La Tremoille
22. Prato, op.cit., p. 224.
29. B.N., fr. 17519, fol. 133.
24. Auton, i, p. 302 and ii, p. 40.
25. Ibid., ii, p.44.
26. Ibid., i, pp. 21, 26 and 71.
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led the relief army into Lombardy in the counter-offensive
of the following year, his standard depicted a bloody sword,
27
a flame and a whip . A Venetian correspondent thought
that the French were at their most vicious when on the
defensive, for "there was no more vile a people when they
28
were afraid But their violence in general was pro¬
verbial, and Prato noted the current saying that "there was
29
no fury greater than that of the French . However, if
French armies excelled in brutality they by no means mono¬
polised it. When Ludovic Sforza retook Vigevano in
February 1500 he had its castellan and three other officers
hanged, whilst in 1509 the Venetians abandoned their own
recaptured town of Treviglio to the depredations of their
■50
Romagnol infantry, as a reward for services rendered.
The viciousness of the French towards their enemies
must go some way towards explaining those outbreaks of
frenzied hatred of the invader which erupted in times of
crisis. In February 1500 the army escaping from the
capital had to fight its way along roads blocked by peasant
bands'^. Indeed many Frenchmen were assassinated in the
Milanese during the decline in their fortunes in early
150052. After the defeat of Novara in 1513 the few
hundred French troops who had entered Milan were fallen
33
upon by mobs and in Pavia Frenchwomen were attacked^ .
27. Pelissier, Louis XII et Ludovic Sforza,vol ii, p.178.
28. Diarii, xiii, col. 86.
29. Prato, op.cit., p. 229.
50. Pelissier, op.cit., ii, p. 164; Diarii, viii, col.316.
31. Auton, i, p. 168.
32. Pelissier, op.cit., p.159.
33. Prato, op.cit. p.316; Burigozzo, op.cit., p. 423; B.N.
n.a.fr. 5126, fol. 56.
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Before Marignano Milan was at the mercy of gangs of anti-
French terrorists who murdered those suspected of gallic
sympathies without hesitation-^ . On the other hand a
sullen resentment of the French seems to have been general
at all times in Lombardy. Indeed the French themselves
were under no illusions about their popularity: in 1501,
one of their captains maintained that the duchy was only
"55
waiting for an appropriate occasion to rebel-^-; the
Emperor Maximilian wrote in early 1510 that the French
troops at Verona would be unlikely to move eastwards to his
56
aid for fear of insurrection in Lombardy^ ; and with the
Swiss invasion late in the following year French morale in
Milan sank to new depths, the Florentine ambassador predic¬
ting that the Swiss would find favour with the Lombards,
37
who were "... ill-disposed towards those who behaved badly^
When the final collapse came in June 1512 it was helped by
-58
the odium with which the French were tainted-^ . However,
this resentment was never either strong or widespread enough
to endanger French rule until after this had first been
undermined by foreign invasion, whilst in the case of the
Swiss attacks of 1510 and 1511 even invasion was insufficient
34. Prato, op.cit., p. 338.
35. Auton, ii, p. 128.
36. Correspondance de ... Maximilien Ier. et de Marguerite
d'Autriche, ed. M. le Glay, S.H.F.,vol. I (Paris,
1839), P. 237.
37- Canestrini and Desjardins, op.cit., ii, p. 545. A
Venetian report noted at this time that the French
did not trust the Milanese, Diarii, xiii, col. 367.
38. F. VettoPi, Sommario della storia d'ltalia (1511-27),
in A.S .I,, vol. vi, appendice (1848), p.287•
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to prompt rebellion-"5". Popular animosity was caused not
so much by the fact of French rule as by the evil behaviour
of the garrison, explaining why opposition remained largely
sporadic and localised. Even during the years of peace in
Lombardy the French maintained a sizeable complement of
troops there. The most serious violence arose from the
robberies of unpaid soldiers: in January 1504, for example,
Chaumont d'Amboise wrote that "... he had been informed that
peasants were gathering on all sides and attacking gendarmes
for taking food without payment, and already they had killed
some of them^." The day to day activities of soldiers
could offend even the mildest spirit and Prato, who was by
no means entirely unfavourable to the French, noted that the
troops in Milan in 1499 behaved more or less well, according
to circumstances, but he was hurt that they should have used
4l
holy places to stable their horses . The Venetian Caroldo
39• The Swiss pursued a deliberate policy in both 1510
and 1511 of trying to win over the Lombards, by
behaving with exemplary courtesy on the march south,
although they did great damage in retreat, Canestrini
and Desjardins, op.cit., p.544; Kohler, Les Suisses
dans les guerres d'ltalie, p. 264; Prato, op.cit■,
pu 267• However, thesetactics were of no benefit,
for the fearful, inhabitants of Milan appear to have
shared Prato's view that the invaders were simply
"uncivilised barbarians", ibid., p. 286.
40. B.N. Melanges de Colbert 13, fol. 43 vo..
41. Prato, op.cit., pp. 228-9.
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observed in 1520 that "the French were hated for their
arrogance and the misbehaviour of their gendarmes, for
which there was no remedy," for "... it was impossible for
the French not to be haughty and not to consume a world of
hp
things ."
The concentration of contemporary commentators on
the periods of French conquest and collapse in Lombardy may
serve to distort our picture of Franco-Milanese relations.
Little is told of those intervening years during which
French rule was stabilised and companies garrisoned out in
provincial towns as they were at home. The army did not
remain simply an occupying force but was to some extent
absorbed into Milanese life. We have seen how a number of
Italian soldiers were recruited into the ranks, how some
units spent many years in the peninsula and how regular
bases were established. Roger de Beam had his wife with
2iq
him at Trezzo in 1512-13 -9 an indication of a degree of
assimilation. Although Milan never became just another
province of France it acquired the status of a satellite,
closely tied to the metropolis by such means as an efficient
postal service - in 1502 the trans-Alpine roads were
44
improved and the duchy had its own set of liveried
4q
couriers, bearing the quartered arms of France and Milan .
Some at least of the King of France's Milanese si±> jects
showed their delight at the success of his arms, even if
this was primarily because of their hatred of his enemies
42. Caroldo's relation, in Relazioni,ii, pp.22 and 17 respectively
43. Diarii, vol. xv, cols 460-1.
44. Auton, iii, p. 89.
45. Ordonnances des rois de France de la troisibme race,
vol. xxi, ed. J,M. Pardessus (Paris, 1649), p~. 405•
See also E. Vaille, Histoire generale des postes
franqaises, vol. ii (Paris, 1949)j PP~- 78 and 326-7.
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rather than their sympathy with his cause: the news of
Agnadello was greeted with joy in the capital, and Prato
for one was only sorry that Louis XII did not go on to
capture Venice itself, whilst French successes against the
Holy League (such as Trivulzio's recapture of Mirandola
and Bologna in 1511 and the raising of the siege of
Bologna the next year) were followed by celebrations in
46
Milan lasting days . The enemies of the French also
tended to associate the Milanese with their adversaries -
when the Venetians retook Brescia in early 1512 Milanese
47
shops in the town were ransacked by local partisans
Charles VIII's conquest of Naples in 1495 had at
first foreshadowed Louis' takeover of Milan. Commynes
summed up affairs by saying that "the people had adored the
French as saints, but this opinion had not prevailed ...
48
owing to their disorder and plundering ." Charles' army
had been so confident of its good reception that the knights
had no longer troubled to wear battle-gear after crossing
4q
the Garigliano . However, even the reduction of the
Neapolitan tax-load by some 260,000 ducats-^0 was in¬
sufficient to prevent violent rebellion in the face of the
46. Prato, op.cit., pp. 276-7, 284 and 289.
47. Diarli, xiii, col. 445.
48. Commynes, Memoirs, ed. Kinser, vol. ii, p. 462.
49. Delaborde, L'expedition de Charles VIII, p. 556.
50. La Pilorgerie, Campagne et bulletins de la grande
armee d'ltalie, p. 214. The cut was of the order
of 500,000 ducats, according to Boislisle, in
Notice sur Etienne de Vesc, p. 136.
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abuses of the occupying forces. Unfortunately the immense
distance from Prance and the presence of a Spanish army in
Calabria meant that the French were unable to ride the storm
of revolt, as later they were able to do in the north.
Besides, Charles' conquest was infused with a fatal measure
of carelessness, as if few could really believe that the
acquisition of Naples could be made permanent. The
second French conquest was happily devoid of his character¬
istic and seems to have occasioned less popular hostility.
Again however the French were unable to bring their
Neapolitan campaign to a successful conclusion and although
there is some evidence that they at first enjoyed wider
SI
popular support than their Spanish opponents-^ , this was
alienated by constant war. The overall Impression of the
political climate in the Kingdom of Naples is one of
comparative under-development, at least outside the capital
and its environs. Relations between the Frenchman and
Neapolitan seem to have turned more exclusively on the
simple tension between soldier and civilian, as in the home¬
land, than they did in urbanised Lombardy, with its political
division of Guelf and Ghibelline. Towns which were bru-
talised by French garrisons, like Aquila in 1495 and
52
Castellaneta in 1503* might appeal to foreigners for relief ,
51. This was the view in 1502 of the Venetian governor
of Monopoli, Diarii, vol. iv, col. 372, and later of
Guicciardini, op.cit., ii, pp. 26-7.
52. L'Aquila appealed to the Venetians, Malipiero,
Annali veneti, in A.S.I., vol. vii, pt. I, p. 33^,
Castellaneta to the Spaniards at Taranto, Diarii,
iv, col. 772.
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but in general the struggle for power was conducted above
the heads of the local inhabitants, especially after 1501
when the Aragonese dynasty was removed from the scene.
The allegiance of the far-flung towns of the Regno depended
even more surely upon the accidents of war than did that of
those in the north, where there was a greater variety of
response to the success or failure of French arrns^ .
When the French came to establish their dominion
over the former Venetian lands of eastern Lombardy in 1509*
they were faced with rather different problems from the
ones they had encountered in Milan and Naples. This was
not only because the dispossessed landlord continued to
maintain credible opposition to French rule, thus providing
a focus for disaffected elements in the conquered terri¬
tories, but also because Venice, alone of the major states
of Italy, inspired something amongst her subjects - even
those in the cities of the terra firma - which was akin
qli
to modern patriotism"^ . This was not enough to encourage
much active resistance to the French advance on the part of
53. Although the city of Milan itself never waited to be
attacked by any invading force, but simply opened its
gates after seeking assurances against possible abuse
by troops, other towns of the duchy were not always
so passive. In early 1500 Tortona rebelled against
Sforza and admitted the French, whilst Vigevano opposed
ducal forces. The Helvetian regime of Massimiliano
Sforza was even more obnoxious than his father's had
been, and the approach of the French army in 1513 led
to rebellion in Alessandria and Pavia, whilst Voghera
refused entry to the Swiss and was sacked as a result,
Prato, op.cit., pp. 241-2 and 311-2.
54. Mattingly, Renaissance diplomacy, p. 88.
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civilians however^ , nor to protect from menace those two
traditional objects of popular hatred, the taxman and the
Jew; in Crema, for instance, the mob was only dissuaded
from attacking the salt-depots and the houses of Jewish
money-lenders by the intervention of prominent citizens^ .
But despite the ease of the French takeover of eastern
Lombardy it was not long before reports of widespread
dissatisfaction with their rule became frequent. Already
in August 1509 Pandolfini had remarked that the newly
conquered lands were discontented with the French, who
57
treated them badly^ . By December the Signory heard that
Brescia, Bergamo, Crema and Cremona were all poised to
rebel, they wrongly believing that the Venetians had re-
58
captured Verona"^ . It was not until the Venetian offensive
of early 1512, however, that general insurrection broke out
in these restless towns. The Brescians, who according to
55. All the major towns between the Adda and the Mincio
rivers yielded rapidly after the battle of Agnadello,
even strong places like Brescia. Indeed the ease of
their advance eastwards seems to have surprised the
French somewhat - see, for instance, a letter from
the camp, of 22nd May, in B.N., n.a.fr. 7647, fol.
256 vo..
56. Sforza Benvenuti, Storla dl Crema, vol. i, p. 3512.
The French invasion of the Kingdom of Naples in 1495
had prompted widespread violence against Jewish
property, Malipiero, op.cit,, p. 333*
57. Canestrini and Desjardins, Negociations diplomatiques,
ii, p. 409.
58. Diarii, vol. ix, cols. 38O-I.
their rebel leader were "sick of the French-^," raised the
Venetian flag and opened their gates to Andrea Gritti in
early February. Gritti himself soon reported that the
citizens of Bergamo and Crema were in arms and had sent
envoys to Brescia^0. Nevertheless, French retaliation
quickly demonstrated that the majority were not prepared to
die for their cause. The inhabitants of Brescia only began
to resist the French assault when it became evident that
their lives and property were threatened; the women of the
town hurled stones and tiles onto the enemy from the windows
of their houses and there were bitter complaints that if
their menfolk had done as much Brescia might have been saved
for Venice - whilst the women had done their duty the men
had hidden in their homes^"1". Meanwhile, news of the sack
of Brescia was enough to bring rebellious Bergamo to terms.
Perhaps the most partisan of all the lost cities
of the Republic was Crema, "... more favourable to Venice
62
than the others", according to reports in August 1509
The enthusiasm of some at the change of government in May
does not seem to have lasted long, as the tax burden had not
6^5
been reduced . The Signory maintained high hopes that
Crema could be subverted, hopes which appear to have fuelled
exaggerated claims about the extent of disaffection in the
town: in April 1510 it was erroneously reported that Crema
59- Ibid., xiii,col. 400.
60. Ibid., col. 449.
61. Ibid., cols. 516, 512-3 and 522-3.
62. Ibid., ix, col. 99*
63. Sforza Benvenuti, op.cit., pp. 313 and 315*
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had risen and all the Frenchmen there been killed, whilst the
claims which reached Venice in early 1512 that the town was
64
in arms were only a little less fanciful . However, such
reports do reveal that French rule in Crema was by no means
entirely secure and indeed in early 1512 there had been a
move to expel a group of citizens of suspect loyalties^.
The commotion in Crema in January and February 1512 may have
worried the members of the Duras company, which was stationed
in the town at the time, but it cannot have caused them much
fright, particularly in view of the impregnability of Crema
castle. Few can have viewed their position with as much
equanimity some months later, after the French collapse in
Lombardy, when the garrison at Crema was cut off by the
advance of the forces of the Holy League. The remaining
stock of the French in Crema was finally sabotaged by Duras'
decision in June to evict the majority of the beleaguered
town's inhabitants. It was reported that, apparently even
before the expulsions, the Crema.schi had expressed the wish
"... to cut the French there to pieces." Later a Venetian
captain noted that the refugees "... were anxious to re¬
capture Crema even if they had to make a staircase of their
bodies and fill up the town's ditches with them^." The
64. Diarii, x, col. 124 and xiii, cols. 421-2, 449 and 463.
65. Sforza Benvenuti, op.cit., p. 321.
66. Diarii, vol. xiv, cols. 315 and 405. An eighteenth-
century historian of Crema, writing of the expulsions,
described Duras as "a hard-hearted man of bestial
callousness", Sforza Benvenuti, op.cit., p. 325*
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Venetian commander had to deny access to the town to the
exiles after Duras' surrender, in order to protect the
French from their wrath. However, even at the end the
French were not without their local supporters, as is shown
by the insistence of Duras in the negotiations for surrender
that certain Cremaschi and Parmensi be granted pardons and
67
that there be no reprisals after his departure. 1
One of the chief accusations levelled by the French
against Italians was that of perfidy - governments, with
their dissembling diplomats, changed sides without com¬
punction whilst the people in general would at first welcome
with Frenchman with humble professions of devotion and at
the next moment be at his back. These are of course
characteristic ploys of the weak struggling to survive
amongst the powerful, and in the circumstances only to be
expected. On the other hand, hypocrisy did not always
colour Franco-Italian relations. For example, the joy with
which the Bolognese greeted the French in 1512 was genuine
enough, for, as the Spaniards had heard, every citizen would
have sooner died than submit to papal lordship. Indeed the
Bolognese composed an ode to the glorious memory of Gaston
de Foix^. By contrast, the French-sponsored Council of
Pisa seems to have aroused feelings of unmitigated detes¬
tation amongst normally friendly, or at least neutral,
67. Diarii, xv, cols. 82 and 56 respectively.
68. Torres, Sucesos de las armas, p. 247 and Prato,
Storia di Milano, p. 29b.
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natives: .in Pisa itself, in November 1511, the crowd tried
to force its way into the lodgings of one of the dissident
Cardinals, where their escort, Lautrec, was also staying at
the time, crying "Kill! Kill!" Meanwhile Lautrec's
soldiers were attacked in the streets^. The Council later
moved to Milan, where its members were hardly more welcome:
they were "a plague worse than the Swiss", according to
Prato. The papal interdict which the Council brought down
on the heads of the Milanese was almost universally respected
and performance of the divine office in the city thus
virtually suspended altogether^0. Contempt for the Council
of Pisa cannot have been entirely uniform however, for the
Venetians heard in March 1512 of a lampoon put on in Milan,
when thirty youths dressed themselves as Cardinals and one
71
as the Pope, attired like a prostitute with a mitre1 .
Besides, the question of the Council of Pisa was a special
case, involving as it did the crucial problem of salvation.
Even the French were worried by the implications of their
defiance of Rome. Despite widespread anti-clericalism
69. Diarii, vol. xiii, col. 28l. For an account of this
episode, which seems to have done more to sabotage
French plans for using Pisa as the venue of the
Council than all the earnest protestations of the
Signory of Florence, see Bridge, A history of France,
vol. iv, pp. 115-16.
70. Prato, op.cit., pp. 281 and 285.
71. Diarii, xiv, col. 80.
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amongst soldiers' , warring against the Holy League and ex¬
communication caused considerable distress^.
Yet beneath the politicking and temporary accommo¬
dations lay a more or less constant current of hatred of
Frenchmen by Italians, which seems to have stemmed to some
degree from the French contempt for the martial qualities of
the latter. The foreigners who took part in the Italian
Wars brought with them to the peninsula all the national
prejudices which had been developed over generations, and
no doubt had them reinforced by further contact with each
other in Italy. Paolo Giovio writes that "... there was a
habit amongst the soldiers... that... when their squadrons
approached and they entered a skirmish, they used to berate
one another with insults, according to the notorious failings
of their respective nations. So the Spaniards called the
French "borrachi", meaning drunkards... and the French held
the former to be ... thieves, fit for the gallows; just as
the Germans used to call the Swiss "covamali", that is
cowherds* to express the baseness of their nation, whilst the
72. Gaguin's gendarme accuses his priest of being a
grasping miser, "Le debat du laboureur, du prestre
et du gendarme," in Epistole et Orationes, publ. by
Thuasne, vol. ii, pp. 360-65. Interestingly, this
characterisation of the cleric as a man greedy for
money is echoed by Bayard's biographer: just before
an assault on Padua in 1509* he tells us, priests with
the army took bribes to hear the confession of
gendarmes; the latter also left their valuables in
the safe-keeping of their confessors, a fact which
prompts our biographer to speculate that these last
no doubt hoped that the trusting soldiers would die
at the breach, Le Loyal serviteur, Histoire de Bayard,
ed. Roman, p. 180.
73. After their recapture of Brescia in February 1512,
the French announced their intention to "make a new
Pope", since they were all excommunicants, Diarii,
xiii, col. 523*
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Swiss dismissed the Germans as "smocari", which in their
language means filthy layabouts; but everyone termed the
Italians "bugglaroni" - pederasts"^." To the traditional
catalogue of Italian faults was added a new one by the wars
in the peninsula, or at least an old prejudice was strengthened,
that of cowardice or effeminacy. Commynes writes of Charles
VIIl's expedition that the French "became so full of their
own glory that it did not even seem to them that Italians
were men^." The Milanese troops who evacuated Alessandria
precipitately in 1499 are dismissed by Jean d'Auton as "soft
76
and effeminate" and like "sheep" . Sforza's army at
Novara in 1500 was composed of nothing but "canaille",
77
according to Yves d'Alegre and other French captains . In
the popular imagination Lombard soldiers were reduced to
little more than sheep for slaughter, as a contemporary song
of gendarmes demonstrates"^. The satisfaction vtoich Italians
derived from the triumph of thirteen of their countrymen
over a similar number of Frenchmen, in a formal combat in
74. Giovio, Le vite del Gran Capitano e del Marquese di
Pescara, publ. by Panigada, pu 136.
75* Commynes, op.cit., ii, p. 485.
76. Auton, i, p. 73.
77. Ibid., pieces annexes, p. 350.
78. Chansons du XVIe siecle, publ. by G. Paris, pp. 129-30.
Apulia in 1503* should be seen in the context of a recent
history of French denigration of Italian manhood. After
all, the combat came about as a result of the insults to
Italian arms delivered by a captive French knight, who had
predicted that had an earlier tournament between Frenchmen
and Spaniards been fought with Italians the French would
have won easily - all Italians were "traitors, poisoners of
79 it
men and pederasts . It was surely the need to punish the
French for their arrogance that led, for example, to the
vicious assault on the unfortunate Batard de Luxe, gendarme
of the Aguerre company, when he was returning north from
Naples; at Brescello in Emilia he was insulted, punched
So
and even tortured by a commander of the Order of St. John.
On the other hand neither the French nor their
enemies entirely dispensed with those ceremonies of war
which were designed to temper the brutish nature of combat,
although the former do seem to have prided themselves on
their no-nonsense approach to warfare, compared with the
outdated antics of Italians. On the 15th of August 1499*
for instance, the French army observed a truce during their
siege of Annona, owing to the solemnity of that day in the
O-i
religious calendar . Battles and sieges were preceded by
79. Auton, ii, pp. 128-9.
80. Pelissier, "Note e document! su Luigi XII e Ludovico
Sforza", in A.S.I., ser. 5, vol. xxiii, p. 154.
81. Pelissier, Louis XII et Ludovic Sforza, ii, p. 7.
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the summonses of heralds and formal challenges to combat.
Chivalrous gestures were prompted by the demands of good
form, and soldiers as pragmatic as Gaston de Foix and
Gonzalo de Cordoba issued calls, to single combat to their
82
opposite number . Moreover French knights appear to have
been able to mix easily with their peers in the enemy camp
in those moments of civilised contact, during a truce or
whilst engaged in negotiations or parleys. After the
surrender of Crema Duras' men mingled with their Venetian
8^5
counterparts so that the two sides were like brothers .
Indeed relations between French captains and their Venetian
enemies were remarkably cordial, if we are to take the
behaviour of our Gascons as typical^ Duras' was well dis¬
posed towards the Venetians and entertained one of their
senior commanders to lunch in Crema castle in September
1512; meanwhile his son, a hostage for his observance of
the terms of surrender, was regaled by the enemy and him-
84
self invited his hosts to a return dinner for the next day
Roger de Beam had treated a Venetian captain of Stradiots
to a fine repast at Trezzo in July; the purpose of the
dinner was to explain to the enemy how France only desired
8s
peace with Venice . After yielding Bergamo castle later
82. Lojendio, Gonzalo de Cordoba, p. 185 and Le loyal
serviteur, op.cit., p. 317* respectively.
83. Diarii, vol. xv, col. 8l.
84. Ibid., cols. 82 and 103.
85. Ibid., xiv, cols. 606-7•
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in the year, the French castellan (who may have been
Lautrec) became friendly with Lippomano, the Venetian whom
Duras had entertained at Crema, and they promised to keep up
O/T
a correspondence after they had parted
French relations with the Spaniards were somewhat
less cordial. According to the Venetian governor of Trani,
writing in March 1503# "the French were so proud that they
had no respect for the Spaniards^." The campaigns in
Naples earned the latter - particularly the footsoldiers -
some grudging regard from the French for their fighting
qualities, but on the whole the Spaniards never seem to have
overcome their image of social inferiority in French eyes.
Even Roger de Beam, a man from the Franco-Spanish frontier
and of by no means unimpeachable pedigree himself, was
observed in 1512 to have had no great regard for his Spanish
OO
enemies at Trezzo . It had been reported in 1511 that the
French were anxious to crush Venice "because of so many dogs
oQ
- Spaniards and Swiss - that she had put on their back ."
Indeed the Swiss eventually became quite the most loathsome
of all France's enemies in Italy. A strong mutual anti¬
pathy developed between French Knights and Swiss mercenaries
over the years of common service in the army of the King of
France, at the root of which lay the hatred of class rather
86. Ibid., xv, col. 558. Lautrec was castellan of
Bergamo, according to Kohler, op.cit., p. 491.
87. Diarii, vol. iv, col. 840.
88. Ibid., xv, col. 457.
89. Ibid., xiii, col. 242.
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than national division. On the whole the man-at-arms
despised his social inferiors in the other branches of the
army: Gaguin's gendarme uses the terms 'villein* and
'footsoldier' interchangeably^; Jean d'Auton, who simply
echoes the views of his noble interlocutors, dismisses the
role of the pioneer as a "vile office" and "base occupation"
When French knights introduced such attitudes into their
relations with the Swiss, the ever-present friction between
horseman and footsoldier took a more serious turn, for the
Swiss pikeman was no mere reflection of the supine French
peasantry but a self-conscious professional and a member of
an 6lite corps. But his conceit only made him more
obnoxious to the French gendarme, whilst his greed for gain
and his barbarity confirmed the latter's suspicion that at
heart the Switzer was nothing but a villainous upstart.
In short, it seems that the mutual hatred which developed
between French and Swiss during the early Italian Wars did
much to throw the Confederacy into the enemy camp after
1509. In 1511 the Swiss complaint,during negotiations for
a possible renewal of the alliance with France, was that
Louis XII had won his victories through their efforts and
92
that it was time they were rewarded*^ . The grievance was
identical in 1513, when La Tremoille was trying to buy off
90. Gaguin, "Le debat du laboureur...", in op.cit., p. 350
91. Auton, vol. iii, p. 17^.
92. Canestrini and Desjardins, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 5^.
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the Swiss who were besieging Dijon: "are they who
willingly endure cold, heat, hunger and thirst, and who
expose themselves to peril of death in its service, not
more beneficial to the public good than those who, beneath
the guise of nobility, are always cosseted in luxury^?"
For Jean Bouchet this question demonstrated "... the
superbly arrogant nature of the Swiss, who at that time had
appointed themselves the correctors of princes^." The
victory at Marignano was to be all the more sweet in that
it was achieved at the expense of these upstarts^.
Of course something was known of these foreigners,
Spaniards, Swiss and others, before the Italian Wars began.
The Albanian light horsemen, the Stradiots, were however
quite new. The French came to both fear and detest them
as enemies, in fact viewed them "with more odium than any
q/T
other troops", according to a Venetian report of 1512y .
As comrades of the French, on the other hand, the Stradiots
appear to have been rather popular, for Chaumont d'Amboise
wrote in 1504 of "... the Albanians, who, according to what
Q7
was said, were the kindest companions in the world^ ."
The Stradiots were a mysterious breed; a French corres¬
pondent who had been at Fornovo wrote home in 1495 and
95* Bouchet, Le panegyric du chevalier sans reproche,
in Collection des memoires, ed. Petitot, vol. xiv,
p. 485.
94. Ibid., loc.cit..
95. A correspondent wrote from Milan, with evident
satisfaction, that the French victory had "...
deflated the arrogance of the Swiss nation...",
B.N. Moreau 774, fol.7.
96. Diarii, xiii, col. 506.
97- B.N., Dupuy 279, fol. 50 vo..
talked of these novel and only half-civilised horsemen:
"...the Venetians have Greek, Albanian and Slav Stradiots,
ugly men, wickedly bearded and looking like village cures.
They wear neither shoes nor armour, but have a shield and
ride Moorish horses which go like swallows! They carry
a javelin, with a pennant, and a scimitar." The Frenchmen
also mentioned their custom of decapitating their victims^®.
The French were never entirely clear about the geographical
origin of the Stradiots. One contemporary calls them "...
subjects of the Venetians, ... from Romania, Morea and
Albania", and elsewhere "all Greeks", and notes that they
QQ
ressembled Turks without turbans . The very obscurity
of the Stradiot's origins made him more objectionable, for
it seemed that he had come to Italy for no good reason save
pleasure in annoying the French1^. As an enemy he was shown
no quarter - he may have expected none - but his fighting
qualities were sufficiently valued to encourage Louis XII
and his captains to recruit large numbers into French
101
service
98. La Pilorgerie, Campagne et bulletins, p. 360.
99. B.N., fr. 17519, fol. 171.
100. Auton, i, p. 255.
101. This ambivalence of feeling towards the stradiot must
have had some echo in the relations between the
Navarrese soldiers in the French army and their
compatriots who formed such an important element in the
celebrated infantry divisions of the Spanish army.
Torres tells a story to illustrate the point: during
the siege of Bologna by the forces of the Holy League
in early 1512, a member of the French garrison, one
Nante de Viamonte or Beaumont, tried to make contact
with his uncle, Colonel Artieda, and his brother-in-
law, Colonel Jaime Diaz, who were serving in the other
camp; unluckily he was shot dead by another Navarrese
colonel in the attempt, Sucesos de las armas, pp.256-7.
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The expedition of Charles VIII was a national
adventure, each step of which was publicised in France by
means of printed bulletins - in the main copies of letters of
102
the King or of others in his company . For the French,
we are told, Italy was a land awaiting rediscovery, a 'lost
paradise', a place of sweet living and the home of the Roman
103
tradition . Certainly a sense of excitement infuses the
bulletins (those at least written after February 1495 when
the success of the expedition seemed assured), a feeling
which may have caused the Italian environment to appear
larger than life: one French captain, for instance, writing
from Rome in January 1495 and reporting on the projected
advance into the Abruzzi, noted that L'Aquila "was scarcely
much smaller than Paris" - a considerable exaggeration10^.
Naples was not to disappoint the French however. The King
himself thought his new realm "... a good and beautiful land,
full of bounty and riches," and its capital "... gorgeous in
every way...". The Cardinal St. Malo reported that Naples
was "an earthly paradise". Particularly delightful were the
105
Neapolitan gardens, with their fruits, flowers and songbirds
102. J-P. Seguin, "La decouverte de l'ltalie par les
soldats de Charles VIII," in Gazette des Beaux-Arts,
ser. 6, vol. lviii (1961), pp~ 127-34.
103. H. Hornik, "Three interpretations of the French
Renaissance," in French humanism, 1470-1600, ed. W.L.
Gundersheimer (London, 1989)> pp. 19.47, p. 43,
104. La Pilorgerie, op.cit., p. 133-
105. Ibid., pp. 199* 218 and 452.
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Printed bulletins continued to be produced during
later years, describing French victories in Italy and other
glamorous events such as royal entries into captured Italian
cities, but the sense of wonder of the first expedition was
never repeated. This was not only because of the novelty
of the Initial contact, but also because Naples - "this land
of gaiety", in the words of an Imperial envoy in France1®^ -
held a special fascination, and the conquest of 1495 had been
a carefree affair, made the more splendid by the presence of
the King himself at the head of his army and the royal welcome
provided by the Neapolitans. Northern Italy does not seem
to have excited the imagination of the French to such a
degree. A modern historian of the French Renaissance has
tried to sabotage "the myth of the Italian Wars", which saw
"... the troops of Charles VIII, barbarians in dress and
behaviour, suddenly transformed into perfect Renaissance men
upon contact with Italian civilisation: a miracle^supposedly
accomplished by the landscape, the classical remains and the
107
new works of art The greater impression made on the
French by Naples would appear to support the view that the
achievements of the Italian Renaissance had at first com¬
paratively little impact on the invader - it was the exotic
south rather than the northern heartlands of the Renaissance,
in Tuscany and Lombardy, which held the stronger appeal.
106. Le Glay, Negociations dlplomatlques entre la France
et l'Autrlche, vol. IT p. 466.
107. F. Simone, The French Renaissance, trans. H. Gaston
Hall (London^ 1969)* p. 39*
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However, in Naples as well as in other parts of
Italy, the response of French soldiers to their environment
was determined in the main by the mundane aspects of every¬
day life - the exigencies of campaigning, the availability
and quality of victuals and lodgings, relations with the
natives, with colleagues and enemies, the perils and oppor¬
tunities of war, disease and the weather. Commynes writes
of the opening of Charles VIIl's expedition that "that year
all the wines of Italy were sour, and the troops did not like
1 08
this any more than the air, which was so hot ." Indeed
complaints about the climate in all parts of the peninsula
continued to be common in later years. Letters from Italy
are dominated by military details, financial considerations
and personal pleas and grievances. If these were the over¬
riding concerns of the King's chief lieutenants (the men
largely responsible for our surviving correspondence) we
would hardly expect hard-bitten captains like Gratien
d'Aguerre and Roger de Beam, men who, to judge by the
quality of their autographs, were scarcely literate, to have
brought a more subtle imagination to bear on their surroun¬
dings. Even men of quality like Gaston de Foix and Jean
de Duras appear to have possessed only a poor knowledge of
108. Commynes, op.cit., p. 456.
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the Italian language10^. Gradually, however, the impact of
Italian civilisation did come to be felt in France, although
it was not until the reign of Francis I that its visible
manifestation, in the form of architecture for example,
became significant, and French captains were among those
responsible for the process. It required a long and con¬
tinuous association before this movement gathered strength,
and by the third decade of the sixteenth century these
conditions had been met: writing in 1525, Fleuranges re¬
called his first journey to Italy but purposely omitted any
description of the Alps because by now "... so many people
had seen them110." The north of Italy at least had become
familiar territory.
109. In writing to the Signory of Florence in September
1511, Foix used a secretary whose Italian was mediocre,
A. Renaudet, Le Concile gallican de Pise-Milan
(Paris, 1922)3 p3 255 and n. 1551 Duras needed an
interpreter to address the town council of Crema in
1512, Sforza Benvenuti, op.cit., p. 323* Other
eminent Gascons seem to have been better equipped:
Gaston's father, Jean de Foix-Narbonne, acted as an
interpreter in 1494 for the Countess of Montferrat,
whose French was poor, P. Desrey, De l'entreprise
du voyage du roy Charles VIII, in Archives curieuses
de 1'histoire de France, ed. Cimber and Danjou, ser.
I, vol. i (1834), p. 214. Roger de Gramont went on
diplomatic missions to Rome and Bologna during the
early years of Louis XII's reign, Diarii, vol. ili,
cols 409 and .i486, and P. Ambri Berselli, "Sources
de l'histoire de France, lettres inedites de Louis
XII aux archives d'etat de Bologne," in Revue
Hlstorique, vol. ccxviii (1957)> PP« 261-78, p. 267.
110. Fleuranges, Histoire des choses memorables, in
Collection des memoires, ed. Petitot, vol. xvi, p.191.
CHAPTER SEVEN
LOUIS D'ARMAGNAC, VICEROY OF NAPLES
Few lives can have been as cruelly deluded by
tricks of fortune as that of Louis d'Armagnac. Born into
one of the noblest houses of France and endowed with a
propitious measure of Valois blood, Louis was nevertheless
soon to fall into penurious anonymity upon the disgrace of
his father. Raised up and reinstated by a new King,
Charles VIII, the young man became an illustrious courtier
and shared in the pompous triumphs of Charles' progress
through Italy. Even these honours paled in comparison
with the ultimate dignity of Viceroy in Naples, attained
in 1501. Yet by 1503* after a life of only thirty years,
Louis' mutilated corpse lay heaped with the other French
dead on the field of Cerignola. One common thread seems
to run through this life: at almost eVery turn the
fortune of Armagnac was determined by the will of the
King of France. Louis appears to typify a new generation
of French peer who, after their fathers had been crushed
by Louis XI and his daughter, Anne de Beaujeu, had
nowhere else to turn but to the Crown itself to procure
the honours which were their due.
On the 4th of August 1477* Jacques d'Armagnac,
the former Duke of Nemours, was led from the Bastille to
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Les Halles in Paris, to receive execution of his sentence
for treason. After confessing his sins and then listing
his debts of over 40,000 livres, Jacques recommended his
children to the good graces of Louis XI. He was then
brought out from the lofts of the fish market onto a
temporary scaffold, and duly beheaded1. BrantSme's
assertion that two of Jacques' children were obliged by
the King to witness the execution of their father is
2
thought to be a piece of dramatic licence . However, the
immediate fate of the children was scarcely less odorous.
During their father's long captivity in Paris, they had
lived miserably enough in the same city, in the care of
some domestic servants. Jacques d'Armagnac left six
legitimate offspring from his marriage with Louise
d'Anjou, who died before her husband. Louis, ironically
the godson of his father's tormentor, from whom he took
his name, was born in 1472. He was the fifth child and
the youngest of three boys. After the execution, the
eldest son, Jacques, became the ward of Boffile de Juge,
one of the beneficiaries of the confiscated estate of the
late Jacques d'Armagnac, and the boy soon died at Perpignan,
not without suspicion of foul play. Only in 1479 did the
1. B. de Mandrot, "Jacques d'Armagnac, due de Nemours",
in Revue Historique, vol. xliii (1890), pp. 274-316
and xliv (1890), pp. 241-312; vol. xliv, pp. 304-6.
2. BrantSme, Oeuvres completes, ed. Merim6e and Lacour,
vol. iii, p7 9^1 Mandrot, op.cit., p. 306, n.2.
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King look to the rest of the orphans, Jean, Louis,
Marguerite, Catherine and Charlotte, when, following
representations from relatives and friends, he ordered
them into various religious houses to provide for their
livelihood^.
A new King brought new hope. In 1483 Charles
. 4
VIII called Jean and Louis d Armagnac to Amboise , and
g
immediately the new tutors-curators of the boys^ began
proceedings to restore their family estates. Firstly
the legacy of the late Charles d'Anjou, comte de Maine,
the children's maternal grandfather, was claimed. The
climate of opinion was favourable, at Court, in Council
and at the Estates-General at Tours, and, notwithstanding
the
the objections of/royal procureur of the Parlement of
Paris, the children of Jacques d'Armagnac and Louise
d'Anjou were granted the lands of Guise, Le Nouvion,
Chatellerault and a host of other lordships, principally
/T
in the Maine-Perche region, on the 5th. of March, 1484 .
3. Ibid., pp. 263 and JlO-ll; H. Stein, Charles de France
(Paris, 1921), p. 212.
4. B.N., p.o. 95, no. 364.
5. According to their letters of appointment of the 12th.
of November 1483, these were Jacques de Luxembourg,
seigneur de Richebourg and maternal great-uncle of
the children, and their uncle, Jean d'Armagnac, bishop
of Castres; Guarcias Faur, president of the
Parlement of Toulouse and former chancellor of Jean
V, comte d'Armagnac, was appointed as a higher
counsellor, ibid., no. 365. See also Mandrot,
op. cit., p. 310, n.2. and 3H«
6. B.N., p.o. 95» no. 364.
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The restoration of Nemours came only a little later, it
being granted to Jean d'Armagnac on the 2nd. of August^.
Once these territories had been acquired, Jean proceeded
to provide for his younger brother by making him count of
Guise, whilst he himself took the title of Duke of
Q
Nemours . These major gifts of Charles VIII were both
confirmed later in the reign^. Jean and Louis had by
no means recouped the entire estate of their forebears;
in 1501, for example, the Duke of Bourbon bought off
Armagnac's claim to the county of La Marche and other
territories which Jacques d'Armagnac had held10. But
there is no doubt that even by 1484 the sons of "poor
Jacques" were already very rich. In that year they were
able to guarantee their sister Catherine a dowry of
100,000 francs (in land and in yearly payments of 10,000
francs)11. In 1489* Jean and Louis exchanged lordships
12
worth 100,000 livres tournois with the house of Bourbon
7. B.N., fr. 16589* fol. 66 vo.; again the Parlement of
Paris opposed the alienation of Nemours, but in vain,
Mandrot, op.cit., p. 511* n.4.
8. B.N., fr. 16589* fol. 185.
9. Guise on the 4th. of May 1492, fr. 2919* fol. 88;
Nemours on the 2nd. of September, 1484 and the 29th.
of March 1492, Mandrot, op.cit., p. 5H and B.N.,
fr. 16587* fol. 71.
10. Titres de Bourbon, vol. ii, no. 7524.
11. Ibid., no. 6876.
12. Ibid., no. 7065. In 1492 the brothers received 11,250
royaux d'or from the King for the exchange of the
lordship of Chize in Poitou, H. Stein, Inventaire
analytique des ordonnances enregistrees au Parlement
de Paris (Paris, 1908), no. 1585•
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From the first, Louis appears to have had closer
links with the King and Court than his brother. This was
no doubt largely as a result of his smaller territorial
fortune and fewer obligations as the younger son. Whilst
Jean pursued the seigniorial claims of his family"1"^, Louis
became an established courtier. Jean was even technically
the lord of Guise and Le Nouvion, for which he did homage
14
in 1492 . Louis, however, enjoyed the titles and effective
possession, by his brother's dispensation. In 1499 he
styled himself "... count of Guise and Pardiac, baron of
Lunel and lord of Leuze and Conde"1"^." By this time he was
"1 ^
already a captain of forty lances . By his own admission,
and that of Charles VIII, Louis was "... continually about
the person of the King1^." In 1496 he called himself a
1 8
royal councillor and chamberlain and the next year
Armagnac enjoyed a pension of 6000 livres"1"^. It was during
Charles VIIl's Neapolitan expedition that Louis established
his reputation as a soldier. Advancing south with the
King he was conspicuous at the head of the procession in
20
which Charles entered Florence . Later he led an advance
19. See Samaran, La maison d'Armagnac au XVe sibcle, for
Jean, Louis and the Armagnac inheritance.
14. Matton, Histoire de Guise, vol.i, pp. 29I-9.
15. B.N., p.o. 95, no. 989.
16. He was a captain of the Ordonnance by 1492, B.N., fr.
25782, no. 114.
17. B.N., p.o. 95, nos. 589-90 and fr. 16589, fol. 185.
18. B.N., p.o. 95, no. 595.
19. Ibid., no. 594.
20. B.N., n.a.fr. 7644, fol. 67.
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guard of companies into the Kingdom of Naples, taking
Roccasecca, Rocca-Guglielma and the great fortress of
San Germano - without encountering much resistance -
before being one of the first to break into Castel Nuovo
in the capital itself in March 149521. Soon afterwards
we find Armagnac operating on the other side of the
22
kingdom, in the Otranto area . He returned north with
Charles, holding joint-command of the rearguard at
27)
Fornovo and finally struggled into Asti with the
exhausted army. At Vercelli, in October 1495, Louis
emerges again, as one of four princes who carried a canopy
of cloth-of-gold over the coffin of the late Count of
2 ji
VendSme, at his funeral in the church of San Eusabio^ .
It is during the Neapolitan campaign that the
first signs of ambition for high command appear. Before
the battle of Fornovo, as the army's dispositions were
being made, Louis fell into dispute with Jean de Foix-
Narbonne over the leadership of the vanguard; since he
had held command of the van previously during the campaign,
Armagnac was unwilling to be excluded at the climax of the
21. Lettres de Charles VIII, ed. Pelicier and Mandrot,
vol.iv, p7 170; La Vigne, Le vergier d'honeur, in
Archives curieuses de l'histoire de France, ed. Cimber
and Canjou, ser. I, vol.i, p. 530; Commynes, Memoirs,
ed. Kinser, vol. ii, p. 483; Delaborde, L* expedition
de Charles VIII en Italie, p. 561.
22. La Pilorgerie, Campagne et bulletins de la grande
armee d'Italie, pp. 216-17.
23. La Vigne, op.cit., p. 3835 Bouchet, Le panegyric
du chevalier sans reproche, in Collection des
memoires, ed. Petitot, vol. xiv, p. 426.
24. La Vigne, op.cit., p. 424.
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27
expedition . Some years later, in 1499 or 1500, a
correspondent observed that "Monsieur de Guise (Armagnac)
had hotly solicited the King for the government of
p/T
Florence... without the King having granted it to him..." ."
This appetite for power would have to wait a while before
it could be satisfied. In the meantime, Armagnac attended
upon the new King, Louis XII, with as much dedication as
in the past he had upon his predecessor, and he took part
27
in the campaign for Lombardy in 1499 •
The new century brought Louis d'Armagnac's
career to its peak. In 1500 his brother Jean died,
without an heir, and Louis became Duke of Nemours. In
February the next year he styled himself, rather ambitiously,
"... duke of Nemours, count of Armagnac, Guise, Pardiac,
and L'lsle Jourdain, viscount of ChStellerault and
pO
Martigue, peer of France ." Next month Louis was
betrothed to Frangoise d'Alengon, daughter of the Count
29
of Perche . Later in the year he did homage, in his own
name and that of his 'wife',for all his lands; the King
25. Commynes, op.cit., p. 526; B.N., fr. 17519, fol.174 vo..
26. L-G. Pelissier, Lettres inedites sur la conqu^te du
Milanais (Turin, 1893)» 11• Florence had applied
for the protection of Louis XII.
27. Pelissier, Louis XII et Ludovic Sforza, vol.i, pp.
509-4. Armagnac accompanied the King in his entry
into Milan, Auton, vol. i, pp. 99 and 105.
28. B.N., p.o. 95* no. 400. Louis was neither count of
Armagnac nor Pardiac but simply held pretensions to
these counties.
29. B.N., Clair. 554, p. 589; Titres de Bourbon, no.
7525. The bride was promised a dowry of 50,000 .
livres by her family whilst Louis guaranteed an
annual rent of 5000 livres for her.
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to
wrot^/his accountants ordering prompt expedition of the
appropriate letters-patent, advising them that "he wanted
Armagnac favourably treated, for he deserved as much as
anyone else in the realm")^." By this time Armagnac was
a Marshal of France and had already been appointed "chief
lieutenant and governor" of the army for the conquest of
Naples, although he had not yet taken up the post-^1.
The army of invasion had left Parma at the beginning of
June 1501, under the command of Beraud Stuart d'Aubigny
and the Count of Caiazzo. Progress was swift and it was
on the 30th. of July that Louis XII received at Lyons
the news of the fall of Capua, the major impediment on the
road to Naples. Not long after the flames of the
celebratory bonfires had died away, Louis d'Armagnac,
due de Nemours, Viceroy of Naples, was on his way south.
He travelled by boat down the RhSne to Marseilles,
accompanied by a host of lords and gentlemen of the royal
household; from here it was a short trip to Genoa, and
30. B.N., fr. IO238, fol. 84. Whether Louis d'Armagnac
ever did marry Frangoise d'Alengon, or simply remained
betrothed, is not clear. At all events Louis can
have seen very little, if anything, of her and they
certainly had no offspring who survived.
31. "Povoir a Monseigneur de Nemours pour la conqueste
de Naples", B.N., fr. 5501* fols. 97 vo. -102; this
document is not dated but the appointment must have
run from early summer 1501. By the 6th of June at
the latest he was commander-in-chief, according to
Venetian information, Diarii, vol. iv, cols. 58-9*
Armagnac is not called 'Viceroy' in the commission
but by 1502 is known as such.
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thence to Naples, where Armagnac arrived on the 12th of
October 1501^2.
At first sight the arrival of the Viceroy must
have seemed to consummate success. The Treaty of Granada,
agreed almost a year before, had, by assuring the King of
Aragon of Calabria and Apulia, surely precluded the menace
of Spanish opposition to French rule in Naples-^,
opposition which had proved fatal in 1495-6. The advance
of Aubigny's army had been as trouble-free as that of
Charles VIIl's before him. The former King of Naples,
Federigo, had been dispatched to France. As Louis
d'Armagnac enjoyed his public welcome, with its official
"54
feasts of celebration-^ , secure in the knowledge that
his commission gave him supreme authority in the conduct
of operations, "... as if we ourselves (Louis XII)... were
there in person-^," can he not have been elated at so
32. Auton, ii, pp. 28, 66, 94-6 and n.l. The King wrote
to the Chambre des Comptes on the 8th of August, telling
of the surrender of the castles of Naples and Gaeta,
B.N., fr. 10238, fol. 173; a letter of the 29th of
July, from outside Naples, had informed him of this
event (which took place on the 27th.), B.N., n.a.fr.
7645, fol. 393 - testimony to the speed with which
good news reached Louis XII.
33• This treaty, ratified at Granada on the 11th of
November 1500 - though kept secret until the following
summer - alloted to France Naples, Gaeta, the Abruzzi
and Terra di Lavoro, to Aragon Apulia and Calabria,
Bridge, A history of France, iii, p. 150.
34. Auton, vol. ii, p. 97-
35. B.N., fr. 5501, fol. 101.
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favourable a realisation of his ambitions?
Problems were not slow to arise, however. On
the one hand, since the time of Aubigny's arrival in Naples
an epidemic of 'plague' had been raging in the city.
Amongst others it killed Caiazzo, Etienne de Vesc,
"56
seneschal of Beaucaire, and the Duke of Mont pens ier"^ .
In the Neapolitan budget of 1502, 6000 ducats were set
aside to help the people of Naples meet the costs of the
37
scourge^1. Armagnac seems to have escaped serious illness
"58
but Aubigny was not so lucky, though he survived^ . The
second major problem was the hostility with which the new
chief was greeted by this same man, Aubigny, who did not
anticipate with pleasure the thought of taking orders from
a man half his age, especially after Aubigny himself had
effected the conquest of the realm. He retired to his
36. Boislisle, Notice sur Etienne de Vesc, p. 213.
37. B.N., fr. 2930, fol. 18. Was this 'plague' the same
thing as Jean d'Auton's "grosse verolle" or
"maladye de Naples" (syphilis ) which was rampant at
the time, according to the chronicler, carrying off
several important people, and which could sometimes
be cured by hot baths and sweating, Auton, ii, p. 107?
Later Auton refers to the deaths of a number of
distinguished men in Naples, round about September
1501, including Caiazzo and Jean de St. Prest; he
does not specify the cause of death, although his
editor, de Maulde, notes that the summer of 1501 was
particularly hot, in both Naples and France, causing
widespread mortality, ibid., p. 138 and n.l. A
brief discussion of the origins of syphilis in Europe
can be found in Bridge, op.cit., ii, pp. 231-2.
38. Auton, ii, pp. 72-3•
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county of Venafro and asked the King if he might be allowed
to return to France. His request was refused. Jean
d'Auton saw this dispute as the beginning of those
divisions in the French command which were to debilitate
the war-effort of the following years^. Cardinal
Georges d'Amboise, Louis XIl's first minister, seems to
have foreseen some danger in Armagnac's appointment as
Viceroy. In a letter to the King of early August 1501,
following Nemours' promotion, he warned against a hasty
appointment: "it is necessary to have (in Naples) a chief
with good sense and a willingness to serve, a man whom
all who remain there, gendarmes or others, will fear and
respect, who will be obeyed and who will think of nothing
but his honour and duty to yourself... At all events,
Sire, consider the matter well and wisely, until such time
as you may have thought otherwise of the Count of Caiazzo
and my lord of Aubigny.. " If this is an admonition
against Armagnac's elevation, as seems likely, it is
evident that in this affair at least the Cardinal was
overruled by the King.
However, the main source of concern for the
French soon came to be the troubling proximity of the
Spaniards in southern Italy. At first this appears as
a minor worry. The memorandum which was probably drafted
towards the end of 1501, containing recommendations on the
39. Ibid., pp. 97-8.
40. B.N., Dupuy 279, fol. 9»
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formalisation of French rule, is concerned primarily with
the establishment of an administration, the foundation of
judicial procedures, the resurrection of Neapolitan
finances, the propitiation of local feelings and the
settlement of proprietary disputes amongst members of the
Neapolitan aristocracy. Only a brief mention is made in
the document of the need to appoint representatives to
treat with the Spaniards, to ensure that the two Kings had
41
received equal shares of the partitioned realm. There
seems to be little doubt that Louis XII concluded the
Treaty of Granada in good faith. Although the editor of
Jean d'Auton's chronicles contends that the commission of
Armagnac gives no hint that the whole realm of Naples does
42
not belong to the French Crown , on the contrary, in this
very document Louis XII qualifies himself "King of Naples",
rather than adhering to the old pretension of "King of
Sicily^." Besides, the loan of French troops to Gonzalo
de c6rdoba, the Spanish commander, to help him complete his
conquest of Calabria and Apulia, testifies to the French
4l. "M6moire de ce quil semble qui est tres necessaire
et ou le Roy entre autres chozes doit promptement
pourvoir pour le bien de son Royaulme de Naples,"
B.N., fr. 3087, fols. 176-7 (published in Auton,
vol. ii, pieces annexes, pp. 395-7).
^2* Ibid., ii, p. 93> n.2.
43. B.N., fr. 5501, fol. 97 vo..
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desire to maintain good relations with their partner
It was the growing suspicion - right or wrong - that the
latter had had the better of the bargain which began to
undermine French faith in the compact. A letter to
Louis XII of late July 1501 informed him that the whole
of the French sector of the Kingdom of Naples had been
taken into control, "... which was very little2^." a
memorandum, which appears to date from this period before
the outbreak of war with Gonzalo, asserts that the
Spanish-held territories produce some 50 to 70,000
ducats' more revenue than the French. At the same time,
the Principate, Capitanate and Basilicate, lands not
explicitly assigned to either party by the terms of the
Treaty of Granada and by 1502 the areas of issue between
the two sides, are calculated to be together worth 160 to
_ 46
180,000 ducats, besides being full of noble families
Here we can detect the seeds of the subsequent conflict.
In the winter of 1501-2 however, other matters
called for attention. The French set about organising
Louis XIl's new kingdom, which he was destined never to see.
They were especially intent on avoiding the follies which
had attended Charles VIIl's occupation. The instructions
44. Auton, il, p. 249; Giovio, Le vite del Gran Capitano
e del Marquese di Pescara, publ. by Panigada, pi 66.
45. B.N., n.a.fr. 7645, fol. 393.
46. "Memoire... sur le Royaume de Secile'citra farum'",
B.N., fr. 2930, fols. 27 and 26 vo..
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which Louis XII had handed to his emissary, Edouard
Bullion, on the 8th. of August 1501, to deliver to his
lieutenants in Naples, illustrate the overriding aims of
economy and moderation. All the artillery was to be
safely installed in the castles of Naples and Gaeta; the
Swiss, some of the French foot and the pioneer and supply
corps were to be paid off, though the gendarmerie was to
47
remain strictly in place 1. The need to husband resources
and conciliate the local population is also stressed in the
48 .
administrative memorandum noted above . Charles conquest
had been seriously compromised by the dissipation of
military and other stores, the lack of money and the growth
of hostility amongst the natives. Only the most obvious
cause of his predecessor's failure, the intervention of a
Spanish army, was not covered by Louis XIl's careful
4q
planning. A budget for the year 1502 was drawn up .
The anticipated revenue of some 571*000 livres tournois
could be expected to be supplemented by 95*000 livres owed
by the city of Naples, as well as a few other incidental
revenues, such as the tax on Jews which normally produced
7000 ducats. These funds would be used for the upkeep
47. Boislisle, op.cit., pp. 207-8.
48. B.N., fr. 3087* fol. 176.
49. "Estat g6n6ral fait de la valleur et revenu des
finances au Royaume de Nappies...", B.N., fr. 2930,
fols. 13-19.
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of 530 French lances and fifty Italian ones in French
service"*0, 1800 footsoldiers, some artillerymen, two
galleys and two brigantines, the repairs to various
fortresses, a host of salaries and pensions, and some
other small expenses. Both Armagnac and Aubigny were to
receive 12,000 livres for their respective posts of
Viceroy and Constable. In addition, whilst Aubigny
enjoyed the county of Venafro, Nemours was assigned a
further 3500 livres on the duchy of Nola. Both men also
enjoyed gratuities on the French finances, amounting to
5000 livres in Armagnac's case in this year 1502^. The
other officers of the realm were paid in the same way,
according to their seniority-^ , and pro rata payment was
to be made for 1501, according to the length of service
in Naples during the previous year. Lastly, it was urged
that captains of castles charged with stores be obliged to
promise to render as equivalent consignment when called
50. The cavalry force in Naples was always a good deal
larger than this, other troops being the charge of
the French or Milanese treasuries. Armagnac s
company was supported by one of the latter but the
Viceroy inherited command of the 50 lance unit of
St. Prest - one of those assigned to Naples -
following this man's death in September 1501,BU.,
Clair. 240, no. 553*
51. B.N., p.o. 95, nos. 397 and 407.
52. Salaries ranged from 4000 livres for Raoul de Lannoy,
grand chamberlain of Naples, to 30 each for the four-
janitors of the Chambre des Comptes of Naples.
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upon to do so, and anyway to ensure that supplies were never
less than two-thirds below strength. Still Louis XII was
haunted by the debacle of his predecessor's defeat.
In composing their budget the French must have
again been struck; by the defects of the Treaty of Granada.
The terms of partition had not rendered definitive judgment
on the status of three areas which had at different times
in the past variously depended upon both French and Spanish-
held provinces for administrative purposes. The difficulty
might have proved less serious than it became had the
contentious territories been insignificant appendages, but
the Capitanate in particular, lying between the Ofanto and
Fortore rivers and the equivalent of the modern province of
Foggia, was a land of great value as a source of grain and
of revenue from the traditional sheep-tax-^. Proof that
the Capitanate became the principal point of issue between
the two sides can be found in the clauses of the treaty
drafted by Louis XII and the Archduke Philip of Austria,
acting for the Catholic Kings, in early 1503, by which a
settlement of the conflict in southern Italy was to be
arranged. Here it is clearly stated that the war began
as a result of the dubious status of this province, and
the terms of the accord concentrate almost exclusively on
53. Guicciardini, Storia d'ltalia, publ. by Panigada,
vol. ii, pp. 33-A; Bridge, op.cit., iii, pp. 150-1.
288.
S4
the future of the Capitanate-^ . French infiltration into
the disputed lands, and into Apulia and Calabria proper,
seems to have begun even before Armagnac's arrival in
Naples; since these territories incorporated many estates
belonging to Neapolitan nobles of pro-French, or Angevin,
sympathies, neither they nor their French patrons could
SB
tolerate Spanish control^ . The initial suspicion of the
Treaty of Granada on the part of French captains was re¬
inforced by increasing evidence that in practice the
division of the realm was unworkable. Both sides
attempted to extend their occupation wherever possible;
the French were the more successful because the main
Spanish army was tied down in a long siege of Taranto -
which only fell on the 1st. of March 1502 - because their
forces were the more numerous in any case, and because they
S6
enjoyed greater local support-^ . In such circumstances
Gonzalo de c6rdoba could only hope to try to delay his
party's extinction by suggesting negotiation. The French
captains, under the leadership of Aubigny until Armagnac's
arrival, were willing to accommodate Cbrdoba, for they had
no real directives from France and hence no consistent
54. B.N., fr. 2930, fols. 3-6 and supplement to treaty,
ibid., fols. 7-8 vo..
55. Lojendio, Gonzalo de Cbrdoba, pp. 169-70.
56. Guicciardini notes the favour enjoyed by the French
in both Apulia and Calabria, op.cit., pp. 26-7.
policy to pursue. In short, both sides, and especially
the French, fumbled for a course of action, left to their
own initiative as they were by the policy-makers at home,
who were of course weeks away by post and anyway ignorant
of the problems which had developed from their mutual
compact.
When Louis d'Armagnac assumed the government of
Naples, he was no better able to regulate a dispute which
was perilously close to open warfare, despite his
possession of supreme authority in matters both military
and diplomatic, and of Louis XII's sworn word to support
all his Viceroy's decisions concerning the conquest of
Naples. As he discussed the dispute with the Spanish
representative, Juan Claver, violations of the Treaty of
Granada persisted, perhaps the most notorious being the
i ^7
advance of Louis d Ars into Apulia-^ . Ars was lieutenant
of the company of Louis de Ligny and he did not scruple
to use his band in the reconquest of the Apulian
inheritance which Ligny claimed by right of his late
wife, the Duchess of Altamura. A meeting between Nemours
and Cordoba was arranged however. It took place on the
4th. of April 1502 at the monastery of San Antonio, between
Melfi and Atella. This interview secured a truce, but
57. Lojendio, op.cit., pp. 177-8.
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despite being only the first of a series of diplomatic
g8
exchanges no lasting peace was obtained^ . The two
chiefs were simply not competent to negotiate a political
settlement, just as Aubigny and c6rdoba had felt unable
to clarify the terms of the Treaty of Granada in 1501.
The matter had to be remitted to the respective sovereigns
and they, feeling almost equally incompetent to issue firm
orders from a distance, passed the burden of responsibility
back to their lieutenants. Giovlo's claim that of all the
go
main protagonists only Gonzalo really wanted peace^ cannot
be sustained; Ferdinand of Aragon for one was most anxious
to avoid hostilities, as the weaker power^. The French
on the other hand would hardly have consented to months of
talks at San Antonio if they had only desired war. Against
a backdrop of violent incidents, at Atripalda and Avellino
in the Principate, at Troia in the Capitanate, and elsewhere
in Apulia^"1", the issue was forced, in the absence of firm
policy at the centre, by local rivalry between French and
Spanish garrisons. Full-scale warfare threatened to break
out by default. In these circumstances Armagnac was in
58. Ibid., pp. 179-82; Giovio, op.cit., p. 76.
59. Ibid., pp. 76-7.
60. Lojendio, op.cit., p. 176.
61. Ibid., pp. 180-1; Auton, ii, pp. 2535-70.
an unenviable position. Bridge's contention that he
"... desired nothing so eagerly as an immediate rupture"
seems unlikely^2. However, in view of the prevailing
conditions, Armagnac, encouraged by Louis XII, determined
to take the offensive. Issuing an ultimatum for the sake
of form, which was naturally defied by his adversary,
67
Nemours advanced into the Capitanate .
With his superiority of forces the Viceroy made
good progress. Now that tenacious attempts at negotiation
could no longer shield his military weakness, Gonzalo de
Cbrdoba withdrew the bulk of his army into the seaport of
Barletta, in Apulia. He reached the town on the 10th.of
July 1502 and having installed smaller garrisons in
Cerignola, Canosa and Andria, to form an outer defensive
ring, he determined to hold out until he could be reinforced.
The decision was bold - the Colonna brothers, who served
under Gonzalo, as well as Ferdinand himself, had no liking
64
for the strategy . Their fears must have been increased
62. Bridge, op.cit., iii, p. 151. Bridge seems to base
his claim on the testimony of Guicciardini, who calls
Armagnac "proud" or "puffed up", op.cit., p. 35 •
The Italian is not however a reliable witness to the
Viceroy's character - for instance, he later confuses
the traditional roles of Armagnac and Yves d'Albgre
at Cerignola, making the former the aggressive and
the latter the cautious protagnoist, ibid., p. 80.
Lojendio notes that Armagnac seemed anxious for an
accord with the Spaniards, op.cit., p. l8l.
63. Although Jean d'Auton naturally blames the Spaniards
for initiating the violence and accuses Cbrdoba of
obstinacy in negotiation, he does nonetheless admit
that Armagnac made the declaration of war, Auton, ii,
pp. 253, 256 and 274-5. The sequence and dating of
events leading up to the outbreak of war are not
easy to establish precisely, although the last exchange
at San Antonio took place on 22nd. of June, Lojendio,
loc.cit.,
64. ibid., p. 187.
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when the French army began to close in. Cerignola, held
by a small contingent, fell quickly, the garrison escaping
65
to Canosa . Indeed the whole of the Capitanate, except
66
for Manfredonia and Monte San Angelo, was overrun
The rather more substantial defensive position of Canosa
was Armagnac's next objective. Here the French had more
work to do, but the place surrendered on terms in late
August, after a stern siege; again the remnant of the
garrison was able to evacuate the town and reply on
Barletta^. About this time too, Minervino, Corato and
Bisceglie fell to Louis d'Ars, as towns of the Altamura
inheritance^®.
The strategy of the Viceroy before Barletta has
been severely criticised by modern authorities^. iphe
failure to assault the place, or at least to invest it
tightly, was an error which ultimately cost Louis XII a
kingdom. It is however rather more easy to appreciate
65. Auton, ii, pp. 280-2.
66. Guicciardini, op.cit., p. 47.
67. Auton, pp. 287-92; Don M. de los Heros, Historia del
Conde Pedro Navarro, in Coleccion de documentos
inbditos para la historia de Espana, vol. xxv (1854),
PP- 45-8.
68. Auton, vol. iii, pp. 1-9*
69. Bridge condemns his strategy, op.cit., iii, pp. 152-4
and 157-9; de Maulde thinks him rather weak and
foolish, suggesting that Jean d'Auton's praise of
the Viceroy s qualities merely follows the bland
official view of the time, Auton, ii, pp. 92, n.l.
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Armagnac's difficulties than to recommend the plan of
campaign which he ought to have adopted. We are told
of differences of opinion at command level: Aubigny would
have preferred to besiege Barletta, according to
70
Guicciardini; La Palice as well, according to Giovio .
Armagnac evidently felt that the port was too strong to
be attacked and its vicinity too waterless for close
investment, so he settled for encirclement at a distance.
His plan is explained in a letter from Raoul de Lannoy,
grand chamberlain of Naples, to Cardinal d'Amboise, written
71
from Canosa on the 23nd.of August, 1502 . After due
consultation with his principal captains, such as Aubigny,
La Palice and Yves d'Alegre, the Viceroy decided he would
occupy all the towns of the Barletta area, so as to prevent
the enemy breaking out towards Taranto, which was still in
Spanish hands; he was hopeful of taking them all, except
70. Guicciardini, op.cit., p. 47; Giovio, op.cit♦, p. 79*
71. B.N., Dupuy 26l, fol. 138. There has been some
confusion over the dates of the siege and fall of
Canosa. Bridge places events in July, a month too
early, op.cit., iii, p. 154. Los Heros suggests
a nine-day siege of Canosa from the 15th. to the 24th.
of August, op.cit., pp. 45-8. Lannoy's letter of
the 23rd. clearly shows however that the place was in
French hands by this date, and it seems best to conclude
that the siege did indeed begin on the 15th but lasted
only about four days, Lojendio, op.cit., pp. 189-90
and Auton, ii, p. 284. For his part Bridge goes
wrong in following Jean d'Auton's chronology which
assumes a rapid closing in on Barletta; on the contrary
Armagnac's campaign was hesitant from the start,
Pieri, 11 Rinascimento e la crisi militare italiana,
p. 401.
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Andria with its powerful garrison. There is in the letter
no indication that Nemours' subordinates disapproved of this
policy, which in effect aimed to starve c6rdoba out of
Barletta whilst hoping that its citizens would turn against
him as living conditions deteriorated. The main difficulty
in tackling the Spanish stronghold was a lack of artillery,
for any impression made on the walls would be quickly
repaired. The Viceroy was sending for two more guns and
72
extra ammunition. In view of the problem which Canosa
had posed to the French, we may well understand Armagnac's
reluctance to attack the much more powerful Barletta.
Besides, the Swiss, some two thousand of whom joined the
army sometime after the fall of Canosa , were notoriously
impatient of siege-work. Finally, until the French could
establish naval superiority in the Adriatic any siege of
Barletta would be unlikely to succeed - the main reason
for Gonzalo's decision to retire to Barletta at all was
afforded by Juan de Lezcano's squadron, which controlled
74
the south Adriatic . The survivors of the siege of
75
Canosa were dispatched by sea to reinforce Taranto'^; the
72. At the start of the campaign the French had had twenty-
six guns, but they were mainly small pieces, Auton,
ii, p. 278.
73. Most sources agree that something between 1500 and
3000 Swiss troops joined Armagnac after the fall of
Canosa. Guicciardini places their arrival before
this event, however, op.cit., p. 47. According to
Pieri, by the spring of 1503 the French had 3500
Swiss in Apulia and 1500 in Calabria, op.cit., p. 4C6.
Perhaps some Swiss forces had remained with the French
in Naples in 1501, despite Louis XIl's order for their
dismissal; certainly it seems that some Swiss or
German soldiers were involved in the siege of Canosa,
Auton, ii, pp. 288 and Los Heros, op.cit., p. 45.
74. Lojendio, op.cit., p. 188.
75« Auton, ii, p. 293.
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attack on Bisceglie had been hindered by three Spanish
r~7
galleys . In the autumn of 1502, the arrival of a French
squadron under the captain-general of the royal galleys,
the Gascon, Pr6gent de Bidoux, helped redress the balance
at sea, but the French were never able to prevent all
77
attempts to resupply Barletta .
In addition Gonzalo could rely upon the friend¬
ship of Bari, whose duchess, Isabella, was an Aragonese
partisan. Furthermore a number of Apulian ports - Trani,
Mola di Bari, Polignano, Monopoli, Brindisi and Otranto -
were held by the Venetians, as a legacy of the League of
Venice of 1495 and the subsequent role of the Republic in
the expulsion of the French from the Regno. The governors
of these ports tried hard to maintain a decent neutrality,
under pressure from both sides to favour their respective
parties. Indeed, as early as September Armagnac was
writing to complain of the support which he felt the
Governor of Trani lent to Cbrdoba's cause. Nonetheless,
the tone of his letter was otherwise optimistic: when
five galleys from Naples had joined the four which Pr6ger.it
de Bidoux commanded, Armagnac would Invest Barletta; mean¬
while in Calabria the French cause had found powerful
rj O
native allies . The Governor of Mola wrote at the end of
September that the affairs of the King of France were
76. Ibid., iii, pp. 5-6.
77. C.F. Duro, Armada espanola, vol. i, p. 38.
78. Diarii, vol. iv, col. 559*
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prospering: Gonzalo held Barletta with 4 or 5000 men, but
most of the other places of Apulia had raised the French
79flag . Besides, as the Governor of Monopoli reported in
early October, the French enjoyed wider popular support than
their enemy; "... it was the general opinion that the
Spaniards would be expelled from the Kingdom,even if they
were reinforced, because they were disliked for their
insolence and even alienated their best friends, who were
now disposed to favour the French as the lesser of two
evils."80
During these autumn months Armagnac, with the
main field army, reduced most of Apulia and the Otranto
8idistrict to obedience . Yet the problem posed by in¬
sufficient naval forces had not been overcome. On the
22nd. of October 1502 the Viceroy wrote to the French
ambassadors in Rome, explaining his recent campaign. "My
lords", he began,
*XI am writing by this same post to the King,
telling of my return from the Otranto area,
which I have put into his sway, apart from
Taranto and Gallipoli, which are encircled by
the sea. And so as not to waste time before
these two places, since I did not have the
fleet with me but had sent it to cruise off the
Calabrian coast, I have done no more than have
a look at them. I also write of my coming to
the Bari area, where more towns submitted upon
my arrival."
Nemours went on to tell of the bloodless surrender of
Bitonto. He aimed soon to take Molfetta, Giovinazzo and
the strong Bari. He would then approach Barletta, "...
79. Ibid., col. 541. This optimistic picture is echoed
in letters from Naples, ibid., col. 359»
80. Ibid., col. 372.
Ibid., cols. 372 and 391.
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"... in which Gonzalo was in dire need of help", in order
to "... do as much harm to him as possible by land and
sea,since he (Armagnac) now had Pr6gent's galleys with
him." He had written to Monsieur de la Lande to come
back from Calabria and join his squadron to Pr6gent's, and
had also ordered two large sailing ships to make for
Apulia. All Calabria but a few coastal places was now
in French hands and, in short, Armagnac was so confident
that he even thought the arrival of Spanish reinforcements
82
would benefit his enemy little . Already however we
can detect a warning in the Viceroy's own account of
matters. If Taranto and Gallipoli could not be taken,
through want of naval support, could the French be any
more sure of squeezing Gonzalo out of Barletta, which
83
maintained a squadron of its own ?
It was surely the lack of adequate naval resources
which more than anything explains Louis d'Armagnac's failure
to place a siege before Barletta. The French disposed of
two squadrons in the south of Italy. The first, a handful
of galleys under Pregent de Bidoux, began operations off
the Apulian coast sometime in September 1502, immediately
after its return from co-operating, as an agent of the
knights of Rhodes, in the Venetian capture of the Turkish
82. Ibid., cols. 421-2. In fact Armagnac had done a little
more than just look at Taranto and Gallipoli, ibid.,
col. 391 and Los Heros, op.cit., pp. 52-5• Unfortunately,
almost nothing of the Viceroy1s correspondence seems
to have survived, with only a few notifications or
transcriptions of letters in Sanuto's diaries.
83. Taranto also had a covering squadron of three barze,
according to a Venetian source, Diarii, loc.cit..
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fort of Santa Maura in the Ionian islands. The second,
a larger force, was equipped at Genoa, put under the command
of Louis de Bigars, seigneur de la Lande, and dispatched in
two stages, the first squadron reaching Naples in early
84
August . Modern authorities suggest that La Lande (who
had arrived with the first detachment, of five former
Neapolitan galleys) never actually joined forces with
Pr6gent, as was the intention of Nemours, who envisaged a
combined operation against Barletta, in support of a proposed
landward investment. Setting out from Naples in late
September, La Lande was unable to pass the Straits of Messina,
8s
blocked by superior enemy forces . La Lande may never have
rounded the toe of Italy at all, although Armagnac's letter,
copied in Sanuto's diaries, implies that his squadron was
with the Viceroy at some stage but was then sent to patrol
the Calabrian coast, before being ordered back to help in the
projected operation at Barletta. ' At all events La Lande
never reached Apulia. The reasons for this costly failure
are not easy to establish. La Lande may have been in¬
competent and also ill-served by his Neapolitan galley
captains^. Perhaps more important was the lateness of the
84. C. de la Ronciere, Histoire de la marine franqaise,
vol. iii (Paris, 1923), pp^ 56-7 and 61-2; A. Spont,
"Les galeres royales dans la Mediterranee de 1496
a 1518", in Revue des Questions Historiques, vol.
lviii (1895), pp. 591-429; p. 401.
85. La Ronciere, op. clt., p. 62 and Spont, loc. clt..
86. La Ronciere, loc.cit.,
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season, which made a voyage from Naples to Apulia a
O I—T
hazardous prospect '. Whatever the reasons, Pr6gent
de Bidoux was left to operate alone in the Adriatic during
the winter of 1502-3, despite the ever-present intention
OQ
to have his squadron reinforced
In the circumstances, Nemours could only persist
with a rather flaccid and ineffectual blockade of Barletta,
raiding at sea and mounting guard on land. The seaport
was enclosed as far as possible by small garrisons, at
Lucera and Foggia, Troia and Cerignola, Minervino, Venosa,
Oq
Spinazzola, Ruva, Terlizzi and Bitonto *. Meanwhile in
Calabria, warfare between Angevin partisans, with French
support, and Spanish contingents, periodically strengthened
by fresh troops from Sicily and the homeland, provided a
second campaign theatre. Late in 1502 Aubigny was sent
into the province, in the face of enemy advances, and he
87. Spont adduces bad weather as the cause of La Lande's
failure to join Pr6gent in late September, op.cit.,
p. 401. On the 13th. of November it was reported
from Naples that the galleys could not leave port
owing to weather conditions, Piaril, iv, col. 483.
The previous month Edouard Bullion had complained
that the papal envoy in Naples had been bribing crews
to desert, ibid., col. 423. It was on the 13th of
November that the second stage of the Genoese force
arrived at Naples, but again bad weather, lack of
funds and the enemy's control of the Straits of
Messina effectively marooned it here, Spont, loc.cit..
88. Pr6gent himself lay at Brindisi continuously from the
end of November until almost the middle of January,
Ibid., p. 402.
89. List of French garrisons in place on the 20th. of
November 1502, Diarii, iv, cols. 526-9. Jean
d'Auton names the main garrisons in January 1503 as




quickly secured a reversal of fortunes^ . Apulia, however,
was the more important arena, where the rival commanders-
in-chief opposed one another with the bulk of their
respective forces. During the winter this Apulian
campaign degenerated into a guerrilla war. The Spaniards
still occupied the main strongpoints of the region, Barletta
and Andria, Bari, Taranto and Gallipoli, to name the most
important, and Armagnac was unable to dislodge them without
help from France. The French offensive had reached its
natural limits. The cavalry skirmishes in the Apulian
plain which at this time passed for warfare only undermined
Armagnac's position further. The French, whose advantage
lay in their mastery of mass cavalry tactics in open
combat, were not particularly well equipped for this sort
of fighting, characterised as it was by the hit-and-run
raid and the ambush. Spanish cavalry on the other hand
had known little else but this type of warfare for centuries
and had been recently re-educated in it in the Granadan
war^. The French found their enemy slippery and Gonzalo
de c6rdoba's manner of waging war devious. The campaign
was fought in an ever worsening context of dearth, penury
90. Ibid., pp. 13-14 and 97-9i Diarii, col. 541.
91. Lojendio, op.cit., pp. 193-^» Their defeat at the
first battle of Seminara in 1495 had convinced the
Spaniards of the folly of exposing their horse to
attack by French cavalry in the open field.
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and native disaffection. The Venetian envoy in Naples
wrote on the 10th. of December that "the realm was being
devastated and business had come to a halt; scarcity,
oppression and extortion were the rule and everyone feared
the worst; and for two months the weather had been foully
wet and only grew worse, despite daily intercessions^2."
The small towns which the French held with their scattered
forces grew more and more weary of their oppressors, and
anxious to expel them. The most serious incident occurred
at Castellaneta, near Taranto, where the company of Aymar
de Prie, under its lieutenant, Louis de St. Bonnet, was
stationed. This unit was driven to extort its livelihood
from the inhabitants, owing to lack of pay; on the 12th.
of February 1303 the citizens seized St. Bonnet and his
men, with Spanish help from Taranto, after many fruitless
appeals to the Viceroy for redress of their grievances, and
q-5
the gendarmes were imprisoned^ . This revolt was just one
Q4
of a number in that part of the country during the new year^ .
By March 1503 the citizens of Naples itself were restless.
The French wished to disarm the civil population, presumably
in fear for their own safety, and the inhabitants resented
92. Diarii, col. 557.
93. Ibid., cols. 772, 778 and 783; Auton, iii, p. 137.
94. Diarii, col. 801.
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95
the move^ . Increasingly the French suffered from this
type of insolence and rebellion, as the local population
grew confident of Spanish victory and the French themselves
lent ever more heavily on the natives in their attempts to
raise funds.
All the work of 1502 was in danger of being
undone in this winter stalemate. Armagnac could well
lose Naples unless he were reinforced, on sea and land.
At sea Pregent de Bidoux, operating from the Apulian ports -
both French and Venetian - did much to disrupt Barletta's
96
supplies-^ . During the winter, conditions here were
desperate at times. Owing to lack of pay, Gonzalo had to
97
placate mutinous troops with promises . According to
Jean d'Auton, the Spaniards in Barletta "... knew not to
which saint to appeal for help," such was their plight^.
95. Ibid., col. 851.
96. On the 12th. of November 1502 the Governor of Monopoli
reported that Pregent had sent a fusta to that port to
be landed for repairs, and also two galleys to have
their rudders fixed, ibid., cols. 476-7. Pr6gent's
presence in their harbours angered the Venetians -
in December the Governor of Brindisl complained that
no ship would enter port with the Gascon berthed
there, ibid., col. 629.
97. Lojendio, op.cit., p. 203• Gonzalo's whole campaign
was plagued by financial trouble, causing more than
one mutiny amongst his men, ibid., pp. 165 and 171.
The administrative development of the Spanish army
at this time is discussed by P. Stewart in "The
soldier, the bureaucrat and fiscal records in the army
of Ferdinand and Isabella," in Hispanic-American
Historical Review, no. xlix (1969), P£n 281-92.
98. Auton, iii, p. 110.
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Pr^gent's depredations were causing hardship but were not
sufficient to bring Barletta to terms. By various means,
c6rdoba kept himself supplied, to some degree. In the
autumn of 1502, for instance, a Genoese merchantman
returning from Alexandria had been captured by Spanish
craft off Sicily and taken to Barletta, where its cargo
of 80,000 ducats worth of specie must have eased Gonzalo's
QQ
financial problems^ . But it was not enough. Soon the
Spanish commander was calling upon the Viceroy in Sicily
to send grain supplies and one full year's pay for his
troops'1"^. Meanwhile Gonzalo fed his garrison by
expropriating Venetian cargoes, rustling sheep and getting
some stores from Sicily as well^"1". Barletta had at her
disposal the small galley squadron of Lezcaro, about the
same size as Pr6gent's force. Around the turn of January
and February 1503, Lezcano sailed south to try and ensure
the safe passage of Sicilian supplies in the Gulf of
102
Taranto and Straits of Otranto, where Pregent was cruising
On the 10th. of February the four French galleys, with their
auxilliary craft and two prizes, put into Otranto. On
the 16th. Lezcano appeared and demanded permission to enter
port to take back Pr6gent's prizes. Although the Venetian
99. Diarii, iv, cols. 389 and 430.
100. Ibid., col. 627.
101. Ibid., cols. 728-9, 763-5, 771 and 772.
102. Ibid., cols. 530, 752, 765, 771, 778 and 802.
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governor refused, the Spaniard entered harbour on the
20th. and surprised the Gascon, who scuttled his ships,
dismissed his convict crews and escaped overland10-^.
At a stroke Armagnac's investment of Barletta was
sabotaged. Supplies soon arrived from Sicily unhindered"1"0^.
Louis XII was incensed that the Venetians should have
allowed such an outrageous violation of their own neutrality;
at Mass one day he became so angry in the company of the
Republic's ambassador that no-one could hear a word of the
105
service .
The destruction of the royal galleys was all the
more fateful in view of the dissipation of Armagnac's land
forces. By the time that Gonzalo left Barletta in April
1503 he had captured seven hundred horses from the French,
according to Giovio - mainly at Castellaneta and also Ruvo,
where the La Palice and Savoy companies were forced to
surrender after a siege at the end of February. In
addition, the Spanish commander was unwilling to offer
prisoners for ransom"1"0^. Gonzalo realised that it was
important to alter the balance of forces in his favour.
As for reinforcements for himself, the most gratifying was
a contingent of two thousand Germans, mainly pikemen, with
103. Ibid., cols. 802, 8C8 and 889; Duro, op.cit., pp.
38-9; Spont, op.cit., p. 402; Auton, vol. ii,
pp. 202-4.
104. Diarii, col. 801 and Giovio, op.cit., p. 100.
105. Diarii, col. 849.
106. Giovio, op.cit., p. 103.
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which Cordoba might oppose the Viceroy's Swiss. On
the 17th of February these troops were embarked at Trieste,
under the supervision of Octavio Colonna, who had been
107
dispatched by Gonzalo to raise them . The Spaniard
boasted that once he had obtained reinforcements from
Spain and Colonna's Germans he would be in Naples within
♦. <- ^ 108twenty days
On the other side, Nemours was not provided with
fresh troops. Since the Swiss arrivals from Genoa the
summer before, French strength had waned as casualties
mounted, more troops were diverted to Calabria and French
partisans quit the cause through want of money. The last
blow to the Viceroy's strength was delivered by diplomatic
means, however. From the winter of 1502-3# rumours of a
new accord between Louis XII and the Catholic Kings were
picked up all over Europe. Ultimately, on the 5th of
April 1503* a treaty was formalised at Lyons by Louis and
the Archduke Philip of Austria, who purported to act for
Spain, providing for a settlement of the Neapolitan war.
Already the Swiss menace to Lombardy had caused the King
of France to divert in that direction reinforcements
intended for Naples10^. Now the treaty with Philip
107. Dlarii, col. 746.
108. Ibid., col. 793* He failed to live up to his word
since it took him over a month to reach Naples
following the Germans' arrival. As for Spanish
reinforcements they all disembarked in Calabria,
despite Gonzalo's insistence that they be sent to
Barletta, Pieri, op.cit., p. 404.
109. Diarii, col. 826.
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effectively halted French military preparations11^.
But when Gonzalo de c6rdoba was instructed to lay down
his arms by the Archduke's representative he simply
replied that he only took orders from his sovereign.
It was thought at the time that c6rdoba had a secret
understanding with Ferdinand to refuse to comply with
any truce111, and indeed he had, having received instruc¬
tions in late February not to agree to anything but his
112master's orders . Even if any reinforcement which
Louis XII might have dispatched after the 5th of April
may well not have reached Armagnac in time for the battle
of Cerignola, the talk of truce had been going on for
months in France and it seems that Louis XII was seduced
from a full prosecution of the war in the south by the
climate of negotiation and his hopes for peace. Certainly
Nemours received no help.
After their defeat the French looked back with
bitterness at the perfidy of Spain and the trickery of the
113
Archduke It seems likely however that it was rather
Maximilian, King of the Romans, who was the instigator of
the deception. The first we hear of peace talks in
Venetian diplomatic sources is of Maximilian's envoy in
France claiming to act for the Catholic Kings. At the
110. Guicciardini, op.cit., pp. 75-6.
111. Auton, iii, p. 157.
112. Lojendio, op.cit., pp. 209-10.
113. B.N., fr. 26108, nos. 454 and 455J M. le Glay,
Negociations diplomatiques entre la France et
1'Autriche, D.I., vol. i (Paris, 1845)* P» 191•
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same time the King of the Romans was informing the Spaniards
114
that he would supply Gonzalo with troops . For their
part the Catholic Kings and their representatives consis¬
tently denied that they were treating for peace with France,
and they repudiated the claims of Maximilian's agents and of
Philip to negotiate on their behalf11^. When Gonzalo sent
word to Germany that he would be in Naples within twenty
days of the arrival of reinforcements, Maximilian's court
received the prediction with delight"'""1"^. The French
ambassador at Venice knew that German troops were preparing
117
to embark for Apulia at least as early as February the 13th.
In short, it seems almost incredible that Louis XII retained
faith in the validity of negotiations with Philip the Fair,
in view of so much adverse evidence.
After the Spanish destruction of Ruvo on the 23rd.
of February, both commanders-in-chief had regrouped their
available forces. Gonzalo, soon to be bolstered by the
Germans from Trieste, intended to deliver the fatal blow
to his enemy in open combat, which until now he had striven
so hard to avoid. Armagnac for his part expected a breakout
from Barletta. On the 27th of April 1503 the Spanish army
issued from the town which had sheltered it for nine months.
Cordoba hoped to bring the French to battle by encamping
on the defensible hillock beneath the small town of
Cerignola, and thus threatening this French-held place.
Diarii, col. 663.
115. Ibid., cols. 663, 678, 692 and 709.
116. Ibid., col. 793.
117. Ibid., col. 728.
According to plan, the next day he set his army down hard
by the village and it busied itself with field fortification.
Towards evening Armagnac approached from Canosa. After
some discussion in the French command it was decided to
attack. A frontal assault of heavy cavalry and infantry
went in as the light faded, and after about an hour of
combat along the trench and staked rampart which the Spaniards
had constructed the French were in full flight. Most of the
horse escaped but the infantry was annihilated and the guns
and baggage captured"*"^"®.
A number of sources for the battle of Cerignola
talk of a dispute between Armagnac and Yves d'Alfegre over
tactics"*""1"^. Alegre, supported by Chand6e, captain of the
Swiss, urged attack on the Spanish position whilst Nemours
advised caution. Jean d'Auton suggests that the Roy
d'armes of Champagne even threatened to report Armagnac's
miserable hesitancy to the King, whilst Louis d'Ars,
supporting the Viceroy, entered into a heated exchange with
120
Albgre . There is no doubt that the solidarity of the
French high command had all but disintegrated by this time.
We have already noted the reports of disagreement between
the Viceroy, Aubigny and La Palice over the siege of Barletta.
118. Auton, iii, pp. 167-76; Giovio, op.cit., pp. 110-15;
Guicciardini, op.cit., pp. 79-81; A. Bernaldez,
Memorias del reinado de los Reyes Cat6licos, ed.
M^ Gomez-Moreno and J. de M. Garriazo (Madrid, 1962),
pp. 422-8; Lojendio, op.cit., pp. 210-21 and Los
Heros, op.cit., pp. 6l-o.
119. Auton, p. 170; Giovio, op.cit., p.112; Guicciardini,
op.cit., p. 80.
120. Auton, pp. 170-1.
309-
Aubigny had since been sent to Calabria, where his campaign
was brought to a close by his defeat at Seminara by fresh
Spanish forces from Sicily, a week before the battle of
Cerignola. Other insolent lieutenants remained in Apulia.
La Palice had felt himself ill-protected at Ruvo when
Armagnac had marched south to punish the rebels of
Castellaneta - he had written to Louis XII advising him
that he should hold the Viceroy responsible for any ill
121
Ruvo might suffer . La Palice was now in Spanish hands
but Alegre continued the tradition of disobedience and,
according to Giovio, he had accused Armagnac of timidity
and incompetence - the Viceroy's strategy had only served
122
to weaken his army . Indeed, at one stage in his
narrative Jean d'Auton sums up this parlous state of
affairs by commenting that "he had been told by several
people that the Viceroy had been ill-obeyed by his captains
and they ill-supported by him"1"2^."
Whatever the acrimony before the opening of the
battle, however, it seems improbable that Armagnac would
have made his decision to charge simply from pique, as
some sources claim. BrantSme even maintains that the
Viceroy was so incensed by Albgre's abuse that he had to
be restrained from plunging his sword into his persecutor's
neck, to avenge his wounded Gascon pride; frustrated in
121. Ibid., p. 138.
122. Giovio, op.cit., p. 112.
123. Auton, p. 147.
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this way, Armagnac launched his charge to demonstrate his
124
mettle in combat . The explanation of the Spanish
chronicler, Bernaldez, for Nemours' decision to attack
seems more convincing: the French always intended to
charge their enemy's position, rightly believing that the
Spaniards were weary after their march from Barletta;
but the timing of the assault was determined by the
Spanish artillery which began to inflict intolerable
casualties amongst the French as they made their dispo¬
sitions. Hence Armagnac and the heavy cavalry which he
12 S
led moved into the charge to escape damaging fire .
This schema would also explain why the French horse and
foot were as yet unaligned when the attack began"1"2^.
In short, it would appear that the undoubted dissensions
in the French command which plagued Armagnac's campaign
have traditionally been telescoped onto this moment of
crisis in the interests of dramatic effect. At last the
Viceroy had the chance to deal with the main Spanish field
army after so many months of inactivity. Admittedly the
124. BrantSme, Oeuvres completes, iii, pp. 94-5*
125. Bernaldez, op.cit., pp. 426-7.
126. Giovio, op.cit., p. 112. It seems unlikely that
the echelon formation of the French array was
anything more than accidental, although it has
usually been portrayed as a tactical design, Bridge,
op.cit., p. 177# Pieri, op.cit., p. 410 and
Lojendio, op.cit., p. 21o.
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enemy position was strong and It was growing dark, but who
had ever withstood the charge of Europe's finest heavy
cavalry, supported by her most feared footsoldiers?
"They charged so straight and with such fury
that it was a marvellous thing to see12^." Louis
d'Armagnac was hit by three arquebus balls and fell from
his horse; he turned to face the Spanish counter-
1 pQ
attack and was consumed in the mel6e . That night of
the 28th. of April, the Spaniards searched for the body
of the Viceroy by torchlight. They were told by one of
the dead man's captured pages to look for a young, handsome
and well-built figure with two rings on his right hand and
a partially shaved head. The corpse was finally dis-
12Q
covered,with its three wounds in head and belly .
Bernaldez claims that Gonzalo wept at the sight of the
stricken corpse of "... such a beautiful man." Escorted
to the convent of San Francesco in Barletta, it was
130
interred with some ceremony ^ .
French resistance in the Regno crumbled
rapidly after this reverse. Aubigny in Calabria
surrendered upon news of the defeat. The bulk of the
survivors of Cerignola fled precipitately as far as
Gaeta, on the fringes of the Kingdom. Louis d'Ars held
127. Bernaldez, op.cit., p. 427.
128. Auton, pp. 173 and 175.
129. Bernaldez, op.cit., p. 429. Giovio observes that
Armagnac's corpse was identified by marks on the
shoulder, op.cit., p.ll4, so no doubt the face
was disfigured beyond certain recognition.
130. Bernaldez, loc.cit..
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up at Venosa to continue a rearguard action for months,
which never however threatened the Spanish victory. The
city of Naples offered its submission, and Gonzalo entered
it on the 14th of May and took its castles from the French.
Although a fresh army was dispatched from the north later
in the year to suffer another wretched Neapolitan winter,
in an effort to reverse the decision of Cerignola, Naples
was not regained.
Armagnac's tenancy of command in Naples ended
in monumental failure. The French army, first weakened
by months of wearily indecisive campaigning around
Barletta, was finally destroyed in a suicidal charge on
an earthwork defended by pikes, thirteen canon and hand
firearms. This spectacular failure has made Louis
d'Armagnac the victim of damaging charges of stupidity
by modern historians. But such charges are perhaps a
little unfair. Contemporary and later opinion saw
Armagnac as a hero. Jean d'Auton expressed the view that
the Viceroy was a good, virtuous and wise prince whose
sense of honour and desire for glory prompted him to lead
1^1
the charge at Cerignola in person J . For Brant8me Nemours
i-*2
was "... this brave and valiant (man)... ." This view,
that Armagnac was both courageous and prudent, is echoed
in Spanish sources^"^. No doubt death in battle helped to
salvage the Viceroy's reputation. Furthermore, we know
131. Auton, iii, p. 171.
132. BrantSme, op.cit., vol. i, p. 188.
133. Lojendio, op.cit., p. 177-
313-
that Armagnac failed to win or retain the loyalty of
his principal lieutenants and that Louis XII continually
entertained the idea of replacing him with Louis de
134
Saluces ^ . In the end, however, it was Armagnac who
emerged with more credit than most. His chief
tormentor, Yves d'Alegre, who had tried to make himself
a fortune in the Capitanate by robbery and the expro¬
priation of local supplies, and who had had charge of the
rearguard at Cerignola which fled almost before it was
13b 136
engaged , was disgraced and banished from France ^ .
Saluces, who arrived at Gaeta in June as the new Viceroy,
scarcely had more authority over his subordinates than
his predecessor: at the end of the month La Tremoille
told Cardinal d'Amboise that he had heard that "... the
captains therewere not very obedient to the Viceroy... ^7.»»
Insubordination was always a lurking threat in an army
which had developed no organised command-structure or
138
hierarchy of rank . A commander-in-chief, especially
if comparatively young and inexperienced, was liable to
have his authority undermined by lieutenants who felt
themselves his equals or superiors, particularly if his
134. Diarii, cols. 449*574 and 852.
135. Auton, pp. 150-1 and 174; Giovio, op.cit., p.99.
136. Bridge, op.cit., iii, p. 201.
137. B.N., Dupuy 262, fol. 126.
138. Contamine, Guerre, Etat et society a la fin du
moyen ctge, pp. 449-50.
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campaign did not prosper. Louis d'Armagnac was indis¬
putably both loyal and brave. He was faced in Gonzalo
de Cordoba by an adversary who is generally held to have
been pre-eminent amongst generals of the early sixteenth
century. It would always have required a supreme effort
of military and naval organisation to maintain French
control of Naples in opposition to an enemy possessed of
a firm base in Sicily, whilst relying upon Provence and
Liguria as one's own springboard. The attempt to do so
without adequate naval resources proved disastrous - after
all, Pregent de Bidoux's defeat at Otranto cost Louis XII
his entire galley fleet1-^. As for the battle of
Cerignola itself, criticism of Armagnac's tactics might
be justified in terms of the principles of military science
as they came to be developed in later centuries but at the
same time perhaps a little unrealistic in historical
context. One day the new Spanish army was going to catch
up with antiquated French battle tactics - Louis
d'Armagnac was simply the unfortunate in charge on the
day that it did so.
159- Spont, op.cit., p. 406.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
GASTON DE FOIX, GOVERNOR OF MILAN
The claim of Gaston de Foix to greatness has never
been questioned. We can see the heroic legend taking
shape at the very moment of his death. Three days after
the battle of Ravenna Bayard wrote to his uncle from the
field:
"My lord," he began, "if the King has won the
battle I swear to you that we poor gentlemen
have undoubtedly lost it, for ... my lord of
Nemours ... was slain, with the result that all
the grief and mourning ever were as nothing
compared with that which has been expressed, and
continues to be so, in our army, since it seems
that we have been defeated. I promise you my
lord that it is the unluckiest princely death
these last hundred years, and had he lived he
would have accomplished feats which no prince
has done; and those over here can well exclaim
that they have lost their father, and as for
myself... I cannot but live in desolation,
because I have lost so much I cannot tell you."-^
Brant6me tells us that Foix was known as "... the thunder¬
bolt of Italy, owing to the military exploits which he
performed in so short a time, just like a flash of
lightning which in a moment does great damage wherever
it strikes.2" By 1607 the dramatist Claude Billard was
composing his tragedy, "Gaston de Foix", whose entire
first act consists of self-congratulations uttered by
1. Le loyal serviteur, Histoire du... seigneur de
Bayard, ed. Roman, p. 4j54.
2. Brant8me, Oeuvres completes, vol. iii, pp. 158-9.
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Gaston himself. The modern editor of this now under¬
standably obscure piece notes that the subject matter of
the play is unusual for the seventeenth century, dramatic
material normally being drawn from ancient history at the
time.
By the early seventeenth century therefore,
Gaston de Foix had been raised to the level of a classical
hero. And there to some extent he still stands, for his
short life, with its consequent brevity of documentation,
has discouraged prospective biographers - the man has
remained unexplored and the verdict of such as BrantBme
and Billard left thus intact. Short as it may have been
the career of Gaston de Foix is however sufficiently well
documented to enable us to reconstruct the man in human
form, and a study of it does much to illustrate some of
the relations between the French Crown and its servants
during our period, as well as providing an interesting
comparison with the career of Gaston's fellow Gascon,
Louis d'Armagnac, whose life had so remarkably fore¬
shadowed Foix's own in more than one respect.
Gaston de Foix was the only son of Jean de Foix,
vicomte de Narbonne, and of Marie d'Orleans, sister of
Louis XII. Born on the 10th of December 1489, at
Mazeres in what is now the departement of Ariege, Gaston
was thus not yet eleven years old when his father died
3. E.H. Polinger, Claude Billard's tragedy, "Gaston de
Foix" (New York, 1931), P«5•
317.
in November 1500. His mother meanwhile had expired in
1^93* so that the boy came from a fairly early age to be
4
raised under the tutelage of the King, his uncle . As a
child Gaston is continually prominent in Louis XIITs
company, although he was separated from the royal house¬
hold in 1503 when he went with two other young French
princes to Valenciennes as a hostage for the security of
Philip the Fair, who was travelling through France from
Spain. The stay at Valenciennes was a long one, from
early February to early July, but it seems that the boys
were generously entertained; Philip instructed his noble
servants to welcome them and to provide diversions, and
particularly to bring their birds to Valenciennes and to
take the young hostages hunting "either in company with
greyhounds, with the net or the crossbow, wherever the
most game might be..." The boys' chief Burgundian host
noted that they were treated to tennis, banquets and
other entertainments, besides hunting, during their
R
enforced vacation .
Less amusing duties called later in the same year
when Gaston acted as a pallbearer at the funeral of the
Duke of Bourbon in Macon and then as a formal mourner at
that of the distinguished courtier, Louis de Ligny, in
4. Anselme, vol. iii, pp. 377-8; Dictionnaire de
biographie franqaise, fascicule lxxix (1978)* p. 209.
5. Le Glay, Negociations diplomatiques entre la France
et l'Autrlche, vol.i, pp. 60, n.4, 61 and 64-5.
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Lyons.^ The year 1503 also marked Gaston de Foix's
coming of age as a government servant, for in December
he was officially invested with the governorship of
Dauphine, which his father had held before him, meriting
the appointment, in the King's words, by dint of "... the
growth of his spirit in honest pursuits and the virtues
in which we daily see him increasingly flourish^." During
the Genoese expedition of I507 Gaston remained "close by
the person of the King", and in June he took a leading
part in the ceremony which attended the meeting of Louis
and Ferdinand of Aragon at Savona; the latter, now his
brother-in-law, having married Gaston's younger sister,
Germaine, made him gifts of two gold collars, a rapier
O
and a belt "... all most rich ." in short, Gaston de
Foix was moving in the very highest circles, as befitted
his status as the best-connected nobleman in Europe.
After the return from Italy, Foix was accorded his majority
by an ordinance of October 1507 and in the following month
he received from the King the duchy of Nemours^.
6. Auton, vol. iii, pp. 247 and Jill.
7. B.N., Clair. 95^> P- 117 and fr. 4604, fols 18 vo.-19;
G.R., no. 7851.
8. Fleuranges, Histoire des choses memorables, in
Collection des memoires, ed. Petitot, vol. xvi, p.l66;
Auton, vol. iv, p. 359*
9. Stein, Inventaire analytique des ordonnances
enregistrees au Parlement de Parish no. 1446; A.N.,
K. 78* no.17.
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Meanwhile in 1500 Gaston had inherited his father's
pretensions to the Foix inheritance, pretensions which had
arisen from the extinction of male heirs of Jean de Foix's
elder brother. The lands of Foix and Navarre were now
held by Jean's niece, Catherine, the wife of Alain
d'Albret's eldest son, Jean. Louis took the initiative
in attempting to restore the inheritance to his nephew:
in February 1502 the Parlement of Paris rescinded the
treaties by which Jean de Foix had renounced his rights to
the lands in return for cash10. The legal process was
pursued for years - although there is no evidence that
Gaston himself was much interested - and the only reward
from the interminable affair was the provision of a pension
for Gaston from Catherine, by order of the Parlement11.
Perhaps this was as much as Louis XII at first expected to
gain - after all, as early as May 1502 he had received the
homage of Jean d'Albret for the counties of Foix and
Bigorre and the viscounties of Marsan, Gabardon and
1 2
Nebouzan . The advance of royal control as far as the
Pyrenees, let alone across them into Navarre, could never
commend itself to Ferdinand of Aragon, and the displacement
of Catherine by Gaston would surely have meant as much.
By 1507 the rapprochement with Spain made the realisation
10. Dlctionnaire de biographie franqaise, loc.cit..
11. Notifications of its payment in 1504 and 1506 can
be found in B.N., Moreau 370* pp. 62 and 323*
12. B.N., Doat 227, fol. 247-
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of Louis XII*a ambitions for his nephew appear more likely,
but political circumstances and diversions over the next
few years conspired to frustrate them. Gaston never
formally renounced his pretension however; in November
1509* for example, he called himself "King of Navarre ..
_ 1"5
count of Foix... lord of Beam ... ■>". But he was only
14
ever to enjoy the titles
The failure of his territorial claims may not have
proved much of a disappointment to Gaston de Foix. It
is evident that his temperament was more attracted to
knightly pursuits, and particularly the glamour of Italy,
than it was to legal affairs. Gaston's earliest experience
of Italy was no doubt his trip to Lombardy in 1499* when
in October he accompanied the King in his triumphant entry
IS
into Milan . He may well have travelled to the peninsula
13. B.N., Doat 228, fol. 321.
14. It seems moreover that the acquisition of the duchy
of Nemours was not without its problems. Luchaire
notes that in 1509 there was a fracas at Court
involving Foix and Gie, whilst about the same time
partisans of Mallet de Graville raided Gaston's
town of Etampes and killed some of his men, Alain
le grand, p. 187. The trouble with Gie presumably
had something to do with Nemours since Gie had
married Armagnac's sister, Marguerite, in June 1503*
to inherit the duchy - evidently losing it with his
disgrace in 1504 or soon afterwards. Sadly the
reason for Graville's raid on Etampes is even more
mysterious. There appears to be no confirmation
of, nor even allusion to, either quarrel in any
other source.
15. Auton, i, p. 99.
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again in company with his father or Louis XII in subsequent
years, and he certainly went to Italy in 1507; in Milan
in June he took part in the great tournament held over ten
days, at which Gaston was praised for his contribution
to the jousts, breaking three lances in his four courses in
the lists'^. These were intoxicating experiences and there
is every indication that Gaston de Foix came to live for the
prospect of Italian adventure. At one stage during these
early years he wrote to a confidant from Paris, where he
was attending a tedious session of the Parlement, presumably
concerning his territorial claims; the affair was dragging
and as it was already the end of March Gaston was afraid
lest he be left behind when Louis XII journeyed to Italy:
"... I am writing immediately to the King
that it be his wish to command me what he would
have me do," Gaston wrote,"for I would not stay
behind for anything in the world if he crosses
the Alps. For this reason I am sending you this
courier in haste, who has promised me to go and
return inside four days, so please... present my
letters to the King and urge him, if he crosses
the mountains, to send for me, for I should be
most unhappy if I were not with him on his
j ourney."
After accompanying Louis XII during the Venetian campaign
of 1509, Foix first appears in Italy independently of his
uncle in 1510. Jean Bouchet recalls that Gaston escaped
to the peninsula without royal leave, in company with La
Tremoille's son; Louis was only momentarily angry, quickly
16. Ibid., iv, pp. 319-20.
17. B.N., fr. 2929, fol. 11.
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deciding to let his nephew have his way and even sending
1 ft
money after him . It seems likely that Bouchet's tale
of boyish impudence is something of a sentimental
embellishment of the facts. Probably Gaston had been
pestering the King for his leave for some time, until
Louis, perhaps with more than a little reluctance, granted
it. This seems to have been in the spring of 1510, for
on the 8th. of May the Imperial envoy in France reported
that Louis had dispatched Gaston de Foix to Italy with a
body of horse"1"^. By the 20th. he had crossed the Alps1^.
The young Duke of Nemours was quick to distinguish
himself on campaign. In July 1510 he was prominent at the
21
capture of Monselice from the Venetians ; in August he
was reported in command of 300 lances operating near
22
Legnago ; the next month he secured Como in the face of
27
the Swiss threat In short, not only was Foix soon in
action but he rapidly gained himself a measure of renown
as a commander. When therefore on the 11th. of March
1511 Chaumont d'Amboise died and the offices of lieutenant-
general and governor of Milan thus fell facant, Gaston had
already established a claim to be considered for these
appointments. A number of candidates recommended them-
18. Bouchet, Le panegyric du chevalier sans reproche,
in Collection des memoires, ed. Petitot, vol. xlv,
p. 460.
19. Le Glay, op.cit., p. 338.
20. Lettres de Louis XII, vol. i, p. 23O.
21. ibid., p. 279-
22. Diarii, vol. xi, col. 85.
23. Le Glay, op.cit., p. 357.
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selves in.effect. Fleuranges tells us that while he lay
ill at Corregio, Chaumont had given "total charge" of the
army to Gian Giacomo Trivulzio, to conduct future
24 ,
operations . Certainly Trivulzio had been Chaumont s
most experienced lieutenant and his military credentials
were unrivalled, but as a Guelf his appointment to the
governorship of Milan might prove troublesome2-5. Gaston
de Foix appeared a more suitable candidate for the latter
post. Towards the end of March the slgnory of Venice
heard that, upon receiving news of Chaumont's death,
Louis XII had dispatched the commission of governor to his
nephew. Early the next month this information was
confirmed - Foix had been appointed governor whilst Louis
was sending the Duke of Longueville to act as lieutenant-
26
general of the army, in concert with Trivulzio . Whether
the late Chaumont's dual functions were thus divided between
Foix and Longueville, as Venetian intelligence suggests,
is not clear, however. Longueville certainly arrived to
assume his command, apparently in May, but by early June
27
was ill with fever and by July back in France . Soon
after hearing news of Longueville's incapacity, and no
doubt in consequence of this, Louis XII sent Foix his
commission as governor of Milan, according to a report
24. Fleuranges, op.cit., pp. 198-9.
25. ibid., p. 294.
26. Diarii, vol. xii, cols. 77 and 110.
27. Le Glay, op.cit., pp. 995* ^15 and 420; Lettres,
ii, pp. 263 and 265.
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from Prance of the l8th. of June . There is therefore
some conflict between our sources concerning the circum¬
stances of Nemours' assumption of command, reflecting
perhaps some indecision on Louis' part. It seems best
to conclude that Gaston de Foix took up both functions
only in June - his presence with the army on campaign in
Emilia in the spring of 1511 hardly suggests that he
had yet assumed any civil responsibility in Milan. Until
Foix's commission arrived, Trivulzio commanded the French
army, as he had done in effect since Chaumont's fatal
illness, but by his letter of the 20th. of July we can
zn
see that Gaston is now in control"^ . By August he is
31
ordering movements of troops as the army commander^ .
Nevertheless Trivulzio evidently retained a position of
almost equal importance to Gaston's own throughout the
latter's tenure of command.
Gaston de Foix had been invested with supreme
authority in Lombardy at the age of twenty-one. Prato
describes him as "... of medium height, with a round, well
shaped face, though pale, and with a refined if rather
28. Ibid., p. 270. On the other hand Gaston was paid
his salary for the governorship of Milan for fully
nine-and-a-half months of 1511* A.N., J 910* no. 2
bis..
29. See for example references to Foix in two letters of
Trivulzio, B.N., Dupuy 262, fol. 95 and n.a.fr. 7647
fol. 251.
30. B.N., Dupuy 262, fol. 67.
31. Ibid., fol. 69 and Diarii, xii, col. 428.
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severe and haughty nature, and somewhat given to luxury."
On occasion Foix would be attended by a great company of
followers, but commonly only by a single page^ . A
Venetian observer in 1512 described Nemours as short and
33
with a big head^ . He dressed himself in fine clothes
and at the battle of Ravenna was to wear a splendid
garment emblasoned with the arms of Foix and Navarre-^.
His taste was for the romance of the joust above all, as
we might expect from his background, and he was to spend
a deal of time at Ferrara indulging both his love of the
lists and his fondness for Lucrezia Borgia, duchess of
33
Ferrara, whose black and grey favour he sported^ .
Even in an age when youth was no barrier to
high command for those of lofty birth, Gaston de Foix's
assumption of the government of Lombardy when scarcely
more than a boy seems remarkable. Yet his extreme youth
seems to have inspired no adverse comment nor surprise.
Indeed Trivulzio, the old hand in Italy, appears to have
36
thought Foix fully worthy of responsibility-^ . Besides,
32. Prato, Storia di Milano, in A ,S.I., vol. iii, p. 296.
33. Diarii, vol. xiii, fol. 517.
34. Loyal serviteur, op.cit., p. 315•
35. Ibid., pp. 255-6 and 267. The thirty year old
Lucrezia was a woman of great charm and vivacity, who
inspired devotion in many admirers - see M.E. Mallett,
The Borgias, the rise and fall of a Renaissance
dynasty (Paladin edition, 1971)* PP« 232-6. It is
interesting that Bayard's biographer depicts Gaston
as a jovial, almost happy-go-lucky, young man, in
some contrast to Prato s image.
36. Trivulzio had not however envisaged Gaston as
lieutenant-general in Lombardy, even as late as June
1511, when he had told the King that in his view there
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the new governor was accompanied by a collection of
mature advisers-^. Nonetheless Chaumont d'Amboise had
found his long tenure of command in Lombardy a considerable
burden. In early 1504, for instance, in a letter to
Louis XII's secretary, Robertet, he had expressed his
desire to be relieved of his post - he would have preferred
■58
the governorship of Burgundy or Languedoc^ . Later, in
September 1509* Chaumont had pleaded with his uncle,
Cardinal d'Amboise, for an end to his uncomfortable
ordeal: "I would beg you ... that it please you to have
me discharged... Apart from the expense, the climate
here is so inimical to me that I have not enjoyed a day
of health these last two months, and my sciatica is
killing me-"^," jn view of Chaumont's difficulties,
Gaston's youthful vigour must have seemed a distinct
36. Cont/...
were two outstanding candidates for the task of
leading an army to aid the Emperor in the east,
namely Nemours or, "... if (the King) did not
wish to invest the latter with such authority...",
La Palice, B.N., Dupuy 262, fol. 86 vo..
37. Abrege de la vie de Gaston de Foix, in B.N.,
dossiers bleus 273.
38. B.N., Dupuy 279, fol. 28.
39. B.N., Melanges de Colbert 13* fol. 59 vo..
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advantage.. Besides Milan was not an Isolated posting
like Naples, for example; communications with France were
first-class and Gaston might even come to consult the King
in person, as he did in August 1511 when the Court was in
Dauphin^^. If the Lombard climate was unpleasant, with
its seasonal extremes of temperature, there is nonetheless
never any indication that Foix enjoyed anything but good
health during his short but energetic career in the
peninsula. Good health and an eagerness to serve, though
necessary, were scarcely sufficient for Gaston's task
however. A certain lack of judgement appears to have
surfaced in what seems to have been the first crisis of
Foix's governorship. In late July 1511 a brawl in Milan
between a number of Lombards and Frenchmen left a few of
the latter dead in the streets. Gaston lost his temper
and, having arrested a handful of Italian suspects, he
intended to hang them. Trivulzio and others, aware of
the peril to civil order threatened by such a course of
action, succeeded in dissuading Nemours from his
in
vengeance . Perhaps such clumsiness was only to be
expected at first. After all, Gaston de Foix's rise in
the world of high command had been spectacularly rapid -
in 1509 he had not even been in charge of his own
compagnie d'ordonnance^2.
40. Lettres de Louis XII, iii, p. 18. He may have gone
to France for a short time in September as well,
Diarii, xii, col. 527.
43.. Ibid., cols. 322 and 977.
42. Roger de Beam received the captain's wages for
1509, B.N., p.0.297, no.92.
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The French campaign in Italy during 1511 largely
followed the pattern of the previous year - early success
giving way to winter retreat. By June the papal forces
in Emilia had been roundly defeated; Julius II had lost
Bologna and had little power to prevent the French from
marching on Rome. But Louis held up the advance of
Trivulzio's army and began to talk peace with Julius, a
man whose overriding aim was to drive the French from
Italy. Louis lost the initiative and with the publication
in Rome on the 4th. of October of a Holy League, formed of
Julius, Venice and Spain, for the defence of the Papal
4^5
States, to which England adhered in November , the
desertion of France's major allies of the League of Cambrai
of 1508 was almost complete. Gaston de Foix's assumption
of command thus took place against a background of
deteriorating diplomatic fortunes and growing menace to
Milan.
The chief threat to Lombardy lay to the north,
with the Swiss, who had effectively become clients of
Rome by an alliance in March 1510, and who had staged an
abortive invasion of the Milanese the following autumn.
When two couriers from Schwyz and Fribourg, were killed
at Lugano in the summer of 1511 relations with France
worsened again. The matter of reparation for the injury
was raised with Foix by the Diet of Luzern In September
43. Bridge, A history of France, vol. iv, pp. 79 and 83.
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44
and referred to the King. Louis handled the affair so
clumsily that by November ten thousand Swiss troops were
poised to march southwards whilst two months before only
4b
the men of Schwyz had been disposed to consider war
The King was not prepared to secure a treaty with the
Swiss by offering higher pensions to their leaders than had
been usual in the past; nor did he propose to spend freely
to defend Lombardy - in short Louis thought little of Swiss
46
menaces . The French were dilatory in the handling of
negotiations with the Confederacy in later 1511, and Gaston
, 47
de Foix was Louis accomplice in this diplomatic failure .
In mid-October, Pandolfini, Florentine ambassador in Milan,
complained of French ineptitude: "The government here...
and the behaviour of the French are such," he wrote, "that
it would not surprise me if one day they suffer very much
as a result... and I believe that in the long run no good
48
can come of maladministration ". It would seem that
until December Louis and Nemours saw the chief threat to
the east; La Palice's detachment in Fruili was ordered
44. Kohler, Les Suisses dans les guerres d'ltalie, pp.
253-4 and pieces justificatives, p. 609•
45. Ibid., p. 249.
46. Canestrini and Desjardins, Negociations diplomatiques
de la France avec la Toscane^ vol. ii, pp. 544—5.
Le Glay, op.cit., p^ 469.
47. Kohler, op.cit., pp. 235-49-
48. Canestrini and Desjardins, op.cit., p. 538.
zoo.
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to retreat in view of Swiss menaces but Foix himself was
to advance to Parma, where he remained until the end of
November, in preparation for any papal attempt to retake ■
50
Bologna . To be fair to the French, the publication of
the Holy League in early October understandably caused
them to fear above all for their eastern flank, whilst by
early November they believed that they had bought off the
51
Swiss^ . Yet this mistaken belief only points to their
diplomatic incompetence - the French never really took the
measure of Swiss hostility. When the invasion was launched
in late November 1511 it came as something of a surprise
and there were complaints in Milan that the administration
had not given enough advance warning to evacuate stores
1 52
from the enemy s pathr . Gaston de Foix hurried back from
Parma to the capital, where the scare was intense. At
Blois there was panic in early December; an Imperial
official wrote that "... the French... feared their
destruction as if it were fated that they should lose
Italy, and were so scared that the Emperor might abandon
them that they were pissing in their pants...53."
49. Lettres de Louis XII, vol. iii, p. 82.
50. Ibid., p. 93; Le Glay, op.cit., pp. 453 and 463,
Canestrini and Desjardins, op.cit., p. 539*
51. A. Renaudot, Le Concile gallican de Pise-Milan
(Paris, 1922), pp. 59b-9; Letiros, Hi, p. 92.
52. Diarii, vol. xiii, col. 312.
53. Lettres, p. 101.
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Once the Swiss were approaching Milan there was furious
activity in the construction of defences and assembling of
levies, but on the whole the Milanese needed no encourage¬
ment to resist an invasion whose potential outcome appalled
them. At last the same strategy as had been applied in
1510 foiled the Swiss, namely Fabian tactics, helped by
bad weather.
The history of the Swiss crisis of 1511 illuminates
many of the facets of the relationship between King and
lieutenant-general. In theory of course Foix was Louis'
personal representative in Milan, his plenipotentiary
agent. In practice however it was impossible for two men
to act as one - the King could never in effect ratify in
advance every decision his lieutenant-general was to make.
Besides, the critical diplomatic position of France from
October 1511, and perhaps also the paternalistic solicitude
of the King towards his nephew, seem only to have encouraged
Louis XII to interfere further in affairs in Lombardy,
whilst the proximity of Milan had always appeared to
facilitate direct control of policy from France. As a
result it was not surprising that Gaston himself had no
great confidence in the validity of some of his powers.
All conspired to inhibit clear policies and hold up
decisions. In October 1511 Pandolfini had written that
"... nothing advanced one step without the especial
command of the King^\" Later the same man observed that
54. Canestrini and Desjardins, op.cit., p. 533-
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"the desire of His Majesty in France to control the war
(in Lombardy) and to regulate expenditure seemed to him a
bad thing which could cause inconvenience to the French,
since the distance was so great and opportunities which
arose evaporated in delay-^." a week later the Florentine
was still complaining that everything had to be determined
by Louis and the delay in communications between King and
Governor would prove the undoing of the French^.
By the end of 1511 Pandolfini had become so
pessimistic about France's chances of holding Milan in the
face of her combined enemies that in his frustration he
came to exaggerate the powerlessness of Nemours. Louis
never attempted to supervise every detail of policy, and
if Pandolfini soon came to the conclusion that it was
fruitless to raise a matter such as the Council of Pisa
with Foix, since it entirely depended upon the King's
57will-" , Florence was never to become so disillusioned as
to recall her permanent embassy from Foix's court. Other
allies of France also thought it worthwhile to make
representations to Gaston as well as Louis in affairs which
concerned them. Early in 1512 the Emperor Maximilian
asked his daughter in the Low Countries to send him a
gentleman who might act as his envoy to the Duke of
58
Nemours^ . Maximilian had dispatched a secretary to Milan
55. Ibid., p. 542.
56. Ibid., pp. 544-5.
57. Renaudet, opcit. p.515.
58. Correspondance de... Maximilien I et de Marguerite
d Autriche, ed. M. le Glay, S.H.F., vol. i (Paris,
1839), p. 493.
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in the summer of 1511 to solicit Foix for military aid^
and by March 1512 was still making representations to
Nemours through a variety of envoys^0. The Bentivogli
begged Foix to invade the Papal States^"1" whilst the Swiss
Diet communicated with Milan rather than Blois
However misplaced the hopes of these supplicants for a
direct and immediate response from Foix were, it was
obvious to them that not only was the latter the channel
through which royal policy in Italy was conducted, but
that the part played by Gaston himself in determining that
policy was real enough to merit attempts to influence
him.
39- B.N., Dupuy 262, fol. 69.
60. Le Glay, Negociations, i, p. 482 and Lettres de
Louis Xllj iii, pp. 186-7• The Imperial ambassador
to France, Andre de Burgo, even undertook a mission
to Milan in the winter of 1511-2, leaving his
secretary, Le Veau, at Blois. Subsequently Jean
Hauvart arrived as Maximilian's representative with
the French army - being presumably the man sent by
Margaret to her father in answer to his request.
Meanwhile Pandolfini was Florence's permanent envoy
to Milan throughout Foix's governorship, until he
was replaced in March 1512, although the Republic
made use of special agents as well - in September
1511, for example, Machiavelli had an interview
with Gaston in Milan, whilst on his way to the
French Court to try to persuade Louis to abandon
his plans for a general council of the Church at Pisa.
61. B.N., Dupuy 262, fol. 67.
62. Franco-Swiss diplomatic relations were resumed in
the new year and it is interesting that embassies
from both France and Gaston were dispatched to
Zurich, Kohler, op.cit., pieces justificatives,
p. 6l8.
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There was one area of policy where Louis XII
insisted upon maintaining tight, if not minute, control
and that was expenditure. Pandolfini wrote from Milan
in mid-September 1511, indicating the friction caused by
this issue: "Foix... intends to write to His Majesty,"
noted the envoy, "and to ask for authority to spend money
... as occasion daily demands. The King will certainly
not agree to this as he does not wish that a single ecu
of extraordinary expenditure be disbursed over here,
except by his own express advice and command." Pandolfini
had already reminded the French in Milan of the many
opportunities lost under Chaumont's rule, through the lack
of gubernatorial authority to spend freely - such
opportunities invariably vanished within ten or twelve
days, which was hardly long enough to have a reply from
the King on the appropriate matters. The French could
only agree with Pandolfini's conclusions^. Two weeks
after this dispatch Gaston himself revealed his nervousness
about spending money in a letter from Brescia to his
uncle: "Sire", he began, "if by chance La Palice is in
some trouble or Verona... comes under siege, all your
captains and I have decided that in such circumstances
63. Canestrini and Desjardins, op.cit., ii, pp. 53O-I.
The normal travel-time of letters between Lombardy
and Blois seems to have been about one week. It
was possible for a dispatch from Milan to reach a
town as near as Valence in two days however,
Lettres, iii, p. 5, but Louis XII spent most of the
period of Gaston's governorship in the north of
France.
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we will raise some infantry... But trust in me, Sire, that
if not greatly needed I shall not levy the troopsJ ." It
is interesting that Foix neglects to ask permission to
raise the foot but simply presents the King with a decision.
To deal with Louis XII over finance evidently encouraged
a bargaining mentality-; it was felt by those in Lombardy
that honest requests for money would bear meagre fruit.
As Pandolfini observed in late October 1511, Foix and his
captains had been discussing in council the requirements
for the defence of the duchy; finally it had been
decided to ask the King that 20,000 new footsoldiers be
raised and other extraordinary outgoings sanctioned, in
the knowledge that Louis would only agree to a given
proportion of whatever was demanded, on principle, so that
the more inflated the request the larger the eventual
grant^.
With the gathering Swiss menace of late 1511*
royal parsimony began to assume a new significance. For
a start, Nemours and his advisers were dissatisfied with
Louis' refusal to consider increased pensions for the
Swiss: "it seemed to them that the miserliness of the
King would be the wrong remedy for the Swiss malady and
they would have liked authority to raise new troops as
64. B.N., Dupuy 262, fol. 75.
65. Canestrini and Desjardins, op.clt., p. 541.
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need arose^". Even as late as the beginning of December,
with the enemy on the march, preparations for defence
were proceeding slowly since Foix was wary of spending
67
without licence . "I do not see that it will be
possible to quell this trouble without expending funds,"
lamented the Florentine ambassador, "and the King hates
expense^". In the end Gaston de Foix was able to do
little harm to the invader as he possessed insufficient
infantry.
Since the resolution of the Swiss crisis hinged
on the question of money, the matter was largely outside
Foix's control - he had to concur with royal decisions
despite his own, somewhat tardy, apprehensions, which did
in fact lead him to dispatch some funds to Switzerland
in appeasement attempts anyway^. But it was not only
in matters of expenditure that Foix waited upon his
master's sanction. He seems to have developed a fairly
clear notion of his permitted area of independent action -
in effect campaign tactics - and to have left the rest to
the King. Gaston de Foix was above all a soldier and
there is no indication that he resented Louis' total control
of diplomatic affairs and grand strategy. The Florentines
were frustrated in their attempts to convince Gaston of
the unsuitability of Pisa as a venue for a General Council
66. Ibid., loc ,cit..
67. Ibid., p. 5^3.
68. Ibid., p. 5^5*
69. Kohler, op.cit., p. 249.
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of the Church, against the desire of the King, as we have
seen; the reply which the Bentivogli had received to their
demand for a French offensive against the Papal states in
July 1511 had been a flat refusal, in accordance with
Louis' directive that papal territory was not to be
70
harmed' ; Gaston's response to the request of Maximilian's
envoys in Milan for the loan of French troops, made on the
1st. of March 1512, was perhaps typical: "... Nemours
replied that he had no brief from the King on the matter,
without whose order he dared try nothing; but he would
71
inform him ". Foix even waited upon Louis' decision in
as small a matter as the fate of prisoners, such as the
Venetian governor of Brescia, taken at the fall of the
72
city in February 1512' . This is not to say that Gaston
had no opinions of his own, that he was a mere cipher,
but simply that he knew his brief and was rarely tempted
to step out of bounds. Nor did this mean that the
interests of lieutenant-general and King never conflicted,
for the strict economy of the latter often appeared to
threaten the success of French arms, as we have seen in
70. B.N., Dupuy 262, fol. 67.
71. Le Glay, op.cit., p. 482.
72. Diarii, xiii, col. 524. It seems that Foix did not
wait for royal sanction in the case of another
prisoner, Avogadro, leader of the Brescian rebels -
he was promptly beheaded in the piazza, ibid., loc.
cit..
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reference to the Swiss crisis, for instance. In the
circumstances, Gaston de Foix's confidence in his ability
to defeat any and all of Louis' enemies in Italy, given
adequate manpower - a confidence evident in his corres¬
pondence and contrasting refreshingly with the hesitancy
and occasional panic displayed at home - is all the more
remarkable. Such confidence was no doubt strengthened by
the harmony which reigned in the French camp in Lombardy;
all sources agree that Gaston was scrupulous in taking
advice from his lieutenants and Jean Bouchet notes that
his success sprang in part from "... the counsel and wise
conduct of the veteran commanders who were with him^."
This modesty may well have done much to preclude any
outbreak of dissension in the high command, of the type
which disfigured Armagnac's campaign in Naples for example,
but perhaps more important was the social status of Foix
which was so high that he brooked no rival.
Nemours' powers in Italy were thus limited both
by Louis' insistence on taking all important decisions
(and many minor ones as well) and by royal control of the
purse. Furthermore Foix's autonomy was circumscribed
by his voluntary acceptance of guidance from captains and
counsellors. Moreover, the exercise of those powers
which were left to him was then impeded by more impersonal
factors, particularly civil disobedience and indiscipline
within his own army. The precarious nature of the French
hold on Milan was made plain during the Swiss scare in
73» Bouchet, op.cit., p. 461.
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December 1511 when the citizens obliged the retreating
French forces to remain outside the city walls and then
assumed command of the castle, according to Venetian
74
reports' . The French were in no mood to enforce their
authority as so many of them were contemplating flight,
knowing the savagery of the invader. The citizens'
action was one of self-defence rather than rebellion,
however; more ominous had been the alleged wish of some
of the inhabitants of Como to deliver their town to the
Swiss
Less predictable than civil disobedience - which
on the whole was confined to places under threat of
imminent conquest by the enemy - was disorder in the
ranks. There is no doubt that Gaston de Foix inspired
loyalty and affection amongst many of his troops, especially
his captains and gendarmes, but the perennial problem of
control of the infantry in particular could not simply be
swept aside by the mere reputation of the lieutenant-
general. In February 1512 the Venetian senate learnt with
glee that the landsknecht garrison of Verona had deserted
the town, owing to lack of pay; funds were quickly raised,
bringing the Germans back, but they then sacked the piazza
"... as was their wont^ ". Local levies could prove even
74. Diarii, xiii, cols. 334-5 and 345*
75. Le Glay, op.cit., p. 470.
76. Diarii, col. 46l.
34 o.
77
more alarmingly unreliable1', but the most disturbing aspect
of an army's behaviour was that, paradoxically, success
could lead to disintegration as surely as could defeat.
At Brescia, again in February, the French captains were
at first unable to temper the slaughter of the sack.
After the chaos had subsided Foix issued an order for the
restoration of some property, which had been indiscriminately
seized from friend as well as rebel, and this caused murmurs
r~j O
amongst the soldiery . The infantry of the day so
obviously lived for loot that a Venetian spy was prompted
to report in March that the French were planning to sack
Modena to encourage their footsoldiers to remain with the
79
army. Such thoughts would probably have been far from
Foix's mind after the experience of Brescia, where his
initial encouragement of the sack proved to be a serious
miscalculation which undermined his future campaign. The
Venetians heard that on the 5th. of March 1512, some two
weeks after the fall of Brescia, an order was issued that
all troops were to cross the Po, on pain of royal disgrace,
since Foix was aiming to march southwards; very many
French soldiers had gone to Milan, loaded with booty from
Oa
Brescia . It took Gaston a few weeks to reassemble
77. On one occasion Venetian troops captured some
Lombard footsoldiers, who put up no defence despite
being superbly armed, ibid., col. 464.
78. Ibid., cols. 517-8.
79. Ibid., vol. xiv, col. 13.
80. Ibid., xiv, col. 23.
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his forces after a conquest which proved also to be a
,, , 8lsetback
If the status of Foix and his kinship with the
King of France had little bearing on the behaviour of
the rank-and-file of his army, these factors were rather
more important in colouring his relations with his
captains. Whilst foreign diplomats might have concluded
that approaches to Foix in an attempt to influence French
policy were on the whole of little value, his subordinates
could no doubt expect more benefit from their pleas for
favour. Just as Foix was seen as the obvious intermediary
for diplomatic exchange with the French Court by Louis'
allies in the peninsula, so was he viewed as their crucial
advocate by supplicants of the King in the army of Italy.
No doubt Chaumont had performed such a function, but the
advent to command of Gaston de Foix, the favoured royal
nephew, must have come as a boon to captains across the
Alps in search of royal favour. It is interesting after
8l. The fact that Brescia would be sacked seems to
have been assumed on all sides. Foix himself saw
only two possible courses of action, immediate
surrender of the place or sack, B.N., n.a.fr. 7647,
fol. 237 vo.. The only order to pillage and kill
appears to have originated with the German captains,
but an eyewitness noted that Gaston did not demand
a halt to the sack until the day after Brescia's
capture, Letters and papers of the reign of Henry
VIII, ed. Brodie and Brewer, vol. i, pt. I, pp.
517-8. Foix no doubt felt that if he could not
obtain Brescia's prompt submission he would have to
hand the city over to his marauding trooos.
However, the French
had been incensed by Brescia's rebellion - the
Venetians had heard that they wanted to punish
the rebels, even by "killing their children in their
cribs", Diarii, xiii, col. 482.
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all that when Chaumont had sought some consideration for
himself he seems to have applied above all to Cardinal
d'Amboise or Robertet. Looking at the surviving letters
of Gaston de Foix to his uncle we can see him asking the
King to help expedite a process of law in the Milanese
82
senate on behalf of one supplicant , to grant captain
d'Aubigny permission to go on leave and to appoint a
relative of the same to the command of Milan castle, and
to find a place amongst the gentlemen of the household
for a brother-in-law of Louis d'Ars^. Later we find
Gaston recommending the employment of a kinsman of the
Marquis of Montferrat, and at the same time writing to
the King on behalf of the executors of the will of a dead
gendarme.
The Duke of Nemours may well have been pleased
to leave Milan in early January 1512. Although the Swiss
had retired and Gaston had stoutly resisted their demands
for possession of Lugano and Locarno, the path of enemy
retreat was marked by a trail of burnt-out villages, and
the French had done little to try and impede the
82. B.N., Dupuy 262, fol. 69.
83. Ibid., fol. 73.
84. Ibid., fol. 77. Maulde-la-Claviere suggests also
that in 1512 Foix asked the King to promote Roger de
Beam to the captaincy of the Montoison company,
Auton, vol. i, p. 40, n.1. Unfortunately no
indication of source is given for the assertion,
although it sounds plausible, even if the alleged
request was to remain unfulfilled.
3;+3.
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destruction . In short the Milanese were not satisfied
with the handling of the affair and were already antagonised
by the presence of the dissident Cardinals of the Council of
Pisa in their city - they had begged Foix to cancel the
proposed session of the Council for the 14th. of December
and move the proceedings to Turin or some other foreign
city before they were all excommunicated^. However,
Gaston left Milan, heading for Parma and leaving Trivulzio
in charge in the capital, to embark on the great campaign
of early 1512, upon which his renown as an outstanding
strategist rests. He was not to return, except for a
few days at the end of February. Since a full account of
the campaign has been admirably presented in English
Oiy
already , it would seem best to avoid lengthy repetition
and rather concentrate on some aspects of the war which
have perhaps not been sufficiently explored.
The same enemies as in the previous year were
assembled on the frontiers of Lombardy, but now they were
joined by a Spanish army which had reached Emilia from
Naples, and with the retreat of the Swiss this force
seemed most dangerous as it threatened Louis XIl's ally,
Bologna. The decision to march to Bologna was not an
immediate one. On the 13th. of January Foix wrote to the
85. Kohler, op.cit., pp. 273-9.
86. Diarii, xiii, col. 313.
87. Bridge, op.cit., vol. iv, pp. 121-59.
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King from Parma, explaining the advantage of Finale-Emilia
as a base of operations. He and his captains were agreed to
proceed there, whence Ferrara, Bologna and Verona were all
within easy reach should any one be threatened. Gaston was
waiting on events, for he was not even certain on the 13th.
OO
where the Spanish army was . By the 19th. of January Foix
was still only at Reggio-Emilia, having evidently abandoned
the original plan of a quick advance to Finale. But on this
day he received a plea from Lautrec - in garrison at Bologna
- for aid, since the Spaniards had imposed a tight siege.
Yet the army would not move precipitately, but would remain
at Reggio for some time to hear news of other fronts and
then advance to Finale. Foix was doubtful of his ability
to reinforce Bologna anyway since, according to his infor¬
mation, the city was encircled by the enemy^. Later in
the month Gaston was implored for help by the Bentivogli,
whilst he was at Finale, but the plea occasioned little
90
response^ . Foix had one eye continually on the Venetians,
hovering just east of Verona.
Whilst the French were thus cautiously waiting upon
developments, the Venetians acted with less circumspection.
At the time that Lautrec had petitioned Nemours the Signory
had heard that Bologna had fallen. The receipt of this
false news coincided with the advance of an army under Andrea
88. B.N., Dupuy 262, fol. 77.
89. Ibid., fol. 71.
90. Diarii, xiii, col. 430.
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Gritti from Vicenza westwards towards the Adige, and it was
not until the 21st. of January that Venice discovered that
her information was bogus - by which time Gritti was across
the river. It is possible that he would have advanced
anyway, even without false news of the fate of Bologna, for
the Venetians believed that the French would either remain in
Emilia or return to confront the Swiss, who were always
threatening to attack once more. Besides, Venetian confi¬
dence was high as it was known that Brescia was anxious to
expel her French garrison and that Bergamo was similarly
disaffected. When the Signory received news of the
completion by the French of a pontoon bridge over the Po at
Stellata, their concern became for the safety of Padua.
In fact the idea that Brescia, captured by Gritti on the 3rd
91
of February, was under threat did not occur to them. .
Meanwhile, on the night of the 4th. and 5th. of February
Gaston de Foix entered Bologna, which had been in danger of
capitulating; the entry was not only unseen but also
unnoticed at first by the Spaniards, who drew off from the
92
city the next day when they discovered the coup-^ . Sur¬
prisingly, the northern approaches to Bologna had been left
unguarded and the French had been able to enter at their
, Q"5
pleasure, despite Gaston s earlier reservations^ .
91. Ibid.,cols. 399, 400-1, 403 and 449.
92. Bridge, op.cit., p. 127.
93. Diarii, xiv, col. 176 (relation of the campaign by
Fabrizio Colonna).
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Upon hearing of the French entry into Bologna,
one prominent Venetian official was triumphant: surely Foix
would be penned in there, and the way was now open for the
q4
Republic to reoccupy Verona and Valeggio^ . In France
meanwhile all was consternation, especially after news of
the fall of Brescia - "... Milan was thought lost and all the
Frenchmen there^." Both the Venetians and the French
Court were however to be disabused of their respective hopes
and fears by an exceptional manoeuvre on Foix's part. Having
received a call for help from the French governor of Brescia,
still holding out in its castle, he quickly moved off with
the bulk of his army to cross the Po at Stellata, aiming to
relieve him. Venice soon heard of the advance, whereupon
the bridge over the Adige at Bonavigo was dismantled, to
prevent the French from moving on Padua^. Suddenly there
was news of the rout of a force under Baglioni, which had
escorted some guns to Brescia and was returning towards
Bonavigo, unaware that the bridge there no longer existed.
In fact Baglioni had been hit a glancing blow by the French
near Isola della Scala, but not been seriously hurt, for Gaston
had not expected to find him in his path. At last Venice
realised that Nemours was making for Lombardy. The next day
conversation in the city turned on the swiftness of the
French march northwards - they had covered seventy 'miles'
94. Ibid., xiii, col. 46l.
95. Lettres de Louis XII, iii, pp. 150 and 152.
96. Diaril, col. 467-
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in two days, fully armed, "... which was an incredible
97
thing . It took Gaston de Foix nine days to reach Brescia
from Bologna, and the Marquis of Mantua, across whose domains
the French army had quietly slipped, remarked later that no
force within memory of man had traversed those marshy
territories of his in the lower Po valley-^. Even so the
Venetian senate was confident that Brescia could hold out in
case of attack. Gritti was not so certain and wrote on the
15th. of February in some desperation, begging for reinforce¬
ments and gunpowder-^. His appeal was of no purpose, for
the same day Foix appeared beneath Brescia's walls and in a
short time the rebellious city was restored to French hands.
The victors boasted that they would soon be in Naples, perhaps
within as little as two months ^<~><"). But losses had been heavy
and one eyewitness remarked on the large trenches dug by the
French in the citadel to accommodate their dead, twenty to a
101
grave
The task which faced Gaston de Foix in March 1512
was summed up by Pandolfini in mid-month: Nemours was under
orders from Louis XII to find the papal-Spanish army, beat
it, occupy the Papal States and then head for Naples without
97. Ibid., cols. 472, 475, 475 and 474.
98. Bridge, op.cit., iv, pp. 129-30 and 136.
99. Diarii, xiii, col. 491.
100. Ibid., cols. 522 and 529*
101. Ibid., col. 518.
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delay, using all the forces at his command . It had
however taken the King some time to reach this bold decision,
for although the members of the Council of Pisa clamoured for
the immediate dispatch of Julius II, Louis himself was more
103
hesitant . Nemours was confident that Lombardy was secure,
following his victory at Brescia - he had heard that the
Spaniards were perhaps moving north to join the Venetians
but "... thought that news (of the loss of Brescia) would
lead them to change their plans;" as for the Venetians they
had no discipline without Spanish reinforcement, whilst
"he thought the latter would be beaten"1"0^." Any offensive
by the French would have to wait upon reinforcements
103
however . Foix spent the last week of February in Milan,
in expectation of the order to advance, and if he had not
yet received it by the time of his departure for Parma on
the 1st. of March it followed soon afterwards"1"0^. By the
8th. he had reached Reggio and was attempting to organise
107
the assembly of his army at Finale '. This army had
102. Cannestrini and Desjardins, op.cit., ii, pp. 576-7-
In effect Pandolfini became a spy for the Holy League,
since this information, passed from him back to
Florence, then found its way to Rome and thence to the
army of the League.
103. Renaudet, op.cit., p. 623.
104. B.N., n.a.fr. 7647, fols. 237 VO.-238.
105. Lettres, iii, p. 184.
106. Renaudet, op.cit., pp. 624 and 638; Le Glay,
Negociations, p. 482.
107. Lettres, pp. 196-7-
3^9.
moved south rather haphazardly to cross the Po at Casalmaggiore
and, as well as being scattered, was much diminished in size
through mass desertion following the sack of Brescia, quite
-| /°\Q
apart from casualties of war . Four thousand French
footsoldiers who had recently crossed the Alps were expected
in Emilia by the middle of the month however1^. During
much of March infantry reinforcements poured eastwards, by
road and river; a Venetian report of the l8th. noted that
Foix was searching for troops on all sides and predicted that
"... this time the French were either going to lose Italy and
their lives as well or else conquer the whole peninsula11*1".
Louis urged his nephew to finish the war quickly and, if we
are to believe Bayard's biographer, for a characteristic
reason - the heavy cost of maintaining a large body of
infantry'1'11. Reports on the state of the army of the Holy
League would have encouraged the offensive spirit of the
French had they heard them. Throughout the early months
of 1512 the Pope complained about the inactivity of the
Spanish forces. The army of the Viceroy of Naples was
112
racked with disease , and a correspondent in Rome wrote in
early March that everyone there believed that "... if the
French sought out the Spaniards the latter would flee like
108. Diarii, vol. xiv, cols. 13# 23 andl5«
109. Lettres, p. 196.
110. Diarii, xiv, col. 40.
111. Loyal serviteur, op.cit., p. 289,
112. Diarii, xiv, col. 7-
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whores. H3»
The opportunity to settle matters with the Holy
League on the battlefield did not arrive as speedily as the
French had hoped. This was for a number of reasons.
Firstly Foix was still faced with the problem of concentrating
] l 4his forces throughout most of March ; in addition weather
conditions impeded his advance - he managed to reach Finale
by the 16th. as planned, after a journey from Reggio through
driving rain, with "the horses up to their bards in mud," but
then floods marooned the army at Finale until the 22nd. of
115March . Lastly the enemy retired before the French
offensive into Romagna, from Budrio, near Bologna, towards
Imola and then Faenza. The injustice done to Spanish
morale by the malicious comment of Rome was revealed by the
good order of the retreat; the Spaniards had no fear of
battle - on their own terms; they were careful to avoid
any surprise whilst all the time they were extending and
attenuating Nemours' lines of supply. It was reported
that the Spanish army contained two-thirds of the men who
had fought at Cerignola nine years before, and that the
French side included many such veterans as well.
Remembering that defeat the French had no wish to assault
their enemy in a fortified position, manned by the only




Canestrini and Desjardins, op.cit., p. 57^.
Lettres de Louis XII, iii, p. 215.
Ibid., pp. 200 and 214.
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foot under Pedro Navarro11^. In the end, however, this
is exactly what they did, outside the papal city of Ravenna.
Foix could quite simply wait no longer for a decision by
early April: Louis had written to urge immediate combat
owing to his fear of another Swiss invasion"'"'1'^ whilst the
1 1 O
army itself was fast running out of food supplies
Ravenna seemed the obvious place to attack as it was the
enemy's major depot - even if it were not to yield quickly
the Viceroy would be obliged to advance to defend it.
The evenness of the battle of Ravenna on the 11th.
of April 1512 was reflected in the confused news which
reached Venice, for it was two or three days after first
hearing of the clash before the Signory discovered with
HQ
certainty who had gained the victory The army of the
Viceroy was routed after many hours of stubborn conflict,
overwhelmed by force of numbers. Technically Gaston de
Foix won the day, but the victory was worthless. The
116. Diarii, xiv, cols. 77 and 73. True to Spanish
tradition, these troops were disgruntled through
lack of pay and on the whole poorly endowed with
protective clothing, but well-equipped with firearms
and very combative, Torres, Sucesos de las ai'inas
de Espana en Italia, pp. 265 and 267•
117. B.N., Moreau 77^j P- 18.
118. Fleuranges notes how on the morning of the battle
of Ravenna, Gaston shared out his remaining rations
- a flask of wine and a loaf - amongst his captains,
op.cit., p. 215.
119. Diarii, xiv, cols. 95-105.
slaughter at Ravenna quite simply disembowelled the French
army of Italy and led directly to the expulsion of France
from Lombardy. It was reported after the battle that the
victorious army now only numbered ten thousand men, too
small a force to be able to capture much of the Romagna.
The castellan of Ravenna believed that "the French had had
such a hammering that it would be easy to put the enterprise
to rights." In Ferrara it was said that "... if the
Spaniards were defeated and had flown, the French were
120
smashed ." After a moment of panic in Rome, stability
returned when the extent of French losses was realised.
A handful of Romagnol towns opened their gates to advanced
parties of the army of the Council of Pisa, but few of
their castles fell. The forces of the Holy League soon
began to regroup, and according to one correspondent "...
121
nobody wanted the French any more" in Romagna . At Blois
there had been an agitated delay in recovering details of
the battle - it was optimistically thought that Foix and
his captains had been too concerned with consolidating
122
their success to have had time to write . But once the
true facts were known, and the implications of the heavy
losses digested, "... no-one in France was pleased with
the victory."'"2^"
Gaston de Foix himself died at Ravenna, cut
down in circumstances which remain unclear. The widely
120. Ibid., cols. 122, 130 and 140.
121. Ibid., cols. 124 and 135«
122. Le Glay, op.cit., p. 496.
123. Lettres, iii, p. 234.
canvassed view that, had Foix lived, the forces of Louis
XII would have marched on to capture Rome is at best
romantic. Louis had lost too great a proportion of his
infantry and the Emperor was soon to recall those land-
sknechts who had survived the slaughter. In the after¬
math of battle, however, the laments were for those of
noble blood who had fallen. Corpses dressed in cloaks
of silk and cloth-of-gold littered the field long after
the end of the engagement. Once again communal graves
were dug - this time in Ravenna, following its capture -
to take the dead "... with gold collars". According to
one eyewitness, the French themselves said they had lost
" "L ^ 2i
ten thousand men"and all the nobles "; naturally this
was an exaggeration but witness nevertheless to the despair
of the moment. However it was the loss of footsoldiers
which was crucial and, as it soon transpired, irreplaceable.
Gaston de Foix's heart was removed from the
125
corpse to be sent back to France . The body, in a
coffin dressed with gold brocade, made its way to Milan
under escort, in the manner of a Roman triumph. The tens
of captured enemy banners and the great sword of the
papal legate who had been with the Viceroy's army went
1 p/
before it, through Bologna and Reggio ^ . The treatment
124. Diarii, xlv, cols. 123, 143 and 156.
125. Ibid., col. 122.
126. Ibid., cols. 145-7.
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accorded the deceased was only appropriate to a man favoured
above all others by the King of France. The latter wrote
on the 20th. of April, in simple and touching terms, that
"... he had lost his nephew and other fine men, which was
a grievous thing to him and hard to bear...." Foix's
body was placed in the Duomo in Milan, but it did not rest
there long. When the Swiss took the city in the summer
of 1512 the coffin was smashed up and its covering of
cloth-of-gold found its way to Berne, where it was con¬
verted into clerical robes. As for the corpse it was
abused by Swiss troops, in full view of the French garrison
128
in the castle . Francis I was concerned to provide a
fitting memorial for Gaston when he retook Milan in 1515.
The body was transferred to the convent of Sta. Marta and
a superb sepulchre commissioned from the noted sculptor,
Agostino Busti. Daily, divine offices were instituted
for the dead man's soul12^. Busti's monument was never
completed however, since Francis ran out of money; its
finished pieces were ultimately sold off and scattered
throughout Europe, although the impressive effigy remains
1"50
in Milan, in the castle museum .
127. B.N., Moreau 774, p. 17. The Imperial envoy at
Blois thought that "it was impossible that the
King could have shown... more grief...," Le
Glay, op.cit., p. 497.
128. Kohler, op.cit., p. 389; Letters and papers, p.602.
129. A.N., J. 910, nos. 4-6.
130. G. Clausse, Les tombeaux de Gaston de Foix et de
la famille Birago (Paris, 1912), pp. 2b-35«
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Gaston de Foix was unquestionably a commander
of great ability, although even he was finally unable to
secure a victory over the Spaniards without great loss
- there can be after all no easy successes against powerful
enemies. However he remained little more than a commander,
for his influence on French policy in Italy appears to
have been negligible. No doubt Louis XII saw in Foix's
appointment the chance to establish his authority even
more firmly in Lombardy. Certainly there is no evidence
that Gaston ever disobeyed a royal order - on the contrary
he carried out his uncle's commands to the letter, even
unto death. In short, Gaston de Foix was a brilliant
casualty of events over which he had little control, and
this realisation has fostered his image as a tragic hero.
Had he lived longer he might have come to exercise greater
authority in political affairs, but as it stands Gaston's
career tells only of a faithful and able agent of Louis'
will. Tragic hero he may have been, but by no definition
was he a great man.
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APPENDIX
FOUR GASCON CAPTAINS OF THE ORDONNANCE
Gratien d'Aguerre
Gratien d'Aguerre, the third and youngest son of
Jean d'Aguerre, a Navarrese knight, was born at Aguerre de
Bustince (Pyrenees-Atlantiques) in the early 1440s. After
serving with his elder brother, Menaut, in the force sent by
Louis XI to help support the Catalan revolt against John II
of Aragon, from 1469* Gratien followed Menaut into the pay
of the Duke of Lorraine in 14731* The brothers distinguished
themselves in the service of Lorraine, whose dukes, according
to Monluc,"had always favoured the Gascon nation Menaut
and Gratien took a prominent part in Rene II's war with
Charles the Bold between 1475 and 1477* finally defending
3
Nancy against the Burgundians . Gratien was rewarded with
a number of lordships in Lorraine, and in 1478 he was married
4
to one Madeleine de Castres . The following year Louis XI,
ever appreciative of the qualities of a proven soldier,
recruited Gratien to French service, with the grant of a
1. Jaurgain, "profils basques, Menaud et Gratien d'Aguerre",
in Revue des Basses-Pyrenees, vol. iv, pp. 1-10 and 140.
2. Monluc, Commentaires, ed. Courteault, p. 804.
3. Jaurgain, op.cit., pp. 11-20.
4. Ibid., pp. 22-3.
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company of a hundred lances and the governorship of Mouzon
(Ardennes)^. In 1481, in line with his move westwards,
Gratien's property in Lorraine was exchanged for several
possessions in Champagne which were at the disposal of
Rene II, namely the baronies of Rumigny, Yvoi (Ardennes),
Aubenton, Martigny and Any (Aisne), and in 1483 Louis XI
ceded to him the revenues of Pardiac and Montlezun, part of
the confiscated estate of the late Duke of Nemours^. The
next year Gratien d'Aguerre called himself "chevalier,
seigneur de Rumigny, conseiller et chambellan du Roy," when
acknowledging the receipt of his royal pension of 1200 livres
tournois for 1484'. He continued to be based on the northern
frontier during the 1480s and early 1490s, serving not only
the King of France but also his old master, the Duke of
Lorraine. In about 1489 Gratien re-established himself in
the duchy when he acquired the lordship of Vienne-le-Ch&tel
O
(Meuse) . By 1491 his pension stood at 1800 livres and by
1494 at 2000^, although his compagnie d'ordonnance was now
only fifty lances strong.
It was this company that he led to Italy in 1494,
5. Ibid., p. 31.
6. Ibid., pp. 32 and 37-
7. B.N., Clair.3, no.66.
8. Jaurgain, op.cit., pp. 37-41; B.N., p.o. 13 (dossier
Aguerre), nos. 63, 87, 89 and 91.
9. B.N., p.o. 13, no. 8 and fr. 26104, no. 1005.
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when in November he landed at Nettuno, in the papal states,
as commander of the detachment designated to link up with the
Colonna. After participating in the stormy events in Naples
and Gaeta following the departure of Charles VIII in 1495,
Gratien spent most of the subsequent year in the Abruzzi,
of which he had been named governor"1"^. In the face of the
Aragonese counter-offensive Aguerre was obliged to retreat
to Gaeta in the latter part of 1496, but after the capitu¬
lation of this place he held up at Rocca Guglielma until the
cessation of hostilities in April 1497. By early 1498
Gratien was back in Prance, to resume his duties as governor
of Mouzon and guardian of the Champagne border. He was never
to return to Italy. In February 1500 he styled himself
"baron de Rumigny, seigneur d'Aubenton et Vienne""^. In
December 1501 Gratien led his company to a tourney at Blois,
held in honour of the Archduke of Austria, and in July 1506
took part in his last campaign, commanding his unit in the
12
force dispatched by Louis XII in aid of the Duke of Guelders
But by the 1500s Gratien drAguerre appears to have virtually
retired as a soldier. By 1517 his pension was down to 1000
livres and his company to thirty lances"1"^. He died in the
10. La Pilorgerie, Campagne et bulletins de la grande arm6e
d'Italie, pp. 86-7; Delaborde, L'expedition de Charles
VIII. p. 429; Commynes, Memoirs, ed. Kinser, vol. ii,
p. 506; Guicciardini, Storia d1Italia, ed. Panigada,
vol. i, p. 221; Jaurgain, op.clt.. pp. 51-8.
11. B.N., p.o. 15, no. 25.
12. Jaurgain, op.cit., pp. 136 and 140-1.
13. B.N., fr. 26115, no. 190 and 21510, no. 946.
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same year, probably in mid-April, and was buried at Vienne1^.
Gratien d'Aguerre produced at least four legitimate offspring
from his union with Madeleine de Castres, and was succeeded by
his second son, Jean. He also left behind him a considerable
reputation: Guicciardini calls him "a courageous and esteemed
captain", an anonymous historian of Charles VIII, "a most
renowned commander", and lastly Fleuranges',"a Spaniard (sic),
a veteran knight and very fine man^."
14. Ibid., loc.cit.; B.N., fr. 26115, no. 190; B.N.,
Clair. 3, no. 70; Jaurgain, op.cit., p. 145.
15. Guicciardini, op.cit., i, p. 145; B.N., fr. 17519#
fol. 162 vo.; Fleuranges, Histoire des choses
memorables, in Collection des memoires, ed5 Petitot,
vol. xvi, p. 154.
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Jean d'Astarac-Fontrailles
Jean d'Astarac was the son of Arnaud Guilhem
d'Astarac, seigneur de Fontrailles (Hautes-Pyrenees), and
Sebille d'Antin^". Unfortunately other details of his birth
and background remain unclear, and he makes his first
appearance in our sources only in 1499* when he led a band
of foot during the first Milanese campaign. In February
the following year we find him at the head of forty men-at-
2
arms operating near Vigevano and it is probable that by
this time he had assumed the lieutenancy of the company of
Yves d'Alegre. Certainly he held this post in July 1500,
when he was granted 200 ducats a year on confiscated goods
in Lombardy for his services . Fontrailles took part with
the Alegre company in the conquest of Naples in 1501 and
remained in the south, enjoying a pension of 300 livres on
4
the Neapolitan finances in 1502 . Early the next year he
acted as one of Bayard's seconds in his duel with the
5
Spanish giant, Sotomayor, in Apulia .
After the loss of Naples Fontrailles soon acquired
a company of his own, of thirty lances, which was normally
stationed in the Astisan during the middle years of Louis
XII's reign^. He led this company on the Bologna expedition
1. Anselme, vol. ii, p. 623.
2. Auton, vol. i, pp. 67-8 and 187-90.
3. Pelissier, Documents pour l'histoire de la domination
franqaise dans le Milanais*^ p3 36.
4. B.N., fr. 2930, fol. 17 vo„
5. Le loyal serviteur, Histoire de Bayard, ed. Roman, p.105.
6. B.N., fr. 7882, fols. 2, 83 vo. and 238; Auton, iv,p.3-62.
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of 1506 and the following year to the attack on rebellious
Genoa, when he also commanded a troop of 4000 infantry^.
Fontrailles missed the battle of Agnadello owing to his
capture by the Venetians in May I509 at TrevigUo, a town he
had been detailed to hold. He was imprisoned in the Palace
at Venice and not released until early in the following year.
Whilst a captive his company was raised to a strength of
Q
forty lances . From 1510 he is continually prominent on
campaign in Italy and he held command of sizeable formations
Q
of troops . Between 15IO and 1512 Fontrailles enjoyed a
pension of 1200 livres per annum on the Milanese treasury10.
After participating in the battle of Ravenna his company is
next mentioned as stationed in the castle of Milan in July
151211, but there is no certain evidence that Fontrailles
himself was here, nor indeed is there any further reference
to his unit being involved in the defence of the place. In
1513 Fontrailles was given command of all Louis XII's light
horse and ordered to Picardy, in face of the English threat
to the northern frontier. In August he successfully re-
12
supplied Therouanne . Soon afterwards his company was
lh
raised to a strength of fifty lances , but by 1515 it dis¬
appears from the''records and it seems probable that
Fontrailles himself was dead by about this date. He had
7. Ibid., pp. 70-1 and 198; Fleuranges, op.cit., p. 166.
8. H7HT, fr. 21507, no. 799-
9« Diaril, vol. x, cols. 5^8 and 846.
10. A.N., J. 910, nos. 1-2 bis.
11. Diarii, xiv, cols. 172-4; Letters and papers of the
reign of Henry VIII, ed. Brodie and Brewer, vol. 1,
pt. I, p. 598.
12 B.N., n.a.fr. 7648, fols. 34 and 38; M. du Bellay,
Memoires, ed. V-L. Bourilly and F. Vindry, S.H.F.,
vo. i 0~aris, 1908), pp. 29-32.
13. B.N., fr. 2928, fol. 10.
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married, at the instigation of Louis XII, a rich heiress,
Catherine de Marestang, daughter of the Baron of Castillon,
by whom he had his son and heir, Jacques11''. Fontrailles
was a favourite of the King, described by a Florentine envoy
in 1509 as "a man of quality and beloved of His Majesty1^."
The Venetians were delighted at his capture, calling him
"a man of great sort, on land and sea" and "better and more
esteemed than any other in the French army1^." He was
remembered for his popularity with Louis XII, his valiant
nature, and particularly for his command of the King's light
cavalry (mainly Albanians), to which he was appointed as
17
early as 1499* according to one authority
14. Anselme, ii, p. 623.
15. Canestrini and Desjardins, Negociations de la France
avec la Toscane, vol. ii, p~ J>16.
16. Diarii, viii, cols. 237 and 239.
17. BrantSme, Oeuvres completes, vol. iii, p. 132; Monluc,
op. cit., p3 601; L. Susane, Histoire de la cavalerie
frangaise, vol. i (Paris, l874"J3 jn 42.
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Roger, baron de Beam
Roger de Beam was born in about 1470, the
illegitimate son of Jean de Beam, seigneur de Gerderest
(Pyrenees-Atlantiques), executed by the Queen of Navarre in
1488, and grandson of Bernard, the bastard of Jean I, comte
de Foix"1". From an early age Roger entered the service of
his cousin, Jean de Foix-Narbonne: by 1491 he had become
bailli and captain of the latter's town of Etampes (a post
p
which he was to retain until almost the end of his life) ,
and a man-at-arms in the Foix company. However he also
maintained links with the land of his tirth, through posses¬
sion of the lordship of Labastide-Villefranche (Pyrenees-
Atlantiques) and other B^arnese territories, which his half-
brother, Bertrand, seigneur de Gerderest, had granted him
-z perhaps
by 1497 • It was/as a vassal of the sovereigns of Beam,
Kings of Navarre, that Roger attended the coronation of Jean
d'Albret and Catherine de Foix at Pamplona in 1494^. But
he was to make his career in French service and by 1497
had become lieutenant of the Foix company, when in April he
was stationed with the unit at Asti^. In 1499 he led the
1. Anselme, vol. iii, pp. 392-9;J B.N., Cabinet d'Hozier
32 (dossier Beam), p. 2; Antony and Courteault, Les
testaments des derniers rois de Navarre, p. 41, n .3;
Dictionnaire de biographie franqaise, vol. v.
2. G.R., no. 12364.
3. B.P., E. 326 and 547.
4. Catalogo del archivio general de Navarra, vol. 1, publ.
by F. Idoate (Pamplona, 1970), no. 1295•
5. Diarii, vol. i, col. 583*
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company during the first Milanese campaign, where the unit
distinguished itself at the siege of Alessandria^. By his
will of October 1500 Jean de Foix-Narbonne bequeathed to
Roger the lordship of Aspet (Haute-Garonne) or, failing this,
that of Auterive (Haute-Garonne)^. After Jean's death in
the following month Roger became the effective captain of
the Foix company, owing to the extreme youth of Jean's heir,
Gaston, and it appears that he enjoyed the captain's salary for
Q
the next nine years at least . The remainder of Roger's
career was to be dominated by service in Italy, although he
did hold administrative posts in France. He was vicomte
and receveur ordinaire of Orbec (Calvados) between 1498 and
1502 at least, although he had relinquished this office by
15069. In 1510 he became captain and governor of Maul6on-
Soule (Pyr6nees-Atlantiques), having first been lieutenant;
the viscounty of Soule, a French enclave in B6arn, had,it
seems, been held by Jean de Foix-Narbonne. Roger was to
retain this post from 1510 until his death, when it passed
to his brother, Menaut"^.
6. Auton, vol. i, pp. 40 and 59.
7. Boucher de Molandon, Le testament de Jean... de Foix,
p. 35.
8. B.N., p.o. 237 (dossier Beam), nos. 32-3*
9. G.R., nos. 12718 and 12797.
10. Ibid., nos. 13972-3 bis; B.N., fr. 26111, no. 937;
B.N., n.a. fr. 1462, no. 198; Jaurgain, "Les capitaines
chatelains de Mauleon, gouverneurs de la vicomt6 de
Soule", in Revue de Beam, Navarre et Lannes, vol. ii,
pp. 251-3.
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Roger de Beam's appetite for Italian adventure
is attested by Jean d'Auton's note that he was one of those
who hurried from Lyons to Mortara in early 1500 to take part
in the final battle with Sforza"1"'1'. In later 1503 he led the
Foix company to the Garigliano, where he distinguished him-
12
self in action before returning north the following January
By 1505 he had been made governor of Trezzo, a town a few
miles east of Milan"^; this was an office he would retain
for life, as long as the French held Lombardy. After
leading the Foix company on the Bologna expedition in 1506,
Roger next took part in the reduction of Genoa the following
14
year . After service during the Agnadello campaign, he
led part of the Foix company to the siege of Padua in later
15
1509 and indeed seems to have spent the next few years
campaigning in Italy almost continuously. By 1508-9 his
French pension stood at 600 livres tournois, a sum apparently
reduced to 500 livres by 1510, but in this year Roger also
enjoyed 1000 livres on the finances of Milan and would con¬
tinue to do so until 1^,12^. He was prominent at the battle
11. Auton, i, pp. 298-40.
12. Diarii, v, col. 786.
19. B.N., fr. 7882, fol. 190 vo..
14. Auton, iv, pp. 70-1 and 196-7.
15. Loyal serviteur, op.cit., p. 149.
16. B.N., fr. 29268, fol. 94 and A.N., J. 910, nos. 1-2 bis..
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of Ravenna and during the French retreat from Lombardy in
June 1512 he held up at Trezzo fortress, which he managed to
defend successfully until January 1513# before yielding to
superior force and retiring to France. Roger was soon back
in Italy, serving at the battle of Novara in June I513 at
the head of the one hundred lance-strong former Foix
company, which he had inherited on the death of Gaston de
17
Foix . After the retreat from Lombardy we find B6arn and
his company in the north later in the same year, and he took
part in the battle of the Spurs, where he was erroneously
18
reported killed . In September 1515 Roger led his company
against the Swiss at Marignano and was handsomely rewarded
by Francis I for his efforts, with both cash and the office
of seneschal of Valentinois-Diois^l in 1516 he still
enjoyed 1000 livres on the Milanese treasury and this had
been doubled by the following year, when in addition he
20
received a French pension of 1000 livres . By 1517 how-
21
ever his company had been reduced to fifty lances . Roger
de Beam died in early 1518# apparently in late January and
22
probably at Trezzo , and was succeeded by his bastard
brother, Menaut. He was a widely respected soldier,
described by Bayard's biographer as "an adventurous knight,
always ready for the skirmish," and by Fleuranges as "a kind
companion2^."
17. B.N., Clair. 2, p. 8 bis..
18. Le Bellay, op.cit., i, pp. 29-32; Diarii, xvii, cols. 32-3»
19. B.N., n.a.fr. 8616, no. 6; B.N., fr. 21509# no. 901; B.
N., Clair. 120, no. 43.
20. A.N., J. 910, nos. 4-5.
21. B.N., p.o. 237, no. 17-
22. B.N., fr. 21510, no. 961; B.N.,Clair.182, no. 112 and
Clair.244, no. 801; Diarii, xxv, col. 209.
23. Loyal serviteur, op.cit., p. 306 and Fleuranges,
op.cit., p. 166.
Jean de Durfort-Duras
Jean de Durfort was probably born in about 1460,
In England, the son of Gailhard IV, seigneur de Duras (Lot-
et-Garonne), Blanquefort and Villandraut (Glronde), and of
Anne of Suffolk, daughter of the Duke of Suffolk. The house
of Duras was one of the most illustrious of those of the
Bordelais and Agenals, but Gailhard, latterly a partisan of
the English in Guienne, had been exiled from France in 1453
and deprived of his French possessions. Afterwards he
distinguished himself in English and later Burgundian service
but he had to wait until 1476 before he was reinstated in his
former territories by Louis XI1. In December 1478 Gailhard
married his son, Jean, to Jeanne Angevin, grand-daughter of
a former notary from Bordeaux, Bernard Angevin, and heiress
of Jacques Angevin, seigneur de Rauzan, Civrac and Pujols
(Gironde). Jeanne brought for her dowry Thil, Tiran and
Bussac (Gironde) and the marriage helped to bolster the
2
finances of the Duras family . Jean succeeded to the Duras
inheritance upon the death of his father in 1487 and by 1489
was in receipt of a royal pension of 800 livres tournois.
By this date also he styled himself "seigneur de Duras,
chevalier, conseiller et chambellan du Roy^." In January
1. Anselme, vol. v, pp. 733-4; Favre, Precis historique
sur la familie de Durfort-Duras, pp. 49-50; B.N.,
dossiers bleus 244 (dossier Durfort), fols. 104-5;
Boutruche, La crise d'une societe, seigneurs et paysans
du Bordelais pendant la guerre de Cent ans, pp. 357 and
414-5. '
2. Anselme, p. 734; B.N., dossiers bleus 244, fol. 70;
Boutruche, op.cit., pp. 357 and 374; Boutruche, Une
societe provinciale en lutte contre le regime feodal,
p. 104.
3. B.N., p.o. 1043 (dossier Durfort), no. 45.
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1494 Jean attended the coronation of the, Kings of Navarre
4
at Pamplona .
It is claimed that soon afterwards Duras took part
in Charles VIIl's expedition to Naples and that in 1499 he
was involved in the conquest of Lombardy-^, but contemporary
reference to his participation in these early campaigns
appears to be wanting. His career during this period is
not entirely unknown to us, however, since in late 1497
Duras appears as an ambassador to England - a role for which
his background made him particularly suited of course - and
he was described by a Venetian envoy in London as "a man of
considerable standing^." In July 1502 Duras formed part of
the escort of Anne de Foix, Queen of Hungary, when she tra¬
velled through Lombardy to Venice on her way to assume her
7
crown'. Soon afterwards Duras became lieutenant of the
Albret company, which he led to the Garigllano in later
O
1509, before returning to Genoa in January 1504 . Later he
led this unit on the expedition to Bologna in 1506 and to the
attack on Genoa the following year, although in April 1507
4. Catalogo del archivio general de Navarra, vol. 1, no. 1295•
5. Anselme, loc.cit.; Favre, op.clt., p. 50; B.N. dossiers
bleus 244, fol. 105 vo.; B.N., cabinet d'Hozier 125
(dossiers Durfort), fol. 51.
6. Diarii, vol. i, col. 826.
7. Auton, vol. ii, p. 245.
8. B. Senerega, De rebus genuensibus commentaria, ed.
E. Pandiani, in L.A. Muratori, Rerum italicarum
scriptores, vol. xxiv, pt. 8, p. 94, n.3; Diarii,
v, col. 786.
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he had also been commissioned to levy troops in Switzerland
Q
for the same operation^. By 1509 Duras was captain of the
former Albret company"1'® and he probably led the unit to the
battle of Agnadello. Some little time later he was appointed
governor of Crema in Lombardy. By the year 1510 Duras
enjoyed a pension of 2000 livres on the Milanese treasury
(as well as J>00 livres in France), a gratuity which he would
11
retain until 1512 . As is suggested by his large Milanese
pension, Duras was based in Lombardy during these years and
he finally sustained a siege at Crema in the summer of 1512,
yielding the place to the Venetians in September and retrea¬
ting to France. He was described by a Venetian official at
12
this time as about 55 years old and "a man of great sort ."
In 1513 Duras married again, Jeanne Angevin having died
sometime before 1504: his second wife was Catherine de Foix,
widow of the lord of Montbardon and daughter of Corbeyran II
de Foix, seigneur de Rabat"1"^. By 1514 Duras enjoyed a
pension of 2000 livres and in the following year he again
14
undertook a diplomatic mission to England . He probably
led his company to the reconquest of Milan later in the year.
By 1517 his compagnie d'ordonnance had been reduced from
9. Auton, iv, pp. 71* l6l and 157•
10. B.N., Clair. 158, no. 80.
11. A.N., J. 910, nos. 1-2 bis..
12. Dlarii, xv, col. 85.
15. Anselme, v, pp. 73^-5.
14. B.N., Clair. 2, p. 153; Canestrini and Desjardins,
Negociations diplomatiques, vol. ii, p. 694.
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fifty to thirty lances1^. He died in 1520, was buried at
Duras, and was succeeded by his second son, Francois, one of
"1 f\
some eight children of Jean's marriage with Jeanne Angevin .
15. B.N., n.a.fr. l48l, no.73-
16. Anselme, p. 73^* B.N., dossiers bleus 244, fol. 71*
Favre, op.cit., p. 53; Lauzun, "Le chateau de Duras",
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